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This dissertation examines how congressional deliberation over the constitutionality of 
a use of force affects the war power relationship between the president and Congress. 
In particular, it presents empirical data on whether and how Congress exerts its 
attempts to control presidential war power through deliberation, on the limits of 
congressional ability to regulate a war, on historical patterns of the presidential 
unilateral use of force, and on the institutional conditions for good congressional 
deliberation. My main argument is that congressional deliberation over the 
constitutionality of a use of force is a primary influence on Congress’s ability to exert 
its will through the passage of legislation to check the president’s use of force.  
I focus on congressional floor debates recorded in the Congressional Record 
(1989-2009) over different use of force events occurring from 1989 to 2003. These 
incidents are collected from the Correlates of War Project Dataset. I cluster 229 
congressional deliberations on the constitutionality of the use of force and bills thereof 
into 14 military events according to the war timeline depicted by the Correlates of War 
Project Dataset.  
In response to the main research question, I present three empirical models. 
The first empirical model demonstrates that a higher level of congressional 
deliberation over a use of force influences Congress to impose a higher level of 
control over presidential war power. The second model demonstrates that as long as 
Congress imposes control over a military deployment, the president systematically 
resists that control.  
Although the second model demonstrates that congressional attempts to check 
presidential war power cannot prevent the president from taking unilateral military 
action, I argue that this result suggests that it is even more important for Congress to 
have better deliberation and to try to impose a check on the president, which can 
create an unequivocal legal and political accountability for the president.  
Therefore, I present the third empirical model to demonstrate that 
congressional rule-setting, including referral of a bill to committee, an adoption of 
open-rule floor debate, and deliberation over a non-annual budget bill, is the primary 
factor determining the quality of congressional deliberation.  
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CHAPTER 1: 
INTRODUCTION:  
THE VIETNAM WAR AND THE DELIBERATIVE TURN IN WAR POWERS 
This is a dissertation about how congressional deliberation over constitutionality of a 
use of force affects the war power relationship between the president and Congress. In 
particular, this dissertation will present empirical data on whether and how Congress 
and exert its attempt of control over presidential war power through deliberation, on 
the limits of congressional ability to regulate a war, on historical pattern of 
presidential unilateral use of force, and on the institutional conditions for a good 
congressional deliberation. My main argument is that congressional deliberation over 
the constitutionality of a use of force is a primary factor that influences Congress’s 
ability to exert its will through the passage of legislation to check the president’s use 
of force. In this introduction, I will (1) explain that the fundamental research 
motivation of this dissertation is a response to what I would call the “deliberative turn” 
in war power in the United States after the end of the Vietnam War, (2) employ as my 
research approach democratic deliberation theory to supplement to the conventional 
rational choice theory, and (3) present an overview of each chapter at the end of this 
introduction.  
On November 26, 1963, the White House issued a national security action 
memorandum to several executive offices, including those of the Secretary of State 
and the Secretary of Defense, outlining ten guidelines regarding the United States’s 
South Vietnam policy.1 Paragraph 5 of that memorandum included the assertion that 
“[w]e should concentrate on our own efforts….on the critical situation in the Mekong 
                                                 
1 National Security Action Memorandum No. 273 (11/26/1963) (Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and 
Museum) http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/  
2 
Delta. This concentration should include not only military but political, economic, 
social, educational and informational effort.”2 In early February, 1964,  Walt Rostow, 
then head of the State Department’s policy planning staff, suggested that President 
Johnson campaign for a legislative resolution that could be endorsed by a bipartisan 
group of congressional members. Rostow suggested that this could give Johnson a free 
hand to conduct the war in Southeast Asia and relieve his impending campaign from 
some major concerns regarding this issue.3   
In late May 1964, William Bundy, then acting Assistant Secretary of Defense, 
completed a rough draft of a resolution giving Johnson the power to commit U.S. 
forces to the defense of any nation in Southeast Asia.4A U.S. Navy ship war attacked 
in the Gulf of Tonkin on August 3, 1964. On August 5, Congress began debte on the 
matter, on August 7 it passed the Tonkin Golf Resolution which authorized the 
President to take “all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces 
of the United States….and to assist any member or protocol state of SEATO 
requesting assistance in defense of its freedom.”5 In addition to authorizing the 
president to use all the necessary means at his disposal as Commander-in-Chief, 
Congress also gave the president a blank check regarding the amount of budget he 
could use in executing the following war.6  
Various critique and review were come up with in the public regarding 
congressional reckless judgment on the adoption of Tokin Gulf Resolution. In his 
memoirs, Robert McNamara, then Secretary of Defense, wrote that on of the problems 
                                                 
2 See STANLEY KARNOW, VIETNAM: A HISTORY 373 (1991).  
3 Id.  
4 Id., at 376.  
5 78 Stat. 384 (1964) 
6 See LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER 116 (2003).  
3 
inherent in the adoption of the Resolution were that “Congress did not grasp the war’s 
potential and how the administration would respond in the face of it.”7 A report made 
by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1967 stated that “Congress committed 
the error of making a personal judgment as to how President Johnson would 
implement the resolution when it had a responsibility to make an institutional 
judgment….[a]nd as to whether, under the Constitution, Congress had the right to 
grant or concede the authority in question.”8  
John Hart Ely criticized Congress, saying that in the process of adopting the 
Resolution, and actually since the 1950s,9 it did not shoulder its constitutional 
responsibility to make a deliberative judgment collectively, but merely authorized the 
president to decide matters of war as an individual.10 He also proposed that a 
constitutional war authorized by Congress should be predicated on a sound judgment 
contributed by legislators and consisting of three due elements.11 First, any legislative 
process pertaining to the authorization of the use of force should follow a due 
deliberative process. Second, any initiation of war, and the subsequent conduct of war, 
should comply with the guidance of congressional authorization made through the 
aforementioned process. Third, the court should also play some kind of role to ensure 
that Congress performs a profound political and legal judgment in order to maintain a 
constitutional act of war carried out by the president.  
                                                 
7 ROBERT S. MCNAMARA, IN RETROSPECT 141 (1995).  
8 Senate Report 90-797 at 21-22 (1967)  
9 See JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY 50-52 (1993).  
10 Id., at 47. (arguing that what is at stake is the judgment that no single individual should be able to 
take the nation into war [emphasis added]). 
11 Id., at 47-60.  
4 
McNamara’s reflection, the Senate’s report, and Ely’s arguments, in fact, all 
reflect the lessons that the American public  learned in the wake of the Vietnam War, 
and also shed new light on some old debates on war powers. That is, to duly control 
presidential war power, members of Congress should see themselves serve collectively 
as a gatekeeper through a soundly deliberative process. This is a historical lesson 
acquired from the Vietnam War as a “deliberative turn” in war powers.  
A deliberative turn, by definition, does not solely indicate how Congress would 
place checks on the presidential war powers via the legislative process. Rather, it is a 
general concept that reflects the discourse held in the public sphere,12 which is to say 
that the decision should be generated from a rational, well informed, and inclusive 
process.13 Because deliberation exists not only in political institutions but also within 
social interactions in the broader public sphere  deliberative turn actually is a plural 
project which simultaneously proceeds in various domains to which it applies.14 
Among these different projects, since Congress, as Jürgen Habermas suggests, is the 
“nexus of public sphere,”15 rightly became one of the particular renovations target in 
this deliberative turn in war power. .  
Congress itself reviewed the decision-making process underlying the 
authorization of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution. As the Senate’s report indicates, the 
failures to identify the intention of the president and to make a responsible institutional 
judgment illumine responsibilities that Congress failed to meet. As the national 
                                                 
12 See JOHN DRYZEK, DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND BEYOND: LIBERALS, CRITICS, CONTESTATION 
(2000) 
13 See JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS 287-328 (1996); also BRUCE ACKERMANN & 
JOHN FISHKIN, DELIBERATION DAY (2004); SIMONE CHAMBERS, REASONABLE DEMOCRACY (1996); 
JOHN ELSTER ED., DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY (1998); DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT (1996).  
14 See Simone Chambers, Deliberative Democratic Theory, 6 ANNUAL REVIEW OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 
307 (2003).  
15 See JÜRGEN HABERMAS, supra note 14, at 168-93.  
5 
security action memorandum mentioned at the outset of this section demonstrates, 
President Johnson had already set on the idea of expanding the interference in 
Vietnam affairs. Had Congress performed a solid deliberation, would it have perceived 
that President Johnson was inclined to bring this nation into a full-fledged war, 
probably as early as 1963? Or, what if Congress had paid more attention to the 
resolution’s sections that provided that “the President, as Commander in Chief, [could] 
take all necessary measures to repel any attack against the forces of the United States.” 
Given a better reflection on the sweeping authorization language of the Resolution, 
would Senator Fulbright still have stated that his belief that the Resolution was “an 
accurate reflection of what I believe is the President’s policy, judging from his own 
statements.”16?   
Judge Richard Posner answers “no” to these questions. He opines that “the 
opposition to the war in Vietnam…. [was] the product of moral and political 
entrepreneurs tapping into wells of discontent among minorities and eventually getting 
the attention of the politicians,” and that the advocates of deliberative democracy have 
“a desire to change specific political outcomes” whose “secret agenda” is to campaign 
for a more aggressive judicial review.17 Posner suggests, on the one hand, that 
Congress is an impasse-prone institution that  cannot be relied upon to pursue a 
comprehensive debate unless minorities’ voices are brought up successfully in the 
political process. On the other hand, deliberative democracy itself is not a means to 
generate a better political outcome, but is rather an alternative strategic route for some 
people to control their political agendas through judicial review.  
                                                 
16 110 Cong. Rec. 18, 459 (1964) 
17 See Richard Posner, Smooth Sailing, 1 LEGAL AFFAIRS (2004) 
(http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/January-February-2004/feature_posner_janfeb04.msp)  
6 
Posner’s challenge to the advocates of deliberative turn in war power raises 
various general questions regarding the underlying theory of deliberative democracy, 
the relationship between Congress and citizens, and most importantly the relationship 
between congressional deliberation and presidential war power: Does an advocacy for 
a more deliberative law-making process in the consideration of war and foreign affair 
issues only strategically arise when a minority  could not gain a majority vote in 
Congress, or does such an advocate of deliberative democracy suggest a more 
interconnected dialogue among Congress, our systems of government, and the citizens 
in broader public sphere? Does Congress only deliberate passively to respond to a 
discontented opinion in the broader public sphere, or does Congress also actively and 
independently deliberate war and foreign affair issues? Is the premise underlying the 
theory of democratic deliberation that better deliberation can generate greater 
congressional control over presidential war power? And finally, if we want to ensure a 
more profound deliberation over war power within the legislative process, do the 
courts have any legitimate authority by which to facilitate a more deliberative 
legislative process?  
In addressing these questions, this dissertation argues that a synthesis of 
deliberative democratic theory and rational choice theory can provide a more complete 
understanding of congressional deliberation because it can shed light upon whether 
and how congressional members independently deliberate, and how Congress interacts 
with the citizens in the broader public sphere over the policy of war-making matters. 
By focusing on the congressional deliberation over the constitutionality of a current or 
a possible presidential proposed use of force, I argue that to protect institutional 
authority from being encroached by presidential unilateral action, Congress itself has 
an independent motivation to deliberate over the constitutionality of a use of force, 
regardless of the impact that citizens in the public sphere may have . I do not suggest 
7 
that congressional members routinely consider constitutional issues regarding war and 
foreign affair matters, or that the so-called “electoral connection”18 between 
congressional members and constituency do not exist. Rather, my primary objective is 
to show that we should not lose sight of the fact that as an independent and collective 
body, congressional institution is the most important factor influencing congressional 
members’ deliberation over the constitutionality of a use of force in the legislative 
process. This is so because Congress both can impose a check on presidential war 
power through the passage or rejection of legislation and can create a more 
unequivocal legal and political accountability for the president.  
To test this argument, I adopt a mixed quantitative and qualitative approach in 
order to analyze the relationship among congressional deliberation, congressional 
check on a use of force, and presidential decision on a use of force. In the chapters that 
follow, I pose four main research questions. First, is a “good” constitutional 
deliberation over a possible or current use of force in Congress more likely to impose 
a check on presidential use of force?  Second, is this more likely to prevent the 
president from taking a unilateral use of force? Third, if either or both of these 
questions can be empirically confirmed, what kind of congressional law-making rule 
and political factors influence the quality of congressional deliberation? Lastly, what 
kinds of implications do those empirical analyses have on the canon of constitutional 
interpretation of war power and policy reform?  
In response to these research questions, I propose three hypotheses for 
empirical analyses. First, if Congress has a higher level of deliberation over the 
constitutionality of a current or possible presidential use of force, then it is more likely 
to impose a higher level check on the president through the passage or rejection of 
legislation. Second, if Congress has a higher level of constitutional deliberation over 
                                                 
18 See DAVID MAYHEW, THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION (1974).  
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the use of force and imposes a higher level of check on the president, then it is more 
likely to prevent the president from initiating a war unilaterally. Third, if 
congressional rule-setting is more information facilitative (e.g.  its members refer a 
bill to committee) and participation inclusive (e.g. no restriction on amendment 
proposal), then Congress is more likely to have a higher level of war deliberation, 
regardless of the impact of non-congressional rule setting (political factors) such as 
presidential approval rating, election year, divided government, and the percentage of 
congressional members from the president’s party.  
I think an exploration of the these questions and hypotheses is natural because 
the ambiguous allocation of war power provided in the Constitution needs the 
president and Congress to cooperate and form contents of war-making and foreign 
affair policy of each event through their interaction. But since the general Commander 
in Chief Clause is often cited by the president as justification for his independent 
power to initiate a use of force, the public often expects Congress to act, react, and 
check the unilateral presidential use of force. Among the various tools at congressional 
disposal, law is still the most primary mechanism through which Congress can impose 
a check on the president and also place the president under a greater political 
accountability.  
The sources of empirical research methodology and data for my empirical 
analyses are diverse. I focus on congressional floor debates recorded in Congressional 
Record (1989-2008) over different use of force events occurring from 1989 to 2003. 
To flesh out different military events occurring during this period, I collect date from 
the Correlates of War Project Dataset, and then cluster 229 congressional deliberations 
over the constitutionality of use of force and bills thereof into 14 military events 
according to the war timeline depicted by the Correlates of War Project Dataset. With 
regard to the qualitative measure of the quality of congressional floor debates, I 
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employ the Discourse Quality Index developed by Jürg Steiner et al. to code each 
congressional member’s quality of a constitutional justification.  
Additionally, to code the level of congressional control over the president 
through the passage or rejection of legislation, I develop a congressional control index: 
substantive and ex ante control denote a higher level of control, whereas procedural 
control and ex post denote a lower level of control. This congressional control index is 
the most important variable of my empirical models as it allows me  to make a 
supplement to conventional empirical research on the presidential war power. In 
particular, conventional strategic research on presidential power focuses on whether 
and why Congress can prolong a possible initiation of force by the president through 
voting. But from a legal perspective, I argue that what Congress says in its collective 
decision is vital because presidential action is controlled by law but not voting itself. 
Therefore, the congressional control index is designed in order to code the contents of 
a law or rejection of a law.  
In Chapter 2, “Reason, Congressional Deliberation and War Power 
Constitution,” I demonstrate that the Founders argued that in order to control 
presidential war and foreign affair powers, Congress should exercise with due 
deliberation in order to make a cool-headed decision for a just cause for a war. 
However, since the Founders did not provide a clear defined version on the principles 
of democratic deliberation and the conditions for “good” congressional deliberation, I 
further identity three elements of contemporary democratic deliberation: constitutional 
publicity, reciprocal political action, and universal discourse principle. These three 
elements of modern deliberative democracy theory are the theoretical root of the 
criteria that constitute not only high deliberative quality but also a greater 
congressional check on the president. Moreover, I will illustrate the calls for empirical 
investigation on congressional deliberation and its relationship with presidential war 
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power is mandated by the principle of deliberative politics itself and a response to the 
critiques on democratic deliberation.  
Although deliberative theorists have comprehensively and normatively shown 
why democratic deliberation can result in better public policy, there are also many 
vocal calls for empirical investigation to supplement to normative arguments. Chapter 
3, “Groundwork for Empirical Research on War Power,” is a research design for 
the three main empirical hypotheses and underlying theories thereof mentioned above 
to respond to such empirical research demand. Several important preparations for 
empirical analyses will be illustrated in this chapter. First, I suggest that the “event-
count model” employed by conventional research on presidential war power is 
incomplete on the grounds that it cannot inform us how Congress attempts to provide 
a check on the president through legal regulation. Second, I indicate that as of now, 
there is no mixed qualitative and quantitative research on the relationship between 
U.S. congressional deliberation and the separation of powers, which has rightly 
become one of this dissertation’s research motivations. Third, the key elements of two 
important qualitative variables, Discourse Quality Index and congressional control 
index, will be fully explained in this chapter. Fourth, the underlying theories of three 
hypotheses I mentioned above will be elaborated in this chapter. Lastly, all of the 
variables included in the models for empirical analyses, the sources from which I 
collect the data of each variable, and their relationship with deliberative democracy 
theory will also be briefly explicated in this chapter.  
Chapter 4, “Congressional Deliberation, Presidential War Power and Ideal 
Congressional Deliberation Situation,” presents the empirical results of the 
relationships between congressional deliberation and congressional legal control over 
the president, between congressional deliberation and decision thereof and presidential 
decision on taking unilateral use of force, and between congressional rules and the 
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quality of congressional deliberation. Three models will be presented in this chapter 
according to the hypotheses mentioned above. First, the empirical model demonstrates 
that a higher level of congressional deliberation over a use of force does influence 
Congress to attempt to impose a higher level of control over presidential war power. 
Second, the empirical model demonstrates that as long as Congress attempts to impose 
a control over a military deployment, the president systematically tries to resist that 
control by taking unilateral military action. Although a congressional attempt to place 
a check on presidential war power cannot prevent the president from taking unilateral 
military action, I argue that this result suggests that it is even more important for 
Congress to have a better deliberation and try its best to impose a check on the 
president, because this can create a unequivocal legal and political accountability for 
the president. Third, the empirical model demonstrates that congressional rule-setting 
is the most primary factor that determines the level of congressional deliberation. The 
model demonstrates that referral of a bill to committee, adoption of open-rule, and 
invocation of cloture together statistically generate a higher level of congressional 
deliberation.  
Chapter 5, “A Deliberative-Oriented Approach for War Power 
Constitution,” presents the implications of the empirical results of congressional war 
power deliberation on constitutional interpretation of war power. What I want to 
emphasize is that though I reinterpret the contents of war power basing on the 
empirical evidences, these empirical evidences just serve as a minimum supplement to 
and reflection on the war power constitutional interpretation as a whole. I do not intent 
to argue that empirical analyses are absolute truth. As for the particular implications 
and reflections in this chapter, I will examine three legal issues often raised in the war 
power area in the light of the empirical evidences demonstrated in chapter 4: the 
procedural and substantive function of Declare War Clause, the form of congressional 
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war authorization and customary presidential war power, and justiciability and 
political question doctrine in war power litigation. My overall argument is that 
interpretation of the allocation of war power should be in accordance with procedural 
and substantive due law-deliberation and law-making processes on the grounds that 
the main function of Declare War Clause is a mandate for greater constitutional 
publicity. But in order to realize a truly deliberative war power Constitution and a 
more accountable government, certain congressional rule reforms are needed.  
Chapter 6, “Conclusion,” provides an overview of the arguments and 
empirical analyses of this dissertation. I will emphasize the central thesis of my 
argument, which may be stated here. In order to promote a more politically 
accountable government and more balanced war policy making, we should establish a 
more democratic, deliberation-oriented congressional rule, thus creating both a more 
ideal speech situation for congressional deliberation and broader public sphere as a 
whole on the constitutionality of a war.  
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CHAPTER 2: 
REASON, CONGRESSIONAL DELIBERATION, AND WAR POWER 
CONSTITUTION 
As I demonstrated in the previous chapter, after the end of Vietnam War, the public 
sphere as a whole, including Congress itself, believes that members of Congress 
should have played a more robust role to collectively make a more reasoned and well-
informed judgment on the authorization for Vietnam War. This “deliberative turn” in 
war power, as I will illustrate below, is actually a revival of a concept that I call 
“control over the presidential war power through congressional deliberation,” which 
can be traced back to the very beginning of the American republic and was advocated 
by the Founders. However, though the Founders emphasized the importance of 
checking presidential war power through due congressional deliberation over a just 
cause for a war, they did not provide us with a clear legacy that delineates what the 
conditions of good congressional deliberation and contents of “deliberative” war 
power relationship between the political branches are. In order to provide an answer 
for this question regarding the principles of good congressional deliberation, I will 
identify in this chapter three elements for the conditions of a “good” deliberation as 
illuminated by modern deliberative democracy theory: (1) constitutional public reason, 
(2) reciprocal political action, and (3) universal discourse principle. These three 
elements will serve as the theoretical root not only of the criteria for what constitutes a 
good deliberation but also for what constitutes a balanced war power relationship 
between the president and Congress. 
In the following sections, I will (1) illustrate the original understanding of the 
Founders’ expectation of control over presidential war power through congressional 
deliberation, (2) explicate the contents of three elements of “good” deliberation and 
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the meaning of reasoned and balanced war power from the perspective of modern 
deliberative democracy theory, and (3) describe the demands for empirical 
investigation of the relationship between congressional deliberation and presidential 
war power. 
I. The Founders’ Expectation: Control over Presidential War Power through 
Congressional Deliberation 
To explore the original understanding of the Founders’ advocacy of congressional 
control over presidential war power through deliberation, I focus on the Founders’ 
historical interpretations of Declare War Clause. In general, I found that the Founders 
stressed, consistent with the central tenet of checks and balances, that the power to 
declare war is a concurrent and mixed power that mandates the president and Congress 
to deliberate over the just cause of a war and the appropriate content of such shared 
power. 
During discussion in the Philadelphia Convention over the meaning of the 
current Declare War Clause, as constitutional historians know, the Clause was 
changed from as statement that Congress has power to “make” war to a statement that 
Congress has power to “declare” war. The reason for this change is this: although the 
president cannot commence a war, he is better qualified than Congress to repel sudden 
attacks, conduct a war, and negotiate peace.1 Therefore, during the Convention, Mr. 
Butler stated that the function of Declare War Clause is to ensure that a war will be 
appropriately directed by the president, who can garner sufficient national support 
through a congressional declaration of war.2 Proposing the vestment of a declaratory 
function in the Congress, Hamilton explained that the whole of military power, 
                                                 
1 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION of 1787, at 318-9 (1911).  
2 Id.  
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including the raising and regulation of an army and navy, is lodged in the legislature 
for the periodic election of Congress, and not among the individual states, so that the 
nation as a whole should be able to prevent other nations from invading it under this 
separation of war-declaring and war-making framework.3 
Jay further pointed out in the FEDERALIST PAPERS that Congress’s deliberative 
function can serve to make certain what the just cause of war is:4 
[Not] only fewer just causes of war will be given by the national Government, 
but it will also be more in their power to accommodate and settle them 
amicably. They will be more temperate and cool, and in that respect, as well as 
in others, will be more in capacity to act advisedly than the offending state. . . . 
The national Government in such cases will . . . proceed with moderation and 
candour to consider and decide on the means most proper to extricate them 
from the difficulties which threaten them. 
Thus, the power of war, first, for reasons of unification under attack, should not be 
held by among the individual states, and, second, the institutional design of the federal 
government can prevent the whole nation from being dragged into a war for 
insufficiently considered reasons. Such an institutional design, which is provided in 
the text of the Constitution that the Congress shall have power to declare War and the 
President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, 
further suggests that the initiation of a war cannot be duly vested in any one person, 
state, or institution. 
This emphasis on the non-monopoly of war power by one person or institution 
was also best reflected in James Wilson’s often-cited speech at the Philadelphia 
Convention:5 
                                                 
3 ALEXANDER HAMILTON, THE FEDERALIST PAPERS No. 24, 25.  
4 JOHN JAY, THE FEDERALIST PAPERS No. 3, 4.  
5 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 583 (MERRILL JENSEN 
ED., 1976).  
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This [constitutional] system will not hurry us into war; it is calculated to guard 
against it. It will not be in the power of a single man, or a single body of men, 
to involve us in such distress, for the important power of declaring war is 
vested in the legislature at large; this declaration must be made with the 
concurrence of the House of Representatives. From this circumstance we may 
draw a certain conclusion, that nothing but our national interest can draw us 
into war. 
Therefore, the design of divided decision-making bodies manifestly signifies that it is 
to be the concurrent, but not monopolistic, nature of war powers that will keep the 
nation at peace. 
In his speech on the Jay Treaty to the Congress, James Madison further 
explained that the nature of a separated power, including the Declare War Clause and 
Commander in Chief Clause, is actually a power that has a special need for the 
legislature’s deliberation:6 
[It] could not be unreasonable, if the clauses under discussion were thought 
doubtful, to lean towards a construction that would limit & control the Treaty-
making power, rather than towards one that would make it omnipotent. . . . this 
House in its Legislative capacity, must exercise its reason; it must deliberate; 
for deliberation is implied in Legislation. . . . Where the Constitution contains a 
specific & peremptory injunction on Congress to do a particular act, Congress 
must of course do the act, because the Constitution, which is paramount over 
all the Departments, has expressly taken away the Legislative discretion of 
Congress. The case is essentially different where the act of one Department of 
Government interferes with a power expressly vested in another and no where 
expressly taken away . . . and if it be a Legislative power, it must be exercised 
with that deliberation & discretion . . .  
This passage actually provides us with an important approach toward interpreting 
constitutional texts that touch on Declare War Clause through the lens of the 
government’s deliberative function. First, since war is presumed to be something that 
                                                 
6 1 THE FOUNDERS CONSTITUTION 10, DOCUMENT 21 (http://press-
pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch10s21.html)  
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can be triggered by the president quite easily,7 the framers had to be explicit in 
allocating separate war powers to the Congress and president, thus proclaiming a 
declaration of war’s concurrent nature. Second, deliberation, especially congressional 
deliberation on the war and foreign affair powers, is the injunction provided by the 
Constitution on Congress to maintain the war powers in an orchestrated balance in 
coordination with the president. Third, if doubt over explicitly concurrent powers still 
continues after prudent deliberation, a reasonable decision favoring the Legislature is 
based on control and limit and not on one side of the war power balance (i.e. the 
president) omnipotent. 
I think that the readings presented above of war or foreign affair power and the 
constitutional clause as a whole--readings that stress control and limit through 
congressional deliberation--are also consistent with and reflect a more general and 
structural tenet among constitutional branches: checks and balances. In fact, the 
separation of powers doctrines have aroused contentious academic debates regarding 
the purpose of such a separated powers design. In the most general sense, the debates 
over that doctrine all agree on its purposes: the encouragement of self-determination, 
the rule of law, and protection of individual liberty.8 The framers also recognized that 
effective and limited government requires both independence of and interdependence 
among the different branches. 9 As Madison explained in THE FEDERALIST,10 
                                                 
7 For example, in a letter to Jefferson, Madison wrote, “The constitution supposes, what The History of 
all [Governments] demonstrates, that the [Executive] is the branch of power most interested in war, & 
most prone to it. It has accordingly with studied care, vested the question of war in the [Legislature].” 
See 6 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 312 (GAILLARD HUNT ED., 1906) 
8 See Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1513, 1534 (1994)  
9 See Thomas O. Sargentich, The Contemporary Debate about Legislative-Executive Separation of 
Powers, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 430, 434,5 (1987).  
10 JAMES MADISON, THE FEDERALIST PAPERS No. 47.  
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The accumulation of powers legislative, executive, and judiciary in the same 
hands, whether of one, a few or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, 
or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny. . . . The 
preservation of liberty requires, that the three great departments of power 
should be separate and distinct. 
Although affected by Montesquieu’s doctrine of the “pure” separation of powers,11 
Madison, by examining the history of the inefficacy of absolutely separated powers 
and concentration of powers in the states’ legislatures during the Confederation 
period, began to urge the delegates to the Philadelphia Convention, as Professor 
Cynthia Farina points out,12 to consider a stable and workable government through 
“mixed” governmental powers.13 
Madison further explained that preventing the concentration of power in one 
branch was “the watchword for a system of interrelationships through which political 
power would be diffused and checked.”14 In the FEDERALIST PAPERS, he also wrote 
that15 
[t]he great authority against a gradual concentration of the several powers in 
the same department, consists in giving to those who administer each 
                                                 
11 See Cynthia Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 
COLUM. L. REV. 452 (19889).  
12 Id. 
13 Therefore, probably one of the most prominent sentences in The Federalist squarely fleshed out 
Madison’s mixed-government view: 
 Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. . . . But what is government itself but the 
greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If 
angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In 
framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you 
must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself. 
A Dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has 
taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions. See JAMES MADISON, THE FEDERALIST PAPERS 
NO. 51. 
14 See Cynthia Farina, supra note 12, at 480.  
15 JAMES MADISON, THE FEDERALIST PAPERS NO. 51.  
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department, the necessary constitutional means, and personal motives, to resist 
encroachments of the others. 
Therefore, Madison suggested that the entire power be granted to the national 
government as a whole rather than to any specific branch of it. As such, separation of 
powers, as a matter of course, becomes a functional doctrine that focuses on checks 
and balances among different branches. But that does not suggest that separation of 
powers loses its importance, in the sense that power should be appropriately allocated 
to different branches, but not for the sake of a rigidly legislative, executive, or judicial 
outline. Power is better conceived as a parcel consisting of several sub-divided units 
wherein no unit is capable of standing for the whole. 
That functional perspective is also clearly described in a modern U.S. Supreme 
Court ruling:16 
In determining whether the Act disrupts the proper balance between the 
coordinate branches, the proper inquiry focuses on the extent to which it 
prevents the Executive branch from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned 
functions. Only where the potential for disruption is present must we then 
determine whether that impact is justified by an overriding need to promote 
objectives within the constitutional authority of Congress. 
As such, a functional approach does not actually deem the allocation of powers to be a 
task that considers only the formal determinacy of law. Rather it considers the 
complicated needs of society in different contexts, which dictates the expected 
behavior of all the governmental powers involved. 
Such a functionalist view was also consistently echoed in the framers’ views 
on war powers. Other than Declare War Clause, the framers’ general understandings 
of the Original Clause further enforce the idea that the appropriations powers of the 
House would serve as another of the most important measures to control military 
                                                 
16 Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 443 U.S. 425, 443 (1977).  
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power. As Jefferson wrote to Madison, it manifested the “separation of money and 
sword”17 perspective:18 
We have already given in example one effectual check to the Dog of War by 
transferring the power of letting him loose from the Executive to the 
Legislative body, from those who are to spend to those who are to pay. 
Therefore, after looking into various historical interpretations of Declare War Clause 
held by the Founders combined with their illustration of the general principles of the 
checks and balances doctrine of governmental structure, I think these arguments all 
converge on an important thesis: Congress should control presidential war power 
through deliberation. This suggests that when interpreting war powers, this general 
thesis about the war power structure is a strong reminder that the Declare War and 
Commander in Chief clauses encourage the Congress and the president to cooperate 
and deliberate with each other and not necessarily engage in an all-or-nothing zero-
sum interaction. 
II. Principles of “Good” Democratic Deliberation 
In the previous section, I demonstrated that although the Founders expected a 
concurrent war power wielded by the president and Congress through deliberation, 
they did not inform us about what the contents and conditions of a “good” deliberation 
are. I think that a clear delineation of the principles of good deliberation is crucial to 
both the institutional design of congressional rules and constitutional interpretations of 
the allocation of war power between the president and Congress. A mere deliberation 
itself does not guarantee us the generation of a reasonable argument and legitimate 
                                                 
17 See LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER 10-12 (2004).  
18 15 The Papers of Thomas Jefferson 397 (JULIAN P. BOYD ED., 1958)  
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decision thereof. 19 Lots of challenges are left unanswered by the Founders. For 
example, what can be counted as a reasonable argument in a deliberative process 
given the many incommensurable values or private interests in our modern complex 
society? In terms of constant disagreement in modern deliberation, what kind of 
decision can be regarded as a legitimate decision grounded in fair cooperative terms 
for future concurrent political action and deliberation, given that disagreement should 
not obstruct our ongoing political action? In terms of unequally distributed of political 
power, what kinds of institutional rules could condition better deliberation in 
Congress? 
By definition, these questions do not exhaust the challenges to which 
deliberative democracy theorists should respond. What I want to emphasize here is 
that if we purport to realize the Founders’ expectation of “control through presidential 
war power through congressional deliberation,” then we should seriously consider 
demands for illustration of shared reasonable principles for assessment of argument in 
congressional deliberation, standards for a legitimate and binding collective decision 
made under the situation of constantly moral disagreement within both and between 
the political branches, and ideal structural process for congressional deliberation. To 
                                                 
19 For example, if members of Congress only present her or his position based on the constituent’s 
preferences, can such preference-aggregation decision framework be counted as deliberation? More 
generally, deliberative politic is a response to such utilitarianism rationality which could necessarily 
create political consensus for further action. For example, McKeavy demonstrates that every 
amendment to a status-quo policy will lead to another amendment process, which brings a policy 
toward a point farther than the ideal point. The political process is full of centrifugal force. In light of 
such a feature, majority rule is not a static maxim of a democratic institution. Moreover, John Rawls 
criticized that the equalization of everyone’s preference under utilitarianism to justify the guidelines for 
our political actions does provide us a seemingly reasonable way to employ a disposition. However, 
utilitarianism’s indifference to the individual’s difference neglects the importance of an individual’s 
agency and the possibility of value incommensurability. Such neglect would suppress other values in 
the political realm, and thus it would fail to gain the legality or legitimacy necessary for a policy. 
Rationality and reasonableness do not necessarily correspond to each other within a complex society. 
This implies that not only should our private reasons be included, objected to respectfully, and tolerated 
in the public sphere as widely as possible, but also it justifies our reasons in a more public sense. 
Therefore, what kind of elements can make a deliberation different from a mere economic rationality is 
deliberative theorists strive to answer.  
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respond to these demands, I will propose in this section three elements to serve as 
primary starting points for modern democratic deliberation: (1) constitutional public 
reason, (2) reciprocal political action, and (3) universal discourse principle. Each of 
these elements will be elaborated below. 
A. Constitutional Public Reason 
Collective political actions need to be taken in a common sphere wherein different 
moral arguments held by discrete moral agencies can be heard, criticized, and brought 
to accommodate each other. I believe that the Constitution, as a minimum reason 
shared by all Americans, rightly creates and reserves the common public sphere for 
such concurrent, deliberative, and collective political action. In the following 
passages, I will illustrate why I think such a constitutional public reason is a necessary 
starting point for democratic deliberation. 
Moral disagreement is a constant in our modern complex society and politics. 
To rebut such disagreement for making a collective decision and taking political 
action, we need a space into which different political actors can participate and freely 
discuss with each other in order to search for a better argument that is based on reason 
and that can be justifiable everyone. This public reason as a base for political action is 
best reflected by John Rawls in POLITICAL LIBERALISM:20 
Our exercise of political power is proper and hence justified only when it is 
exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens 
may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals 
acceptable to them as reasonable and rational. This is the liberal principle of 
legitimacy. And since the exercise of political power itself must be legitimate, 
the ideals of citizenship impose a moral, not a legal, duty — the duty of civility 
— to be able to explain to one another on those fundamental questions how the 
principles and policies they advocate and vote for can be supported by the 
political values of public reason. 
                                                 
20 JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 217 (1993).  
23 
Therefore, Rawls suggests that a constitution is a public reason consisting of shared 
principles by which citizens can practice their own reason publicly and persuade 
others in accordance with the content of those shared principles enshrined in the 
constitution. As such, in the example of the United States, the Constitution becomes 
the minimum reason of which American public and political lives constitute. 
Moreover, Rawls suggests that all citizens have a moral duty to continuously interpret 
those publicly recognized principles such as basic liberties, equality, and freedom.21 
But why in our political lives are we willing to accept a constitution as a 
reasonable entity, withhold our comprehensive reasons (e.g. our individual concerns 
and rationales), and commit to the interpretation of that constitution? I think this is 
because public reason is not a transcendental value. Public reason should be internal to 
our beliefs and agreements rather than an extrinsic value imposed by coercive power. 
Hence, Rawls suggests that we have a burden of judgment limited by public reason, so 
that we can balance and assess different kinds of ends and value claims such that 
moral disagreements among us can become reasonable within a reflective 
equilibrium.22 Such a non-transcendental public reason further suggests that a 
constitution is a starting point for deliberation because constitutional public reason 
could gain authority in a continuously reflective process. Public reason establishes 
itself within an endless practical process. Re-practical reasoning can reinforce, 
deconstruct, and reconstruct the content of public reason; thereby we are willing 
within our public lives to withhold our comprehensive reason and commit to an 
ongoing constitutional interpretation. 
                                                 
21 Rawls also specified a list of the content for this minimum public reason. These are abstract and 
primary concept of basic social structure, which includes “basic rights and liberties, institutional 
opportunities, and prerogatives of office and position, along with income and wealth.” The purpose of 
the introduction of these primary goods is to establish an intersubjective dialogue, or what Rawls calls 
an interpersonal comparison, within a reasonably pluralistic society. Id. 
22 See JOHN RAWLS, supra note 22, at 54-5.  
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In this vein, the American Constitution can serve as a starting point for 
democratic deliberation not through coercive enforcement via governmental power, 
but rather via several practical reasoning processes--inter alia, reinterpretation of its 
text, critique of its inadequate power, and a built-in amendment process--all of which 
perpetually engender Constitutional authority. As such, the central tenet of 
constitutional public reason becomes clear: the authority of public reason is internally 
established by a public criticism of external power; through this, public reason also 
acquires its legitimate power to enforce within this continuous reason-internalization 
process. Constitutional public reason can complement and stabilize the legitimacy of 
our collective decision through an ongoing process of moral-political construction. 
Therefore, I argue that a constitution is by nature a public resolution of an 
entrenchment of public reason that recognizes our history as value-plural, and thus the 
content of a constitution needs to be continuously interpreted and constructed by the 
public. 
Nevertheless, even though I elucidate why a constitution can serve as a starting 
authority of minimum public reason for us to interpret, it does not address why a 
constitution can include non-deliberativists23 into deliberative politics. I argue that this 
is because a constitution itself depicts a public space in which we are all implicated 
and from whose boundaries we cannot escape.24 This is not because we are not free 
                                                 
23 By non-deliberativists, I indicate not only those traditionally religious fundamentalists, but also 
political actors who simple do not open to reflection or other identity groups.  
24 I draw on this argument on Hannah Arendt’s illustration of the nature of constitution:  
The outward reality of freedom, as distinguished from the human capacity itself, 
indicates the space in which we move freely and which must be limited and protected 
by boundaries like all space fit to be inhabited by men. Freedom is this space between 
men which binds them together and at the same time separates them from one 
another. . . . [Consequently,] authority will come into being automatically wherever 
men . . . have established a common world and organized a body politic. . . . with its 
laws and institutions, which confronts each of them in his individuality as the 
authority. 
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from deliberation, but rather because democratic deliberation recognizes that it is not a 
politics of neutrality. As long as we appear before this public space, we are heirs to the 
principles and rules demarcated by our predecessors.25 I do not suggest that these 
principles and rules constitute an enduring providence in our political life. Rather, 
democratic deliberation urges us to recognize that those basic principles of 
constitutional public reason therein are not neutral but are already incorporated among 
and into us. 
Therefore, if we want to practice our private reason in the public sphere we 
have a moral duty to continuously transform those basic principles, including the 
principles of deliberative politics itself, by appealing to constitutional public reason 
simply because it is already here among us.26 As such, deliberative theorists are 
always ready to say that non-deliberativists do not have an obligation to partake in the 
                                                                                                                                            
See HANNAH ARENDT, What is Freedom, in BETWEEN THE PAST AND THE FUTURE 143 (1993).  
25 As Hannah Arendt indicated, the arbitrariness of constitutional principle is the first thing we ought to 
recognize in our political lives: 
What save the act of beginning from its own arbitrariness is that it carries its own 
principle within itself, or to be more precise, that beginning and principle, principium 
and principle, are not only related to each other, but are coeval. The absolute from 
which the beginning is to derive its own validity and which must save it, as it were, 
from its inherent arbitrariness is the principle which, together with it, makes its 
appearance in the world. The way the beginner starts whatever he intends to do lays 
down the law of action for those who have joined him in order to partake in the 
enterprise and to bring about its accomplishment. As such, the principle inspires the 
deeds that are to follow and remains apparent as long as the action lasts. 
See HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 214 (2006).  
26 In addressing overlapping consensus, John Rawls also argued that those basic social and political 
institutions are already given in the original position, and thus the subsequent process is not neutral, in 
the sense that it already includes reasonable pluralism and is not in favor of any comprehensive 
doctrine. However, political liberalism does not exclude the possibility of a dynamic political 
conception of justice, that is, the wide-background political culture and the overlapping consensus are 
complementary. As a result, the neutrality doctrine of political liberalism suggests that it does not 
presuppose (and thus advance) any comprehensive doctrine other than overlapping consensus as a 
default or priority doctrine. It is an impartial doctrine in the sense that each citizen is regarded as being 
free and equally allowed to advance her concept of “good” to change the breadth and depth of the 
content of overlapping consensus. As such, Rawlsian neutrality still has its minimum moral value 
intrinsic in the public reason, which ensures social cooperation in a mutually respectful manner. 
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deliberative process. But for those who attempt to deny some basic principles of 
constitutional public reason, such as equality and basic liberty through passage of 
legislation, it is critical to understand that in the tradition of American politics, non-
deliberativists are obligated to justify their private reason through constitutional public 
reason. In consequence, I think constitutional public reason not only is a starting point 
for democratic deliberation, but also serves as an indispensible standard for different 
political actors in the public sphere to interpret and make a collective decision. 
B. Reciprocal Political Action 
In the last part, though I demonstrated why constitutional public reason is a starting 
point for democratic deliberation and an indispensable part of our political lives, the 
basic and abstract principles of constitutional public reason are inevitably limited in 
their capacity to resolve constant moral disagreements in deliberative politics. 
Constitutional public reason obviously is an insufficient element for a fairly 
cooperative action, given that “stand-off” is persistence in our democratic deliberation. 
In the following passages, I will argue that if we do not purport to have moral 
indeterminacy hindering our political action, a reciprocal political action is another 
necessary element for accommodating deliberative disagreement, and encourages 
future deliberation. 
In the simplest sense, the meaning of reciprocity is best illustrated by Amy 
Guttmann and Dennis Thompson. They define reciprocity as the claims made by 
others “on terms that I can accept in principle,” and those that I make proportionately 
“on terms that you can accept in principle.”27 I think the form of deliberative 
reciprocity is thus identical to that of Kantian reason, which requires each person’s 
reason to be public and beyond private interests. In particular, Kantian reason suggests 
                                                 
27 See AMY GUTTMANN AND DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT 55 (1996).  
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that the audiences of our speech should be the world at large28 so that our reason 
would not be only self-regarding or partially other-regarding.29 Insofar as humanity as 
a whole is taken into account, and insofar as no other external authority defines the 
reach of speech, the reason underlying our communication becomes public. As such, 
the form of deliberative reciprocity indicates that the reason we use is articulated from 
a first-person plural perspective. 
Nevertheless, Guttmann and Thompson emphasize that deliberative reciprocity 
does not require us to justify the contents of public reason universally. Rather, the 
content of public reason only needs to be mutually acceptable30 to all the political 
actors partaking in democratic deliberation on the grounds that public reason cannot 
exist alone without our situated context.31 In particular, Kantian universality assumes 
that reason can be adopted by all the people beyond their boundaries.32 However, I 
think such a demanding principle of public reason may have a paradoxical result: in 
terms of various unshared political common senses across different politics, people’s 
                                                 
28 See Immanuel Kant, What is Enlightenment. 
(http://www.english.upenn.edu/~mgamer/Etexts/kant.html)  
29 Therefore, for example, although I present my opinion on public education to friends in a coffee shop, 
my speech is still public if I assume that my speech actually can reach beyond my friends. To the 
contrary, if a congresswoman asserts that a bill lacks legitimacy because it neglects the interests of her 
constituency, her speech could become a private reason (in Kant’s sense), because she may intend to 
deliver her speech only to a limited group or area. 
30 See AMY GUTTMANN AND DENNIS THOMPSON, supra note 27, at 54.  
31 Guttmann and Thompson also emphasize that the content of public reason should be beyond 
overlapping consensus as Rawls defined. In particular, they argue that if public reason aims at serving 
as the common ground of a society, a mere Rawlsian political deliberation is not sufficient, unless the 
overlapping consensus includes the mutually recognized moral principles of all citizens. Guttmann and 
Thompson hold the same view as Rawls, that the notion of public reason should be beyond one’s 
narrow self-interests. However, they further argue that public reason should also reach those who hold 
different moral standpoints and be justifiable to those who reasonably disagree with them by using their 
own moral terms.31 As such, the concept of public reason has been relaxed and reformulated by 
Guttmann and Thompson in their principle of reciprocity, which may be more complete than that of 
Rawls’. 
32 See Onora O’Neill, Political Liberalism and Public Reason: A Critical Notice of John Rawls, 
Political Liberalism, 106 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW 411 (1997). 
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wills may have no convergence in most situations, thus implying that most of the 
“reasons” we hold are only private ones.33 Not only does such a paradox occur among 
different countries; it also exists within a country. Once we practice our reason, we 
cannot expect this practice to have been executed within an empty context. 
Therefore, I think that what deeply concerns Thompson and Guttmann is that a 
strong principle of universality and public reason may suppress individual autonomy 
in the public or political sphere. The weight of each person’s concept of a good and 
moral argument thereof to which we should accord ourselves in the political and 
public sphere is a subject that we cannot afford to forget. Deliberative politics thus 
should condition these plural moral perspectives by creating a vibrant political action 
in the public sphere34 based on reciprocity. Although the Kantian universal form of 
public reason presupposes everyone as being free and of equal agency, which naturally 
results in plural and conflicting perspectives, in the process of practical reasoning, 
without recognizing the difficulty of reaching a moral agreement, communication 
among us may become merely many demonstrations of individual perspectives.35 
Hence, what deliberative reciprocity pursues of the content of public reason is 
politically constructed36 by a mutually acceptable justification (or by mutually 
acceptable justifications) rather than by absolute truth. 
                                                 
33 Id. 
34 I draw this argument on Hannah Arendt’s comment on vita activa. Arendt’s action can be seen as a 
synthesis of speech and act. Once we understand as long as we appear in the public sphere delimited by 
our constitution, then everyone should be able to proffer their independent perspectives freely. That 
plural moral perspective view taking actually is a means to another concerted end—to complement the 
value of plural equality while at the same time mandating that we unearth our shared understanding. See 
HANNAH ARENDT, HUMAN CONDITION (1998).  
35 See AMY GUTTMANN AND DENNIS THOMPSON, supra note 27, at 54.  
36 In this aspect, the concept of deliberative reciprocity is consistent with Rawlsian political 
constructivism. In particular, in terms of the wide reasonable pluralism that exists within our society, it 
is also natural for us to expect that disagreements among all of us are also correspondingly plural. In 
Rawls’s view, even after a reflective procedure is concluded, various sources of disagreement 
emanating from different theoretical, experiential, and normative roots cannot converge at a 
29 
The emphasis on mutually acceptable justification also represents what 
deliberative politics values: not only persuasion in the decision-making process but 
also a concurrent political action after persuasion. But since deliberative reciprocity 
understands political disagreement to be a constant in deliberative politics, reciprocity 
also mandates that political actors should also establish fair terms for social 
cooperation and future deliberation under mutually acceptable disagreements. As 
different deliberative theorists have suggested, although we could expect a good 
deliberation to bring about a thicker consensus on a substantive moral agreement, a 
good deliberation may also sometimes polarize political actors and generate no 
agreement at all. However, moral disagreement should not hinder further political 
action. If deliberative politics aims at criticizing unequal share and inappropriate 
influence of political power in the public sphere, it should not privilege a status quo 
policy by definition. Under such circumstances, deliberative theorists will encourage 
political actors, especially political actors in the government, to bargain under a fair 
cooperative process, present their reasons in the public sphere, and then take a stand 
by a process of majority voting. 
Based on the above illustrations, reciprocal political action can be seen as a 
two-part element. First, everyone should formally deliberate over an issue before 
taking a concurrent political action and also be able to present a reason justifiable to 
everyone. Second, in the case of no reciprocal justification, however, deliberative 
reciprocity requires political actors to construct a mutually acceptable alternative 
                                                                                                                                            
comprehensive consensus. Therefore, we all have a duty to reflect on the overlapping consensus and to 
present our reasons to be justifiable reciprocally to others. As such, Rawls indicates that the political 
concept of justice is politically constructed rather than an absolute truth demonstrated by any 
comprehensive doctrine. Therefore, the political identity between “you and me” rests not on the 
endorsement of each person’s comprehensive views, but on our liberal, institutional principles. See 
JOHN RAWLS, supra note 20, at 31-2, 55-8.  
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through fair bargaining, and negotiation for deliberative disagreement should not 
hinder political action and privilege status quo. 
C. Universal Discourse Principle 
In the previous two parts of this section, I have stated that because constitutional 
deliberation in our political lives will inevitably generate political disagreement out of 
various moral perspectives held by different individuals, democratic deliberation 
should value the importance of reciprocal political action based on deliberative 
disagreement. Within this argument, I have strived to avoid splitting procedural and 
substantive conditions of good deliberation into a dichotomy. However, I think that 
any democratic deliberation has to be undertaken amid various institutional processes 
in the public sphere, a a characteristic of the democratic process mandating that 
deliberative theorists not bypass touching upon the institutional principle for 
participation in the deliberative process. In the following passages, I will argue that a 
synthesis of Habermas’s U-principle as well as D-principle, a universally agreed upon 
procedure of participation to ensure that every moral agent has the opportunity to 
discourse about and criticize on an action norms, is an indispensible procedural 
condition for democratic deliberation. 
Habermas repeatedly levels the critique that a principal defect of the modern 
public sphere is a lack of deliberative reason in modern democratic politics owing to 
both a chaotic civil society and a closed institutional deliberative process in the 
political sphere. As such, the basic concern for Habermas is the structures of 
participation in democratic deliberation within a modern complex society. In 
particular, because of the large size, complex moral values, and overloaded 
governmental function of modern society, citizenship, deliberation, and collective 
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decision-making cannot appropriately link together. This generates weak public 
reason, powerless constituents, and unchecked political institutions. 
Habermas’s solution to this problem of participatory structure facing modern 
complex society is to transform the public sphere into an independent and 
interconnected “two-track” model.37 That is, each citizen in the public sphere can 
participate in a decentered “subjectless” communicative process dispersed across the 
public sphere, and can meet each other at the public sphere’s nexus, which in the 
United States is Congress. Therefore, a good deliberation and deliberative collective 
decision is contingent on an inclusive and complex procedural institution situated in 
the public sphere wherein various moral values38 held by citizens can be 
communicated in common, thereby increasing the reflexivity of our collective actions. 
                                                 
37 Habermas’s critique of publicity under socialism and liberalism illustrates the need for both 
separation and interconnection within two-track public sphere. He states that neither socialism nor 
liberalism could ensure that public opinion would be both critical and rational. On the one hand, he 
opines that socialism overwhelmingly publicize the production and re-production resulting into the 
socialization of politics. If too much of our private communication is publicized, then the critical 
function of both the political sphere and of civil society is undermined, because the scope of the private 
sphere shrinks. Civil society should be separated from the control of the political sphere. On the other 
hand, Habermas opines that liberalism leaves too much will-formation and opinion-formation in the 
private sphere to be controlled by the private capital, which increases the secrecy within the public 
sphere and thus undermines the oversight function of the political sphere and of civil society in general. 
Civil society should be separated from the control of the social power elite. Neither model’s publicity 
could preserve the critical function of the political sphere and/or of civil society. In light of this defect, 
Habermas thus argues that both the political public sphere and civil society should be differentiated 
from the capitalized sphere, and at the same time the political public sphere should serve as a 
complement to, and be complemented by, civil society, which becomes an open and vibrant two-track 
public sphere.  
38 Habermas regards these various moral values held by different citizens in the public sphere as a 
“lifeworld” that circumvents various objective experiences shared by different social actors depending 
on how we assign a theme to our situational context; thus, dynamic and relevant matters are included. In 
this objective perspective, Habermas acknowledges the importance of ethical values within a 
community. Yet he opines that after the emergence of modernity ethical values no longer can master 
our actions, but our actions can master the relevance of shared ethical values. In other words, the 
lifeworld is a series of taken-for-granted background settings that can all be “components” of our 
actions. Therefore, for Habermas, an important step toward deliberative reason is to differentiate the 
form from the content of our lifeworld.  
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To provide a main principle for the institutionalization of “subjectless” 
communication in “two-track” public sphere, Habermas suggests that D-principle is a 
necessary condition for the moral deliberative process:39 
Those action norms that are considered valid are only those to which all 
possibly affected persons could agree as participants in rational discourse. 
The moral claim inherent in the D-principle concerns how we could treat each 
participant as a free and equal partner in the deliberative process. D-principle enjoins 
us to establish a deliberative process in which each individual who hold a different 
private reason from other individuals can freely and equally criticize others and be 
equally criticized by others, and thus each private reason can become publicly and 
politically rationalized. 40 
However, Habermas understands that in reality we cannot expect to reach an 
anonymously collective decision, given the existence of deep moral conflicts in 
complex society. Therefore, Habermas also proposes U-principle as a solution for 
constant moral disagreement after deliberation:41 
A moral norm is valid just in case the foreseeable consequences and the side 
effects of its general observance for the interests and value-orientations of 
each individual could be jointly accepted by all concerned without coercion. 
This strong moral consensus theory seemingly reveals that democratic deliberation 
suffers the same defect that Kantian reason does, that is, public reason is an impartial 
                                                 
39 JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS 107 (1998).  
40 Habermas argues that the tripartite modes of validity claims can be categorized in accordance with 
three basic elements of the speech act: assertion, expression, and regulation. He opines that all of these 
three modes of validity claims are more or less inherent in our communicative actions toward 
justification on the grounds that speech acts indicate a communicative process in which both speaker 
and listener can take a “yes” or “no” position. That suggests that rational discourse is a process of 
public use of reason in which actors can criticize other actors’ argumentation along those three 
dimensions of the speech act.  
41 JÜRGEN HABERMAS, MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 65 (1992).  
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and absolute moral truth, which would only become part of each person’s 
demonstrations of her or his moral perspective. However, Habermas explicitly argues 
that U-principle can be deduced from D-principle. Given that D-principle is applied in 
moral-political deliberation, the moral norm in U-principle is also applied in a moral-
political deliberation. Following this vein, he indicates that the criterion of a valid law 
should be enacted based on an argument that is consistent with a common moral-
political law and set of principles, such as a constitution.42 Therefore, what U-principle 
values and stipulates is that the criterion of a legitimate decision outcome should be 
based on a full and autonomous moral agreement after a universal deliberation that is 
predicated on general interest. 
Accordingly, once we understand the criterion for deliberation and decision 
thereof as a moral-political deliberation by appealing to a politically constructed 
standard in a constitution, a strong consensual account of deliberation will not prevent 
us from employing bargaining and a majoritarian decision-making process.43 This is 
                                                 
42 This point is made in BETWEEN THE FACTS AND NORMS, in which Habermas differentiates facticity 
and validity in accordance with positive and common law. More specific, he argues that law as a 
medium not only can institutionalize these two kinds of actions to economize the actor’s burden of 
interaction, but also can incorporate procedural mechanisms into it to facilitate the ongoing use of 
practical reason. Law, Habermas argues, then has both facticity and validity dimensions. In the most 
general sense, facticity of law exists at two levels. One is its positive activity and shared norm among 
social actors within the sphere of law, backed by coercive enforcement. The other is the enactment and 
positivity of law. The validity of law also exists at two levels in the most general sense. One comprises 
the legitimate conditions of democratic and legal procedures of legal enforcement for rational 
acceptability within the whole society. The other is a system of rights, which conditions the legitimacy 
of constitutional principles. Whatever tensions we discuss, the point is that legal validity can be 
assessed in terms of two dimensions, which Habermas calls the “dual validity of law”: first, legal 
enforcement as a social fact embedded in our lifeworld is not valid unless it can be differentiated 
through rational communication within the whole society. Second, a positive law, even if it also 
occupies the validity side of law at the same time, is not valid unless it meets the rationalization 
requirement of law directed by the system of rights.  
43 Habermas also touches on the criteria of the bargaining process toward maintaining an ongoing social 
cooperation. Not surprisingly, he establishes the relationship between bargaining and deliberation via 
the D-principle. His central argument is that the legitimacy of the bargaining process itself should 
adhere to a discursively enacted legal norm, which would then indirectly bind our bargaining and 
compromising process at hand, and thereby render that bargaining process moral. He also argues that 
such a process should allow for inherent equality in bargaining power. Thus, a fair and legitimate 
compromise has to meet three conditions: (1) it benefits each party to the agreement, (2) it attaches no 
free rider, and (3) no party contributes more to the cooperative effort than they gain from it.  
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not only because political actors, as I mentioned in the previous part, could reach a 
deliberative disagreement before voting, but also because a demanding consensual 
theory can prevent those who are disadvantaged from being excluded from the moral-
political deliberative process.44 As such, Habermas reminds political actors that 
participatory process for democratic deliberation should be able to correspondingly 
reflect moral structural values in the public sphere. 
If the process of democratic deliberation should be able to flesh out and give 
citizens opportunity to deliberate over those structural and complex moral values in a 
civil society with a two-track public sphere, laying down several general principles for 
institutional conditions in the legislature is therefore a crucial task. Hence, Habermas 
generally proposes four institutional principles for deliberation in Congress or 
Parliament regarding both congressional and non-congressional procedural 
mechanisms.45 First, Congress should be open to the broader public sphere through 
which social critics can be introduced into congressional forum to be heard, addressed, 
or accommodated. Second, to realize such an open deliberation in Congress, its 
members should be aware of what the institutional techniques for ensuring public 
                                                 
44 In addition to protecting the minority’s right to discourse from being infringed upon by the majority, 
D-principle and U-principle also try to protect democratic deliberation from being undermined by 
political power. In particular, to protect our system of rights for both public and private autonomy we 
require legal enforcement of our communicative decisions through administrative power. Moreover, 
Habermas differentiates administrative power from communicative power and also elucidates the 
internal relationship between law and politics. In the most general sense, this internal connection 
reflects three different dimensions in correspondence with the tripartite structure of governmental 
power: lawmaking power, which is “established with the help of governmental power,” executive 
power, which “organizes offices of public administration,” and judicial power, which “relies on the 
sanctioning power of the state.” Following his discourse theory and idea of separation of system and 
lifeworld, Habermas argues that those three governmental powers have different modes of discourse 
(respectively) through which communicative power can bind administrative power via law. As 
Congress is the locus of complicated communicative power in the public sphere, administrative power 
then implements the decision of communicative power through “pragmatically informed and purposive-
rational” pragmatic discourse. The main difference between legislative and executive power is that the 
latter cannot “deal with normative reasons in either a constructive or a reconstructive manner.” 
Communicative power thus can transcribe itself into law, and leashes executive power by transforming 
it into a mere “steering system” for the democratic procedure.  
45 See JÜRGEN HABERMAS, supra note 41, at 359-87. 
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opinion are, as these techniques can also guide congressional members in the decision-
making process. Third, congressional members’ collective decision should be 
predicated on a weightier justification. In other words, there should be an authentic 
deliberation. Fourth, various procedures in Congress should also facilitate independent 
deliberation and not be distorted by self-interest in the broader public sphere. 
Based on this discussion, one can understand that the universal discourse 
principle I present here represents two kinds of a structure for congressional 
participation and deliberation in accordance with Habermas “two-track” public sphere. 
First, congressional deliberation should be interconnected with and responsive to a 
vibrant civil society. Second, members of Congress also have the accountability to 
create various procedural conditions that will facilitate an independent argument for a 
better argument based on politically constructed values shared by all of the citizens. 
III. Calls for an Empirical Investigation of War Power Deliberation 
In the previous section, I have demonstrated that a good deliberation should be 
conditioned by a sphere that has been depicted and publicly entrenched within a 
constitution, and that enables all of the political actors to introduce, interpret, and 
criticize various plural moral perspectives on an equal footing. This is done in 
accordance with shared constitutional principles through complex procedures 
established in a two-track public sphere--thereby reciprocal public reason or 
deliberative disagreement is able to be generated in order to promote social 
cooperation and future deliberation. But why are these principles crucial to the 
Founders’ proposal that Congress should exert control over presidential war power 
through deliberation? As I will present below, there are also several criticisms of 
deliberative politics that have been made by non-deliberative political theorists and 
deliberative theorists alike, which may in turn undermine the validity of the argument 
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made by the Founders and modern deliberative theorists. However, as Jürg Steiner 
suggests, “the fact that the [deliberative] model is controversial makes it not less but 
rather more interesting to study in an empirical way.”46 As such, it is necessary to 
understand why an empirical investigation of congressional deliberation is legitimate 
and, more importantly, how or why it relates to control over presidential war power. In 
the following passages, I will (1) explain why empirical investigation is indispensible 
from the perspective of deliberative democracy theory, (2) why constitutional 
deliberation over war power in Congress is indispensible for empirical analysis, (3) 
why to test the impact of congressional deliberation on a reciprocal use of force 
between the president and Congress is legitimate, and (4) why identifying the function 
of procedural institution in Congress through empirical analysis is crucial for war 
power deliberation. 
A. Empirical Claim as Practical Reason 
The first and foremost foundation for performing an empirical investigation of 
congressional deliberation is that the moral-political value of deliberative politics itself 
should be reciprocally reached to its rival such as rational choice theorists. As 
Guttmann and Thompson suggest, an empirical claim is one of the requirements 
mandated by the principle of reciprocity.47 This requirement is also consistent with the 
central tenet of Kantian reason, that is, reason should be put into practice.48 Although 
                                                 
46 See JÜRG STENINER, ANDRÉ BÄCHTIGER, MARKUS SPÖRNDLI, AND MARCO R. STEEBERGEN, 
DELIBERATIVE POLITICS IN ACTION 32 (2004).  
47 See AMY GUTTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, supra note 29, at 55-6.  
48 In the FIRST CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON, Kant explained the difference between practical reason and 
speculative reason as:  
All statements enounced by pure reason transcend the conditions of possible experiences, 
beyond the sphere of which we can discover no criterion of truth, while they are at the 
same time framed in accordance with the laws of understanding, which are applicable 
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every moral claim cannot be completely proved through empirical demonstration, it at 
least should be practiced and thus reasonably plausible in our lifeworld. Accordingly, 
a consistent and relatively reliable and verifiable method of empirical investigation 
can be used to evaluate moral claims. 
An empirical investigation into congressional deliberation is relatively 
objective in the sense that the content of the sample is recorded in a governmental 
document, which can easily be empirically tested by the public. Although coding the 
form and content of speech delivered by members of Congress is a subjective 
judgment, as long as the coding method is objectively recognized as a reliable method, 
the empirical analysis will not be unreasonable. As I will illustrate in the next chapter, 
the Discourse Quality Index developed by Jürg Steiner et al. is a publicly recognized 
research measure for the quality of congressional deliberation among the community 
of deliberative theorists.49 Therefore, by applying Discourse Quality Index to explore 
the moral-political claim made by the Founders is a reasonable method with which to 
test whether the thesis of “control over the presidential war power through 
congressional deliberation” can be empirically confirmed. 
                                                                                                                                            
only to experience; and thus it is the fate of all such speculative discussions that while the 
one party attacks the weaker side of the opponent, he infallibly lays open his own 
weaknesses.  
Thus, what distinguishes the public use of reason from speculative or pure reason alone is whether we 
think about practical reasoning. A categorical reason is merely an a priori reason, which would lead us 
only to skepticism. Only when we practice our a priori reasoning will we expand our private horizon 
toward the public horizon, on the grounds that the reflection from and judgment of others would 
determine the rights and limits of our private reason.  
49 See Simone Chambers, Democratic Deliberative Deliberation, 6 ANNU. REV. POLIT, SCI. 307 (2003) 
also see Dennis F. Thompson, Deliberative Democratic Theory and Empirical Political Science, 11 
ANNU. REV. POLIT, SCI. 497 (2008).  
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B. Constitutional Deliberation outside the Court 
The first criticism of the principle of good deliberation that I have proposed in the 
previous section, constitutional public reason, comes from deliberative theorists. 
Guttmann and Thompson criticize Rawlsian reason for only recognizing principles 
provided in the Constitution as the pubic reason that we should endorse, which will 
exclude plural moral perspectives in the political realm and tend to generate moral 
indeterminacy for those who disagree with constitutional public reason.50 Moreover, 
they argue that the abstract values of constitutional provisions would almost always 
generate the most contestable interpretations and moral disagreement.51 Therefore, 
Guttmann and Thompson argue that to widen the scope of constitutional deliberation, 
constitutional deliberation not only should be taken outside the Supreme Court but 
also rests upon a comprehensive moral ground rather than upon mere constitutional 
ground.52 
Guttmann and Thompson’s critiques of constitutional deliberation can fit 
squarely into the debates over the role of constitutional review in the Supreme Court. 
In particular, although the role of constitutional review in the Supreme Court is a 
subject that is both controversial and the topic of endless scholarly debate, scholars of 
judicial supremacy would not deny the arguments made by constitutional and political 
scholars53 that members of Congress and presidents could resolve separation of 
                                                 
50 See AMY GUTTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, supra note 29, at 38-9.  
51 Id., at 34-5.  
52 Id., at 199-201.  
53 See e.g. LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT (1997); 
MARK TUSHNET, TANKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999); KEITH WHITTINGTON, 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING (1999); NEAL 
DEVINS, SHAPING CONSTITUTIONAL VALUES: ELECTED GOVERNMENT, THE SUPREME COURT, AND THE 
ABORTION DEBATE (1996); MITCHELL PICKERILL, CONSTITUTIONAL DELIBERATION IN CONGRESS 
(2004).  
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powers issues under the Constitution through compromise and accommodation, often 
without judicial help.54 For example, Louis Fisher argues that various issues of 
constitutional doctrines often arise between the president and Congress, which thus 
motivates members of Congress to engage in constitutional dialogues outside the 
Court and even reject constitutional interpretation made by the Court.55 
In the most general sense, I think Fisher’s argument on congressional 
deliberation suggests that constitutional deliberation in Congress is a way to protect 
the legislature’s institutional authority either when the Court’s interpretation threatens 
its core power or when the Court rejects the opportunity of getting involved in a 
separation of powers issue between the political branches.56 Following Fisher’s line of 
thought, in war and foreign affair power areas, I think members of Congress should 
have more incentive to engage in constitutional deliberation on the grounds that the 
Court usually avoids reviewing the relevant war power issues out of prudential 
concerns. 
Guttmann and Thompson may be right that constitutional deliberation itself 
could not necessarily resolve moral disagreement in democratic deliberation. 
However, as I suggest above, once that we appear in the public sphere delineated by a 
constitution, we inevitably become the heirs to the principles laid down by our 
                                                 
54 See LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES: INTERPRETATION AS A POLITICAL PROCESS (1988); 
LOUIS FISHER, SEPARATION OF POWERS: INTERPRETATION OUTSIDE THE COURTS (1990); LOUIS FISHER, 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT (1997).  
55 A notable example is congressional refusal to accept the Supreme Court’s ruling on the 
constitutionality of a legislative veto and still provided for legislative veto clauses in the laws. Other 
than constitutional interpretation by the governmental organizations, Fisher and Devins demonstrate 
that non-governmental organizations also play significant role in constitutional deliberation in the 
public sphere.  
56 In addition to protection of its own institutional authority, Congress deliberates over the Constitution, 
other scholars argue, because of “electoral connections,” “policy entrepreneurs,” or different 
institutional factors. See DAVID MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION (1975); 
DOUGLASS ARNOLD, THE LOGIC OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION (1990); JOHN KINDON, AGENDAS, 
ALTERNATIVE AND PUBLIC POLICIES (1995).  
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predecessors, who themselves interpreted these principles in accordance with the 
constitution. As such, I argue that though constitutional public reason can and should 
be continuously transformed through democratic deliberation, it still plays a prominent 
role in democratic deliberation. This argument not only constitutes the fundamental 
research motivation of this dissertation, issuing a response to Guttmann and 
Thompson’s critique of constitutional public reason, but also generates the primary 
empirical hypothesis that I will illustrate in the next chapter: a better constitutional 
deliberation in Congress can generate a more balanced congressional-executive war 
power relationship. 
C. Responsible Political Game 
The second criticism of another element of good deliberation, reciprocal political 
action, is posed by political philosophical theorists. Chantal Mouffe charges that 
deliberative theorists have illusory expectation for consensus.57 In particular, she 
argues that any procedure and any shared principles inherent in it are created through 
exclusion. Here, she challenges Habermas’s separation of procedure and lifeworld. 
That is, Habermas opines that the D-principle and the complex procedures thereof are 
together a product of rational dialogue that distinguishes an inclusive process that is 
consistent with a set of general interests that arise from our taken-for-granted 
background world. However, Mouffe argues that those complex procedures are always 
rooted in the lifeworld precisely because the justification of those procedures is based 
on those existing shared substantive forms that are part of our lifeworld. Hence, even 
if Habermas argues that consensus can converge on procedure, it is still built on 
substantial ethical commitments rather than on a moral-political argument.58 
                                                 
57 See Chantal Mouffe, Deliberative Democracy or Agonistic Pluralism?, 3 SOCIAL RESEARCH 749 
(1999).  
58 Id., at 749.  
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Moreover, Mouffe levels the criticism that deliberative politics is an 
impossibile politics because “power and antagonism and their ineradicable 
character”59 always exist. She charges that the public reason advocated by deliberative 
theorists is not a neutral and rational dialogue. Rather, Mouffe opines that discourse 
can be persuasive only via a “master signifier,” which suggests that the deliberative 
process is already conditioned by an external authority and a biased political power.60 
As such, any voting procedure after a good deliberation will still be the same as that 
after any other power political game. Deliberative politics would not be able to 
generate moral and legitimate substantive policy. 
Deliberative democracy theorists never deny that power politics would be 
ruled out in deliberative politics. What deliberative theorists value is that political 
power game should be predicated upon a responsible democratic deliberation. More 
specific, precisely because deliberative theorists acknowledge that consensus is not 
easy to build and power politics would often come into play, deliberative theorists 
hypothesize that political actors still would present their best justification to the public 
sphere and try to persuade their constituents about the reason for playing a political 
power game. Moreover, as I have pointed out in the previous section, I do not assert 
that a decision made out of deliberative process is neutral. Deliberative politics asks 
political actors first to recognize that every decision we make is only provisionally 
consistent with the general interest; otherwise, political actors in the deliberative 
process would not be broadly open-minded. Therefore, deliberative theorists are not as 
naïve as Mouffe supposes Decision made after deliberation would not be a perpetually 
consensual agreement. 
                                                 
59 Id., at 752 (1999).  
60 Id., at 751.  
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Accordingly, deliberative theorists hypothesize that even if ideal deliberative 
disagreement and decision would be difficult to realize in real politics, it does not 
necessarily suggest that it does not exist partially.61 Therefore, from an empirical 
standpoint, deliberative theorists need an operational measurement to test whether a 
good deliberation could generate a more ideal policy outcome. As I will address in 
chapter 3, I develop a congressional control index to explore whether a higher quality 
of congressional deliberation would be able to generate a more concurrent and less 
unilateral presidential use of force. 
I think that testing a reciprocal political action principle as it applies to war and 
foreign affair deliberation is vital because the Constitution does not provide clear 
guidelines regarding the allocation of war or foreign affair power between Congress 
and the president. Much of the content of relevant war power allocation should be left 
for a mutual deliberation between the political branches. Moreover, in light of many 
events of unilateral presidential uses of force in constitutional history, it is reasonable 
to infer that such an ambiguous constitutional allocation of war power is likely to 
generate a sheer power political game. Therefore, it is legitimate for deliberative 
theorists to inquire whether better congressional deliberation could generate a more 
balanced congressional control over the president through passage of legislation and 
also prevent the president from initiating a unilateral war. 
                                                 
61 Habermas often emphasizes that pragmatic discourse in the political realm is a mixed speech act. In 
particular, Habermas’s “speech act” theory differentiates itself from strategic action, which he regards 
as facticity of, and a success-oriented action. More importantly, speech acts indicate how each moral 
“agent” relates herself through pragmatic rather than semantic analysis to her hearers and her lifeworld, 
which Habermas views as validation, and an understanding-oriented action. As such, there is no sharp 
distinction between strategic and deliberative discourse; it just a matter of degree.  
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D. Institutional Responsive Congress 
The third criticism of my last element of good deliberation, universal discourse 
principle, is often made by political activists. Iris Young argued that a mild voice of 
reason could not force members of Congress to be responsive to citizens’ voices. 
Similar to Mouffe’s argument, she opines that the structure of congressional 
deliberation would only reflect the inequality with which justice is meted out in 
society .62 This is because procedural norms are always biased toward more powerful 
agents but not open for full and equal participation. Therefore, Young argued that the 
only way to make Congress responsive is to take direct political action conditioned by 
a strong civil society.63 
Nevertheless, the scenario drawn by Young above is precisely what the 
Founders worried about. In particular, the Founders were afraid that the function of 
congressional deliberation would be undermined by factions and populism. They 
opined that a reasoned decision cannot be made without a relatively insulated space. 
That is why they expected that a representative body elected from a wide territory 
could be beneficial to a cool-headed deliberation and decision. Hence, the design of 
the electoral system should be a means toward the realization of public reason but not 
an end for narrowly local interests or mere demonstration of reason. 
                                                 
62 See Iris Young, Activist Challenges to Deliberative Democracy, 29 POLITICAL THEORY 675 (2001).  
63 The difference between Mouffe’s argument and Young’s is that Mouffe still believes in 
representative politics but Young does not. Therefore, Young advocates a constructive political 
activism: 
The activists is suspicious of exhortations to deliberate because he believes that in the 
real world of politics, where structural inequalities influence both procedures and 
outcomes, democratic process that appear to conform to norms of deliberation are 
usually biased toward more powerful agents. The activist thus recommend that those 
who care about promoting greater justice should engage primarily in critical 
oppositional activity, rather than attempt to come to agreement with those who support 
or benefit from existing power structures.  
Id., at 671.  
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Deliberative theorists hypothesize that the tension between elite deliberation 
and populism can be relatively mediated by a well-designed deliberative process in 
Congress. In particular, members of Congress indeed have an obligation to deliberate, 
especially over those highly contested issues, independently from their constituents; 
yet representatives should also deliberate and accommodate their constituents, as 
much as possible, before voting. For deliberative theorists, what is important for the 
division of deliberation between the formal institution and the broader civil society is 
that members of Congress should pay equal respect during a deliberative 
disagreement. After profound deliberation with their constituents, the representatives 
still could vote the opposite of what the constituents think if they sincerely believe that 
the reasons they hold for voting in Congress the way they do are sufficiently 
reasonable.64 Deliberative theorists hypothesize congressional rule setting could 
facilitate such a job. 
Accordingly, following the above assumption, it is natural for deliberative 
theorists to investigate the effects of congressional rule and non-congressional rule 
setting have on the quality of deliberation. If the result shows that a more 
participation-inclusive and information-facilitative congressional rule does generate a 
better congressional deliberation, deliberative theorists would be able to argue that 
congressional institution can make a decision that is both independent and responsive, 
and not be as pessimistic as political activists are. 
In sum, an examination of how universal discourse principle affects both the 
deliberation over and the law regarding the war and foreign affair powers is important 
for two reasons. First of all, deliberative theorists argue that procedural institution in 
Congress could condition congressional deliberation to be both responsive and rational 
in the public sphere, which is especially important in discussing a just cause for a war. 
                                                 
64 See AMY GUTTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, supra note 29, at 137-40.  
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Second, precisely for this reason, the elements of procedural due process in 
lawmaking and deliberation that are crucial to condition congressional war and foreign 
affair decisions that are prudent, are thus worthy of being identified through an 
empirical analysis. 
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CHAPTER 3: 
GROUND WORK FOR EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON WAR POWER  
As I suggested in chapter 2, deliberative democracy theorists already provide many 
normative arguments about the condition and content of democratic deliberation. At 
the same time, we also see that deliberative theorists are not satisfied with 
philosophical debates over democratic deliberation theory. A call for empirical 
investigation of democratic deliberation in real-life situations has become keener in 
the past decade. This chapter is a preparatory work for such an empirical response 
regarding the relationship among congressional deliberation, congressional check, and 
presidential use of force.  
In the following sections, several important ground works for empirical 
analyses will be elucidated, including: (1) a brief literature review and critique of 
empirical research on presidential use of force and its implications for the construction 
of one of the principal variables, congressional control index; (2) another brief 
literature review and critique of empirical research on the quality of congressional 
deliberation and its implications for constructing another major variable, discourse 
quality index; (3) an explanation of the theory underlying the empirical hypotheses; 
and (4) an explanation of the sources of data and variables for the empirical analyses. I 
have two main critiques of the aforementioned literature reviews: (1) conventional 
research on presidential war power neglects what Congress actually says in a specific 
military event, which suggests that we should focus more on the contents of a law; (2) 
empirical research on the relationship between congressional deliberation and policy 
outcome is too static to observe how the executive branch responds to a congressional 
decision and how Congress further reacts to the executive response, thus suggesting 
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that a more comprehensive research on the pattern of congressional deliberation and 
decision thereof is needed.  
I. Review and Critique of Empirical Research on Presidential Military 
Deployment  
To explore the implications of conventional empirical research on presidential military 
deployment, the following review will mainly focus on the development of the 
empirical model employed in conventional research, the hypotheses underlying a 
presidential decision to military deployment, and the significant variables affecting the 
presidential decision on military deployment. I argue that the most important 
implication of these conventional studies of presidential military deployment is that 
event-count model, focusing only on the frequency of presidential use of force, 
neglects the patterns of how Congress attempts to place checks on the president 
through passage or rejection of legislation during the deliberative process.  
A. Review of Empirical Research on Presidential Military Deployment 
In surveying the past thirty plus years of empirical research on presidential use of 
force, one cannot disregard Barry Blechman and Stephen Kaplan’s pioneering study of 
incidences of non-major military action (“short of war”), which has long served as a 
classic ground work for empirical study on military deployment. Blechman and 
Kaplan argue that those “short of war” incidents are presidential “political” military 
deployments for conveyance of national resolve, promotion of national interests, and 
commitment to the U.S.’s allies, and can meet the president’s short- and long-term 
political agendas both nationally and internationally. The main contribution of 
Blechman and Kaplan’s study is that it is the first to include, identify, and 
operationalize the concept of non-major military action into the empirical research on 
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presidential war power. However, given the limits of their datasets, they merely make 
simple descriptive results without exploring causal relationships.  
Building upon Blechman and Kaplan’s dataset, Charles Ostron and Brian Job 
adopt an event-count empirical model to analyze how “domestic political factors” 
influence a presidential decision on use of force. They argue that the president, as a 
“political leader,” comprehensively “monitor[s] salient dimensions in the domestic, 
international, and political arenas” before dispatching the troops abroad. In particular, 
Ostron and Job argue that though international politics characters by definition affect 
influence the presidential decision on use of force, domestic political characters, 
including presidential approval rating, national elections year, and various weighted 
economic misery indices, are the primary factors that substantially affect the 
presidential decision on use of force. 
Some studies show that electoral connection is the most significant factor 
influencing the frequency of presidential use of force. First, building on Blechman and 
Kaplan’s dataset, Benjamin Fordham takes a somewhat different argument from that 
of Ostron and Job, and argues that domestic political and economic factors influence 
the presidential decision on use of force only indirectly. In particular, Fordham argues 
that the president only regards those domestic political and economic variables as 
proxies of his opportunity to be reelected. His event-count model demonstrates that if 
the national economic situation, namely, low inflation and high employment rate, is 
better, then the president has less incentive to use force abroad, as it would imperil his 
chances of being reelected. Second, the electoral connection argument is also 
demonstrated in Richard Stoll’s research on presidential use of force. His event-count 
model demonstrates that the initiation of military force systematically peaks during the 
wartime reelection years and drops during peacetime reelection years.  
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Some research focuses on the relationship between congressional partisan 
component and the presidential decision on use of force. In particular, William Howell 
and Jon Pevehouse build upon a different event-count model dataset and refine 
congressional partisan composition into three different variables—unified 
government, percent president party, and president party power—to test the frequency 
of presidential use of force. They demonstrate that use of major force is significantly 
affected by congressional partisan component and argue that domestic political factors 
are the most prominent factors affecting congressional controllability over the 
presidential use of force.  
B. Critique of Conventional Research on Presidential Use of Force 
The conventional empirical studies on presidential use of force presented above 
inform us about the importance of inclusion of domestic political factors into an 
empirical model. However, for the reasons I elaborate below, I argue that an event-
count model cannot account for a systematic pattern of dynamic power variation 
between the president and Congress after a presidential use of force.  
All of the statistical models mentioned above employ an event-count model to 
analyze the ebb and flow of presidential war power relative to congressional power. 
Such a statistical model suggests that the event of a presidential use of force stands for 
the failure of the congressional attempt to provide a check on the presidential use of 
force. For example, Howell and Pevehouse model the presidential war power as an 
expansion of presidential power if Congress has a short time to linger on the 
president’s decision before a military action. This veto-player perspective is also 
reflected in John Ely’s argument.1 He claims that Congress by design is intended to 
                                                 
1 See JOHN H. ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY 3-11 (1993).  
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“clog the road to combat” by responsively slowing the president’s calls for military 
action.  
However, viewing Congress only as a veto-player of each military action event 
ignores the fact that Congress also often cooperates with the president to initiate a 
military deployment. A presidential use of force is not necessarily a zero-sum 
interaction game between the president and Congress. Therefore, I think it is essential 
to observe the presidential-congressional war power relationship from two aspects, 
which could make empirical research on use of force being more approximated to 
complete: (1) the pattern of congressional attempts at checking a presidential use of 
force through rejection and passage of legislation and (2) the pattern of presidential 
responses to the congressional attempts at gaining control over presidential use of 
force.  
Another critique I flesh out from the above review is that conventional studies 
do not inform us how the president and Congress respond to and manage a foreign 
crisis either before or after a use of force. By focusing on the frequency of military 
deployment, an event-count model can only treat each military event as discrete, and 
neglects the fact that each military event often consists of a series of congressional and 
presidential efforts to manage a foreign crisis through various non-military 
deployment measures. Therefore, I think it is vital not only to include military 
deployment decisions made by both the president and Congress into the empirical 
dataset, but also to include non-military deployment decisions into the scope of 
empirical analyses.  
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II. Review and Critique on Empirical Research of Congressional Deliberation2 
There are a few empirical studies on the quality of congressional deliberation. The 
underlying theme of these empirical research efforts is the development of a discourse 
quality measurement unit applicable to each congressional member’s speech, so as to 
either provide or test the relationship between congressional deliberation and the 
institutional rules or the quality of a congressional decision. In the balance of this 
section, I will briefly review the development and critique of those empirical studies 
of the measurement of quality of congressional deliberation and decision thereof. My 
overall critique is that current empirical research on congressional deliberation is too 
static to observe both political actors’ responses in the public sphere to a congressional 
decision and how Congress reacts to political actors’ responses to its decision in the 
public sphere through its deliberative process.  
A. Review of Empirical Research on Congressional Deliberation  
The first research call for study on congressional deliberation was proposed by 
Edward Lasher, who provides a series of hypotheses as “a preface to empirical 
analysis”3 of the quality of congressional deliberation. He hypothesizes that if the 
relevant information of an issue is more salient and accessible within the legislative 
process, then legislative decisions will better meet a more correct and legitimate 
decision. Although Lasher warns that an empirical test of this kind is not easy to 
construct or conduct, he still believes that “it is sufficiently important to clarify the 
                                                 
2 As I pointed out in Chapter 1, this deliberative turn is both general and particular in practice. Broadly 
defined, deliberative democracy includes transformation of both formal institutions and civil society. In 
other words, all of the talks that occur in the public sphere can be deemed as deliberations, but are not 
merely limited to elite-elite, citizen-elite, or citizen-citizen talks. Empirical research on deliberative 
democracy tends to take one of these three lines. Because my research focuses on only congressional 
deliberation, I exclude the discussions of public talks.  
3 Edward L. Lasher, Assessing Legislative Deliberation: A Preface to Empirical Analysis, XXI 
LEGISLATIVE STUDIES QUARTERLY 4, 501 (1996).  
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concept of deliberation”4 and to “make the study of deliberation as concrete as 
possible.”5  
John Dryzek and Valerie Braithwaite go further by outlining a set of 
congressional discourses for Australian politics in accordance with different political 
values. They propose two major hypotheses regarding the relationship between the 
quality of deliberation and political values. First, Dryzek and Braithwaite posit that a 
higher quality of deliberation can be expected if people holding different political 
values demonstrate an engagement in the democratic process.6 Second, they suggest a 
correlation between both a higher quality of deliberation and political actors whose 
discourse is value-oriented and who usually enjoy substantial support from their 
constituency. Otherwise, different value-holders would imperil their reelected 
opportunity.7  
Although Dryzek and Braithwaite provide several hypotheses about how the 
appreciation of the same political and social institution and value-oriented discourse 
tend to generate a higher quality of deliberation, they do not further identify how each 
actor’s discourse brings about such a higher quality. Katharina Holzinger supplements 
that work by applying speech act theory to her observation of two German cases: a 
mediation of a waste management conflict, and a parliamentary debate on embryonic 
stem-cell research.8 She categorizes speech acts into bargaining and arguing modes.9 
                                                 
4 Id., at 503.  
5 Id. 
6  See John Dryzek & Valerie Braithwaite, On the Prospects for Democratic Deliberation: Values 
Analysis Applied to Austrian Politics, 21 POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY 241-66 (2000).  
7 Id. 
8 See Katharina Holzinger, Context or Conflict Types: Which Determines the Selection of 
Communication Mode, 40 ACTA POLITICA 239, 240 (2005).  
9 Id., at 240-3.  
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Her hypothesis and frequency test are intuitive: more arguing modes would result in a 
higher quality of deliberation. In other words, a higher level of justification would 
generate a better collective decision. More importantly, her frequency test also shows 
that congressional debate does not necessarily involve complete argumentative speech. 
Thus, she concludes that institutional factors and the nature of an issue are crucial to 
predetermine the quality of democratic deliberation.  
As Holzinger points out, discerning how institutional context influences 
deliberation is a natural first step in future empirical studies on congressional 
deliberation. Jürg Steiner, Andre Bachtiger, Markus Sporndli, and Marco 
Steenbergen’s empirical research on four parliamentary deliberations accepts the 
challenge in this field by developing the “Discourse Quality Index” in accordance with 
Jürgen Habermas’s discourse ethics theory to test the influence of institutional factors 
and issue characteristics on congressional deliberation. In particular, following 
Habermas’s division between facticity and legality, Steiner argues that a complete 
justification should relate a normative argument to the issue at hand. In other words, a 
higher level of deliberation means a justification is developed and defended through 
reflection on an actual case.  
Steiner’s empirical tests are two tiered. The first- tier test pertains to the 
relationship between institutions and issues on the one hand and deliberative quality 
on the other. The second- tier test regards the association between deliberative quality 
and its consequences. Among various empirical results, it is noteworthy that his 
empirical model shows that the United States presidential system does not necessarily 
generate strong deliberation in terms of the complexity of discourse justification, 
especially in comparison to the British and German parliamentary systems.10 
                                                 
10 Id., at 122-5.  
 54 
However, the discourses among the members of the United States Congress are more 
respectful.  
B. Critique of Empirical Research of Congressional Deliberation 
The review of empirical research on congressional deliberation presented above makes 
two important contributions to future research. First, it reveals that both institutional 
(e.g. a presidential as opposed to a parliamentary system) and political factors 
(reelection opportunities) influence the quality of congressional deliberation. Second, 
it suggests that a complete justification in discourse should consist of both normative 
and positive elements. For the reasons elaborated below, I argue that research on 
congressional deliberation can be more comprehensive if an empirical model can 
account for the interaction between Congress and the broader public sphere.  
Although all of the studies on congressional deliberation mentioned above 
emphasize the importance of context or actual case reflection in deliberation, this goal 
is not fully realized in those studies, for they do not look into responses of other 
political actors, such as the president. I think an investigation into the event of a  
presidential response is more consistent with Habermas’s division of facticity and 
legality.11 In particular, the main purpose of congressional deliberation is to promote 
the legitimacy of Congress’s own decision. One of the standards of legitimacy is not 
only other political actors but also private citizens must be willing to abide by the law 
passed by Congress. In consequence, and in the context of this dissertation, it is 
important to see how the president responds to congressional regulation of his war 
power.  
                                                 
11 See JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS 28-40(1996).  
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Another critique I suggest here is that we should explore the characteristic of 
congressional deliberation when an issue is revisited by Congress.12 As I suggest 
above, political actors in the broader public sphere would respond to a congressional 
decision, which would also force Congress to revisit and deliberate again upon its 
prior decision. Some deliberative theorists argue that democratic deliberation would 
have a better outcome if political actors have the chance to reflect upon their own 
decisions. Under the context of this dissertation, I think to look into the quality of 
congressional re-deliberation of a military event is important in terms of the extremely 
dynamic nature of the war power issue. Congress already has mechanisms that give 
congressional members chances to re-deliberate upon the war power issue through the 
annual budget process, which reflects the Founders’ expectation that Congress can 
mainly assert control over war and foreign affair policy making through its budget 
power. Therefore, I argue that the scope of the empirical dataset of congressional 
deliberation should be enlarged by including congressional re-deliberation and re-
legislation of a specific military event.  
III. Measuring Separation of Power and Deliberation: The Congressional 
Control Index and the Congressional Discourse Quality Index 
Based on the literature reviews in the previous two sections, I found that two 
important steps should be established in order to perform an empirical analysis 
regarding the relationship between congressional deliberation and presidential use of 
force: (1) a qualitative variable to measure the level of congressional control over the 
president provided in a law and (2) a qualitative variable to measure the level of 
congressional deliberation over the constitutionality of a use of force. The former 
                                                 
12 See Dennis F. Thompson, Deliberative Democratic Theory and Empirical Political Science, 11 
ANNU. REV. POLIT. SCI. 498-500 (2008) 
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variable, which I name “congressional control index,” is vital to the extent that it does 
not treat the relationship between the president and Congress as a zero-sum game in 
the way that conventional research on presidential use of force does. The latter 
variable, which Steiner names “Discourse Quality Index,” is a variable to represent the 
quality of each speaker’s discourse. I will partially adjust Steiner’s Discourse Quality 
Index for the research purpose of this dissertation. In the following passages, I will 
illustrate the contents and underlying theory of these two variables in more detail.  
A. Congressional Control Index  
As I indicate above, the conventional research on congressional control over a 
presidential use force, only regards the relationship between the president and 
Congress as zero-sum game; thus it ignores the fact that Congress often collaborates 
with the president in managing a military event through legislation. I argue therefore 
that an alternative variable should be established to represent the degree to which 
Congress participates in and controls over a formation of military and foreign affair 
policy made by the president. As I list below, the “congressional control index,” which 
can duly reflect the above critiques, consists of two elements: (1) control orientation: 
procedural/ substantive control and (2) control timing: ex ante/ ex post control. I will 
elucidate the underlying theory of these two elements below.  
1. Control Orientation: Procedural/ Substantive Control  
In terms of the degree of congressional participation in the formation of a war and 
foreign affair policy  with the president, I identify two elements for the level of 
congressional control over the content of policy: procedural control and substantive 
control. Procedural control stands for a lower level of congressional control over the 
presidential war and foreign policy making, whereas substantive control represents a 
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higher level of congressional control. This element is constructed in accordance with 
non-delegation doctrine and one of the conditions of good deliberation I identified in 
chapter 2: reciprocally political action.  
As I indicated in chapter 2, I believe that the fact that disagreement over 
constitutional interpretation is a constant in our political life entails that reciprocity is 
the standard for a  political action. Such a situation will prevent democratic 
deliberation and cooperation from falling apart and can in turn encourage future 
democratic deliberation. However, reciprocity does not necessarily suggest a 
consensus on a specific constitutional interpretation and policy, especially in terms of 
different moral values held by moral agents Following the basic principle of 
democratic deliberation, I argue that even if there is no consensus on the substance of 
a policy, each political actor should at least have a chance to provide her or his opinion 
on an action in a deliberative process. Therefore, the bottom-line standard is that a 
procedural control over the president is indispensible for Congress, as it can give 
Congress an opportunity to be informed and to take a yes or no position.  
From a legal perspective, the above bottom- line standard of reciprocal 
political action is consistent with the central tenet of non-delegation doctrine. In 
particular, the basic principle of non-delegation doctrine is to require Congress to 
make a substantive policy choice; further, it allows Congress to control the president 
through an “intelligible standard” provided in a law.13 However, in terms of the ever- 
changing and complex nature of war and foreign affair issues, it is natural to give the 
president discretion to provide war policy options and to make a public case for his 
own option first and then give Congress an opportunity to take a yes or no position in 
                                                 
13 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defesne Council Inc., 467 U.S. 367 (1984) (In 
determining what Congress may do in seeking assistance from another branch, the extent and character 
of that assistance must be fixed according to common sense and the inherent necessities of the 
government co-ordination).  
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a deliberative process. In other words, the purpose of non-delegation doctrine is to 
ensure that Congress has a meaningful and deliberative participation procedure to 
present its reason for a policy choice to the public sphere. Therefore, it is fair to say 
that a minimum standard of congressional control over the presidential war and 
foreign affair powers is a procedure that facilitates Congress’s own participation in 
and deliberation over a policy choice.   
2. Control Timing: Ex Ante/ Ex Post Control  
In terms of whether a presidential action is predicated on a law generated out of a 
deliberative process in advance, I identify another two elements for the level of 
congressional control over the presidential action: ex ante and ex post control. Ex ante 
control stands for a lower level of congressional control over the presidential war and 
foreign policy making, whereas ex post control represents a higher level of 
congressional control. This element is constructed in accordance with the original 
understanding of Declare War Clause and also the content of reciprocal political 
action mentioned above.  
The principle of reciprocal political action attempts to ensure that each political 
actor’s choice is based on a meaningfully deliberative action. If a policy deliberation is 
premised on a unilateral policy choice, it would not only decrease other political 
actors’ incentive to cooperate in future deliberation, but also impair the promise of 
reciprocal political action. Moreover, if the president tries to acquire a congressional 
authorization before initiating a use of force, the  constituents of each congressional 
member can discourse in the broader public sphere and with the president as well 
through “the nexus of public sphere, namely, Congress. This in turn gives the 
president more opportunity to understand what the better argument is regarding a war 
in the broader public sphere.  
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More important is the fact, in light of the British Crown’s dominant national 
security power between the fifteenth and eighteenth centuries, that the Founders 
expected the fundamental reason for enacting Declare War Clause to be protection of 
the people from life and property loss as a consequence of the president’s unilateral 
decision. In other words, the Founders suggested that one of the functions of Declare 
War Clause is to protect the great interests that could potentially be at stake. If this 
function could be realized, the president by definition should consult Congress by 
trying to persuade its members and acquire an authorization before taking a military 
action. Therefore, in the war power area, an ex ante congressional control over the 
presidential use of force is more ideally approximated to an ex post congressional 
control.  
In sum, congressional control index features two elements. The first element of 
congressional control index, control orientation, states that the greater the procedural 
mechanism provided in a law, the less influence Congress will have over presidential 
power, whereas if a greater substantive policy choice is provided in a law, the greater 
congressional influence on presidential power will be. Also, the second element of 
congressional control index, control timing, denotes that the earlier the president must 
provide a justification to Congress and the broader public sphere, the stronger the 
congressional check imposed on the president will be, whereas the later the president 
must provide a justification to Congress and the broader public sphere, the weaker the 
congressional check imposed on the president will be. Hence, the coding of a 
congressional control index follows the outline below. 
1. Control Orientation 
(0) No Control  
(1) Procedural Control 
(2) Substantive Control 
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(3) Procedural and Substantive Control  
2. Control Timing 
(0) No Control  
(1) Ex Post Control 
(2) Ex Ante Control 
The above two components are scalable. Therefore, I expect the coding categories to 
hang together reasonably well so that both of them can be combined to form a scale 
that can serve as an overall measure of the level of congressional control over the 
presidential power.  
B. Discourse Quality Index  
As the literature review on congressional deliberation suggests above, the 
development of a qualitative measurement of the quality of congressional deliberation 
is an indispensible step in testing the theory of deliberative democracy. Thanks to Jürg 
Steiner’s Discourse Quality Index, one can use his Index as a basis and also adjust it to 
measure the quality of public deliberation in accordance with a specific purpose. In the 
following passages, I will describe (1) the observation unit of each congressional 
member’s speech, that is, constitutional deliberation, and (2) the elements of my 
partially adjusted Discourse Quality Index.  
1. Observation Unit of Speech: Constitutional Deliberation over War Power 
The first question concerning the construction of the Discourse Quality Index is that of 
what constitutes my observation unit of each congressional member’s speech during 
floor debates. I mainly follow Habermas’s speech act theory and Steiner’s Discourse 
Quality Index to code every utterance by every member of Congress delivered in a 
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floor debate.14 Moreover, since one of the most important premises of deliberation is 
common knowledge or inter-subjectivity, which suggests that actors should know each 
other’s thoughts and take up their own thoughts in either a supportive or opposing 
way, I have to limit my observation unit of the speech act a specific issue.  
The research purpose of this dissertation is to investigate the war powers 
distribution between the president and Congress; therefore, I will limit the observation 
of congressional deliberation to those speech acts concerning the constitutional 
interpretation of war and foreign affair powers between the political branches.15 Under 
this premise of observation, a speech act about when or how the president should 
withdraw troops, for example, will not be included in my observation, even though 
one can argue that war policy is also indirectly constitutional in nature. As a result, if a 
discourse of a congressional member is not relevant to war power constitutional 
deliberation, I will merely code her or his discourse as 0.  
2. The Partially Adjusted Discourse Quality Index  
Steiner’s Discourse Quality Index is designed to measure congressional deliberation in 
order to compare how the political institutions of different countries influence the 
quality of congressional deliberation and decision- making in each case. That suggests 
that Discourse Quality Index is applicable to the research purpose of this dissertation. 
The original Discourse Quality Index consists of six elements: participation, level of 
justification, level of content of justification, respect toward groups, respect toward 
demands, respect toward counterarguments, and constructive politics. For the reasons 
I will explain in the following passages, I will illustrate an adjusted Discourse Quality 
                                                 
14 See JURG STEINER, supra note 18, at 55.  
15 For the meaning of constitutional deliberation, see J. MITCHELL PICKERILL, CONSTITUTIONAL 
DELIBERATION IN CONGRESS 11 (2004) (“Deliberation [indicates] reflection and debate over the scope 
of federal powers under the Constitution in the context of legislation.”)  
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Index that consists of only two elements used for this dissertation: (a) the level of 
justification and (b) the level of content of justification.  
a. Level of Justification 
Steiner refers to this category as “the nature of the justification for demands.”16 This 
category includes four levels of justifications: no justification, inferior justification, 
qualified justification, and sophisticated justification. Generally speaking, Steiner 
depicts these levels in accordance with the extent of rationales given by the speakers. 
In particular, a proposition that is given without any reason is deemed to have “no 
justification.” A proposition that is given with a reason, but where no linkage exists 
between the reason and proposition, is regarded as an “inferior justification.” If there 
is one reason given by the speaker, and the linkage between the reason and the 
proposition is explicit, then it is a “qualified justification.” If there are two or more 
“qualified justifications” provided by the speakers, they are treated as “sophisticated 
justifications.”  
To meet the context of the research on congressional constitutional 
deliberation, I include in my definition of justification of a constitutional interpretation 
the requirement that the language be linked with the Constitution. In other words, as 
long as a member of Congress delivers her or his conclusion on a constitutionality 
issue, that speech would at least be coded as level 1; otherwise, it would be coded as 0. 
Accordingly, I slightly change the definition of this category as follows: 
(0) No justification: no constitutional interpretation  
(1) Inferior justification: a constitutional interpretation without citing any 
constitutional provision 
                                                 
16 Id., at 57.  
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(2) Qualified justification: a constitutional interpretation with citation of a 
constitutional provision 
(3) Sophisticated justification: two or more qualified justifications.  
b. Level of Content of Justifications 
Steiner differentiates three levels of the content of justifications in this category: 
explicit statements concerning group interests, neutral statements, and explicit 
statements of the common good. The distinction between group interests and the 
common good is whether “one or more groups or constituencies are mentioned in a 
speech.” Because Steiner’s research is about parliamentary debates on policy 
concerning women’s equality, it is natural to distinguish “common good” speech from 
“group interest” speech. For the reason I explain below, in the context of this 
dissertation, I will differentiate a speech regarding only one-branch authority from that 
regarding two-branch authority.  
One of the premises of deliberative democracy is that all actors have a 
common interest and identity. This suggests that speakers are not motivated toward 
discussing issues with other actors if they do not share the same goal or value. Thus, 
Steiner treats the level of “common good” speech as higher than that of “group 
interest” speech. In the context of war powers debates, I think such “common good” 
speech is especially important because one of the basic functions of the Constitution, 
as provided in the Preamble, is to “provide for the common defense.” This “common 
defense” function mandates that a military action or war power as a whole should be 
wielded as a concurrent power by the government. In consequence, it is fair to 
differentiate a justification of a speech only regarding one-branch (either the president 
or Congress) authority from a justification of a speech regarding two-branch authority 
and treats the level of two-branch justification as higher than that of one-branch 
 64 
justification, which can duly reflect the spirit of “common defense” provided in the 
Preamble.  Accordingly, a slightly changed category of “level of content of 
justification” is listed as follows:  
(0) No constitutional statement: no constitutional justification  
(1) One-branch constitutional statement: a constitutional interpretation 
concerning only one-branch authority 
(2) Neutral statement: a constitutional justification without explicitly 
mentioning any branch’s authority 
(3) Two-branch constitutional statement: a constitutional interpretation 
concerning two-branch authority.  
3. Reasons for Exclusion of Other Elements of Discourse Quality Index  
The other elements of Discourse Quality Index, participation, respect, and 
constructive politics, will not be included in my adjusted Discourse Quality Index for 
several reasons. First, the original meaning of participation in Steiner’s Index stands 
for a speaker complaining that her or his speech is interrupted by another speaker. But 
in the record of the population employed in this thesis, there is no such “complaint” 
given by any member of Congress, which suggests that there is no statistical variation 
of this element. More importantly, since democratic deliberation is a premise for a law 
I think that the most important function of participation during the floor debate is 
whether a congressional member can take an action on the floor, namely, propose an 
amendment on the floor. In other words, I transform a subjective meaning of 
“participation” into an objectively institutional meaning. Therefore, I will code 
whether a floor debate rule is open-rule as another variable but not an element of 
Discourse Quality Index.  
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Second, the reason to exclude respect from the element of Discourse Quality 
Index is that at least two empirical studies on U.S. congressional deliberation already 
demonstrate that a congressional member’s discourse in U.S. is systematically higher 
than that in any other nation.17 Hence, I think it is not necessary to explore the 
relationship between the degree of respect and the level of congressional control over 
the president.  
Third, the original meaning of constructive politics is that a speaker makes an 
alternative proposal during a deliberation. I exclude this element from the Discourse 
Quality Index on the grounds that a speaker’s alternative proposal is not necessarily 
based on his or her constitutional justification. Therefore, to focus on the relationship 
between congressional deliberation and the level of congressional check on the 
president, it is appropriate to exclude this element from Discourse Quality Index for 
the purpose of this dissertation.  
IV. Hypotheses about Congressional Deliberation and the Balance of War Power 
As I already suggested in Section II, the purpose of researching congressional 
deliberation is to understand the dynamic interaction between congressional 
deliberation and the broader public sphere. Therefore, after illustrating the contents of 
two important indices for measuring the level of congressional control on the president 
and the quality of congressional deliberation, it is natural in the next step to establish 
for further empirical analyses the hypotheses of the relationship among congressional 
deliberation, congressional check, and the influence of deliberation on the presidential 
use of force. Moreover, if there is a statistical relationship between congressional 
deliberation and presidential use of force, it is also legitimate to explore the effects of 
institutional and non-institutional factors as well upon congressional deliberation.  
                                                 
17 See generally Jürg Steiner, supra note 6, at 122-5; also Dennis Thompson, supra note 12, at 511-3.  
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I will propose three main hypotheses concerning my principal empirical 
research questions about (1) the relationship between the level of congressional 
deliberation and the level of control over the president, (2) the relationship between 
the level of congressional control over the president and the presidential decision on a 
use of force, and (3) congressional participation structure and the quality of 
congressional deliberation. One more point needs to be briefly explained here. The 
following hypotheses only concern the effect of congressional deliberation on the level 
of congressional legal control over the president, presidential response to 
congressional legal control over his war power, and the effect of the congressional 
participation structure on the quality of congressional deliberation. Therefore, other 
hypotheses regarding non-deliberation factors contributing to the level of 
congressional control, the types of presidential response, or the quality of 
congressional deliberation will be described in the next section along with the list of 
independent variables. In the balance of this section, I will elucidate my three main 
hypotheses and their underlying theory in the balance of this section. 
A. Hypothesis about Congressional Deliberation and Legal Control over the President 
The main specific research question regarding this hypothesis is this: Is Congress 
more likely to attempt the imposition of a check on the presidential use of force after a 
higher level of deliberation over the constitutionality of a current or proposed 
presidential decision on use of force? The hypothesis in response to this question is:  
If Congress has a higher level of deliberation over the constitutionality of a 
current or possible presidential use of force, all else equal, then it is more likely to 
impose a higher level check on the president through the passage or rejection of 
legislation.  
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The theory underlying this hypothesis is that deliberative theorists argue that a 
higher level of deliberation is more likely to result in a more substantive agreement.18 
It is the persistent moral disagreement in the modern public sphere that motivates a 
great number of political theorists to call for democratic deliberation and to consider it 
a need. A deliberative process not only is a solution for debate by different moral 
agencies holding different moral values, but also expects to economize and thus 
accommodate their substantive moral disagreement after a good deliberation.19 
Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that a higher quality of good deliberation 
probably would generate a thicker consensus on a substantive moral agreement.  
In the war and foreign affair power areas, a higher quality of congressional 
deliberation over either the constitutionality of a use of force or the allocation of war 
and foreign affair powers between the political branches is especially important 
because most of the war and foreign affair powers fall, in within Justice Jackson’s 
famous term, within a “zone of twilight,” which needs members of Congress to 
mutually deliberate with each other and determine what the better allocation of war 
and foreign affair power is for each military event. Although it is possible within a war 
power debate that a higher level of constitutional deliberation often results from 
minority’s discontent with their inability to change a possible future or status quo 
policy but not a mutual deliberation among members of Congress, such higher level of 
constitutional deliberation at least creates an opportunity to force the majority to 
address such discontent in a public forum and may also create the opportunity to 
economize the substantive disparity between the minority and majority. As a 
consequence, if the argument made by the deliberative theorists holds, it is reasonable 
to expect that a higher quality of congressional deliberation is more likely to result in a 
                                                 
18 See AMY GUTTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT 79-94 (1996).  
19 Id. 
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convergence on a substantive and ex ante control over the presidential war and foreign 
affair policy making.  
B. Hypothesis about Congressional Legal Control over the President and Unilateral 
Presidential Action 
The main specific research question regarding this hypothesis is this: Is a higher level 
of congressional deliberation and thus attempt to impose a higher level of check on the 
president more likely to prevent the president from initiating a war unilaterally? The 
hypothesis in response to this question is:  
If Congress features a higher level of constitutional deliberation over the use of 
force and imposes a higher level of check on the president, all else equal, then 
Congress is more likely to prevent the president from initiating a war unilaterally. 
This hypothesis rests on one of the most important normative hypotheses of 
democratic deliberation argued by deliberative theorists, that is, deliberative theorists 
hypothesize that a higher quality of democratic deliberation is able to persuade people 
who have different opinions to accept a better argument. In particular, deliberative 
theorists argue that since a better argument is not a priori given but be found amid 
common deliberation, a person’s preference thus should and will be changed after a 
good deliberation. Recalling what I identified as good deliberation in chapter 2, the 
Constitution is a minimum public reason for the people to identify with and provide 
the shared principles or values to which political actors appeal. A better argument, 
from the perspective of deliberative democracy theory, thus should be reasonably 
accepted by all of the political actors participating into a good deliberation.  
I think it is especially legitimate for this dissertation to empirically investigate 
the presidential response to an attempt by Congress to impose a check on a use of 
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force, because modern presidents always claim the prerogative as Commander in 
Chief to decide the policy of war and peace. Such a constantly sharp disagreement 
over the allocation of war power between the president and Congress therefore 
provides an occasion to test the normative argument of deliberative theorists. In 
particular, what makes deliberative democracy theory different from strategic theory is 
that it holds that every political actor should yield to a better argument. An action 
should be based on “the unforced force of the better argument”20 but not a strategic 
calculation of countering the veto-pivotal members in Congress. When Congress 
deliberates over a policy of war and peace issue, the president can present his rationale 
through various formal and informal channels to persuade members of Congress to 
accept his argument if he thinks a congressional check over his war power is an 
unconstitutional encroachment on his prerogative. But if Congress decides to impose a 
legal check on his power based on a more persuasive argument, according to the 
normative argument of deliberative theorists, he should accept that more persuasive 
argument and not take a unilateral military action; otherwise, he can just veto it and 
give Congress and the broader public sphere another opportunity to deliberate. 
Therefore, I think it is crucial to explore the pattern of presidential response to a 
congressional check on his war power through empirical analysis.  
C. Hypothesis about Congressional Participation Structure and the Quality of 
Congressional Deliberation  
The main specific research question regarding this hypothesis is this: if either or both 
of the above hypotheses can be empirically confirmed, what kind of congressional 
law-making rule and political factors influence the quality of congressional 
deliberation? The hypothesis in response to this question is:  
                                                 
20 See JURGEN HABERMAS, supra note 11, at 305.  
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If congressional rule-setting is more information facilitative (e.g. referral of a bill 
to committee) and participation inclusive (e.g. no restrict on amendment 
proposal), all else equal, then Congress is more likely to have a higher level of 
war deliberation, regardless of the impact of non-congressional rule setting 
(political factors) such as presidential approval rating, election year, divided 
government, and the percentage of congressional members of the president’s 
party.  
This hypothesis consists of two sub-hypotheses. First, if congressional rule-
setting is more participation inclusive and information facilitative, then Congress is 
more like to have a higher level of war deliberation. Second, although congressional 
deliberation is likely to be affected by political factors, congressional setting is still the 
primary factor to keep congressional deliberation being stable and independent of ever 
changing political environment.  
The theory underlying the first sub-hypothesis is also based on the normative 
argument of deliberative theorists that none of the political actors in the political 
process should be excluded from discourse. One should also note that deliberation 
itself is not the end of deliberative process; a collective decision or political action is 
an indispensible element of democratic deliberation. The complete participation of 
Congress should allow congressional members not only to talk but also to act. Such 
speech and act requirements thus suggest that if members of Congress could make an 
amendment to a draft bill during a floor debate, then the congressional rule can be 
regarded as being more participation inclusive. In this vein, if a member of Congress 
is not allowed to propose an amendment to a draft bill, then she or he may have less 
incentive to present an argument on the floor, thus in turn generating a lower level of 
congressional deliberation.  
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Moreover, some deliberative theorists argue that the primary function of 
congressional committees is to collect the information specific to a bill, therefore 
providing information for members of Congress to debate on the floor. However, 
modern “unorthodox”21 congressional rules often bypass committee and give partisan 
leaders more discretion to decide policy. This undermines the information gathering 
function of the congressional committee. Thus, it is reasonable to hypothesize and 
investigate whether a more information facilitative rule would contribute to a higher 
level of congressional deliberation.  
The theory underlying the second sub-hypothesis above is two-fold. First, all 
democratic theorists agree that democratic representatives should be able to respond to 
and interpret the intention of their constituents. Hence, members of Congress attempt 
to reflect their constituents’ opinions during the floor debates. Second, though 
deliberative theorists argue that democratic representative should reflect what citizens 
think in the public sphere, deliberative theorists at the same time argue that democratic 
representatives should independently decide on their own according to a reasonable 
and better argument and try to deliberate with and persuade their constituents to accept 
their decision. Such arguments are also consistent with the Founders’ expectation that 
the institutional design of Congress could accomplish this two-fold goal of democratic 
representation and provide a Congress that is both independent and responsive through 
a wide-ranging election. Therefore, I think it is legitimate to explore whether 
congressional rule setting could ensure such independence and responsive functioning 
in a deliberation process.  
An exploration of these two sub-hypotheses is important in war and foreign 
affair deliberation because war policy-making is especially in need of a just cause. A 
relatively insulated congressional deliberative process could prevent the nation as a 
                                                 
21 See BARBARA SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING (2000).  
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whole from being pulled into a war without searching for a better argument. In the 
same time, the crafting of war-policy cannot happen without wide support from the 
public sphere. Therefore, whether and how congressional rule setting is able to 
maintain simultaneously an independent congressional deliberation and an 
interconnected public sphere is therefore worthy to be explored through empirical 
analysis.  
V. Variables and Dataset Collection  
To test Section IV’s empirical hypotheses, one more research design step is needed: a 
list of dependent and independent variables datasets. In the balance of this section, I 
will (1) illustrate all of the dependent variables that will be used in the empirical 
models in the next chapter and the sources from which I collect the data, and then (2) 
explain all of the independent variables that will be included in the empirical models 
and their sources. Independent variables listed below will be divided into institutional 
and political/ economic variables. Moreover, as I already reminded at the beginning of 
Section IV, based on other empirical researchers’ analyses, lots of non-congressional 
deliberation factors would influence the relationship between congressional check and 
the presidential use of force, which I did not elucidate in the main hypotheses above. 
Therefore, I will also briefly explain the hypotheses or argument for the effects that 
those non-congressional deliberation factors have on the level of congressional check, 
the presidential use of force, or the quality of congressional deliberation as they 
pertain to each independent variable when it is needed.  
A. Dependent Variables and the Dataset Resources  
There are three kinds of dependent variables that will be used in accordance with the 
three empirical hypotheses listed above: (1) the level of congressional control over the 
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president provided in a military deployment and non-military deployment law or 
rejection of a presidential proposal, (2) the president’s unilateral military deployment 
and non-military deployment actions, and (3) the level of congressional deliberation. 
Each variable will be explained in detail.  
1. Congressional Control Level in both Military Deployment and Non-military 
Deployment Law  
To define the military deployment law and non-military deployment law pertinent to a 
military event, one should first search a military event dataset and cluster the different 
congressional deliberations and bills thereof for each corresponding military event. I 
collect those military event datasets from the Correlates of War Project Dataset.22 This 
dissertation focuses on different use of force events occurring from 1989 to 2003.  
As I already suggested in my critique of conventional empirical research on 
presidential use of force, conventional research does not look into the level of 
congressional check on the presidential use of force and congressional management of 
a foreign affair crisis; thus I collect both military deployment and non-military 
deployment bills pertaining to each military event and code the level of congressional 
check provided in each bill. I will focus on the bills passed or rejected by Congress 
from 1989 to 2008. According to the military event timeline depicted by the Correlates 
of War Project Dataset, I cluster 229 bills into 14 military events; 38 of the bills are 
military deployment bills, whereas 191 of the bills are non-military deployment bills. 
A list of 14 military events and their relating bills is provided in Appendices A 
through N. Lastly, the coding criteria for the level of congressional legal control have 
already been explained in the presentation of the congressional control index in 
Section III.  
                                                 
22 http://www.correlatesofwar.org/  
 74 
2. Presidential Response to the Congressional Control  
As I have mentioned above, research on congressional deliberation generally neglects 
how other political actors in the broader public sphere respond to congressional 
decisions; thus the observations of these researchers are too static. Therefore, it is 
worthwhile to explore the pattern of presidential response to the congressional control 
over a use of force. The dependent variable here is whether the president takes a 
unilateral action to impair a congressional attempt to check on his war and foreign 
affair powers. If he does take a unilateral action, then it is coded as 1; otherwise, it is 
coded as 0.  
A unilateral presidential action, according to Philip Cooper, includes a mere 
dispatch of troops and the issuance of an executive order, national security directive, 
presidential memorandum, presidential proclamation, and presidential signing 
statement.23 The coding strategy here is to examine whether a unilateral presidential 
action would alter the level of congressional influence, including whether it could 
change a substantive control into a procedural control, whether it could alter an ex ante 
control into an ex post control, and whether it could change a mandatory provision 
into an advisory provision.  
I collect the executive orders from The National Archives Web site.24 National 
security directives are collected from the Federation of American Scientists Web 
site.25 Most, but not all presidential memoranda, and presidential signing statements 
can be found in The Public Papers of the President and The American Presidency 
                                                 
23 See PHILIP J. COOPER, BY ORDER OF THE PRESIDENT: THE USE AND ABUSE OF EXECUTIVE DIRECT 
ACTION (2002).  
24 http://www.archives.gov/  
25 http://www.fas.org/  
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Project website.26 A list of 14 military events and their relating presidential responses 
is also provided in Appendices A through N.  
3. The Level of Congressional Deliberation Quality  
The contents and coding categories of my adjusted congressional Discourse Quality 
Index have been explained in Section III. The contents of congressional floor debates 
are all recorded in Congressional Record (1989-2008). In total, I cluster 229 
congressional deliberations over the constitutionality of use of force into 14 military 
events according to the war timeline depicted by the Correlates of War Project 
Dataset.  
B. Independent Variables  
I divided independent variables into two kinds: (1) institutional variables and (2) 
political and economic factors variables. Each variable will be briefly described as 
follows.  
1. Institutional Variables  
a. Character of the Use of Force 
Several empirical studies of presidential use of force have suggested that the president 
tends to buy “political insurance”27 from Congress when a use of force might result in 
a higher level of hostility and thus greater American casualties. Additionally, the 
existence of a higher level of hostility might make an issue more salient to the 
legislators, motivating them to deliberate upon the issue before them. Therefore, some 
                                                 
26 http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/  
27 See Jide Nzelibe, A Positive Theory of the War-Powers Constitution, 91 IOWA L. REV. 993, 999 
(2006).  
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scholars argue that a more intense an expected hostility might be, the higher the level 
of congressional control over the president will have to be. Here, the coding of 
hostility level on a 1 through 5 scale provided by the Correlates of War Project will be 
applied. If a military event falls between hostility level 1 and 3, it will be coded as a 
minor force, whereas an event registered either 4 or 5 will be coded as a major force.  
I also create an alternative coding category regarding the character of a use of 
force: whether a use of force is employed for peacekeeping or humanitarian operation. 
The reason to create this category is because after the end of the Cold War, 
peacekeeping and humanitarian operation became an influential military action, 
especially during the 1990s. Hence, I will also alternatively code whether a military 
action is either of these action.  
b. Character of the Law  
I will distinguish a budget bill from a non-budget bill for an annual budget process, as 
the distinction may alter the bill’s impact on both the level of congressional check on 
the president and the quality of congressional deliberation. 
With regard to the level of congressional control, the Founders expected that, 
other than Declare War Clause, members of Congress could efficiently control 
presidential war power through congressional budget power. Thus, it is reasonable to 
hypothesize that members of Congress would provide for a higher level of control 
over the president in a budget bill.  
As for the quality of congressional deliberation, I distinguish deliberation over 
appropriations bill from that over “regular” law on the grounds that Congress only has 
a limited time to deliberate every year on an appropriations bill because of the 
pressure of time constraints. In addition, as some deliberative theorists suggest, 
appropriation processes can be regarded as a re-deliberation process, which may 
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contribute to a higher level of congressional deliberation. However, since the primary 
jurisdiction of an appropriation bill is different from the passage of a regular or annual 
authorization law, which may fall short of expert deliberation, I therefore think it is 
necessary to investigate whether the annual appropriation process has any significant 
impact on the quality of congressional deliberation as well. If a bill is an appropriation 
bill, it will be coded as 1; otherwise, it will be coded as 0. 
c. The Time Each Law Needs for Passage 
Although time is not necessarily a factor that affects the quality of deliberation and 
decision, some deliberative theorists argue that sometimes we should not make a quick 
decision but should rather take a longer time for another round of deliberation. 
Therefore, it is worthy to investigate whether the duration of each bill’s enaction 
process influences both the level of congressional deliberation and the level of control 
over the president. When I survey each passed law’s legislative history, I will also 
record the duration of each enacting process. The time unit here is a “month.” Thus, if 
a law is passed within one month, I will record it as one month.  
d. Closed Rule 
As I have suggested in Section IV, democratic deliberation does not regard 
deliberation itself as an end. It must allow political actors to take action; otherwise, it 
would decrease actor’s incentive to deliberate. Thus, in Section IV, I hypothesize that 
an adoption of closed-rule in a House floor debate would generate a lower level of 
congressional deliberation. If Congress adopts a closed rule, it will be coded as 1; 
otherwise, it will be coded as 0.  
 78 
e. Cloture 
So far there is no research on the relationship between the invocation of cloture in the 
Senate and the quality of congressional deliberation. My initial hypothesis is that an 
invocation of cloture would generate a higher level of congressional deliberation. That 
is because in the modern Senate, an invocation of cloture usually suggests that most of 
the senators have already addressed an issue and reached a consensus on a specific 
issue. This indicates that information is already facilitated among senators, which may 
in turn generate a higher level of congressional deliberation. If a cloture is invoked, it 
will be coded as 1; otherwise, it will coded as 0.  
f. Referral of a Bill to Committee 
I have also explained in Section IV that the primary function of a committee, to gather 
information on a pending bill, may significantly affect the quality of congressional 
deliberation in the floor debate. But the modern “unorthodox” lawmaking process 
often bypasses committee, which may decrease the level of congressional deliberation. 
Therefore, it is legitimate to explore whether referral of a bill to congressional 
committee would generate a higher level of congressional deliberation. If there is a 
referral of a bill to committee, it will be coded as 1; otherwise, it will be coded as 0.  
g. Committee Hearing 
Other than referral of a bill to congressional committee, some deliberative theorists 
and legislative process scholars also argue that a committee hearing would provide 
Congress more opportunity to gather information on a pending bill from the broader 
public sphere, which could subsequently facilitate a higher level of congressional 
deliberation. Hence, it is also reasonable to include this variable in the dataset to 
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explore the function of committee hearing. If there is a hearing held by committee 
hearing, it will be coded as 1; otherwise, it will be coded as 0.  
h. Filibuster  
From the perspective of deliberative democracy theory, the attempt by congressional 
members to prevent Congress from making a decision through a filibuster, suggests 
that the filibuster members do not have intention of mutually deliberating with other 
non-filibuster members. As democratic deliberation theory indicates, a lack of desire 
for mutual understanding is not a condition that generates good deliberation. Thus, it is 
fair to hypothesize that a filibuster would generate a lower level of congressional 
deliberation. I will introduce a filibuster dataset constructed by Overby and Bell to 
record whether a filibuster occurred during the deliberation of a bill.28 If a filibuster 
occurred, it will be coded as 1; otherwise, it will be coded as 0.   
i. Alliance  
Some rational choice theorists argue that war policy deliberation is only appreciated 
by a nation and its allies but not by non-alliance nations. More importantly, some 
argue that congressional members usually do not have sufficient information about 
non-alliance nations. Therefore, it is not necessary for Congress to deliberate over a 
war policy and send a signal based on wrong information to the non-alliance nations.29 
If this argument holds, one can hypothesize that congressional members may attempt 
to impose a lower level of control over the president when a war policy pertains to a 
                                                 
28 See Marvin Overby & Lauren Bell, Extended Debate Over Time: Patterns and Trends in the History 
of Filibusters in the U.S. Senate, Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political 
Science Association, Palmer House Hotel, Chicago, IL Online <APPLICATION/PDF>. 2010-01-24 
from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p196768_index.html 
29 See Jide Nzelibe & John Yoo, Rational War and Constitutional Design, 115 YALE L.J. 2512 (2006).   
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non-alliance nation. The Correlates of War Project Dataset provides the alliance and 
non-alliance relationship between each nation. I will code a U.S. alliance nation as 1; 
otherwise, I will code as 0.  
2. Political and Economic Variables    
a. Divided Government 
If the President’s party is the majority party in Congress, conventional wisdom 
demonstrates that he has greater discretion in the war powers field.30 However, this 
assumption may also contradict some demonstrations offered by deliberative theorists 
that non-polarized environments result in a higher level of deliberation, and thus have 
a higher level of congressional control over a war and foreign affair policy. Such 
different arguments provide a legitimate motivation to examine which argument is 
possibly more statistically persuasive. A divided government will be coded as 1; a 
unified government will be coded as 0.  
b. Ideological Disparity between the President and Congress 
Every person’s ideology definitely affects his or her communication with others. Other 
than the above “divided government” variable, I think ideological disparity between 
the president and Congress also represents the situation of polarization of the political 
branches. Thus, whether a communication can achieve an ideal result is contingent on 
the ideological difference between the communicators. Since deliberative theorists 
argue that greater ideological difference may generate a lower level of deliberation, I 
hypothesize that a greater ideological difference between the president and Congress 
                                                 
30 See e.g. DAVID R. MAYHEW, DIVIDED WE GOVERN (2005); William G. Howell and Jon C. 
Pevehouse, supra note 28, at 218-219.  
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would generate a lower level of congressional check on the president. The data on 
ideological differences can be acquired from The Voteview Website.31  
c. Presidential Approval Rating  
Some scholars find that presidential approval ratings are a highly significant 
determinant of a presidential decision on the use of force.32 In particular, several 
researchers demonstrate that the president tends to initiate a war when his approval 
rating is low, which may create an opportunity for a “rally around the flag” effect. If 
this demonstration holds, it is also reasonable to hypothesize that when the presidential 
approval rating is lower, congressional check over the president is higher because 
members of Congress expect that the president may attempt to initiate a war. 
Therefore, I will also include this variable by using the Gallup approval rating for the 
President.33  
d. The Percentages of Congressional Members of the President’s Party 
As Howell and Pevehouse suggest, the “divided government” variable contains the 
least amount of information about the relationship between the president and 
Congress, which demands that researchers include other alternative variables to denote 
the relationship between the political branches. One of the alternative variables 
employed by Howell and Pevehouse for presidential war power research is to record 
the percentages of congressional members of the president’s party. They find that a 
lower percentage of members from the president’s party in Congress would result in a 
                                                 
31 http://voteview.com/  
32 See Charles W. Ostrom, Jr. & Brian Job, The President and the Political Use of Force, 80 AMERICAN 
POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW 542 (1986).  
33 The rating can be acquired from Roper Center for Public Opinion Research in Lexis database. 
 82 
lower probability of a use of force. Therefore, I will also include this alternative 
variable into the dataset to see if the level of congressional check is also affected by 
the percentages of congressional members of the president’s party. The data for this 
variable can be acquired from the American Presidency Project mentioned above.  
e. Election Year 
Because election results, whether for congressional or for presidential elections, may 
substantially affect the incumbent president’s or congressional member’s opportunity 
to be reelected, both Congress and the president will definitely take possible election 
results into account, and thereby affect the level of congressional control over a war 
and foreign affair policy. Moreover, inclusion of this variable into the dataset can also 
test whether the institutional design of Congress does in fact provide Congress with an 
independent competence to deliberate as the Founders expect, regardless of the effect 
of other political factors such as election. Hence, the uncertainty of the effect of 
election legitimately motivates me to include it as a variable here. Election year will 
be coded as 1; otherwise, it will be coded as 0. 
f. Economic Factors  
Some researchers have shown that poor economic performance is more likely to push 
the nation toward a war. Therefore, following Howell and Pevehouse’s literature, I 
will also include the Unemployment Rate, Annual GDP, and the Consumer Price 
Index into the control variables. The data can be acquired from the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics.34  
                                                 
34 http://www.bls.gov/  
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CHAPTER 4: 
CONGRESSIONAL DELIBERATION, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER AND 
IDEAL CONGRESSIONAL DELIBERATION SITUATION 
After illustrating my preparatory work for empirical research on war power, I will 
present in this chapter the results of the three main empirical models regarding 
congressional deliberation and presidential use of force. These models have been 
constructed according to the hypotheses and different variables I laid down in chapter 
3. The relationships these three empirical models analyze include: (1) the relationship 
between the quality of congressional deliberation over the constitutionality of a current 
or presidentially proposed use of force and the level of congressional control over the 
president, (2) the pattern of presidential response to the congressional attempt of 
control over the presidential war and foreign affair power, and (3) the relationship 
between congressional rules and the quality of congressional deliberation. 
In the following sections, I will illustrate both descriptive and regression 
results for each of these empirical models. Here, I briefly describe the main regression 
results of each. The first model shows that if Congress exhibits a higher level of 
deliberation, then it attempts to impose a higher level of check on the president 
through the passage or rejection of legislation. The second model shows that once 
Congress regulates a military deployment, the president systematically resists such 
regulation and takes unilateral action alone. Although neither deliberation nor legal 
regulation on war can necessarily prevent the president from unilaterally taking 
military action, I argue that a better congressional deliberation would create an 
unequivocal voice within Congress and an opportunity to invite the president to be 
charged with greater political accountability in the public sphere. Therefore, an 
empirical investigation into the relationship between congressional rule-setting and the 
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quality of congressional deliberation is legitimate. The third model demonstrates that 
although some political factors, including presidential approval rating and the advent 
of an election year, influence the level of congressional deliberation, congressional 
rule-setting is the primary factor to determine the level of congressional deliberation. 
I. Modeling the Deliberation and Control of Presidential War Power 
Does “good” deliberation necessarily generate a “good” outcome? In terms of the 
presidential-congressional relation in the war power field, as I mentioned in chapter 2, 
the Founders expected that a reasonable and balanced allocation of war-making power 
would be one in which Congress could be able to control the presidential war power 
through deliberation. Nevertheless, it is not congressional deliberation itself that 
controls presidential war power. Congress attempts to control over the president 
through rejection or passage of legislation. Law is the primary mechanism through 
which Congress attempts to impose a check on the president. 
Therefore, as I suggested in chapter 3, the empirical analyses of the 
relationship between congressional deliberation and the presidential war power should 
be able to answer two empirical questions: (1) does Congress more likely attempt to 
impose a check on the presidential use of force after a good deliberation over the 
constitutionality of a current or proposed presidential decision on use of force? and (2) 
is a higher level of congressional deliberation and thus a higher level of congressional 
check on the president more likely to prevent the president from taking a unilateral use 
of force? The results of the first empirical question will be addressed in this section, 
and that of the second empirical question will be illustrated in the next. 
In addition to the model regarding the relationship between the quality of 
congressional deliberation and the level of check on the presidential war power, I also 
listed in chapter 3 other variables— including the level of hostility (major v. minor 
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force), foreign assistance, and alliance— or alternative hypotheses made by other 
presidential war power researchers. In this section, after presenting my primary 
“deliberation” model, I will also include those alternative variables respectively into 
my “deliberation” model as a robustness check of my primary model. 
Accordingly, in the balance of this section, I will (1) explain the variables 
included for the primary “deliberation” model and statistical model selection; (2) 
present descriptive and regression results of the primary “deliberation” model; (3) 
present the results of the robustness check of the primary model. 
A. Variables for Congressional Deliberation and Control of Presidential War Power 
Although all of the variables and hypotheses thereof were already described in chapter 
3, I have not specified what variables are included for each hypothesis. Hence, I 
briefly explain the variables I employ for the first empirical question: Does Congress 
more likely attempt to impose a check on the presidential use of force after a good 
deliberation over the constitutionality of a current or proposed presidential decision on 
use of force? 
The main dependent variable for this question is the level of congressional 
check on presidential power, namely, congressional control index, which I labeled as 
CtrlScale. Since this index consists of two scalable sub-categories, on top of testing 
the combination of those two sub-categories as an overall congressional control index, 
I will also test those two sub-categories respectively. In particular, the first category is 
CtrlOrientation, which stands for procedural control, substantive control, or both 
kinds of controls over the president. The second category is CtrlTime, which indicates 
whether any clause provides that Congress has the opportunity at least to be informed 
by the president or executive branch before a presidential or executive action. 
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The key independent variable here is the quality of constitutional 
deliberation, namely, Discourse Quality Index. Since Discourse Quality Index also 
consists of two sub-categories, the level of justification (labeled as Justification) and 
the level of content (labeled as Content), I will test them respectively. 
Other institutional independent variables I enumerated in chapter 3 that may 
influence the level of constitutional deliberation might also influence the level of 
congressional control on presidential power. As a result, in the statistical models that 
follow, I will also use them in this model, including whether a bill is an annual 
authorization and appropriation bill (labeled as LawCharacter), whether a committee 
holds a hearing (labeled as HComHearing/SComHearing), whether a bill is referred to 
committee (labeled as HCom/SCom), and the state of both chambers’ floor rules 
(labeled as ClosedRule/Cloture). 
The independent political and economic variables I will include for this 
model are the divided government (labeled as DividedGov), the election year (labeled 
as Election), the presidential approval rating (labeled as Approval), the percentage of 
congressional members of the president’s party (labeled as PercentParty), the 
ideological disparity between an incumbent president and Congress (labeled as 
IdeoGap), the gross domestic product (labeled as GDP), the unemployment rate 
(labeled as Unemployment), and the consumer price index (labeled as CPI). 
B. Descriptive Results of Congressional Control Index v. Congressional Deliberation 
In this part, I will report the descriptive results of the main dependent variables of the 
first model in this section, ControlScale, and its relationship with Justification. Two 
preliminary conclusions are found in this descriptive result. First, the mean of overall 
congressional control index (ControlScale) and its sub-categories (CtrlOrientation and 
CtrlTime) suggests that Congress tends to impose substantive and ex post policy 
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control over the president through passage of legislation. Second, an initial t-test 
shows that a higher level of congressional deliberation correlates with a higher level of 
congressional control over the president, which suggests that a further regression 
analysis is needed. 
Table 4.1 shows that the average Overall ControlScale (CtrlOrientation + 
CtrlTime) is 2.56, varying from 0 to 5. Looking into the subcategories of 
ControlScale, the table shows that the average CtrlOrientation is 2.04, and CtrlTime is 
0.52. Because the mean CtrlOrientation and CtrlTime of the original measurement are 
1.5 and 1 respectively, the actually average of CtrlOrientation (2.04) and Ctrltime 
(0.52) may suggest that Congress attempts to impose a substantive and ex post policy 
control over the president through passage of legislation. 
Table 4.1. Descriptive Results of Congressional Deliberation and Control Scale 
(Results by Military Deployment, Foreign Affair and Overall Cases) 
Descriptive Results (Overall Cases)  
Variables  N  Mean  SD   Max  Min 
Justification  229  0.174  0.273  1.035  0 
Content  229  0.157  0.25  1  0 
Major 
Justification 
229  0.253  0.436  1  0 
Major 
Content 
229  0.336  0.473  1  0 
Control 
Scale 
229  2.559  1.358  5  0 
Control 
Orientation 
229  2.044  0.972  3  0 
Control Time  229  0.515  0.698  2  0 
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Table 4.1 (Continued) 
Descriptive Results (Military Deployment Cases)  
Variables  N  Mean  SD   Max  Min 
Justification  38  0.277  0.337  1.026  0 
Content  38  0.255  0.311  0.948  0 
Major 
Justification 
38  0.421  0.5  1  0 
Major 
Content 
38  0.474  0.506  1  0 
Control 
Scale 
38  2.553  1.554  5  0 
Control 
Orientation 
38  1.985  1.085  3  0 
Control Time  38  0.658  0.745  2  0 
Descriptive Results (Foreign Affair Cases)  
Variables  N  Mean  SD   Max  Min 
Justification  191  0.154  0.254  1.035  0 
Content  191  0.138  0.232  1  0 
Major 
Justification 
191  0.22  0.415  1  0 
Major 
Content 
191  0.309  0.463  1  0 
Control 
Scale 
191  2.56  1.32  5  0 
Control 
Orientation 
191  2.073  0.949  3  0 
Control Time  191  0.487  0.687  2  0 
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Moreover, a comparison of the average ControlScale between the military 
deployment (2.55) and non-military deployment (2.56) cases seems to indicate that 
there is no significant difference between them. However, two sub-categories, 
CtrlOrientation and CtrlTime, appear to exhibit greater variance. In the case of 
military deployment, they are 1.89 and 0.66 respectively, whereas in the case of non-
military deployment they are 2.07 and 0.49 respectively. More interestingly, according 
to one-sample test, the data shows that only the average CtrlOrientation and CtrlTime 
in the case of non-military deployment are significantly greater than those in the case 
of military deployment, but the average CtrlOrientation and CtrlTime of a military 
deployment case are not significantly greater than those of a non-military deployment 
case. That may suggest that the level of congressional attempt of control on the 
president’s military deployment power may have a systematic situation, whereas 
control on the non-military deployment power may not. However, that still needs to be 
confirmed by further regression tests. 
Table 4.2 shows the cross relationship between the level of congressional 
deliberation and the level of congressional control. I divided the level of congressional 
deliberation into high and low deliberations. According to a preliminary t-test, it does 
show that a higher level of congressional control (ControlScale) correlates with a high 
deliberation (Justification). The same patterns of correlation also exist between the 
two sub-categories of the level of congressional control scale (CtrlOrientation and 
CtrlTime) and the level of deliberation (Justification). 
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Table 4.2. Congressional Discourse Quality v. Congressional Control Index  
Panel A. Congressional Discourse Quality v. Congressional Control Index 
Congressional Control Index     
0  1  2  3  4  5  Total 
High Deliberation  20  14  74  27  33  3  171 
Low Deliberation  3  1  12  8  23  11  58 
Total   23  15  86  35  56  14  229 
Pearson chi2(5) = 38.9172; Pr = 0.000 
Panel B. Congressional Discourse Quality v. Congressional Control Index (CtrlOrientation)  
Congressional Control Index    Level of  
0  1  2  3  Total 
High Deliberation  21  25  70  55  171 
Low Deliberation  3  6  15  34  58 
Pearson chi2(3) = 13.1243; Pr = 0.004 
Panel C. Congressional Discourse Quality v. Congressional Control Index (CtrlTime)  
Congressional Control 
Index  
  
 
0  1  2  Total 
High Deliberation  121  40  10  171 
Low Deliberation  17  24  17  58 
Total   138  64  27  229 
Pearson chi2(2) = 37.5830; Pr = 0.000 
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C. Model Selection and Main Model Results 
The preliminary t-test and descriptive results above show that the level of 
congressional deliberation does correlate with the level of congressional attempt of 
control over the president. To further understand the predictability of their 
relationship, a model for regression analysis is needed. In the following passages, I 
will (A) explain the reason for and premise behind applying ordinal model regression 
for testing the relationship between congressional deliberation and congressional 
control, and (B) then report the results of the regression model. 
1. Ordinal Model Selection 
Since my main dependent variable, congressional control index, is ordinal and need 
not be divided into high and low congressional control, it is appropriate to apply 
ordinal regression to the main dependent variable in this research. In consequence, I 
examine on the one hand whether the assumption of ordinal logit model (the parallel 
regression assumption) is satisfied,1 and what approach, on the other hand, 
(cumulative, stage, or adjacent ordinal variable) should be employed to construct such 
an ordinal dependent variable.2 
First, I test the parallel regression assumption by using an approximate 
likelihood-ratio test. This test shows that, by including all of the variables I 
enumerated in the previous section, the parallel regression assumption can be rejected 
at the 0.01 level. Therefore, the assumption of parallel regression is not violated. 
Second, a cumulative approach to ordinal variables is usually applied in order to 
predict a continuous latent variable. However, since legislation is a public but not a 
                                                            
1 See J. Scott Long & Jeremy Freese, Regression Models for Categorical Dependent Variables Using 
Stata 197-9 (2006).  
2 See generally Andrew S. Fullterton, A Conceptual Framework for Ordered Logistic Regression 
Models, 38 SOCIOLOGICAL METHODS & RESEARCH 306 (2009).  
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latent observation, it is not appropriate to employ a cumulative approach.3 Moreover, 
because this study focuses on the final outcome of both chamber’s floor actions, one 
need not model the differences between any other possible sequence--thus a stage 
approach to deriving a main dependent variable is not applied here.4 Finally, since the 
scale of congressional control neither actually represents continuous and latent 
distributions nor operates as a sequence of stages in this dissertation, it is ideal to 
employ the adjacent approach for the ordinal variable of this kind. 5 
2. Main Model Results 
In the following two parts, I will not only report the relationship between 
congressional deliberation and congressional attempt of control on presidential power 
in military deployment case and non-military deployment case respectively, but also 
report the relationship between other important institutional or non-institutional 
variables and the level of congressional attempt of control over the president. 
In short, the level of congressional deliberation positively influences the level 
of congressional attempt of control both in military deployment and in non-military 
deployment cases. In addition, certain institutional variables—including adoption of 
closed-rule, referral of a bill to House’s committee, and deliberation over annual 
budget bill— would statistically influence the level of congressional attempt of control 
in military deployment cases, whereas the adoption of closed-rule would not influence 
the level of congressional attempt of control in non-military deployment cases. Lastly, 
among political and economic variables, including lower presidential approval rating 
and lower percentage of congressional members of the president’s party in Congress, 
                                                            
3 Id., at 306.  
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
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are positively correlated with the level of congressional attempt of control in military 
deployment cases, whereas only lower presidential approval rating would 
systematically generate a higher level of congressional control. I will explain these 
results in detail as follows. 
a.. Military Deployment Case 
i. The Effects of Deliberation and Institutional Variables on Congressional Control 
The first model reported here posits the scale of congressional control over the 
president’s military deployment power as a function of the level of constitutional 
deliberation and the deliberative institutional variables. Table 4.3 shows that the level 
of constitutional Justification is highly and positively correlated with the 
congressional control scale. Moreover, a bill referred to the House committee is also 
positively correlated with the level of congressional attempt of control over the 
president. Although I do not report the effect of the level of Content (Table 4.4) on the 
congressional control scale here, it also reveals a comparable pattern. 
A further look into two sub-categories of ControlScale (Table 4.5, Table 4.6, 
Table 4.7, and Table 4.8) shows that, in fact, the levels of both constitutional 
Justification and Content have a significantly positive effect only on CtrlTime but not 
on CtrlOrientation. Therefore, a higher level of constitutional deliberation seems that 
only consistently generates ex ante or ex post control but has nothing to do with 
procedural or substantive control on the president in the case of military deployment. 
In other words, congressional members may be more concerned with having the 
president consult with Congress before a military deployment than with forming a 
substantive policy.6 
                                                            
6 The above finding is relatively inconsistent with Steiner’s finding on the relation between the level of 
deliberative content and outcome. Specifically, Steiner’s research reveals that a higher discourse quality 
of Content does not have a statistically significant effect on the deliberative outcome, while my dataset 
shows that the level of Content does have a significant effect. Of course, a different research subject can 
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As for the effects of other institutional variables, Table 4.3 and Table 4.4 also 
show that the congressional budget bill generates a positively significant effect on the 
scale of congressional control over the president’s military deployment power. That 
suggests that the Founders’ ideal, separation of money and sword,7 seems to have been 
successfully realized in the constitutional mechanism that they expected to create.8 
It is also noteworthy that the holding of a committee hearing would 
significantly reduce the level of congressional attempt of control over the president’s 
military deployment power. I argue that this is because the function of committee 
hearing in the modern Congress is more similar to an arena for “political ritual” but 
not deliberative sphere. My model could not understand why the inclusion of political 
context variables into this model causes the direction associated with a holding of 
committee hearing appearing so different from the other variables provided above. But 
as Sinclair suggests, with the utilization of an unorthodox lawmaking process and the 
involvement of increasingly complicated interests, a committee hearing becomes 
merely a tool to temper the tension among conflicting interests.9 As such, the function 
of the committee hearing is not to serve as a channel for the facilitation of moral-
                                                                                                                                                                           
be a reason for the different findings. However, another possible explication for such different findings 
may be more institutional. Steiner’s case is a debate in the German Federal Mediation Committee, a 
constitutionally mandated organization with the authority to mediate differences between the Federal 
Diet and the Council. The organizational statute of the Committee provides that the Committee’s 
deliberation is not open to the public. The record of its members’ debate will not be disclosed until five 
years after the decision. Although a high-quality deliberation sometimes requires a non-public arena, it 
inevitably may increase the possibility of power politics and reduce the accuracy of some indicators of 
discourse quality. See JÜRG STENINER, ANDRÉ BÄCHTIGER, MARKUS SPÖRNDLI, AND MARCO R. 
STEEBERGEN, DELIBERATIVE POLITICS IN ACTION 138-64 (2004).    
7 See Louis Fisher, Presidential War Power 10-12 (2004).  
8 The result shows that when a budget bill is enacted, the highest probability (63%) of the level of 
control is 4--that is, either “substantive and ex ante control” or “procedural, substantive, and ex post 
control.”  
9 See Barbara Sinclair, Unorthodox Lawmaking 229 (2000).  
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political deliberation, but to serve as an arena of political ritual in which compromise 
may be forged between conflicting interests. 
ii. The Effects of Political and Economic Variables on Congressional Control 
By further complicating the above model by controlling for and integrating the 
political and domestic economic context variables into the model showing that some 
core deliberative procedural variables are strengthened and several political and 
economic variables also have a statistically significant effect on the congressional 
control scale. 
The results presented in Table 4.3 show that lower presidential approval rating 
and lower percentage of congressional members of the president’s party will generate 
a statistically higher level of congressional control, whereas divided government has 
only a negatively marginal effect on the level of congressional attempt to control over 
the president. Moreover, it is worthwhile to note that high unemployment rates 
negatively correlate with the level of congressional attempt of control over the 
president’s military deployment power. Both Ostrom et al. and Howell et al. find that 
“economic misery” results in higher levels of military activity and opportunities for 
the president to use military force. My finding here can provide an additional evidence 
for the claim that a systematically lower level of congressional attempt of control over 
the president during economic misery is another mechanism contributing to the higher 
level of military deployment. 
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Table 4.3. Congressional Control Scale and Discourse Quality of Constitutional Justification  
Dependent Variable= ControlScale 
Military Deployment Cases   Non‐military Cases   Overall Cases  
 
No Political and 
Economic 
Context 
Political and 
Economic 
Context 
Included 
No Political 
Context 
Political and 
Economic 
Context 
Included 
No Political 
Context 
Political and 
Economic 
Context  
Included 
Ideological Cleavage 
Included  
 
Justification  5.215*** 
(3.27) 
14.919** 
(2.27) 
3.611*** 
(4.18) 
3.738*** 
(4.21) 
3.415*** 
(4.81) 
3.562*** 
(4.61) 
3.603*** 
(5.2) 
 
LawCharacter  4.565*** 
(3.63) 
8.206*** 
(3.50) 
0.681 
(1.39) 
0.692 
(1.18) 
1.281*** 
(2.82) 
1.295** 
(2.34) 
1.283** 
(2.22) 
 
HComHearing  ‐2.167 
(‐0.87) 
‐5.177*** 
(‐3.54) 
‐0.646 
(‐1.61) 
‐0.567 
(‐1.39) 
‐0.799** 
(‐2.17) 
‐0.603 
(‐1.63) 
‐0.649** 
(‐2.1) 
 
SComHearing  ‐0.07 
(‐0.1) 
‐2.433 
(‐1.48) 
‐0.198 
(‐0.9) 
‐0.362 
(‐1.53) 
‐0.338** 
(‐2.03) 
‐0.587*** 
(‐2.63) 
‐0.354 
(‐1.43) 
 
ClosedRule  3.002** 
(2.02) 
6.875** 
(2.17) 
0.156 
(0.61) 
0.135 
(0.43) 
0.483 
(1.58) 
0.559 
(1.44) 
0.560 
(1.55) 
 
Cloture  1.106 
(0.66) 
5.183 
(1.08) 
0.088 
(0.3) 
‐0.236 
(‐0.77) 
0.232 
(0.86) 
‐0.131 
(‐0.43) 
‐0.284 
(‐0.94) 
 
HCom  1.139*** 
(2.6) 
3.391*** 
(4.89) 
0.226** 
(2.21) 
0.276*** 
(2.45) 
0.322*** 
(2.75) 
0.378*** 
(2.73) 
0.411*** 
(3.05) 
 
SCom   0.376 
(0.55) 
3.503 
(1.24) 
0.024 
(0.29) 
0.064 
(0.7) 
0.041 
(0.4) 
0.089 
(0.71) 
0.117 
(1.01) 
 
DividedGov    ‐12.731* 
(‐1.65)  
  ‐0.513 
(‐1.13) 
  ‐0.907** 
(‐2.07) 
‐0.358 
(‐1.12) 
 
Ordinal logit regressions estimated. ***=p<0.01; **=p<0.05; *=p<0.10  
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Table 4.3 (Continued) 
Dependent Variable= ControlScale 
Military Deployment Cases   Non‐military Cases   Overall Cases  
 
No Political and 
Economic 
Context 
Political and 
Economic 
Context 
Included 
No Political 
Context 
Political and 
Economic 
Context 
Included 
No Political 
Context 
Political and 
Economic 
Context  
Included 
Ideological Cleavage 
Included  
 
Election    ‐0.174 
(‐0.04) 
  0.062 
(0.18) 
  ‐0.281 
(‐0.83) 
‐0.329 
(‐0.92) 
 
Approval    8.487 
(0.67) 
  ‐3.017** 
(‐2.55) 
  ‐2.333** 
(‐2.08) 
‐2.695** 
(‐2.21) 
 
PercentParty    ‐83.459* 
(‐1.72) 
  ‐8.372 
(‐1.47) 
  ‐10.409** 
(‐2.07) 
3.488 
(0.85) 
 
GDP    ‐0.004 
(‐0.12) 
  0.002*** 
(0.27) 
  0.002*** 
(0.31) 
0.001** 
(0.2) 
 
CPI    0.022 
(0.46) 
  0.002 
(0.32) 
  ‐0.001 
(‐0.22) 
‐0.002 
(‐0.41) 
 
Unemployment    ‐2.647** 
(‐2.33) 
  0.065 
(0.49) 
  ‐0.021 
(‐0.14) 
‐0.022 
(‐0.18) 
 
IdeoGap              12.035*** 
(3.19) 
 
N  38  38  191  191  229  229  229   
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Table 4.4. Congressional Control Scale and Discourse Quality of Congressional Content  
Dependent Variable= ControlScale 
Military Deployment Cases   Non‐military Cases   Overall Cases  
 
No Political 
Context 
Political and 
Economic 
Context Included 
No Political 
Context 
Political and 
Economic 
Context 
Included 
No Political 
Context 
Political and 
Economic Context  
Included 
Ideological 
Cleavage Included  
Content  6.148*** 
(3.11) 
19.145*** 
(2.90) 
3.981*** 
(4.32) 
4.197*** 
(4.37) 
3.657*** 
(4.54) 
3.87*** 
(4.5) 
3.87*** 
(4.79) 
LawCharacter  4.98*** 
(3.62) 
9.975*** 
(2.79) 
0.624 
(1.28) 
0.635 
(1.09) 
1.249*** 
(2.67) 
1.278** 
(2.28) 
1.266** 
(2.16) 
HComHearing  ‐2.768 
(‐1.21) 
‐6.750** 
(‐2.27) 
‐0.626 
(‐1.54) 
‐0.551 
(‐1.34) 
‐0.781** 
(‐2.1) 
‐0.597 
(‐1.63) 
‐0.644** 
(‐2.11) 
SComHearing  ‐0.268 
(‐0.56) 
‐4.019 
(‐1.46) 
‐0.189 
(‐0.89) 
‐0.362 
(‐1.57) 
‐0.322** 
(‐2.02) 
‐0.578*** 
(‐2.72) 
‐0.346 
(‐1.47) 
ClosedRule  3.553** 
(2.06) 
7.859*** 
(2.88) 
0.2 
(0.74) 
0.184 
(0.55) 
0.531 
(1.63) 
0.619 
(1.48) 
0.616 
(1.59) 
Cloture  1.047 
(0.57) 
5.016 
(1.51) 
0.106 
(0.35) 
‐0.249 
(‐0.75) 
0.251 
(0.92) 
‐0.142 
(‐0.46) 
0.292 
(‐0.94) 
HCom  1.163** 
(2.34) 
4.576*** 
(2.61) 
0.231** 
(2.2) 
0.281** 
(2.43) 
0.327*** 
(2.75) 
0.385*** 
(2.73) 
0.418*** 
(3.06) 
SCom   0.365 
(0.5) 
3.38 
(2.1) 
0.005 
(0.06) 
0.042 
(0.45) 
0.022 
(0.21) 
0.067 
(0.53) 
0.095 
(0.8) 
DividedGov    ‐13.003** 
(‐2.51) 
  ‐0.431 
(‐0.91) 
  ‐0.86* 
(‐1.91) 
‐0.317 
(‐1.00) 
Ordinal logit regressions estimated. ***=p<0.01; **=p<0.05; *=p<0.10  
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Table 4.4 (Continued) 
Dependent Variable= ControlScale 
Military Deployment Cases   Non‐military Cases   Overall Cases  
 
No Political 
Context 
Political and 
Economic 
Context Included 
No Political 
Context 
Political and 
Economic 
Context 
Included 
No Political 
Context 
Political and 
Economic Context  
Included 
Ideological 
Cleavage Included  
Election    ‐2.922 
(‐1.35) 
  0.055 
(0.16) 
  ‐0.309 
(‐0.9) 
‐0.356 
(‐0.98) 
Approval    2.224 
(0.39) 
  ‐3.184*** 
(‐2.87) 
  ‐2.546** 
(‐2.42) 
‐2.899** 
(‐2.53) 
PercentParty    ‐88.794** 
(‐2.36) 
  ‐8.284 
(‐1.46) 
  ‐10.382** 
(‐2.08) 
3.392 
(0.85) 
GDP    ‐0.002 
(‐0.05) 
  0.002*** 
(0.29) 
  0.002*** 
(0.32) 
0.001** 
(0.21) 
CPI    0.145 
(1.00)  
  0.002 
(0.33) 
  ‐0.001 
(‐0.19) 
‐0.002 
(‐0.36) 
Unemployment    ‐3.438** 
(‐2.11) 
  0.049 
(0.39) 
  ‐0.035 
(‐0.25) 
‐0.035 
(‐0.28) 
IdeoGap              11.938*** 
(3.01) 
N  38  38  191  191  229  229  229 
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Table 4.5. Congressional Control Orientation and Discourse Quality of Constitutional Justification  
 Dependent Variable= CtrlOrientation  
Military Deployment Cases   Non‐Military Deployment Cases   Overall Cases 
 
No Political 
Context 
Political and 
Economic Context 
Included 
No Political 
Context 
Political and 
Economic 
Context 
Included 
No Political 
Context 
Included 
Political and Economic 
Context Included 
   
Justification   1.743 
(1.43) 
5.511** 
(2.18) 
2.457** 
(2.55) 
2.833** 
(2.58) 
2.111*** 
(3.06) 
2.547*** 
(2.86) 
   
LawCharacter  3.998*** 
(4.06) 
4.796*** 
(3.33) 
0.501 
(0.82) 
0.522 
(0.63) 
1.065** 
(2.01) 
1.111 
(1.53) 
   
HComHearing  ‐2.421 
(‐1.44) 
‐2.677 
(‐1.28) 
‐0.455 
(‐1.2) 
‐0.004 
(‐0.01) 
‐0.609 
(‐1.64) 
‐0.065 
(‐0.18) 
   
SComHearing  ‐0.242 
(‐1.44) 
‐1.391** 
(‐2.47) 
‐0.006 
(‐0.02) 
‐0.33 
(‐1.03) 
‐0.109 
(‐0.48) 
‐0.564** 
(‐2.15) 
   
ClosedRule  1.489 
(1.34) 
2.985 
(1.38) 
0.348 
(1.27) 
0.402* 
(1.84) 
0.482 
(1.58) 
0.605** 
(2.21) 
   
Cloture  ‐0.109 
(‐0.11) 
0.737 
(0.39) 
0.25 
(0.76) 
‐0.465 
(‐1.42) 
0.313 
(0.99) 
‐0.361 
(‐0.92) 
   
HCom  0.935** 
(2.17) 
2.111*** 
(3.02) 
0.274** 
(2.27) 
0.282** 
(2.14) 
0.339** 
(2.54) 
0.372** 
(2.36) 
   
SCom   0.724 
(0.78) 
2.861 
(1.17) 
0.132 
(1.21) 
0.196 
(1.48) 
0.167 
(1.14) 
0.252 
(1.51) 
   
DividedGov    ‐4.913 
(‐1.19) 
  0.532 
(1.00) 
  0.023 
(0.06) 
   
     
Ordinal logit regressions estimated. ***=p<0.01; **=p<0.05; *=p<0.10  
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Table 4.5 (Continued) 
 Dependent Variable= CtrlOrientation  
Military Deployment Cases   Non‐Military Deployment Cases   Overall Cases 
 
No Political 
Context 
Political and 
Economic Context 
Included 
No Political 
Context 
Political and 
Economic 
Context 
Included 
No Political 
Context 
Included 
Political and Economic 
Context Included 
   
Election    ‐0.321 
(‐0.18) 
  ‐0.252 
(‐0.79) 
  ‐0.518 
(‐1.62) 
   
Approval    2.65 
(0.49) 
  ‐2.867** 
(‐2.04) 
  ‐1.934 
(‐1.61) 
   
PercentParty    ‐34.266 
(‐1.26) 
  0.228 
(0.04) 
  ‐2.831 
(‐0.62) 
   
GDP    0.001 
(0.09) 
  0.003*** 
(0.31) 
  0.003*** 
(0.32) 
   
CPI    0.053 
(0.78) 
  0.017*** 
(0.005) 
  0.017*** 
(3.44) 
   
Unemployment     ‐1.253** 
(‐2.11) 
  0.151 
(0.87) 
  0.104 
(0.63) 
   
N  38  38  191  191  229  229     
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Table 4.6. Congressional Control Time and Discourse Quality of Constitutional Justification  
 Dependent Variable= CtrlTime 
Military 
Deployment 
Cases  
Non‐Military Deployment Cases   Overall Cases 
 
No Political 
Context 
No Political Context  Political and 
Economic Context 
Included 
No Political Context 
Included 
Political and Economic 
Context Included 
Justification   7.156*** 
(3.26) 
  3.424*** 
(4.18) 
3.706*** 
(4.77) 
3.543*** 
(4.86) 
3.742*** 
(5.69) 
LawCharacter  2.422*** 
(4.24) 
  0.954*** 
(2.71) 
1.089** 
(2.04) 
1.298*** 
(3.89) 
1.547*** 
(2.88) 
HComHearing  0.026 
(0.02) 
  ‐0.45 
(‐1.03) 
‐0.865 
(‐1.57) 
‐0.475 
(‐1.1) 
‐0.76* 
(‐1.77) 
SComHearing  ‐0.086 
(‐0.09) 
  ‐0.372 
(‐1.23) 
‐0.339 
(‐0.96) 
‐0.513 
(‐1.84) 
‐0.60** 
(‐2.07) 
ClosedRule  3.749* 
(1.69) 
  ‐0.112 
(‐0.34) 
‐0.244 
(‐0.68) 
0.292 
(0.72) 
0.32 
(0.71) 
Cloture  0.796 
(0.59) 
  ‐0.119 
(‐0.3) 
0.053 
(0.13) 
0.01 
(0.03) 
0.11 
(0.34) 
HCom  0.658* 
(1.87) 
  0.03 
(0.26) 
0.115 
(1.46) 
0.116 
(1.01) 
0.20** 
(2.36) 
SCom   ‐1.243 
(‐1.16) 
  ‐0.108 
(‐0.8) 
‐0.115 
(0.498) 
‐0.151 
(‐1.22) 
0.161 
(‐0.96) 
DividedGov        ‐1.61** 
(‐2.21) 
  ‐1.974*** 
(‐2.73) 
Ordinal logit regressions estimated. ***=p<0.01; **=p<0.05; *=p<0.10  
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Table 4.6 (Continued) 
 Dependent Variable= CtrlTime 
Military 
Deployment 
Cases  
Non‐Military Deployment Cases   Overall Cases 
 
No Political 
Context 
No Political Context  Political and 
Economic Context 
Included 
No Political Context 
Included 
Political and Economic 
Context Included 
Election        0.482* 
(1.93) 
  0.142 
(0.57) 
Approval        ‐4.582** 
(‐1.99) 
  ‐3.977** 
(‐2.06) 
PercentParty        ‐20.226*** 
(7.154) 
  ‐21.888*** 
(‐3.21) 
GDP        0.001 
(0.12) 
  0.001 
(1.42) 
CPI        ‐0.025 
(‐1.57) 
  ‐0.03** 
(‐2.2) 
Unemployment         ‐0.045 
(‐0.21) 
  ‐0.199 
(‐0.94) 
N  38    191  191  229  229 
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Table 4.7. Congressional Control Orientation and Discourse Quality of Constitutional Content  
Dependent Variable= CtrlOrientation 
Military Deployment Cases   Non‐Military Deployment Cases   Overall Cases 
 
No Political 
Context 
Political and 
Economic Context 
Included 
No Political 
Context 
Political and 
Economic 
Context 
Included 
No Political 
Context 
Included 
Political and 
Economic 
Context 
Included 
Ideological 
Cleavage 
Included 
 
Content   2.198* 
(1.71) 
7.923*** 
(2.60) 
2.630** 
(2.58) 
3.061*** 
(2.62) 
2.208*** 
(2.88) 
2.70*** 
(2.79) 
2.718*** 
(2.91) 
 
LawCharacter  4.127*** 
(4.06) 
5.864*** 
(3.66) 
0.465 
(0.75) 
0.474 
(0.58) 
1.045* 
(1.92) 
1.101 
(1.51) 
1.095 
(1.47) 
 
HComHearing  ‐2.432 
(‐1.39) 
‐2.697 
(‐1.22) 
‐0.445 
(‐1.18) 
0.003 
(0.01) 
‐0.601 
(‐1.63) 
‐0.068 
(‐0.18) 
‐0.097 
(‐0.29) 
 
SComHearing  ‐0.19 
(‐0.21) 
‐1.398* 
(‐1.82) 
‐0.004 
(‐0.01) 
‐0.342 
(‐1.07) 
‐0.103 
(‐0.46) 
‐0.57** 
(‐2.21) 
‐0.456 
(‐1.54) 
 
ClosedRule  1.673 
(1.39) 
3.658* 
(1.71) 
0.369 
(1.31) 
0.429* 
(1.89) 
0.503 
(1.62) 
0.640** 
(2.2) 
0.648** 
(2.32) 
 
Cloture  ‐0.121 
(‐0.12) 
1.044 
(0.45) 
0.265 
(0.81) 
‐0.477 
(‐1.47) 
0.328 
(1.05) 
‐0.374 
(‐0.98) 
‐0.46 
(‐1.19) 
 
HCom  0.948** 
(2.13) 
2.268*** 
(5.10) 
0.276** 
(2.26) 
0.285** 
(2.14) 
0.342** 
(2.53) 
0.377** 
(2.38) 
0.398** 
(2.33) 
 
SCom   0.756 
(0.77) 
2.85 
(1.12) 
0.119 
(1.07) 
0.18 
(1.34) 
0.156 
(1.04) 
0.235 
(1.38) 
0.25 
(1.47) 
 
DividedGov    ‐4.123 
(‐0.91) 
  0.566 
(1.04) 
  0.044 
(0.1) 
0.344 
(1.13) 
 
Ordinal logit regressions estimated. ***=p<0.01; **=p<0.05; *=p<0.10  
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Table 4.7 (Continued) 
Dependent Variable= CtrlOrientation 
Military Deployment Cases   Non‐Military Deployment Cases   Overall Cases 
 
No Political 
Context 
Political and 
Economic Context 
Included 
No Political 
Context 
Political and 
Economic 
Context 
Included 
No Political 
Context 
Included 
Political and 
Economic 
Context 
Included 
Ideological 
Cleavage 
Included 
 
Election    ‐0.917 
(‐0.55) 
  ‐0.265 
(‐0.82) 
  ‐0.546* 
(‐1.66) 
‐0.568* 
(‐1.67) 
 
Approval    1.623 
(0.31) 
  ‐2.952** 
(‐2.14) 
  ‐2.075* 
(‐1.79) 
‐2.286** 
(‐1.97) 
 
PercentParty    ‐33.339 
(‐1.28) 
  0.218 
(0.04) 
  ‐2.842 
(‐0.63) 
4.332 
(0.76) 
 
GDP    ‐0.001 
(‐0.02) 
  0.003*** 
(0.31) 
  0.003*** 
(0.31) 
0.003** 
(0.25) 
 
CPI    0.104 
(1.23) 
  0.017*** 
(3.43) 
  0.017*** 
(3.44) 
0.017*** 
(3.16) 
 
Unemployment     ‐0.738 
(‐1.2) 
  0.141 
(0.82) 
  0.093 
(0.58) 
0.091 
(0.58) 
 
IdeoGap              6.164 
(1.05) 
 
N  38  38  191  191  229  229  229   
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Table 4.8. Congressional Control Time and Discourse Quality of Constitutional Content  
Dependent Variable= CtrlTime 
Military Deployment 
Cases  
Non‐Military Deployment Cases   Overall Cases 
 
No Political Context    No Political 
Context Included 
Political and 
Economic Context 
Included 
No Political 
Context Included 
Political and 
Economic Context 
Included 
Ideological 
Cleavage Included 
 
Content   8.550*** 
(2.84) 
  3.780*** 
(4.05) 
4.174*** 
(4.68) 
3.892*** 
(4.41) 
4.185*** 
(5.16) 
4.369*** 
(5.91) 
 
LawCharacter  2.577*** 
(3.86) 
  0.902** 
(2.59) 
1.038** 
(2.02) 
1.289*** 
(3.75) 
1.54*** 
(2.95) 
1.566*** 
(2.77) 
 
HComHearing  0.184 
(0.11) 
  ‐0.437 
(‐0.98) 
‐0.873 
(‐1.61) 
‐0.464 
(‐1.06) 
‐0.762* 
(‐1.81) 
‐0.774* 
(‐1.93) 
 
SComHearing  0.096 
(0.09) 
  ‐0.359 
(‐1.23) 
‐0.33 
(‐1.01) 
‐0.491* 
(‐1.78) 
‐0.582** 
(‐2.15) 
‐0.242 
(‐0.84) 
 
ClosedRule  4.189* 
(1.7) 
  ‐0.067 
(‐0.19) 
‐0.186 
(‐0.47) 
0.357 
(0.84) 
0.402 
(0.82) 
0.455 
(1.02) 
 
Cloture  0.910* 
(0.65) 
  ‐0.108 
(‐0.26) 
0.044 
(0.1) 
0.022 
(0.06) 
0.086 
(0.24) 
‐0.183 
(‐0.56) 
 
HCom  0.653 
(1.66) 
  0.033 
(0.28) 
0.12 
(1.54) 
0.119 
(1.04) 
0.203** 
(2.45) 
0.278*** 
(3.3) 
 
SCom  ‐1.249 
(‐1.31) 
  ‐0.135 
(‐1.00) 
‐0.15 
(‐0.88) 
‐0.177 
(‐1.39) 
‐0.193 
(‐1.13) 
‐0.117 
(‐0.79) 
 
DividedGov        ‐1.518** 
(‐2.04) 
  ‐1.884** 
(‐2.59) 
‐0.656 
(‐1.1) 
 
Ordinal logit regressions estimated. ***=p<0.01; **=p<0.05; *=p<0.10  
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Table 4.8 (Continued) 
Dependent Variable= CtrlTime 
Military Deployment 
Cases  
Non‐Military Deployment Cases   Overall Cases 
 
No Political Context    No Political 
Context Included 
Political and 
Economic Context 
Included 
No Political 
Context Included 
Political and 
Economic Context 
Included 
Ideological 
Cleavage Included 
 
Election        0.490* 
(1.88) 
  0.108 
(0.42) 
0.037 
(0.13) 
 
Approval        ‐4.819** 
(‐2.16) 
  ‐4.252** 
(‐2.25) 
‐4.544** 
(‐2.51) 
 
PercentParty        ‐19.989*** 
(‐2.78) 
  ‐21.551*** 
(‐3.14) 
11.075 
(1.05) 
 
GDP        0.001 
(0.13) 
  0.002 
(0.15) 
0.005 
(0.04) 
 
CPI        ‐0.025 
(‐1.58) 
  ‐0.03** 
(‐2.16) 
‐0.033*** 
(‐2.84) 
 
Unemployment         ‐0.08 
(‐0.37) 
  ‐0.226 
(‐1.03) 
‐0.238 
(‐1.32) 
 
IdeoGap              28.347*** 
(2.94) 
 
N  38    191  191  229  229  229   
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b. Foreign Affair Case 
i. The Effects of Deliberation and Institutional Variables on Congressional Control 
In this part, I explore the pattern of congressional deliberation and its relation with 
congressional attempt of control over the presidential power in non-military foreign 
affair case. Generally, the level of both constitutional Justification and Content still 
has a positively significant effect on the level of congressional attempt of control over 
the president’s foreign affair power. As for other institutional variables, a bill referral 
to the House committee still plays an important role in influencing the level of 
congressional attempt of control, whereas the congressional annual budget bill and the 
House’s floor rule do not play as statistically significant a role as they do in military 
deployment case. 
Table 4.3 shows that constitutional Justification, as it did in the military 
deployment case, is highly and positively correlated with the level of congressional 
scale in a non-military deployment foreign affair case. The same pattern also generates 
in overall military and non-military deployment cases. The quality of deliberation 
itself plays a crucial role to the level of congressional attempt of control over the 
president. 
Additionally, the same situation that happens in the military deployment case 
also happens in the non-military deployment case: referral of a bill to the House’s 
committee, the higher the level of congressional attempt of control over the president. 
Moreover, both chambers’ committee hearings are negatively correlated with the level 
of congressional attempt of control. Although it is still unclear why a committee 
hearing would generate a lower level of congressional control over the president, 
given the “political ritual” reason mentioned above, the function of a committee 
hearing in the modern era is apparently not an arena for moral-political deliberation 
but rather for compromise over interests—thus it is reasonable to expect lower 
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congressional attempt of control. Lastly, while the closed-rule is positively correlated 
with the level of control in the military deployment case, it does not have any 
statistically significant effect on the scale of congressional control in the foreign affair 
case. 
Further, a look into the sub-category of ControlScale in foreign affair case 
(Table 4.5 and Table 4.6) shows that, unlike the results in military deployment cases, 
the level of congressional Justification is positively correlated with both 
CtrlOrientation and CtrlTime. According to the change of probability test, the results 
show that a higher level of constitutional Justification tends to yield more ex post 
control and at the same time procedural and substantive mixed control over the 
president. This may suggest that in the field of foreign affairs as a whole, 
congressional members are willing to authorize the president to initiate a policy first, 
but attempt to control the president with some kind of “patrol” mechanism after the 
president makes his decision. 
Table 4.4 also displays the relationship between the level of constitutional 
Content and ControlScale. I consistently find that the content of deliberation is a 
matter of the outcome. In foreign affair case, the patterns are comparable to those of 
constitutional Justification. Specifically, in foreign affair cases, only the level of 
Content and a bill referral to the House’s committee are positively correlated with the 
level of congressional control, whereas the holdings of both chambers’ committee 
hearings are still negatively correlated with the level of control. 
ii. The Effects of Political and Economic Variables on Congressional Control 
By further complicating the model by including political and economic variables, the 
deliberation and institutional variables presented above still yield the same results as 
they do in the above model without political and economic variables and in military 
deployment case. In addition, lower presidential approval rating would generate a 
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higher level of congressional control. Most importantly, I found that ideological 
disparity between the president and Congress is positively correlated with the level of 
congressional attempt of control when military deployment and non-military 
deployment cases are taken together and tested against those political and economic 
variables. A detail explanation of these results is as follows. 
The impacts of political and economic variables on the level of congressional 
attempt of control over the president are slightly different from those in military 
deployment case. The model (Table 4.3) shows that only a lower presidential approval 
rating significantly results in a higher level of congressional control, but the 
percentage of congressional members of the president’s party in Congress and other 
economic variables no longer play any important role in determining the level of 
congressional control. 
More importantly, it is noteworthy that in overall military deployment and 
foreign affair cases,10 both the divided government and the percentage of president’s 
party are negatively correlated with the level of congressional control. However, the 
divided government variable does not have any significant effect on the level of 
congressional control in the previous analyses. Recalling what Howell and Pevehouse 
admonish, the divided government variable itself “contains the least amount of 
information.”11 Moreover, as Paul Quirk and Bruce Nesmith indicate, the conflicting 
and complementary interests between the president and Congress do not vary whether 
the government is unified or divided. Therefore, how a divided government affects the 
operation of constitutional government as a whole is highly contingent upon other 
                                                            
10 Unless it is worthy of exploration, I do not regularly report the pattern of overall military deployment 
and non-military deployment cases and its relation with the level of congressional deliberation or 
congressional control in the body of this dissertation. Yet I still report the regression results in each 
table for reference.  
11 See William Howell & Jon Pevehouse, While the Dangers Gather 96 (2008).  
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political factors--such as policy interest, electoral interest, or ideological cleavage--but 
not divided government per se.12 Based on the above reasons, I think it is legitimate to 
make robustness check of the effect of divided government by including the 
ideological difference between the president and Congress into the model, which can 
include a more comprehensive information about both political branches policy 
preferences and ideological cleavage. 
Table 4.3 shows that the greater the liberal-conservative ideological disparity 
between the president and Congress is, the higher the level of congressional control is. 
Moreover, including ideological difference in the model does affect the original 
statistically significant relationship between some of the political variables and the 
level of congressional attempt of control over the president. In particular, the results 
show that divided government does not have a statistically significant effect on the 
level of control at all, whereas the ideological difference does not alter the effects of 
other institutional procedural variables. 
The above finding of the effect of ideological disparity is inconsistent with the 
hypothesis of deliberative theorists. In general, deliberative theorists hypothesize that 
an issue which is salient to congressional member’s electoral success, disagreement 
among the political actors tend to generate a lower quality of deliberation. That 
suggests that in turn may generate a lower level of congressional attempt of control 
over the president for lacking of substantive agreement in a polarized political context. 
I think there are two possible and somewhat complementary explanations can be made 
here from loose strategic and deliberative points. From a strategic point, no matter the 
ideological situation in which the president and Congress stand, both actors face 
pressure to make the passage of legislation for their regular business in order to 
                                                            
12 See Paul Quirk & Bruce Nesmith, Divided Government and Policymaking: Negotiating the Laws, in 
The Presidency and the Political System 508-32(2005).  
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accumulate political capital for reelection. To cooperate under such greater ideological 
cleavage and mutual distrust circumstances, different ideological actors may 
strategically change their discourse to create a better negotiation atmosphere, and thus 
a more reasonable and balanced level of control may become a way to create non-zero 
sum cooperation. 
However, the above strategic explanation does not necessarily provide a reason 
for why negotiation under such a situation sometimes is possible but sometimes is not. 
Some deliberative theorists argue that a polarized ideology does not necessarily result 
in a lower level of deliberation when facing those non-traditional ideological issues.13 
Therefore, even the existence of a greater ideological cleavage does not necessarily 
preclude deliberation between polarized parties. They cannot deliberate over those 
traditionally ideological issues. No matter what explanations hold, inclusion of the 
ideological variable into the model does suggest in a manner consistent with Howell 
and Pevehouse’s finding that divided government is not a sufficient variable with 
which to analyze the congressional-presidential relationship. In consequence, in terms 
that military deployment and foreign affair legislation are not traditionally ideological 
issues,14 I think neither the divided government nor the ideological cleavage itself 
could directly polarize the deliberation and balancing operation of the constitutional 
structure as a whole.15 
                                                            
13 For example, Steiner et al. find that congressional debate regarding ideological issue such as abortion 
tends to generates lower discourse quality. Moreover, John Dryzek and Valerie Braithwaite also reach 
the similar conclusion that a deliberation is rosier if its subject does not pertain to an identity issue. See 
Steiner et al., supra note 6, at 131-135; See John Dryzek & Valerie Braithwaite, On the Prospects for 
Democratic Deliberation: Values Analysis Applied to Australian Politics, 21 POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY 
241, 241-66 (2000).  
14 In terms that the “rally around the flag” effect always occurred at the beginning of a war, this further 
illustrates that military deployment or foreign affair legislation as a whole is a more “political” but not 
necessarily moral undetermined issue in the traditional liberal-conservative dimension.  
15 Another finding I did not report here concerning the relationship between GDP and the level of 
congressional check on the presidential war power on the grounds that its marginal effect is extremely 
low in the model. In particular, I found that a greater GDP generates a higher level of congressional 
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D. Robustness Check on the Deliberation Model 
Although I had demonstrated in the previous part that the primary model regarding the 
relationship between congressional deliberation and congressional control over the 
president is statistically correlated, there are still several hypotheses argued by 
presidential war power researchers that I have not included in the primary deliberation 
model presented above. Hence, to test the robustness of my primary deliberation 
model, I further complicate my primary deliberation model by incorporating other 
important factors into the model. 
In the following passages, three important alternative factors— the level of 
hostility, alliance relationship, and the type of foreign assistance— will be included in 
the model respectively. In short, the models show that none of these three alternative 
factors has any effect on the primary deliberation model. Moreover, the models also 
show that (1) the level of congressional attempt of control over a major force is 
systematically higher than a minor one; (2) there is no statistically difference of the 
level of congressional attempt of control over the president because of alliance or non-
alliance relationship with U.S.; and that (3) congressional attempt of control over the 
military and humanitarian assistance is systematically higher, whereas Congress does 
not show a systematic attempt of control over the economic assistance. 
                                                                                                                                                                           
control. This finding seems to be counterintuitive. If GDP accurately portrays the economic situation, 
then growth in GDP should stand for a better economic situation and thus higher presidential support 
from Congress and from the public as a whole. However, an ongoing war usually will boost GDP 
because of greater demand for war-related products regardless of other poor performance in economic 
indicators. Therefore, the meaning of GDP growth in the context of this research may imply the more 
severe situation of an ongoing war, and thus may generate higher level of congressional control. Again, 
this finding is too preliminary to report in the body of this dissertation. Thus, I just describe it here as a 
reference.  
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1. Major War v. Minor War and Congressional Control 
Is Congress more concerned with major wars but give the president a pass on minor 
wars? Howell and Pevehouse demonstrate that Congress has stronger influence on the 
presidential decision of a use of major force but not on a minor use of force. Hence, I 
also take the level of hostility into account to test its influence on the level of 
congressional check. Following Howell and Pevehouse’s definition, I categorize 
hostility levels 4 and 5 as indicating a major war, whereas hostility levels 1 through 3 
as indicating a minor war. 
The data shows that the average level of congressional control over the 
president during a major war is 2.87, as opposed to 2.23 during a minor war. That 
suggests that even the average control of major war falls within the same level as 
minor force. According to a one-sample mean test, the control scale of major force is 
less than 3, which cannot be rejected at .01 level, whereas the control scale of minor 
force is greater than 2, which cannot be rejected at the .05 level. Such result, which 
presents no statistically significant difference of the level of congressional attempt of 
control over the president between major and minor force in overall military and non-
military deployment cases, is also confirmed by the regression test displayed in Table 
4.9.16 Moreover, though I do not address the relationship between congressional 
deliberation and the level of control here, the results (Table 4.9) in this part, again, still 
show that the level of discourse quality is highly and positively correlated with the 
level of congressional attempt of control over the president in overall military 
deployment and non-military deployment cases. 
                                                            
16 A post-regression test reveals that the odds of a higher level of control increase by 50% when a major 
force happens, given that major force does exist, the highest probability of the control level would be 2, 
the same as a minor force. The same pattern-- no statistically different level of congressional on the 
president—can also be found in non-military deployment foreign affair cases.  
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Table 4.9. Congressional Control Scale and Major/ Minor War  
Dependent Variable= ControlScale 
Military Deployment 
Cases  
Non‐Military 
Deployment Cases  
Overall Cases 
 
Political and Economic Context are All Included 
Justification   16.196*** 
(3.50) 
3.667*** 
(4.14) 
3.469*** 
(4.49) 
Force  3.539** 
(1.99) 
0.673** 
(2.55) 
0.456** 
(2.15) 
LawCharacter  8.163*** 
(3.14) 
0.673 
(1.12) 
1.294** 
(2.30) 
HComHearing  ‐4.332*** 
(‐4.97) 
‐0.557 
(‐1.43) 
‐0.571 
(‐1.59) 
SComHearing  ‐1.134 
(‐0.61) 
‐0.281 
(‐1.20) 
‐0.508** 
(‐2.18) 
ClosedRule  7.342*** 
(3.10) 
0.148 
(0.45) 
0.569 
(1.45) 
Cloture  7.758** 
(2.05) 
‐0.291 
(‐0.9) 
‐0.167 
(‐0.55) 
HCom  4.045*** 
(3.21) 
0.291** 
(2.49) 
0.384*** 
(2.82) 
SCom  3.179 
(1.53) 
0.008 
(0.08) 
0.053 
(0.41) 
DividedGov  ‐16.808*** 
(‐3.09) 
‐0.282 
(‐0.54) 
‐0.762* 
(‐1.68) 
Election  ‐0.311 
(‐0.09) 
0.062 
(0.19) 
‐0.299 
(‐0.90) 
Approval  10.058 
(1.03) 
‐3.286*** 
(‐2.81) 
‐2.481** 
(‐2.23) 
PercentParty  ‐97.559** 
(‐2.32) 
‐5.654 
(‐0.84) 
‐8.679 
(‐1.59) 
GDP  ‐0.001 
(‐1.74) 
0.002** 
(0.21) 
0.002*** 
(0.27) 
CPI  0.048 
(0.59) 
‐0.001 
(‐0.22) 
‐0.003 
(‐0.48) 
Unemployment   ‐3.202* 
(‐1.73) 
0.032 
(0.25) 
‐0.038 
(‐0.27) 
N  38  191  229 
Ordinal logit regressions estimated. ***=p<0.01; **=p<0.05; *=p<0.10  
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Table 4.10. Congressional Control Scale and Humanitarian Operation or Alliance 
Dependent Variable= ControlScale 
(Humanitarian Operation)  
Dependent Variable= ControlScale 
(Alliance v. Non‐alliance) 
 
Military 
Deployment 
Case 
Non‐military 
Deployment 
Case 
Overall Case  Non‐military 
Deployment 
Case and 
Assistances 
Overall Case 
and 
Assistances 
Military 
Deployment 
Case 
Non‐military 
Deployment 
Case 
Overall Case 
Justification  17.169*** 
(5.03) 
4.426*** 
(5.01) 
3.748*** 
(5.28) 
4.574*** 
(5.07) 
3.721*** 
(5.33) 
16.104** 
(2.29) 
3.686*** 
(4.09) 
3.497*** 
(4.51) 
Import  ‐0.012 
(‐1.23) 
‐0.002 
(‐1.05) 
‐0.002 
(‐1.38) 
‐0.002* 
(‐1.68) 
‐0.002* 
(‐1.92) 
      ____        ____        ____ 
Export  ‐0.045 
(‐0.80) 
‐0.001 
(‐0.39) 
0.002 
(0.5) 
‐0.002 
(‐0.11) 
0.002 
(0.85) 
      ____        ____        ____ 
MilitaryAssist        ____        ____        ____  1.506*** 
(4.23) 
1.142*** 
(2.74) 
      ____ 
 
      ____ 
 
      ____ 
 
EconomicAssist        ____        ____        ____  0.609 
(1.37) 
0.156 
(0.60) 
      ____        ____        ____ 
HumanitarianAssis
t 
      ____        ____        ____  0.887*** 
(3.48) 
0.781*** 
(2.81) 
      ____ 
 
      ____ 
 
      ____ 
 
TradeBalance        ____ 
 
      ____ 
 
      ____ 
 
      ____ 
 
      ____ 
 
‐0.006 
(‐0.35) 
‐0.006*** 
(‐3.39) 
‐0.004*** 
(‐3.57) 
Alliance         ____        ____        ____        ____        ____  ‐1.446 
(‐0.58) 
0.308 
(0.98) 
0.13 
(0.46) 
Ordinal logit regressions estimated. ***=p<0.01; **=p<0.05; *=p<0.10  
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Table 4.10 (Continued) 
Dependent Variable= ControlScale 
(Humanitarian Operation)  
Dependent Variable= ControlScale 
(Alliance v. Non‐alliance) 
 
Military 
Deployment 
Case 
Non‐military 
Deployment 
Case 
Overall Case  Non‐military 
Deployment 
Case and 
Assistances 
Overall Case 
and 
Assistances 
Military 
Deployment 
Case 
Non‐military 
Deployment 
Case 
Overall Case 
LawCharacter  10.199*** 
(4.57) 
0.288 
(0.45) 
0.996* 
(1.66) 
0.356 
(0.57) 
1.016* 
(1.81) 
8.953** 
(2.28) 
0.619 
(1.01) 
1.281** 
(2.24) 
HComHearing  ‐4.938*** 
(‐3.83) 
‐0.531 
(‐1.29) 
‐0.560 
(‐1.40) 
‐0.531 
(‐1.37) 
‐0.567 
(‐1.48) 
‐5.648** 
(‐1.97) 
‐0.567 
(‐1.33) 
‐0.599 
(‐1.59) 
SComHearing  ‐4.688* 
(‐1.82) 
‐0.087 
(‐0.29) 
‐0.404* 
(‐1.84) 
‐0.091 
(‐0.28) 
‐0.419* 
(‐1.69) 
‐2.231 
(‐0.89) 
‐0.190 
(‐0.73) 
‐0.473* 
(‐1.92) 
ClosedRule  7.361*** 
(2.87) 
0.18 
(0.65) 
0.576* 
(1.69) 
0.235 
(0.85) 
0.58* 
(1.75) 
6.776** 
(2.37) 
0.16 
(0.52) 
0.576 
(1.52) 
Cloture  2.483 
(0.54) 
‐0.289 
(‐0.81) 
‐0.148 
(‐0.45) 
‐0.314 
(‐0.81) 
‐0.171 
(‐0.48) 
6.097 
(1.34) 
‐0.296 
(‐0.97) 
‐0.18 
(‐0.61) 
HCom  4.013*** 
(3.65) 
0.277*** 
(2.60) 
0.386*** 
(2.93) 
0.309*** 
(2.75) 
0.411*** 
(3.01) 
3.675*** 
(2.61) 
0.273** 
(2.53) 
0.378*** 
(2.75) 
SCom   3.316 
(1.42) 
‐0.029 
(‐0.30) 
0.034 
(0.27) 
‐0.001 
(‐0.01) 
0.050 
(0.38) 
4.312* 
(1.83) 
0.004 
(0.04) 
0.049 
(0.41) 
DividedGov  ‐17.104*** 
(‐2.77) 
0.222 
(0.49) 
‐0.49 
(‐1.11) 
0.322 
(0.64) 
‐0.414 
(‐1.00) 
‐15.637** 
(‐2.00) 
‐0.333 
(‐0.77) 
‐0.791* 
(‐1.85) 
Election  0.046 
(0.01) 
‐0.043 
(‐0.11) 
‐0.417 
(‐1.14) 
0.018 
(0.05) 
‐0.370 
(‐1.01) 
0.406 
(0.15) 
0.025 
(0.07) 
‐0.328 
(‐0.96) 
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Table 4.10 (Continued) 
Dependent Variable= ControlScale 
(Humanitarian Operation)  
Dependent Variable= ControlScale 
(Alliance v. Non‐alliance) 
 
Military 
Deployment 
Case 
Non‐military 
Deployment 
Case 
Overall Case  Non‐military 
Deployment 
Case and 
Assistances 
Overall Case 
and 
Assistances 
Military 
Deployment 
Case 
Non‐military 
Deployment 
Case 
Overall Case 
Approval  7.363 
(0.66) 
‐3.382*** 
(‐3.27) 
‐2.443** 
(‐2.52) 
‐2.959*** 
(‐3.01) 
‐2.127** 
(‐2.33) 
11.913 
(1.11) 
‐3.358*** 
(‐2.87) 
‐2.568** 
(‐2.40) 
PercentParty  ‐112.067*** 
(‐2.84) 
‐2.467 
(‐0.45) 
‐6.986 
(‐1.54) 
‐2.513 
(‐0.43) 
‐7.101* 
(‐1.68) 
‐95.896* 
(‐1.92) 
‐6.828 
(‐1.17) 
‐9.489* 
(‐1.86) 
GDP  0.003 
(0.06) 
0.002** 
(0.23) 
0.002*** 
(0.29) 
0.002* 
(0.19) 
0.002*** 
(0.27) 
‐0.006 
(‐0.07) 
0.002*** 
(0.28) 
0.002*** 
(0.32) 
CPI   ‐0.062 
(‐0.99) 
‐0.003 
(‐0.47) 
‐0.005 
(‐0.80) 
‐0.006 
(‐0.89) 
‐0.007 
(‐1.25) 
0.018 
(0.17) 
0.005 
(0.66) 
0.001 
(0.12) 
Unemployment  ‐4.057** 
(‐2.36) 
0.025 
(0.28) 
‐0.042 
(‐0.38) 
‐0.612 
(‐0.60) 
‐0.122 
(‐1.07) 
‐2.558 
(‐1.46) 
‐0.007 
(‐0.06)  
‐0.064 
(‐0.53) 
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The result in Table 4.9 shows that in military deployment case, the Congress 
really is more concerned with military deployment for a possible major force than a 
minor one. The level of force is positively correlated with the level of congressional 
check on the president. This finding is consistent with the conventional wisdom that 
the president tends to buy “political insurance” from the Congress before dispatching 
the troops for a major force. However, that does not mean that such “policy” is a free 
pass for the president to do whatever he wants with unconditional compensation 
offered by the Congress because the results also show that there is no significantly 
different level of congressional attempt of control between major and minor forces 
provided in legislation relating to non-military deployment cases. 
I think the aforementioned findings have two implications on the Declare War 
Clause. The first is that some scholars argue that the Declare War Clause implies that 
Congress only has power to authorize the president to engage in military conflict 
amounting to the scale of a war but not short of a war. Such an interpretation ignores 
the fact that Congress can decide to what extent or degree they authorize the president 
to engage in a possible military conflict or in different kinds of conflicts. Lower 
control over the president does not necessarily mean that Congress gives all of its war 
power away. Second, authorization itself cannot be exploited as a license for sweeping 
discretion in subsequent military-related action. Although Congress is willing to 
authorize the president to decide the conduct of a military action, it cannot be broadly 
interpreted as a legal basis for other war-related conduct because Congress usually 
will show their attempt to control over a specific foreign policy in the subsequent non-
military deployment bills.17 
                                                            
17 I think the above finding also suggests that it is doubtful that the president has broadly independent 
war-initiation power. As shown in Appendix Table O.1, only in two out of fourteen events (invasion of 
Panama and prevention of Taiwan-China conflict), or two out of thirty-eight occasions, did Congress 
not express its judgment about whether the president should dispatch the troops abroad in order to 
engage in any possible kind of hostility. Congress did not fulfill its job in six out of fourteen events 
(Appendix Table O.2 and Table O.3) in which it did not make ex ante judgment son military 
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2. Alliance v. Non-alliance Relationship and Congressional Control 
So far I have not taken the possible impact of international factors into account in my 
model. John Yoo and Jide Nzelibe hypothesize that because congressional members 
do not have sufficient information of a non-alliance country, they are not willing to 
make a decision under such an ambiguous circumstance and send a wrong signal to 
either the president or a non-alliance country.18 Therefore, in this part, I test what 
perception the Congress holds toward an alliance or non-alliance nation. 
The results in Table 4.10 show that whether an alliance’s interest is factored 
into a military conflict has no statistically significant effect on the level of 
congressional attempt of control over the president. Moreover, the results still show 
that congressional deliberation is highly and positively correlated with the level of 
congressional attempt of control over the president after including alliance and non-
alliance relationship into the primary deliberation model. 
The above finding is inconsistent with conventional research on the relation 
between congressional influence and alliance made by international relation scholar 
and rational choice theorists. First, international relations scholars hypothesize that 
Congress has more influence on the presidential decision if a non-alliance interest is 
involved, whereas Congress has less influence if an alliance’s interest is involved. But 
the data here shows that alliance is not a concern for Congress. A possible explanation 
for such inconsistency relates to the end of Cold War. With a lower probability of 
military conflict existing between the U.S. and the former Soviet Union or Russia 
                                                                                                                                                                           
deployment. Further looking into those six occasions, we can find that the Lebanon hostage incident 
and Post-First Iraqi War events both are actually ongoing events in which Congress had already been 
involved. Some of the events cannot be regarded as legislative inaction if Congress had more or less 
expressed their judgments in an earlier bill. Therefore, unless one can prove that Congress 
systematically gives away its ex ante control on the president in either “little wars” or “big wars,” it is 
hard to justify the opinion that the president has broadly independent war initiation power.  
18 See Jide Nzelibe & John Yoo, Rational War and Constitutional Design, 115 YALE L.J. 2512 (2006).   
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afterward, even though balance of power is still at the center of international politics, 
collective security institutions such as U.N. or NATO have gained much more 
influence in the post-Cold War era. 
Second, rational choice theorists hypothesize that lacking information about 
non-alliance nations, Congress tends to give the president more discretion to deal with 
the relationship between U.S. and a non-alliance nation.19 However, the findings 
above show an inconsistent result with what rational choice theorists hypothesize. In 
particular, since the model shows that the level of congressional deliberation still 
highly affects the level of congressional check, I argue that whether members of 
Congress could acquire sufficient information depends upon the will of Congress to 
deliberative over a specific event but not upon the alliance and non-alliance 
relationship. Moreover, as game theorists suggest, every decision maker usually makes 
a judgment on the next step by taking another actor’s behavior but not necessarily that 
other actor’s intention into account. It is the historical interaction between U.S. and 
another nation, domestic interest, or structure of international system that may affect 
the judgment of president and Congress. 20 As such, I think that if Congress has a 
stronger will to deliberate, it may be able to form a more reliable judgment that is 
                                                            
19 Id. 
20 Although I only address “military” alliance and non-alliance above, in Table 4.10, I also include 
whether and how “economic” alliance, or economic interdependency relationship influences on the 
level of congressional control. Since the statistical results are rather marginal and preliminary, I only 
report the results here as a reference. Table 4.10 shows that in military deployment cases, U.S. trade 
with a targeted nation is not a concern of Congress in deciding the level of control over the president. 
However, a greater trade deficit between the U.S. and a targeted nation would generate a lower level of 
congressional control. That may suggest the fact that the military balance of power is not a main 
concern for Congress does not necessarily mean that neither is economic balance of power. As 
international realist scholars suggest, the balance of economic power between two states also affects the 
capability of a nation to win a war between the two states. As such, given a lack of an “economic 
collective system” through which to “punish” a big trade surplus country generally, Congress may 
assume that the president must have greater discretion to address an unbalanced economic situation 
with a possible targeted nation. See MICHAEL GERACE: MILITARY POWER, CONFLICT, AND TRADE 
(2004).  
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predicated upon a set of complex international factors but not necessarily predicated 
upon the nature of the U.S. relationship with another nation. 
3. Foreign Assistance and Congressional Control 
In traditional U.S. foreign policy, foreign assistance is one of the main measures 
employed to stabilize and manage a foreign region and foreign crisis thereof. 
Traditionally, U.S. foreign assistance can be divided into three categories: military 
assistance, economic assistance, and humanitarian assistance. In consequence, I 
include these three modes of assistance in my primary deliberation model and test 
whether and how foreign assistance influences the level of congressional control. The 
results show that the level of congressional attempt of control is positively correlated 
with military assistance and humanitarian assistance, but is not correlated with 
economic assistance. Moreover, the inclusion of foreign aid factors does not affect the 
primary deliberation model at all. 
The results in Table 4.10 show that the level of congressional control is 
positively correlated with U.S. foreign military and humanitarian aid policy. These 
findings may suggest that Congress does believe that foreign aid plays an effective 
role in stabilizing a foreign region. However, to a certain extent, these findings are 
partially inconsistent with the conventional wisdom of international relations scholars 
who have formed hypotheses about the congressional role. The hypothesis is that 
congressional attempt of control over the presidential power is lower if the U.S. has a 
stronger commitment, either militarily or economically, to a targeted nation. That 
hypothesis may ignore the fact that foreign aid policy is usually a long-term but not 
short-term policy, which suggests that members of Congress have abundant 
opportunity to reflect their own previous decisions on foreign aid. Therefore, if 
Congress is able to deliberate over whether the U.S. wants to commit to a region and 
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what kinds of resources U.S. will commit, it then actually has the time and ability to 
judge which regions should be regarded as substantial regions of interest by the U.S, 
and thus relatively balances its power in relation to that of the president. Therefore, 
contrary to international relations scholars, I argue that Congress does not forfeit its 
overall foreign aid authority to the president. 
Lastly, a possible explanation for there being no systematic control on 
economic assistance comes from the reason that economic assistance is not a major 
instrument used to prevent foreign crises in the post-Cold War era. In fact, the amount 
of economic assistance already began to decline in mid-1980 when the Cold War 
became détente and was not as intense as was in 1960s and 1970s. Instead, security 
assistance and humanitarian problems became main concerns of international society 
throughout the post-Cold War of the 1990s. Therefore, it is not surprising to see higher 
congressional attempt of control on both military and humanitarian assistance but not 
over economic assistance. 
II. Presidential Unilateral War and Collaborative Political Accountability 
As I indicated in chapter 3, current research on congressional deliberation neglects to 
consider how other political actors in the public sphere respond to congressional 
deliberation and decision thereof. In the war and foreign affair areas, it is especially 
important for researchers to investigate the systematical pattern of presidential action 
that emerges after congressional action. In this section, I reconstruct my model based 
on the unilateral politics model mainly constructed by William Howell and concept of 
Markov chain to explore the pattern of presidential action and congressional checking 
ability over the presidential power. In the following passages, I will (1) illustrate my 
model design for this exploration, and (2) report the results of regression analyses. I 
will also argue and illustrate that though neither deliberation nor legal regulation on 
 124 
war can necessarily prevent the president from unilaterally deploying the troops, a 
higher level of congressional deliberation and war regulation can invite the president 
to be charged with greater political accountability, which would prevent a unilateral 
presidential military action become a presidential war-making law through 
congressional inaction. 
A. Modeling Presidential Unilateral War 
The main objective of the presidential unilateral war model presented here is to 
incorporate Markov chains and presidential unilateral politics into a model. Simply 
put, Markov chains indicate that a decision is made only by taking an event closest to 
the current point in time into account regardless of other events that occurred prior to 
that closest time point.21 In other words, a decision made at time point t is only 
conditional on the event that happened at time point t-1 but not t-2 or so on. By 
unilateral action, I mean either that a presidential action is not authorized by the 
Congress or that an action is contrary to what the Congress expressed in a bill. 
Through these two concepts, I categorized various types of presidential actions listed 
in chapter 3--including executive orders, national security directives, signing 
statements, proclamations, and vetoes--by juxtaposing each with the respective 
congressional actions closest to those presidential unilateral actions. It should be noted 
that not all of those presidential actions are coded as unilateral action if an action is 
already authorized by Congress at time point t-1. 
From a legal perspective, one of the main downsides of the above model may 
be that it neglects the effect has by existing law enacted prior to time point t-1. 
However, in terms of dynamic relation between the president and Congress, only the 
most relevant and up-to-date law can reflect the latest inter-branch interaction. 
                                                            
21 See Jeff Gill, Essential Mathematics for Political and Social Research 392-5 (2006).  
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Moreover, even if the president takes an action in accordance with an alleged authority 
or law, Congress still can choose to retrospectively codify, reject, or adjust it. For 
example, though the first President Bush issued an executive order to block Yugoslav 
Government property according to the International Emergency Economic Powers 
Act, Congress still recognized and codified that in a later defense authorization act. 
Therefore, to Congress, any presidential action can be regarded as a possible 
depredation of the balance of power, which may prompt it to patrol along the 
legislative border. 
The dependent variable in the following model is whether the president 
adopts a unilateral action, which I label Unilateral. A binary logistic model will be 
applied to such a dependent variable. Three kinds of independent variables are 
included. First, I still include the level of congressional deliberation into the model. 
The main justification for including this hypothesis was described in chapter 3: given 
that higher deliberation may generate a better argument, the president should also 
accept such a better argument after a higher level of deliberation and thus refrain from 
taking unilateral action alone. 
Second, three institutional independent variables are included. The first one 
is whether a unilateral action is taken after Congress enacted a military deployment 
regulation (Military), which directs the president either not to dispatch the troops or to 
withdraw the troops before a specific date. It is intuitive to assume that the president 
will take an action contrary to Congress under such circumstances. The second 
institutional variable is whether a law is an appropriation and annual authorization law 
(Lawcharacter). It is included because the Founders assumed that Congress would 
tend to control the president’s war and foreign affair powers through budget laws. If 
this “separation of money and sword” assumption holds, one may expect a unilateral 
action not taken by the president after an enactment of a budget bill. 
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Third, all of the “standard” political and economic variables included in the 
prior section--including the divided government, percentage of the president’s party, 
election year, presidential approval rating, and ideological disparity--are all included 
in the following models. Following Howell’s unilateral political action model,22 I also 
include Filibuster and Unemployment into the political and economic variables. 
B. Model Results 
I divide my models into two types: the first type includes unilateral military 
deployment action, and the second one drops unilateral military deployment action. 
Generally, the model shows that the president systematically resists the congressional 
regulation of his military deployment power by taking a unilateral action. In addition, 
a higher level of congressional deliberation does not prevent the president from taking 
unilateral action in a military deployment case, whereas a higher level of 
congressional deliberation could prevent the president from taking unilateral action in 
non-military deployment case. Lastly, variables play much more a statistically 
significant role in a presidential unilateral war. I briefly describe the model in detail as 
follows. 
In unilateral military deployment case, as Table 4.11 shows, the level of 
congressional Justification is not statistically correlated with presidential unilateral 
action, which suggests that a higher level of congressional deliberation does not have 
any influence on the president. As for institutional variables, whether Congress 
provides for military deployment and redeployment in a law, not surprisingly, would 
positively trigger the president’s unilateral action. However, none of the rest of the 
institutional variables, including the level of congressional control (ControlScale), and 
annual budget law (LawCharacter), is statistically correlated with presidential 
                                                            
22 See William Howell, Power without Persuasion (2003).  
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unilateral action. I think such a historical pattern of systematically presidential 
resistance with congressional war regulation sheds a substantial amount of new light 
on the argument for customary presidential war power, which will be addressed in 
chapter 5. 
Table 4.11. Unilateral Presidential Military and Non-military Action  
Dependent Variable=  
Presidential Unilateral 
Action  
(War Included) 
Presidential Unilateral 
Action 
(War not Included) 
ControlScale  0.062 
(0.55) 
0.021 
(0.17) 
Justification   0.666 
(1.55) 
0.605** 
(2.02) 
LawCharacter  ‐0.353 
(‐0.72) 
0.118 
(0.25) 
MilitaryDeployRegulation  0.719** 
(2.05) 
0.673 
(1.44) 
DividedGov  0.724* 
(1.66) 
1.009** 
(2.41) 
Election  0.077 
(0.19) 
0.263 
(0.66) 
Approval  ‐3.792** 
(‐2.06) 
‐3.803** 
(‐2.03) 
PercentParty  8.474 
(1.16) 
12.041 
(1.54) 
Filibuster  ‐1.105*** 
(‐2.98) 
‐0.999** 
(‐2.43) 
Unemployment  ‐0.068 
(‐0.63) 
0.051 
(0.36) 
IdeologicalGap 
 
6.135 
(1.32) 
12.572** 
(2.46) 
Constant    ‐6.206 
(‐0.94) 
‐12.465* 
(‐1.82) 
N    191  229 
Binominal regressions estimated. ***=p<0.01; **=p<0.05; *=p<0.10  
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So far as political context variables are concerned, the model shows that 
presidential approval rating (Approval) is negatively correlated with unilateral action. 
In other words, when the presidential approval rating is lower, the president tends to 
take a unilateral action. Moreover, the divided government is only marginally 
correlated with a unilateral presidential action, and none of the rest of political context 
variables--including the percentage of president’s party (PercentParty), the ideological 
cleavage (Ideogap), and the election year (Election)--is statistically correlated with 
presidential unilateral action. 
In cases of unilateral non- military deployment, the result shows that the 
level of congressional Justification is positively correlated with the presidential 
unilateral action. With regard to three institutional variables in the model —
ControlScale, LawCharacter, Military— none is statistically significant with 
unilateral action. However, the data shows that there are also stronger relationships 
between unilateral action and political context variables. Specifically, divided 
government and ideological disparity are both positively correlated with presidential 
unilateral action, whereas the presidential approval rating is negatively correlated with 
it. In other words, a greater ideological cleavage, a lower presidential approval rating, 
or a divided government tends to generate unilateral action by the president. Lastly, 
neither the percentage of congressional seats held by the president’s party nor whether 
it is an election year has any statistically significant effect on the president’s unilateral 
action. In terms of the stronger political effect on unilateral presidential action in a 
non-military deployment case, I argue that the overall pattern of presidential unilateral 
action is a synthesis of political calculation to counter congressional constraint by 
employing a highly public action. 
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C. Heighten Political and Legal Accountability 
Do the above findings, in which no evidence appears to indicate that either 
deliberation or congressional regulation can prevent unilateral action by the president, 
disappoint both deliberative and legal theorists? In terms of the nature of democratic 
deliberation and the dynamic interaction of separation of powers, my answer is no. Yet 
I argue that to allow a highly dynamic interaction between the president and Congress, 
the latter should shoulder its responsibility to both present a better argument in the 
public sphere and try to place a check on the president, which could charge the 
president with a greater political and legal accountability. 
First of all, democratic deliberation expects that all of the actors--whether 
citizen or in the government--engage in the public sphere ceaselessly and 
collaboratively to deliberate, legislate, and re-legislate the contents, legality, and 
legitimacy of a law. By definition, the president should partake in such ceaseless 
constitutional dialogue. If a higher level of deliberation occurring in Congress 
positively results in a presidential unilateral action, then, arguably, both the president 
and Congress are aware of a constitutional issue that actually lies in between them. 
Just as Congress should take action after deliberation, the president should take action 
and make his own case as well. If such action at least is publicly and widely known, I 
believe it does not necessarily violate democratic deliberation generally. However, 
that does not suggest that all kinds of presidential unilateral action are legally, 
politically, and morally allowed. If the president tends to take unilateral action along 
with a lower level of congressional deliberation, that could result a most disappointing 
moment for deliberative theorists. The empirical results show that perhaps one of the 
most disappointing findings for both legal and deliberative theorists is that the result 
does show that the president systematically takes unilateral action to impair 
congressional attempt of regulation on presidential military deployment, and seems to 
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reveal that Congress does not has an efficient tool to counter such unilateral military 
action immediately. 
But what can Congress do if congressional members do not have an efficient 
tool to counter such unilateral military action? My answer is still the same: deliberate. 
The central tenet of democratic deliberation is “deliberate before you act.” Any action 
should be predicated on a norm generated out of a deliberative process. This central 
tenet not only suggests that deliberation is a premise of law, but also reminds us that 
while an action is controlled by law, deliberation itself is not. Thus, two kinds of 
political accountability are derived from the aforementioned central tenet of 
democratic deliberation: reason-giving and acceptance of a better argument and 
decision thereof. The president can provide his opinion on a bill during the 
consideration of a bill through various channels. If his rationale is not accepted by 
Congress, he is both legally and politically accountable for compliance with a law that 
Congress has predicated on a weightier argument; otherwise he can veto the bill. 
Therefore, even if the empirical model demonstrates that a higher level of 
congressional deliberation cannot prevent the president from taking unilateral action, I 
argue that it is even more important and legitimate to promote “good” deliberative 
conditions in Congress on the grounds that a better justification not only can be 
presented to the public sphere but also creates an opportunity for Congress to charge a 
unequivocally legal and greater political accountability for the president to abide by. 
Moreover, though congressional action is not necessarily a sufficient tool to counter 
unilateral presidential action, as a matter of law, congressional action taken in each 
unilateral presidential military action event at least would create an opportunity to 
prevent the future president to cite congressional inaction as a precedent for justifying 
the content of Commander in Chief power. In consequence, I further present the third 
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model in the next section to explore what kind of congressional law-making rules and 
“political and economic factors” influence the quality of congressional deliberation. 
III. Modeling the War Power Constitutional Deliberation in Congress 
As I mentioned in chapter 3, I hypothesize that the structure of congressional 
participation is the primary factor to influence the quality of congressional 
deliberation. In particular, I divided congressional structure by regarding two 
dimensions: (1) the effect of congressional rule-setting on deliberation and (2) non-
congressional rule-setting (political factors). 
The hypothesis underlying the first of these dimensions is that a more 
participation- inclusive and information- facilitative rule-setting would result in a 
higher level of congressional deliberation. The hypothesis of the latter dimension is 
that though political and economic factors may influence the level of congressional 
deliberation, congressional rule-setting is still the primary factor that determines the 
level of congressional deliberation. The following results show that these two 
hypotheses are both empirically confirmed. 
In addition to testing the effects of “core” variables, I will also include two 
more alternative variables into my primary model as a robustness check. These two 
alternative variables are, respectively, whether more veto-player (referral of a bill to 
multiple committees and filibuster) and partisan factor (Republican Congress v. 
Democratic Congress) would influence the level of congressional deliberation. 
Accordingly, in the balance of this section, I will (1) describe the variables included in 
the following models; (2) briefly illustrate the descriptive results of the main 
dependent variable, that is, the level of Justification; (3) report the condition for a 
“good” congressional deliberation; (4) report of two robustness checks. 
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A. Variables for Testing Congressional Deliberation 
Although all of the variables and hypotheses thereof were described in chapter 3, I 
have not specified what variables are included for each hypothesis. Since I already 
illustrated the possible influence that each variable has on the level of congressional 
deliberation, I only briefly explain the variables I employ for the empirical models 
below. 
The main dependent variable is the level of congressional deliberation 
(Discourse Quality Index). As I described in chapter 3, following Steiner, I divide this 
variable into two categories: the level of Justification and Content. These two 
categories will be tested respectively. 
The independent institutional variables included in the following models 
are: whether a bill is an annual authorization and appropriation bill (labeled as 
LawCharacter), whether a committee holds a hearing (labeled as 
HComHearing/SComHearing), whether a bill is referred to committee (labeled as 
HCom/SCom), and the state of both chambers’ floor rules (labeled as 
ClosedRule/Cloture). These are all of the core institutional procedural variables from 
the last section. I also take into account the duration of Congress’s deliberation upon a 
bill. In other words, I include Time as a variable to record the duration of this 
deliberation from a bill’s introduced to the Congress until its members cast a vote on 
that bill on the floor. 
The independent political variables I will include for this model are the 
divided government (labeled as DividedGov), the election year (labeled as Election), 
the presidential approval rating (labeled as Approval), the percentage of congressional 
members of the president’s party (labeled as PercentParty), referral of a bill to how 
many committees (labeled as HComNumber/ ScomNumber), and filibuster (labeled as 
Filibuster). 
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B. Descriptive Results 
In this part, I report the descriptive data of the main variable, Justification, and the 
institutional independent variables. Here, I briefly explicate the calculation of 
Justification before reporting its descriptive statistics. The value of Justification is the 
mean of the level of constitutional justification in total divided by the total number of 
members who actually spoke on the floor for each bill. For instance, if five of the 
twenty members on the floor address the constitutionality of a bill and their total level 
of constitutional justification is twelve, then Justification value for that bill is 0.6 
(12/20) but not 2.4 (12/5.) Moreover, since I cluster different legal provisions in 
accordance with different military events I clustered, a bill sometimes may have two 
or more “average Justification.” For example, the average Justifications of 
Department of Defense Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1994 were 1.053 with 
regard to Somalia and 0.774 pertaining to Haiti. 
1. Constitutional Justification Distribution 
Not surprisingly, out of the 229 observations, there are 147 observations with a 
constitutional justification level of 0. That is due to the stringent definition of, only 
when a member of Congress explicitly addresses the constitutionality of a bill will be 
counted as justification, the “constitutional deliberation” in this dissertation. 
Quantitatively speaking, such a distributional situation indicates that both Skewness 
(2.60) and Kurtosis (9.67) of the distribution are severely positive skewed. 23 As 
Figure 4.1 shows, 75% of the observations concentrate at the left part of the graph, 
which suggests that the dependent variables here are in violation of the assumption of 
normal distribution. 
                                                            
23 Of course, it does not make any sense that the average constitutional justification level is less than 0 
in this case.  
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Figure 4.1 Distribution of Constitutional Justification 
To resolve the above non-normal distribution problem, I divide the data into 
two categories: high and low deliberation. Following what Jürg Steiner et al. did for 
their pioneering study of congressional deliberative quality,24 I split the Justification 
into low and high justifications, the latter of which is labeled as MajorDeliberation, at 
the mean (0.17) of the s Justification. Therefore, MajorDeliberation is coded as 1 if 
Justification is greater than 0.17. Transforming Justification as such will also permit 
us to observe the overall deliberative patterns congressional deliberation through 
binominal regression model. 
2. Main Descriptive Results 
In addition to reporting the descriptive results of the level of congressional 
deliberation, I also report the descriptive results of other institutional variables, as 
these latter variables constitute the core institutional conditions that I have attempted 
to identify as the conditions that facilitate a “good” deliberation. The results are as 
follows. 
Table 4.12 shows that the overall average justification of constitutional 
deliberation is about 0.17, varying from 0 to 1.03. It is worthwhile to note that there is 
                                                            
24 See Jürg Steniner, André Bächtiger, Markus Spörndli, and Marco R. Steebergen, supra note 6.  
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considerable variation in this variable as the standard deviation is greater than 0.27. To 
compare the justification pattern between deliberations over military deployment and 
those over foreign affairs, I describe their summary statistics in Table 4.13 and 4.14 
respectively. Note first that in 38 military deployment cases, the average constitutional 
justification is about 0.27 with a standard deviation over 0.34, whereas the average 
constitutional justification in 191 foreign affair cases is 0.15, lower than the overall 
average justification. That difference may further confirm my hypothesis that 
congressional members have different attitudes toward the president’s Commander-in-
Chief power and foreign affairs power. This in turn informs us to distinguish the line 
between these two powers. 
Table 4.12. Overall (Military Deployment and Non-Military) Summary Statistic 
of Variables  
Variables  N  Mean  SD  Max  Min 
Justification (Square root)  229  .1741697  .2728357  1.035374  0 
LawCharacter (Appropriation=1)  229  .7729258  .4198587  1  0 
HComHearing (Hearing=1)  218  .2889908  .4543369  1  0 
SComHearing (Hearing=1)  219  .2648402  .442259  1  0 
Cloture (Cloture=1)  222  .2072072  .6468457  8  0 
Closedrule (Closed=1)  217  .6543779  .4766703  1  0 
Time (Month)  229  4.423581  3.023238  17  1 
 
Another noteworthy matter is the proportion of appropriations bills to other 
bills (LawCharacter). About 80% of foreign affair cases are appropriations bills, 
whereas in military deployment cases, the proportion of appropriations bills drops by 
15% (65 %). Furthermore, there seems to be a greater variance in the proportion of 
hearings on military deployment cases to those on foreign affair cases held 
respectively by the House and the Senate (HComHearing/ SComHearing). It seems 
worthy both of note and of further exploration that only about 13% of the hearings 
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were held in military deployment cases in the Senate and about 34% of the hearings 
were held in military deployment cases in its counterpart, the House. As for the “time” 
variable, there seems to be no obvious variance among overall, foreign affair, and 
military deployment cases. Yet, the standard deviations of Time in overall, foreign 
affair, and military deployment cases are very considerable (about or greater than 3). 
Table 4.13. Foreign Affairs (Non-Military Deployment) Deliberation Summary 
Statistic of Variables  
Variables  N  Mean  SD  Max  Min 
Justification  191  .1537776  .2542618  0  1.035374 
LawCharacter  191  .7958115  .4041668  0  1 
HComHearing   186  .2795699  .4499992  0  1 
SComHearing  181  .2928177  .4563178  0  1 
Cloture  184  .2282609  .6950765  0  8 
Closedrule  185  .6594595  .475177  0  1 
Time  191  4.554974  2.942585  1  17 
Table 4.14. Military Deployment Deliberation Summary Statistics of Variables  
Variables  N  Mean  SD  Max  Min 
Justification  38  .2766666  .337327  0  1.026158 
LawCharacter  38  .6578947  .4807829  0  1 
HComHearing   32  .34375  .4825587  0  1 
SComHearing  38  .1315789  .34257  0  1 
Cloture  38  .1052632  .3110117  0  8 
Closedrule  32  .625  .4918694  0  1 
Time  38  3.736158  3.364635  1  17 
 
Two main floor procedural variables (Cloture and ClosedRule) have different 
variances in foreign affairs and military deployment cases respectively. Specifically, 
the Senate seems to invoke cloture (10%) less in military deployment case than it does 
in foreign affair cases (22%). But there is no obvious variance for ClosedRule in both 
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military deployment and foreign affair cases. Again, this is just the most preliminary 
observation in this section. Their interactions with the main dependent variable, the 
level of Justification, are explored in the following parts. 
C. Main Model Results 
In the following passages, I will report the primary conditions for a “good” 
deliberation model, and then I will report the results of alternative models by including 
alternative variables into my primary model as robustness check in part D. The main 
model shows that the institutional conditions for a higher level of congressional 
deliberation include the adoption of open-rule, the referral of a bill to committee, the 
deliberation over a non-annual budget bill, and no use of a filibuster. In the following 
passages, I will (1) report the effect of institutional and political factors have on the 
quality of Justification in more detail and then (2) report the effect of institutional and 
political factors have on the quality of Content, another sub-category of Discourse 
Quality Index. 
1. The Effects of Institutional and Political Variables on the Level of Justification 
The overall pattern of both military deployment and non-military deployment 
deliberations shows that even though congressional deliberation to a certain extent is 
affected by political factors, the institutional variables are still the primary factors that 
affect the level of congressional deliberation. However, there are still some differences 
between military deployment and non-military deployment cases. 
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Table 4.15. Discourse Quality of Constitutional Justification and Congressional Participation Structure  
Dependent Variable = MajorDeliberation 
No Political Context  Political Context Included 
 
Military Deployment 
Cases 
Non‐military  
Cases 
Overall Cases   Military  Deployment 
Cases 
Non‐military Cases  Overall Cases 
LawCharacter  ‐1.093 
(‐0.96) 
‐0.953** 
(‐2.38) 
‐0.945** 
(‐2.31) 
‐1.707 
(‐0.96) 
‐1.005** 
(‐2.25) 
‐1.047** 
(‐2.08) 
HComHearing  ‐2.219 
(‐1.47) 
‐0.722 
(‐0.93) 
‐0.942 
(‐1.32) 
‐3.778 
(‐1.43) 
‐0.785 
(‐0.96) 
‐0.946 
(‐1.28) 
SComHearing  0.856 
(0.57) 
‐0.059 
(‐0.1) 
‐0.027 
(‐0.05) 
0.885 
(0.57) 
0.143 
(0.24) 
0.146 
(0.29) 
ClosedRule  ‐1.437*** 
(‐3.72) 
‐0.836** 
(‐2.12) 
‐0.927** 
(‐2.77) 
‐3.257** 
(‐2.63) 
‐0.854** 
(‐1.98) 
‐0.977** 
(‐2.88) 
Cloture  1.512 
(0.95) 
0.629** 
(2.45) 
0.612** 
(2.55) 
0.192 
(0.05) 
0.685** 
(2.38) 
0.691** 
(2.27) 
HCom  0.614** 
(1.97) 
0.221 
(1.16) 
0.275 
(1.51) 
0.073 
(0.18) 
0.252 
(1.51) 
0.293* 
(1.9) 
SCom   ‐0.416 
(‐0.55) 
0.075 
(0.34) 
‐0.025 
(‐0.12) 
‐1.445 
(‐1.47) 
0.122 
(0.54) 
0.025 
(0.12) 
Time  ‐0.138 
(‐0.07) 
0.011 
(0.16) 
‐0.017 
(‐0.3) 
0.105 
(0.49) 
0.021 
(0.31) 
‐0.01 
(‐0.18) 
DividedGov        6.838 
(1.53) 
‐1.669 
(‐1.41) 
‐1.293 
(‐1.23) 
Binomial regressions estimated. ***=p<0.01; **=p<0.05; *=p<0.10 
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Table 4.15 (Continued) 
Dependent Variable = MajorDeliberation 
No Political Context  Political Context Included 
 
Military Deployment 
Cases 
Non‐military  
Cases 
Overall Cases   Military  Deployment 
Cases 
Non‐military Cases  Overall Cases 
Election        ‐4.285** 
(‐2.39) 
‐0.007 
(‐0.02) 
‐0.023 
(‐0.08) 
Approval        ‐12** 
(‐2.25) 
‐0.607 
(‐0.37) 
‐0.487 
(‐0.3) 
PercentParty        52.145* 
(1.68) 
‐9.442 
(‐1.02) 
‐6.332 
(‐0.8) 
Constant   1.065 
(0.82)  
‐0.543 
(‐0.73) 
‐0.061 
(‐0.09) 
‐15.063 
(‐1.22) 
5.336 
(1.15) 
4.067 
(1.09) 
N  38  191  229  38  191  229 
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a. Military Deployment Case 
The results in Table 4.15 show first of all that in a military deployment case, the 
referral of a bill to the House committee would generate a higher level of 
congressional deliberation. This result is consistent with the finding in Section I that 
referral of a bill to the House committee would generate a higher level of 
congressional control over the president. 
Moreover, Table 4.15 also shows that an adoption of closed-rule would 
systematically generate a lower level of congressional deliberation. This result is 
consistent with my hypothesis in chapter 3 that democratic deliberation is a speech and 
act theory: if one is prohibited from taking a political action after a discourse, she or 
he does not have incentive to make a higher quality of discourse. However, in Section 
I, the empirical model shows that the adoption of closed-rule for the House’s floor 
action tends to generate higher congressional control over the president. This finding 
thus is inconsistent with the finding in that section. Specifically, closed-rule tends to 
result in lower discourse quality, thus leading to the natural inference that closed-rule 
may generate lower control over the president. But the result shows that it generates a 
higher level of control. Nevertheless, this seeming paradox finding is actually not 
necessarily incompatible with the finding in Section I for at least two reasons. 
First, this research only focuses on those constitutional deliberations involving 
separation of power issues. As such, I inevitably omit other kinds of discourses, which 
do not necessarily constitute constitutional deliberation. Congressional members may 
control the president out of other pragmatic reasons, but not for separation of power 
reasons. Second, deliberative democracy theory does not assume that those procedural 
variables of the legislative process would be the controlling factors that determine 
deliberative outcome. As Habermas suggests, deliberation is a hybrid speech act that 
consists of both communicative and strategic actions. If a committee reports a bill 
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back to the floor with higher control on the president, it is not surprising that closed-
rule would naturally be selected in order to ensure that the deal sticks. Actually, this 
finding does not necessarily disappoint deliberative theorists. As strategic theorists 
suggest, the restrictive nature of closed-rule may conversely give the information 
holder incentive to share private information informally.25 As such, those non-
information holders would be more willing to defer to the decisions made by those 
pivotal members, as long as non-information-holders are kept informed informally 
while meanwhile holding the opportunity to take public action. In consequence, I think 
a more fundamental problem for such phenomena here becomes how to balance the 
relationship between an informal and formal control held by members of Congress. I 
will try to address this issue in chapter 5. 
By further including political factors into the model, the results (Table 4.15) 
show that institutional variables still play a relatively important role in determining the 
level of congressional deliberation. In particular, an adoption of closed-rule would still 
generate a lower level of congressional deliberation, but referral of a bill to committee 
becomes no significant correlation with the level of congressional deliberation. 
Moreover, two political variables are correlated with the level of congressional 
deliberation: the presidential approval rating and whether it is an election year. In 
particular, the results show that a non-election year and a lower presidential approval 
rating would generate a higher level of congressional deliberation. Therefore, based on 
the evidence that congressional deliberation is influenced by both institutional 
variables and political context, I think it is fair to conclude that during a deliberation 
over military deployment, Congress is both independent of and interconnected with 
the broader public sphere. 
                                                            
25 See Nolan McCarty, Proposal Rights, Veto Rights, and Political Bargaining, 44 AMERICAN JOURNAL 
OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 506-522 (2000); also Nolan McCarty, Presidential Pork: Executive Veto Power 
and Distributive Politics, 94 AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW 117-29 (2000).  
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b. Non-military Deployment Case 
In a non-military deployment case, the results (Table 4.15) show that 
institutional variables play dominant roles in determining the level of congressional 
deliberation. In particular, both chambers’ floor rules are correlated with the level of 
congressional deliberation. In the House, the adoption of closed-rule still 
systematically decreases the level of congressional deliberation as it does in military 
deployment case. In the Senate, an invocation of cloture would systematically generate 
a higher level of congressional deliberation in non-military deployment case.More 
importantly, whether a bill is an annual appropriations and authorization bill also 
affects the quality of congressional deliberation in the foreign affair deliberations. 
Specifically, the results (Table 4.15) show that an appropriations bill results in lower 
congressional deliberation. This may suggest that debate limitation, set up by the 
process incorporated in Congressional Budget and Impoundment Act, is one of the 
possible procedures contributing to the lower quality of congressional deliberation. 
However, some deliberative scholars encourage Congress to adopt different 
mechanisms to reflect on the same subject periodically.26 As legislators deliberate 
upon authorization and appropriations bills every year, these bills also have some 
kinds of re-deliberative features. However, it seems that annual reflection does not 
necessarily generate a higher level of congressional deliberation. I think there are two 
possible explanations for such phenomena. First, appropriation and authorization bills 
are under different committee jurisdictions, which makes information-sharing among 
different committees more difficult. Second, the spending limit set up in the 
Congressional Budget and Impoundment Act may cause members of Congress to 
deliberate over various pragmatic issues rather than moral-political problems during 
the debates over the annual budget bill. I will try to address this issue in chapter 5 
                                                            
26 See Amy Guttmann & Dennis Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement 199-229 (1996).  
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regarding the validity of military deployment authorization through the annual 
appropriation bill. 
After including political factor variables (Table 4.15), the model shows that 
institutional variables still play an important role in predicting the level of 
congressional deliberation, whereas none of the political variables has any significant 
effect on the level of congressional deliberation. In particular, the House’s closed-rule 
continuously serves as a consistent factor in predicting the probability of a lower level 
of congressional deliberation. Moreover, the invocation of cloture also serves as a 
consistent predictor for a higher level of congressional deliberation. Lastly, the annual 
authorization or appropriations bill also remains as statistically correlated with a lower 
level of congressional deliberation. 
2. The Effects of Institutional and Political Variables on the Level of Content 
The two models presented above pertain to the level or form of the quality of 
constitutional Justification and its relation with both the Congress’s institutional effect 
and the connection within broad public sphere. As I described in Chapter 3, I also 
include another variable, Content, in my model to discern whether the above variables 
also have an effect on the content of the justification approach employed by 
legislators. The main descriptive statistical results of Content are displayed in Table 
4.16. Generally speaking, the overall effect of institutional variables here is slightly 
different from the level of Justification. In military deployment cases, the legislators 
attempt to rest their justifications more on the institutional relations between the 
president and Congress, whereas in the non-military foreign affair cases, the 
legislators are concerned more with only one branch’s authority. 
It seems that institutional variables do not have a consistently institutional 
effect on the discursive content of the legislators as it has on the level of Justification. 
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In the military deployment cases, as is shown in Table 4.17, the House’s floor rule 
still has as statistically significant an effect on the Content as it has on the 
constitutional Justification. The adoption of closed-rule would generate a higher 
probability of one-branch authority discourse. Moreover, after including political 
variables into the model, the results show that the adoption of closed-rule would still 
generate a higher probability of one-branch authority discourse. However, the results 
(Table 4.17) show that a non-military case has no statistical consistency with the core 
predictors here. 
In a non-military deployment case, it seems that the hypothesis of 
congressional independence is not that salient. The results (Table 4.17) show that both 
chambers’ floor rules are relatively sensitive to political context variables, compared 
to the above Justification. In particular, the adoption of closed-rule does not have any 
significant correlation with the Content of constitutional deliberation when those 
political context variables are included in the model. Additionally, referral of a bill to 
a House committee would result in a significantly higher probability of addressing the 
two branches’ relationship.27 
                                                            
27 In order to explore further whether there is any effect of political context variables on congressional 
independency hypothesis and Content in the above overall and non-military deployment cases, I 
introduce two interactions terms. The one is “Cloture x Politic” and the other is “ClosedRule x Politic.” 
The results in Appendix Table O.4 show that Cloture significantly interacts with the political context 
variables, and thus the probability of two-branch discourse, whereas ClosedRule does not. Specifically, 
the odds of being MajorContent, without the political interaction terms, increase by 94 percent once 
cloture is invoked, whereas in the model including the political interaction term, the odds increase about 
150 percent. This suggests that, with the invocation of cloture, as long as if there is neither an election 
nor a divided government, the deliberative Content has the highest probability to fall within a higher 
quality level. Accordingly, one may assume that political context has more impact on the effect of 
cloture in relation with the deliberative content than the cloture itself in both overall and non-military 
deployment foreign affair cases.  
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Table 4.16. Descriptive Results of Constitutional Content  
Military Deployment Cases  Non‐military Deployment Cases  Overall Cases  
N  Mean  SD  Min  Max  N  Mean  SD  Min  Max  N  Mea
n 
SD  Min  Max 
Content 
(Square 
root) 
38  0.255  0.31
1 
0  0.948  191  0.138  0.23
2 
0  1  229  0.15
7 
0.25  0  1 
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Table 4.17. Discourse Quality of Constitutional Content and Congressional Participation Structure  
Dependent Variable = MajorContent  
No Political Context  Political Context Included 
 
Military Deployment 
Cases 
Non‐military  
Cases 
Overall Cases   Military  Deployment 
Cases 
Non‐military Cases  Overall Cases 
LawCharacter  ‐0.271 
(‐0.25) 
‐0.654 
(‐1.28) 
‐0.601 
(‐1.44) 
‐0.429 
(‐0.28) 
‐0.767 
(‐1.37) 
‐0.694 
(‐1.45) 
HComHearing  ‐2.479* 
(‐1.68) 
‐0.146 
(‐0.27) 
‐0.382 
(‐0.77) 
‐4.711* 
(‐1.72) 
‐0.227 
(‐0.41) 
‐0.408 
(‐0.78) 
SComHearing  ‐0.322 
(‐0.22) 
‐0.228 
(‐0.36) 
‐0.227 
(‐0.38) 
‐1.406 
(‐0.83) 
‐0.078 
(‐0.12) 
‐0.117 
(‐0.2) 
ClosedRule  ‐1.577*** 
(0.61) 
‐0.308 
(‐0.94) 
‐0.49 
(‐1.44) 
‐2.689** 
(‐2.03) 
‐0.373 
(‐1.05) 
‐0.545* 
(‐0.78) 
Cloture  0.952 
(0.61) 
0.487 
(1.5) 
0.456 
(1.61) 
‐0.963 
(‐0.32) 
0.748*** 
(2.59) 
0.702*** 
(2.75) 
HCom  0.778* 
(1.82) 
0.196 
(1.38) 
0.251 
(1.72) 
0.945 
(1.14) 
0.252** 
(1.97) 
0.298** 
(2.29) 
SCom   0.31 
(0.64) 
‐0.13 
(‐0.07) 
‐0.046 
(‐0.25) 
‐0.792 
(‐1.07) 
0.041 
(0.2) 
0.013 
(0.07) 
Time  ‐0.021 
(‐0.1) 
‐0.03 
(‐0.43) 
‐0.42 
(‐0.66) 
0.145 
(0.63) 
‐0.016 
(‐0.24) 
‐0.032 
(‐0.51) 
DividedGov        6.115 
(1.45) 
‐1.503* 
(‐1.76) 
‐1.19 
(‐1.39) 
Binomial regressions estimated. ***=p<0.01; **=p<0.05; *=p<0.10  
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Table 4.17 (Continued) 
Dependent Variable = MajorContent  
No Political Context  Political Context Included 
 
Military Deployment 
Cases 
Non‐military  
Cases 
Overall Cases   Military  Deployment 
Cases 
Non‐military Cases  Overall Cases 
Election        ‐3.8* 
(‐1.89) 
0.45 
(1.47) 
0.378 
(1.55) 
Approval        ‐9.182 
(‐1.54) 
0.202 
(0.16) 
0.27 
(0.19) 
PercentParty        43.555 
(1.47) 
‐9.053 
(‐1.2) 
‐7.12 
(‐1.01) 
Constant   0.041 
(0.04) 
‐0.264 
(‐0.42) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
‐14.726 
(‐1.26) 
4.665 
(1.27) 
3.767 
(1.12) 
N  38  191  229  38  191  229  
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D. Robustness Check on the “Good” Deliberation Condition Model 
Although I had demonstrated in the previous part that those primary institutional 
variables are statistically correlated with the level of congressional deliberation, 
regardless of the impact of those political factors, I have not tested other alternative 
hypotheses that deliberative theorists argue may also affect the quality of 
congressional deliberation. In the following passages, I will include these alternative 
hypotheses in the primary model above as a robustness check on my original model. I 
will (1) test whether institutional or political veto-player variables would influence the 
level of congressional deliberation and then (2) test whether partisan component 
variables would influence the level of congressional deliberation. In short, the models 
show that (1) a filibuster would decrease the quality of congressional deliberation in 
non-military deployment case, and that (2) a Republican Congress is more sensitive to 
those political factors variables. 
1. Veto-player and Deliberation 
Veto players are two-fold: institutional and political. Specifically, an institutional 
veto-player is designed and pre-given by the Constitution or a formal rule, whereas a 
political veto-player is mainly contingent upon the random behavior of congressional 
member.28 Deliberative theorists hypothesize that more veto players in the decision-
making process would result in a higher level of congressional deliberation.29 
However, in the above model, two of the political veto-player variables in the political 
context variables, the divided government and the percentage of president’s party, do 
not have any statistically significant effect on the level of deliberation. 
                                                            
28 See JÜRG STENINER, ANDRÉ BÄCHTIGER, MARKUS SPÖRNDLI, AND MARCO R. STEEBERGEN, supra 
note 6, at 98-128. 
29 Id., at 78-81.  
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Table 4.18. Committee as Veto-player and Discourse Quality of Constitutional 
Justification  
Dependent 
Variable=MajorDeliberation 
Dependent 
Variable=MajorContent 
 
Overall Cases  Overall Cases 
LawCharacter  ‐1.226*** 
(‐2.69) 
‐0.821 
(‐1.48) 
HComNumber  0.299 
(1.5) 
0.154 
(0.94) 
SComNumber  0.473 
(0.7) 
0.281 
(0.44) 
HComHearing  ‐0.921 
(‐1.26) 
‐0.368 
(‐0.7) 
SComHearing  0.103 
(0.2) 
‐0.116 
(‐0.2) 
ClosedRule  ‐1.218*** 
(‐3.37) 
‐0.685 
(‐1.77) 
Cloture  0.636* 
(1.7) 
0.625 
(1.7) 
HCom  0.281* 
(1.73) 
0.286 
(2.14) 
SCom   0.008 
(0.04) 
0.005 
(0.03) 
Time  ‐0.013 
(‐0.26) 
‐0.032 
(‐0.55) 
DividedGov  ‐1.195 
(‐1.26) 
‐1.034 
(‐1.47) 
Election  0.006 
(0.02) 
0.4 
(1.71) 
Approval  ‐0.892 
(‐0.55) 
‐0.05 
(‐0.04) 
PercentParty  ‐5.942 
(‐0.78) 
‐6.304 
(‐0.95) 
Constant  
 
3.536 
(0.96) 
3.167 
(0.98) 
N    229  229 
Binomial regressions estimated. ***=p<0.01; **=p<0.05; *=p<0.10  
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Table 4.19. Filibuster and Discourse Quality of Constitutional Justification  
Dependent Variable=MajorDeliberation  
Non‐military Cases  Overall Cases 
LawCharacter  ‐1.048** 
(‐2.19) 
‐1.069** 
(‐2.1) 
Filibuster  ‐1.283** 
(‐2.47) 
‐0.52 
(‐1.56) 
HComHearing  ‐0.711 
(‐0.87) 
‐0.937 
(‐1.28) 
SComHearing  0.129 
(0.24) 
0.15 
(0.31) 
ClosedRule  ‐0.956** 
(‐2.19) 
‐1.024*** 
(‐2.94) 
Cloture  0.687** 
(2.18) 
0.681** 
(2.22) 
HCom  0.248 
(1.42) 
0.294*  
(1.9) 
SCom   0.121 
(0.55) 
0.023 
(0.11) 
Time  0.02 
(0.28) 
‐0.015 
(‐0.26) 
DividedGov  ‐1.499 
(‐1.36) 
‐1.228 
(‐1.22) 
Election  0.011 
(0.03) 
‐0.028 
(‐0.09) 
Approval  ‐0.637 
(‐0.41) 
‐0.522 
(‐0.32) 
PercentParty  ‐8.85 
(‐0.96) 
‐6.136 
(‐0.77) 
Constant   5.153 
(1.11) 
4.074 
(1.08)  
N  191  229 
 
Binomial regressions estimated. ***=p<0.01; **=p<0.05; *=p<0.10  
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Table 4.20. Discourse Quality of Constitutional Justification and Congressional Participation Structure v. Republican and 
Democratic Congress 
Dependent Variable= MajorDeliberation 
(Republican Congress)  
Dependent Variable= MajorDeliberation 
(Democratic Congress)  
 
Non‐military Cases  Overall Cases  Non‐military Cases  Overall Cases 
LawCharacter  ‐0.68 
(‐0.86) 
‐0.412 
(‐0.55) 
‐1.285* 
(‐1.77) 
‐1.57*** 
(‐2.69) 
HComHearing  ‐0.114 
(‐0.06) 
‐0.444 
(‐0.3) 
‐0.513 
(‐0.52) 
‐0.537 
(‐0.72) 
SComHearing  ‐1.944 
(‐1.33) 
‐1.445* 
(‐1.88) 
1.215 
(1.31) 
0.538 
(0.56) 
ClosedRule  ‐2.182* 
(‐1.95) 
‐1.784*** 
(‐3.55) 
‐1.109 
(‐1.24) 
‐1.057 
(‐1.33) 
Cloture  1.024 
(1.63) 
0.582 
(0.88) 
‐0.199 
(‐0.28) 
1.023 
(1.48) 
HCom  ‐0.153 
(‐0.32) 
‐0.107 
(‐0.29) 
0.351* 
(1.66) 
0.404** 
(2.12) 
SCom   0.639* 
(1.66) 
0.438 
(1.35) 
‐0.218 
(‐0.42) 
‐0.378 
(‐0.72) 
Time  0.071 
(0.58) 
‐0.139 
(‐0.18) 
0.022 
(0.22) 
‐0.017 
(‐0.18) 
DividedGov  ‐15.321*** 
(‐6.62) 
‐11.248*** 
(‐4.37) 
‐0.625 
(‐0.28) 
‐1.279 
(‐0.76) 
Binomial regressions estimated. ***=p<0.01; **=p<0.05; *=p<0.10  
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Table 4.20 (Continued) 
Dependent Variable= MajorDeliberation 
(Republican Congress)  
Dependent Variable= MajorDeliberation 
(Democratic Congress)  
 
Non‐military Cases  Overall Cases  Non‐military Cases  Overall Cases 
Election  0.935 
(1.3) 
0.286 
(0.48) 
‐0.733 
(‐1.34) 
‐0.246 
(‐0.53) 
Approval  ‐11.883*** 
(‐2.77) 
‐9.937 
(‐1.99) 
‐2.136 
(‐1.25) 
‐0.926 
(‐0.47) 
PercentParty  ‐258.483*** 
(‐5.96) 
‐196.509*** 
(‐4.71) 
‐3.137 
(‐0.24) 
‐5.641 
(‐0.58) 
Constant   142.395*** 
(6.08)  
109.108*** 
(4.55)  
3.193 
(0.44)  
4.635 
(0.88)  
N  191  229  191  229 
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To confirm the existence of an alternative kind of veto-player, I further include 
another institutional veto-player proxy—the number of congressional committees 
involved in the decision process in both chambers— into the model to explore such 
alternative kind of veto-player’s possible effect on constitutional deliberation. As 
Barbara Sinclair notes, bills introduced since 1975 have had a very high probability of 
being referred to multiple committees, because many conflicting interests are usually 
affected by such a modern complex bill.30 As such, multiple committee referrals may 
suggest a more difficult decision-making process for members of Congress to reach a 
thicker consensus. Therefore, it is worthwhile to examine the relation between the 
multiple committee referrals and the level of constitutional deliberation. 
The results in Table 4.18 show that none of the numbers of referral committees 
has any effect upon constitutional Justification. Moreover, as Table 4.18 shows, same 
pattern can also be found in the level of deliberative Content. In consequence, the 
number of referral committees in Congress seems to have no obvious effect on the 
level of constitutional deliberation. More importantly, those core institutional variables 
are again still observed as being statistically significant, and are unaffected by the 
inclusion of the alternative veto-player variables in the models. 
Another more case-specific variable to see if veto-player has any effect on the 
constitutional deliberation is the existence of the filibuster.31 The finding in Table 4.19 
shows that a filibuster has a significantly negative effect on the constitutional 
                                                            
30 See Barbara Sinclair, Unorthodox Lawmaking 11-14 (2000).  
31 One may adopt Cloture as a proxy of filibuster; however, in the modern Senate’s floor action, cloture 
is more often used as a tool to manage the legislative schedule than a rule to end the extended debate.  
The dataset in this research shows that there are only four invocations of cloture pertaining to filibuster. 
Therefore, I introduce Marvin and Bell’s dataset into my model to be more case-specific. See Marvin 
Overby & Lauren Bell, Extended Debate Over Time: Patterns and Trends in the History of Filibusters 
in the U.S. Senate, Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, 
Palmer House Hotel, Chicago, IL Online <APPLICATION/PDF>. 2010-01-24 from 
http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p196768_index.html.  
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Justification in the non-military deployment foreign affair cases. However, a filibuster 
has no statistically significant effect on the deliberative Content. Again, a filibuster 
has no statistical effect on the original pattern observed in the model; institutional 
variables still play the primary role in determining the level of congressional 
deliberation. 
2. Republican Congress and Democratic Congress 
Does a Republican Congress systematically differ from a Democratic Congress in the 
level of military and foreign affair deliberation? I think that exploring this question is 
legitimate to the extent that one may need to know whether the above conditions for 
“good deliberation” would be affected by the partisan component. In particular, since 
a different majority party would try to control Congress, especially the House, by 
establishing a new congressional rule in accordance with its partisan agenda,32 it is 
worthy to explore whether different partisan rules would result in different 
deliberation conditions. The overall results show that after dividing the dataset into 
Republican and Democrat subsets, a Republican Congress seems to be easily 
“captured” by the political factors, while a Democratic Congress tends to be more 
affected by the characteristics of the annual budget process. However, there is no 
statistically significant difference at the level of constitutional deliberation between 
Republican and Democratic Congresses. 
Table 4.20 shows that, during a Republican Congress, the level of 
constitutional Justification in the overall military and non-military deployment cases, 
is negatively correlated with the adoption of close-rule, a divided government, the 
presidential approval rating, and the percentage of congressional members of the 
president’s party, but it is no longer correlated with the invocation of cloture. Among 
                                                            
32 See BRYAN W. MARSHALL, RULES FOR WAR 61-86 (2005).  
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these variables, it is noteworthy first to observe the effect given by those political 
context variables rather than the procedural variables. A post-regression test shows 
that the odds of generating high-level constitutional Justification decrease by 100% in 
all three political context variables--that is, when a Republican Congress faces a 
Democratic president, a higher presidential approval rating, or a higher composition of 
their counterparty in the Congress. 
Such a highly political sensitive effect, or what I would call “political capture,” 
may be attributed to two major congressional rule reforms made by a Republican 
Congress. When the Republican Party assumed a position as the majority party 
between the 104th Congress and the 106th Congress, its congressional members 
promised to adopt less restrictive rules during the election, and did change several 
rules in Congress after the election. The result in the House, however, actually was the 
centralization of the Speaker’s power and a decentralized role of the committee chairs 
because of term limits and the abolition of proxy voting in the committees.33 For 
example, then-Speaker Newt Gingrich, though he successfully mobilized the Contract 
with America agenda gave the Republicans a successful majority,34 was a more 
involved partisan leader in the legislative substance and “captured” the congressional 
leadership into more complex political interests. This in turn affected the role of public 
reason in the deliberative atmosphere. 
Another possible reason, according to Charles Tiefer, that may have 
contributed to the “political capture,” is the conservative Republican political agenda 
in the 2001-2006 Congress, which was realized through extreme use of closed-rule on 
the floor and exclusive conference meetings.35 Given the aforementioned two possible 
                                                            
33 See BARBARA SINCLAIR, supra note 21, at 103-4.  
34 Id., at 104.  
35 See Charles Tiefer, Congress’s Transformative “Republican Revolution” in 2001-2006 and the Future 
of One-Party Rule, 23 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLITICS 233 (2007).  
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reasons for “political capture,” it might be easy to understand why political factors 
variables are highly correlated with the level of congressional deliberation: If the 
purpose of the rule is to increase partisanship or ideological make-up rather than to 
facilitate reciprocal dialogue in the course of deliberation, the positively deliberative 
function of institutional rules would be forfeited by such political capture. 
The reason for a lower level constitutional deliberation in the budget and 
appropriation process during the Democratic-controlled Congress,36 might be 
attributed to the Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 (“BRA90”) and the Budget 
Enforcement Act, which required a five-year deficit cut requirement. The constraint of 
the total budget cut and spending caps for each item exhausted the efforts of 
congressional members in negotiating of the balance of domestic entitlement programs 
and foreign affair functions.37 For example, during the three consecutive years of 
debates over defense and foreign affairs authorization and appropriation for fiscal year 
1994 to 1996, one of the central issues raised by congressional members was the 
appropriateness of spending projections under the rule of zero-based budgeting. From 
the perspective of deliberative democracy theory, this suggests that, for the legislators, 
pragmatic deliberation seemed to be more important than moral-political principles in 
the course of the budget process. Given such a strong effect on the budget process by 
BRA90, it is reasonable to conclude that none of the institutional variables can predict 
the level of constitutional deliberation before the expiration of “BRA90.” The results 
in Table 4.21 show that both the adoption of closed-rule and invocation of cloture 
became significantly correlated with the level of constitutional deliberation again after 
                                                            
36 This argument is beyond the scope of this research because to make the argument in this passage 
should also perform a comparison between foreign affairs and domestic program, given the scope this 
research, I cannot provide the empirical evidence of such comparison.  
37 See WILLIAM I. BACCHUS, THE PRICE OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY: CONGRESS, THE EXECUTIVE, 
AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS FUNDING 98-9 (1997).  
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the expiration of BRA90 in 1995, which can partially support my above inference that 
the process of “BRA90” would strongly affect the issues being considered in the 
process. 
IV. Summarizing the Evidence 
In this chapter, I demonstrated three main empirical models in attempting to answer 
three main empirical questions. First, is a higher level of congressional deliberation 
more likely to generate a higher level of congressional control over the presidential 
war power? Second, is a higher level of congressional deliberation and congressional 
control more likely to prevent the president from taking a unilateral military action? 
Third, what kind of institutional conditions in Congress would be more likely to 
generate a higher level of congressional deliberation? In this summary section, I 
briefly present the most important findings from in the previous section as follows. 
A. The Effect of Congressional Deliberation on Congressional Check on the 
President’s Power 
The results reveal that the level of congressional deliberation, including congressional 
Justification and Content, have a statistically strong and positive effect on the level of 
congressional check (ControlScale) on the president’s military deployment and 
foreign affair powers. However, their effects on the sub-categories of ControlScale are 
different with respect to these two powers. Specifically, a higher level of constitutional 
deliberation only systematically generates ex ante control on the president (CtrlTime) 
but not procedural or substantive control (CtrlOrientation) in the case of military 
deployment power. As for non-military deployment foreign affair power, a higher 
level of deliberation systematically yields not only ex post and at the same time 
procedural and substantive mixed control over the president. 
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Table 4.21. Discourse Quality of Constitutional Justification  
Dependent Variable=MajorDeliberation 
(post‐1995) 
after the Expiration of BRA90  
Non‐military Cases  Overall Cases 
LawCharacter  ‐1.474** 
(‐2.19) 
‐1.224* 
(‐1.69) 
HComHearing  ‐0.016 
(‐0.02) 
‐0.566 
(‐0.9) 
SComHearing  0.817 
(0.97) 
1.106 
(1.53) 
ClosedRule  ‐1.695*** 
(‐4.5) 
‐1.635*** 
(‐5.52) 
Cloture  1.405*** 
(4.15) 
1.017** 
(2.1) 
HCom   ‐0.107 
(‐0.2) 
‐0.107 
(‐0.19) 
SCom   0.448** 
(2.49) 
0.475*** 
(3.2) 
Time  ‐0.04 
(‐0.38) 
‐0.045 
(‐0.5) 
DividedGov  ‐2.378 
(‐1.16) 
‐2.038 
(‐1.24) 
Election  0.592 
(1.3) 
0.462 
(1.46) 
Approval  2.061 
(0.65) 
1.622 
(0.67) 
PercentParty  ‐20.077 
(‐1.36) 
‐15.775 
(‐1.32) 
Constant   10.009 
(1.35)  
7.914 
(1.32) 
N  191  229 
Binomial regressions estimated. ***=p<0.01; **=p<0.05; *=p<0.10  
In addition to the relation between congressional deliberation and the level of 
control, I find that two of the House’s institutional process variables are also 
correlated with the level of control. The one is that a referral of a bill to the House 
committee consistently generates a higher level of congressional control over the 
president. The other is that the adoption of closed-rule also yields a higher level of 
control. However, the holding of a hearing in a House committee would reduce the 
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level of control. Although these variables, as I find in the last section, are crucial to the 
hypothesis of congressional independence and an ideal speech situation in Congress, 
these variables traditionally are also important agenda-setting tools in the legislative 
process. Therefore, when these variables are interpreted in the models presented in this 
section, we may need to take strategic action, or power politics, more into account. 
By including “standard” political and economic context variables into the 
models, I find that they have different effects on military deployment and foreign 
affair powers, but that the quality of congressional deliberation is still highly and 
positively correlated with the level of control on the president. Among those results, I 
find that the presence of a divided government and the percentage of congressional 
seats held by the president’s party do not necessarily provide enough information 
about legislators’ preferences. Rather, an ideological cleavage is an important 
alternative predictor of the level of congressional control. 
B. The Effect of Congressional Control on the Unilateral Presidential War 
In a military deployment case, the empirical model demonstrates that the level of 
congressional deliberation is not a significant factor in making the president cooperate 
with Congress in crafting war policy. In particular, as long as Congress tries to 
regulate military deployment, re-deployment, or withdrawal, the president will 
systematically impair such regulation. The president defies a congressional military 
deployment regulation through various unilateral tools at his disposal, including a 
unilateral dispatch of the troops, an executive order, a signing statement, or a 
proclamation. 
In a non-military deployment case, the empirical model demonstrates that a 
higher level of congressional deliberation generates a greater probability of unilateral 
presidential action. This kind of presidential unilateral action in foreign policy making 
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is also a synthesis of political calculation through a highly public act to counter 
congressional constraint. In particular, the empirical model demonstrates that a lower 
presidential approval rating and a divided government together statistically signal the 
probability of unilateral presidential action. Hence, it is fair to conclude that unilateral 
presidential action in foreign policy area is a kind of deliberative action to the extent 
that the president tries to pressure Congress by generating pressure from the 
constituency and that Congress is fully aware of a constitutional issue. 
C. The Conditions for Good Congressional Deliberation 
The analyses in the prior section demonstrated that the institutional process has 
crucially strong effects on the level of constitutional Justification and a relatively 
weak (compared to Justification) effect on the level of constitutional Content. For the 
level of constitutional Justification, when I only consider the core institutional 
variables, the results consistently show that the House’s closed-rule plays a negative 
role in the constitutional deliberation of both military deployment and non-military 
deployment foreign affair cases, whereas the Senate’s cloture plays a positive role in 
the constitutional deliberation of foreign affair cases but not in the decision to 
authorize military deployment. 
Political context factors (divided government, presidential approval rating, 
election year, and president’s party percentage) affect only the deliberation over the 
constitutionality of military deployment in Congress but not the deliberation over non-
military foreign affair cases. However, the inclusion of those political context factors 
does not change the robust effect of institutional variables on the level of 
constitutional Justification. 
Up to this point, while the data in this chapter lend strong support to my key 
hypothesis concerning the relationship between congressional deliberation and 
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congressional control over the presidential war power, quantitative analyses inevitably 
omit normative assessment, such as its implication for different legal doctrines. The 
analysis, by definition, should not be suspended here. In chapter 5, I will examine 
several important legal controversies that often appear in war and foreign affair power 
cases, including Declare War Clause, the scope of Commander-in-Chief Power, 
customary presidential war power, political question doctrine, acquiescence doctrine 
and congressional delegation. 
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CHAPTER 5: 
DELIBERATIVE-ORIENTED INTERPRETATIONS AND REFORMS OF 
WAR POWER CONSTITUTION 
The empirical analyses in chapter 4 have provided a plethora of information about 
whether and how Congress attempts to exert its control over the president through 
deliberation as the Founders expected, the limits of congressional ability to regulate a 
war, and historical patterns of presidential unilateral action. However, quantitative 
analyses inevitably omit normative assessment, especially their implications for 
different legal doctrines. As a matter of constitutional interpretation, these analyses 
provide much insight for reflection on various disputes over interpreting the allocation 
of war power under the Constitution. However, since these empirical analyses have 
their own limiting nature, the reflection I am going to present based on these empirical 
evidences in this chapter is just a minimum supplement to the entire debates over 
various constitutional interpretation of war power allocation between the president and 
Congress. 
In this chapter, I will examine three main legal issues often raised concerning 
the subject of war power allocation based on the empirical evidence that I 
demonstrated in chapter 4: (1) the procedural and substantive function of Declare War 
Clause, (2) the form of congressional war authorization and customary presidential 
war power, and (3) justiciability and political question doctrine in war power 
litigation. My overall argument is that interpretation of the allocation of war power 
should be in accordance with procedural and substantive due law-deliberation and 
law-making processes. But to realize a veritably deliberative war power according to 
the Constitution and a more accountable government, certain congressional rule 
reforms are needed. In particular, I argue that (1) the function of Declare War Clause 
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requires that the president should not independently initiate a war unless a sudden 
attack would occur within one month; (2) in terms of systematic presidential resistance 
with congressional war regulation throughout history, congressional acquiescence is 
not a valid source of customary presidential war power; and (3) the courts should be a 
forum more easily accessed by both congressional members and citizens concerning 
war power litigation. 
I. The Function of Declare War Clause and Congressional Authorization for War 
Although the United States declared war against foreign nations only seven times in its 
history, the meaning and function of the Declare War Clause remains one of the most 
controversial legal issues in the field of war power research. I will explore two legal 
issues traditionally raised under the Declare War Clause: (1) the function of Declare 
War Clause, (2) the relationship between Declare War Clause and Commander in 
Chief power and (3) the legal justification for a humanitarian operation or 
intervention. As for the first issue, I argue based on the empirical evidence that the 
most important function of Declare War Clause is a mandate for “greater publicity” 
because both Congress and civil society have a strong desire for mutual deliberation 
with each other in the decision-making process concerning military deployment. With 
regard to the second issue, I argue that Commander in Chief Clause is an independent 
presidential war power to repel a sudden attack that will occur within one month. 
Concerning the third issue, I argue that a humanitarian operation cannot be solely 
justified on the grounds of its usually low hostility or authorization of an international 
organization. 
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A. The Procedural and Substantive Function of Declare War Clause 
Although there are two methods usually employed by Congress to initiate a war, 
declaration of war and statutory authorization of a war, the Supreme Court in Bas v. 
Tingy1 argued that these two kinds of war-initiation methods have identical 
characteristics as far as the function of Declare War Clause is concerned. In particular, 
Bas Court argued that though an undeclared but congressionally authorized war may 
be more limited in terms of its objective and scope, it is still a public war authorized 
by a legitimate power. 2 However, the Bas Court did not further address much of the 
meaning of a “public war” in terms of its implication for the function of the 
congressional decision-making process in the initiation of a war. 
In the following passages, I will argue that, based on the empirical evidence, 
Declare War Clause mandates that (1) a public war should be debated by members of 
Congress under an adoption of open-rule for a greater publicity requirement in the 
broader public sphere, and that (2) as long as Congress does not provide for other 
specific conditions regarding the general scope, time, or objective of a war, the 
substantive nature and scope of a declaration of a war is identical to an authorization 
of a war. 
1. The Procedural Function of Declare War Clause: A “Greater Publicity” 
Requirement 
Although the Bas Court indicated a public war should be authorized by legitimate 
power, an emphasis on a formal congressional authorization itself does not necessarily 
                                                            
1 See 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37 (1800). 
2 Id. (The Supreme Court distinguished an undeclared war from a declared war by arguing that an 
undeclared war is an imperfect war with limited objective, time, and place, whereas a declared war is a 
perfect war that authorizes all members of a state to commit hostilities upon all members of the other 
state.)  
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constitute a sufficient condition of a public war. In particular, from the perspective of 
deliberative democracy theory, I argue that a public war is predicated not only on a 
formal congressional authorization, but also on a mutual deliberation that searches for 
the greater publicity of a war in the broader public sphere. 
In Bas, the Court wrote in its opinion that whether to declare a formal war 
against another nation is a matter of congressional choice out of various prudential 
concerns. Such a prudential rationale is consistent with the Founders’ original 
intention that an initiation of a war should be based on a just cause, which requires a 
due deliberation among members of Congress. However, a due deliberation among 
congressional members does not suggest a thoroughly insulated deliberation in the 
political public sphere. Congressional deliberation is also interconnected with the 
broader public sphere. Recalling James Wilson’s speech to the Philadelphia 
Convention, he said that the nature of constitutional system is not to involve us in war 
by any man and single body of men,3 and thus suggested that an initiation of war 
needs to be reinforced by a legitimately public reason or better argument that arguably 
can be accepted by all of the political actors in the broader public sphere. In other 
words, to ensure that a cause of a war initiation is just and thus prudential, Congress 
should endeavor to create a circumstance under which different political actors can 
mutually deliberate with each other in the “nexus of public sphere,” namely, Congress, 
and search for a greater publicity to the greatest extent. Therefore, based on both an 
original understanding and modern deliberative democracy theory of the Constitution, 
I argue that the function of Declare War Clause is a mandate for government as a 
whole to meet with a requirement of greater publicity for a just cause of a war. 
Therefore, I understand that both declared and undeclared wars equally demand this 
greater publicity in order that they may be understood to be justly caused. . 
                                                            
3 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 583 (MERRILL JENSEN 
ED., 1976).  
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I think that this “greater publicity” interpretation of the function of Declare 
War Clause can also, to certain extent, be supported by the empirical evidence I 
presented in chapter 4. In particular, most of the political context variables—including 
election year and presidential approval rating, exhibit a pattern of statistically 
significant effects both on the level of congressional deliberation and congressional 
control on the president in military deployment case. Although this pattern is not 
necessarily a direct evidence of deliberation between Congress and civil society, it 
strongly suggests that legislators are sensitive to what attitude their constituents hold 
toward such subject matter. I think such a closely interconnected relationship between 
the political public sphere and civil society can be seen as a moment that different 
political actors collaboratively deliberate with each other to search for the underlying 
publicity of a war. Therefore, although an initiation of war can only be formally made 
by the government, the function of such a process is to provide legislators not only a 
means of deliberation with the president but more importantly, to explore and include 
the opinion of the broader public sphere into that process. 
To institutionally realize the above greater publicity condition in Congress, as 
a policy suggestion point, I argue that military deployment decision should be made 
under an open-rule congressional process. My reason for proposing such open-rule 
setting is because the empirical evidence in chapter 4 systematically shows that a 
lower level of constitutional Justification in military deployment debate resulting from 
an adoption of closed-rule. More importantly, as I already argued in chapter 3, 
deliberative democracy theory is a theory for political action but not mere deliberation. 
In consequence, if the House adopts open-rule for the military deployment debate on 
the floor, arguably, congressional members from across the nation have the 
opportunity to take political action (i.e. amendment) in a floor debate, which may give 
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those non-bill-referral committee members incentive to have reciprocal 
communication with their constituents respectively. 
Moreover, an adoption of open-rule for floor debate over military deployment 
also provides Congress itself with an important internal check on a bill’s referral 
committee. As legislative process scholars suggest,4 the House’s defense committee is 
often composed of preference outliers, compared to members of other committees. 
This further indicates to us that open-rule both can be a possible efficient measure for 
a chamber to place a check on the special interest capture of defense committee and 
facilitates a more comprehensive deliberation thereby meeting the greater publicity 
requirement. In short, I would interpret the meaning of a public war as to ensure that 
congressional deliberation over initiation of a war should be accountable to a 
nationwide constituency under the function of Declare War Clause. 
2. The Substantive Function of Declare War Clause 
In the last part, based on the empirical evidence revealed in chapter 4, I demonstrated 
that the procedural function of Declare War Clause is a requirement of greater 
publicity of a war for both declaration and statutory authorization of a war. In 
accordance with such greater publicity rationale, in the following passages, I further 
argue that the substantive function of statutory authorization of a war is identical to 
that of a declaration of war. In particular, based on the empirical evidence 
demonstrated in chapter 4 that congressional regulation over military deployment 
systematically attempts to impose an ex ante control over a military deployment but 
not other substantive policy authorization and regulation, I argue that declaration of a 
                                                            
4 See e.g. KENNETH SHEPSLE, THE GIANT JIGSAW PUZZLE: DEMOCRATIC COMMITTEE ASSIGNMENTS IN 
THE MODERN HOUSE (1978); Arthur Denzau & Robert Mackay, Gatekeeping and Monopoly Power of 
Committees: An Analysis of Sincere and Sophisticted Behavior, 27 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 740 (1983); See 
KEITH KREHBIEL, INFORMATION AND LEGISLATIVE ORGANIZATION (1991); Richard Hall & Bernard 
Grofman, Process and the Conditional Nature of Committee Bias, 84 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1149 (1990). 
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war does not empower the president additional authority to conduct unauthorized war-
related action. 
In the Bas case, the Court mentioned that an undeclared war is an imperfect 
war with limited objective, time, and place, whereas a declared war is a perfect war 
that authorizes all members of a state to commit hostilities upon all members of the 
other state. Developing based on Bas, some scholars also cite Little v. Barreme5 and 
Talbot v. Seeman6 and argue that the scope of declaration of war is greater than that of 
an undeclared war. In particular, they argued that a declared war is substantially a 
general and comprehensive delegation by Congress and all citizens to the president of 
the power to commit hostility, as opposed to authorization of war constrains the 
president only to conduct a war according to authorization provided in a law.7 
To argue that congressional authorization of a war is a limited delegation, from 
an empirical standpoint,8 I think one should explore the pattern of members of 
                                                            
5 See 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804) (The President did not have “any special authority” to order the 
seizure of non-American ships and ships departing French ports. Even if the Flying-Fish had been an 
American ship, it still would not have been subject to seizure).  
6 See 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1 (1801) (Congress may authorize general hostilities, and in such case the 
general laws of war will apply, or partial hostilities, when the laws of war, so far, as they are 
applicable, will be in force).  
7 See ABRAHAM D. SOFAER, WAR, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND CONSTITUTIONAL POWER: THE ORIGINS 1632 
(1976).  
8 From a legal interpretation point, I think the distinction between undeclared and declared war is not 
totally consistent with the Supreme Court’s opinion in Brown v. United States, in which a majority 
opinion ruled that declaration of war does not exclude the power of Congress to decide, as a policy 
matter, whether to authorize and regulate presidential war-related conduct within the U.S. territory. As 
such, one could only conclude that the Supreme Court opines that, on the one hand, declaration of war 
does not constitute a general delegation to the president regarding domestic war-related conduct. On the 
other hand, it is still doubtful that Brown implied that the president has more sweeping discretion with 
regard to war-related conduct physically outside the United States. Thus, the aforementioned concern 
illumines a need to reinterpret the effect and function of the declaration and authorization of war in a 
more coherent way both within and outside the territory. This concern is similar to what we have 
already seen in the war on terror, when the government would use extraterritorial extradition to avoid 
the effect of constitutional ambit and violate a prisoner of war’s rights under the Geneva Convention by 
asserting that the president had more sweeping power outside the territory. See Brown v. United States, 
12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110 (1814); Justice Marshall wrote that “when war breaks out, the question, what 
shall be done with enemy property in our country is a question rather of policy than of law. . . . 
[Therefore,] the power of confiscating enemy property is in the legislature.” Id., at 128-9; Another 
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Congress attempt to control over the president in military deployment decisions. 
Based on the empirical model demonstrated in chapter 4, the relation between the 
level of congressional deliberation and two sub-categories of ControlScale in military 
deployment cases, Congress only shows a systematic pattern of ex ante control over 
the timing of military deployment but not of other substantive technique controls and 
other general war-related conduct over a military deployment. This pattern suggests 
that legislators are only concerned with when, but not necessarily with how, troops 
should be dispatched when they consider deploying the military, or with other 
substantive objectives of a military action. Therefore, based on empirical evidence, I 
would argue that though congressional authorization of a war is a limited delegation, it 
is limited in the sense of authorization only of a possible military action, but it has 
nothing to do with the goal of a military action and other war-related policy thereof. In 
other words, one cannot necessarily understand whether an authorization of war is 
limited in other objectives because Congress has not yet decided on other issues 
pertinent to such an authorization. 
I think the aforementioned interpretation of congressional authorization is 
reasonable in terms of the dynamic nature of a military action. Neither Congress nor 
the president could predict what would happen after an initiation of war. Both the 
president and Congress have to deliberate cooperatively over the possible military and 
foreign policy goal when they acquire more information after a military action begins. 
I think this kind of limited information concern for Congress is not different in the 
case of declaration of war. Although I do not have chance to use quantitative analysis 
to compare congressional deliberation and control between cases of congressional war 
                                                                                                                                                                           
narrower interpretation of the holding of Brown is that when citizen’s property rights are possibly 
involved, legislative authorization should refer to capture of property. As a result, the Supreme Court 
narrowly interpreted that declaration of war does was not in the ambit of the act of Congress.  
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authorization and declaration of a war in this research,9 the dynamic nature and limited 
information circumstance under which a declared of a war is made by Congress is 
identical to, or even more nasty than, that of congressional authorization. Therefore, in 
terms of the scope of authorization,10 a declaration of a war—compared to that of a 
congressional authorization for war, unless Congress provides for other substantive 
matter such as no ground troops should be introduced in a statutory authorization—
should not be deemed as a greater authorization of discretion to the president.11 
                                                            
9 A look into the historical documents pertaining to the congressional declaration of war shows that a 
common function of those declarations is that they constitute authorization for military deployment and 
mobilization for that deployment under other congressionally authorized acts. But they do not provide 
for other substantive matters in those declarations of war.  
10 Although I argue that the purpose of an authorization of war declaration, in principle, is the same as 
that of a congressional authorization for a war, this does not exclude the possibility of “legal domino” 
effects of a declaration of war on several standby domestic laws that give the president additional 
statutory authority not available in peace time. For example, the president may authorize electronic 
surveillance to acquire foreign intelligence without a court order up to 15 days following a declaration 
of war by Congress. See 50 U.S.C. §§1811, 1829, 1844 (2000). However, one should notice that such 
greater discretion for the president is not the result of a declaration of war per se, but rather that of other 
special domestic laws enacted prior to the declaration.  
11 Several scholars, to the contrary, strongly claim that the function of Declare War Clause is neither the 
same as that of a modern authorization for a war nor an allocation of war power to Congress. Among 
them, John Yoo presents an extremely broad scope for presidential war power. Yoo argues that the 
original understanding of Declare War Clause in the 18th century was juridical rather than legislative. In 
particular, he finds that the Founders regarded a war declaration only as a legal notice under 
international law, by which the “declaration” could trigger international laws governing rules of 
neutrality and belligerence. To address this argument, I refer to the empirical pattern of congressional 
perception toward international institutions mentioned in chapter 4. With regard to the relation between 
the level of congressional check on the president and humanitarian assistance, the data shows that 
Congress systematically exerted less control over matters of humanitarian assistance. Although this is 
rather indirect evidence of congressional attitudes toward international institutions, one should note that 
humanitarian assistance, especially the responsibility to protect, is actually an emerging justification for 
military deployment under international law. But in terms of the effect of international law on domestic 
law, what might be the reason for and meaning of lower level of control over humanitarian assistance in 
military deployment cases? I would suggest that although the effect of international law is not at the 
center of the military deployment debate, this lower priority issue does not necessarily indicate 
congressional indifference toward international institutions. Otherwise, the relationship between 
humanitarian assistance and congressional control level would not be positively correlated in a foreign 
affair case. Moreover, as Paul Kahn indicates, since war has been eliminated as a legal action under the 
UN Charter, a country’s war declaration substantially has no effect on international law. Any 
international legal effect of war should be triggered only by UN authorized collective military action or 
self-defense under the UN Charter. If we still take constitutional clause seriously, especially Declare 
War Clause and Treaties Supremacy Clause, it would be inappropriate to claim that a declaration of war 
strictly occurs for a non-existing juridical purpose under international law. See e.g. ROBERT F. 
TURNER, REPEALING THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION: RESTORING THE RULE OF LAW IN U.S. 
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In sum, based on the aforementioned illustration, the function of Declare War 
Clause has two components. The first part is a procedural function dictating that not 
only the president and Congress but also the broader public sphere should deliberate 
over the legality and legitimacy of military deployment. Following such a mandate, I 
suggest that the deliberation over war authorization should be considered under a due 
deliberative process. The second part is a substantive function regarding the scope of 
congressional authorization for a war and declaration of war. My conclusion is that, in 
principle, declaration of and authorization for a war does not necessarily constitute a 
different scope of delegation to the president: both of them should be narrowly 
interpreted only as an authorization function for conduct concerning military 
deployment but not other war-related conduct. 
B. The Relation between Declare War Clause and Commander in Chief Power 
In the previous part, I argue that the functions of Declare War Clause and 
authorization for a war are identical in principle. However, I have not addressed the 
relationship between Declare War Clause and the Commander in Chief power. To 
address their relationship is crucial to the extent that the presidents often cite his 
Commander in Chief power as a source of the independent military power. In practice, 
in the absence of declaration or authorization, the presidents almost always argue that 
the power inherent in Commander in Chief power is broad and sufficient enough to 
allow the president to deploy troops for the security and defense of the United States. 
It is this inherent “defensive” war power, sometimes claimed as a presidential 
                                                                                                                                                                           
FOREIGN POLICY 80-81 (1991); Henry P. Monaghan, Presidential War-making, 50 B.U. L. REV. 19 
(special issue 1970); Eugene V. Rostow, Great Cases Make Bad Law: The War Powers Act, 50 TEX. L. 
REV. 833, 864-6 (1972); John Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original 
Understanding of War Powers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 167 (1996). Also see e.g. THE RESPONSIBILITY TO 
PROTECT: REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION AND STATE 
SOVEREIGNTY (2001). Also see Paul W. Kahn, War Powers and the Millennium, 34 LOY. L.A. L. 
REV. 11, 16-7 (2000).  
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obligation under the Take Care Clause, which contributes to numerous conflicts 
between the president and Congress regarding the scope of executive defensive and 
emergency power. In the following passages, I will address this issue by looking into 
congressional deliberative ability in both military deployment and non-military 
deployment case and argue that Commander in Chief power is an independent 
defensive power to repel a sudden attack which would occur within one month. 
I begin my discussion by exploring again two strict but opposite interpretations 
of the relationship between Declare War Clause and Commander in Chief Clause 
made by Walter Dellinger and John Ely. Walter Dellinger opines that Congress can 
only regulate an initiation of a large-scale war through either a declaration of war or 
the issuance of a letter of marquee and reprisal.12 If Congress fails to regulate a war by 
either measure, the president has independent power to wage a war under his 
Commander in Chief and broad foreign affair power. 13 
To the contrary, John Ely argued that Declare War Clause is an exclusive 
legislative power conferred upon the Congress to regulate all kinds of military 
deployment, regardless of the scale of hostility.14 Considering the Founders’ original 
understanding of Commander in Chief power,15 Ely argues that the president can only 
                                                            
12 See Office of Legal Counsel Opinion, DEPLOYMENT OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES 
INTO HAITI (9/27/1994).  
13 This argument concerning broad foreign affair power as the president’s independent military power 
was first seen in an article authored by Leonard Meeker, a Legal Adviser to the Department of State 
during the Johnson presidency. See 54 Dept. State Bull. 474 (1966). For another similar argument, 
please see Robert Turner, The War on Terrorism and the Modern Relevance of the Congressional 
Power to Declare War,” 25 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 519 (2002).  
14 See John Hart Ely, War and Responsibility 5-7 (1993).  
15 John Ely understood Commander in Chief power to be general power first and foremost. In particular, 
Hamilton wrote in The Federalist that Commander in Chief power is nothing more than “the supreme 
command and direction of the military and naval force, as first General and admiral of the Confederacy; 
while that of the British king extends to the declaration of war and to the raising and regulating of flees 
and armies, all which, by the Constitution under consideration, would appertain to the legislature. See 
Hamilton, The Federalist Paper No. 69 . . .  
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independently deploy troops without congressional authorization in advance in order 
to repel a sudden attack on the actual territory of United States. He explains that the 
meaning of “sudden” indicates that there is no time to secure an advance 
authorization. 
Two empirical questions are raised by the above two constitutional 
interpretations. First, does Congress’s military deployment power vary in accordance 
with the scale of war as Dellinger suggests? The empirical demonstrated in chapter 4 
suggests that the predicted congressional control level over a major war indeed is 
systematically higher than that of a minor war. As I already indicated in chapter 4, the 
empirical models demonstrated that in a minor war, members of Congress also attempt 
to impose a lower level of control over a minor war through passage of foreign affair 
legislation. In other words, a lower congressional control over minor force does not 
amount to any control at all. Moreover, even if one concedes that a minor war is under 
the ambit not of Declare War Clause but of presidential foreign affair power, the 
empirical model in chapter 4 demonstrated that in regulating a foreign crisis, Congress 
does not manifest a systematically heterogeneous check on the president between an 
ongoing major and minor use of force. That suggests that foreign affair power does not 
necessarily constitute an independent base of the president’s independent military 
power.16 
                                                            
16 Recalling the separation of power and authority I illustrated in chapter 2, a political action taken by a 
person or body can be deemed authoritative only if others are also granted the power to reconstruct the 
authority of that action. If the president can be a “sole organ” to have power to conduct foreign relations, 
that power must be granted by another constitutionally provided organ. Therefore, this empirical finding 
also suggests that the so-called “extra-constitutional foreign affair power” theory argued by Justice 
Sutherland in U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright is unsustainable in the real world of power politics. If Sutherland’s 
extra-constitutional theory does hold, then we would observe no congressionally systematic control 
over presidential foreign relations power but rather endless conflict whenever Congress control over 
external relations matters. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304,320 (1936). 
Therefore, the meaning of “sole organ” of the nation in its external relations should only be narrowly 
interpreted to refer to the sole agent of the nation as a whole but not a broad basis for independent 
military power holder; see e.g. Michael D. Ramsey, The Myth of Extraconstitutional Foreign Affairs 
power, 42 WM.& MARY L. REV. 379 (2000); Charles A. Lofgren, United States v. Curtiss-Wright 
Export Corp: An Historical Reasseessment, 83 YALE L.J. 1 (1973); David M. Levitan, The Foreign 
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The second empirical question related to Dellinger and Ely’s debate concerns 
the role of time. In particular, Dellinger and other proponents of unitary executive 
theory rest their arguments on the functional incompetence of Congress to handle 
volatile foreign relations because of the freewheeling nature of deliberation in 
Congress.17 They do share Ely’s underlying rationale to the extent that time 
compression would give Congress only a limited opportunity to conduct complicated 
external relations. But Ely did not opine that such time-compressing nature of foreign 
relations inevitably accords the president a seemingly unchecked foreign affair power. 
He argued that only in a time of “sudden” attack would Congress have no time to 
deliberate and react. Thus, except in the case of imminent threat, Congress still holds 
the primary power over military deployment and foreign affairs. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                           
Relations Power: An Analysis of Justice Sutherland’s Theory, 55 YALE L. J. 467 (1946); See United 
States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936). In addition, although Sutherland’s theory is 
often cited as “extra-constitutional theory,” I understand his argument in relation with external matters 
as not totally beyond constitutional principles. For example, the Senate still holds treaty consent power 
pursuant to the Constitution; further, congressional-executive agreement is generally also conditioned 
by the principle of rule of law. As such, Sutherland’s theory is more similar to a residual foreign power 
theory.  
17 In Curtiss-Wright, Justice Sutherland also underscored the importance of efficiency in handling a 
volatile state in foreign relations and argued for a broad foreign relations power to the president.  
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Table 5.1. Congressional Control Scale and Congressional Time Variables 
Dependent Variable= ControlScale 
Military Deployment Cases   Non‐military Cases   Overall Cases  
 
No Political and 
Economic Context 
Political and 
Economic Context 
Included 
No Political Context  Political and 
Economic Context 
Included 
No Political Context  Political and 
Economic Context  
Included 
Justification  5.215*** 
(3.27) 
14.919** 
(2.27) 
3.611*** 
(4.18) 
3.738*** 
(4.21) 
3.415*** 
(4.81) 
3.562*** 
(4.61) 
LawCharacter  4.565*** 
(3.63) 
8.206*** 
(3.50) 
0.681 
(1.39) 
0.692 
(1.18) 
1.281*** 
(2.82) 
1.295** 
(2.34) 
HComHearing  ‐2.167 
(‐0.87) 
‐5.177*** 
(‐3.54) 
‐0.646 
(‐1.61) 
‐0.567 
(‐1.39) 
‐0.799** 
(‐2.17) 
‐0.603 
(‐1.63) 
SComHearing  ‐0.07 
(‐0.1) 
‐2.433 
(‐1.48) 
‐0.198 
(‐0.9) 
‐0.362 
(‐1.53) 
‐0.338** 
(‐2.03) 
‐0.587*** 
(‐2.63) 
ClosedRule  3.002** 
(2.02) 
6.875** 
(2.17) 
0.156 
(0.61) 
0.135 
(0.43) 
0.483 
(1.58) 
0.559 
(1.44) 
Cloture  1.106 
(0.66) 
5.183 
(1.08) 
0.088 
(0.3) 
‐0.236 
(‐0.77) 
0.232 
(0.86) 
‐0.131 
(‐0.43) 
HReportTime  3.086*** 
(1.57) 
1.1** 
(0.53) 
0.111 
(0.083) 
0.117 
(0.08) 
0.131** 
(0.07) 
0.147** 
(0.08) 
SReportTime    ‐0.254 
(0.26) 
‐2.993 
(2.55)  
0.353 
(0.354) 
0.532 
(0.38)  
0.282 
(0.49) 
0.463 
(0.35)  
DividedGov    ‐12.731* 
(‐1.65)  
  ‐0.513 
(‐1.13) 
  ‐0.907** 
(‐2.07) 
Ordinal logit regressions estimated. ***=p<0.01; **=p<0.05; *=p<0.10  
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Table 5.1 (Continued) 
Dependent Variable= ControlScale 
Military Deployment Cases   Non‐military Cases   Overall Cases  
 
No Political and 
Economic Context 
Political and 
Economic Context 
Included 
No Political Context  Political and 
Economic Context 
Included 
No Political Context  Political and 
Economic Context  
Included 
Election    ‐0.174 
(‐0.04) 
  0.062 
(0.18) 
  ‐0.281 
(‐0.83) 
Approval    8.487 
(0.67) 
  ‐3.017** 
(‐2.55) 
  ‐2.333** 
(‐2.08) 
PercentParty    ‐83.459* 
(‐1.72) 
  ‐8.372 
(‐1.47) 
  ‐10.409** 
(‐2.07) 
GDP    ‐0.004 
(‐0.12) 
  0.002*** 
(0.27) 
  0.002*** 
(0.31) 
CPI    0.022 
(0.46) 
  0.002 
(0.32) 
  ‐0.001 
(‐0.22) 
Unemployment    ‐2.647** 
(‐2.33) 
  0.065 
(0.49) 
  ‐0.021 
(‐0.14) 
N  38  38  191  191  229  229 
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From an empirical standpoint, I suggest that in order to assess the above 
disputes over whether Congress has ability to duly deliberate over war and foreign 
affair issues, we should look into the congressional deliberative ability, in terms of 
time, to form a controllable and substantive military deployment and foreign affair 
policy. To make such an empirical investigation of the effect of time has on 
congressional deliberative ability, I slightly change my original empirical model 
regarding the relationship between congressional deliberation and congressional check 
in chapter 4 (Table 4.3) by including both chambers’ committees deliberation time 
into the model. The results of the effect of time has on the level of congressional 
control over the president is presented in Table 5.1. 
In particular, in terms of the time a bill takes to pass both chambers, there is no 
empirical evidence showing that a longer deliberative time would generate a higher 
level of congressional control. Nevertheless, time indeed is a significant factor for the 
House committee and thus affects the level of congressional control over presidential 
power. The empirical model demonstrates that a longer time taken by the House 
committee in reporting a bill back to the floor systematically generates a higher level 
of congressional check on the president in both military deployment and foreign affair 
cases. According to the post-regression analysis, in a military deployment case, a 
higher level (level 4 or greater) of congressional control over the president usually 
takes less than one month of the House’s committee bill reporting time. In non-
military deployment case, a higher level of congressional control over the president 
usually takes less than six months of the House’s committee bill reporting time. I think 
these predicted results suggest that Congress is able to take a yes or no position on a 
specific military deployment issue within one month, and form a more comprehensive 
foreign policy within six months. Therefore, from the standpoint of congressional 
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deliberative ability,18 I would suggest that an imminent threat may be defined as a 
military action that must be taken to repel an attack within one month, which could 
annex a certain justification for the president to avoid acquiring advance congressional 
authorization from Congress. In other words, if an attack would happen within one 
month, then the president has independent power to take a military action under his 
Commander in Chief power.19 
I want to suggest a point of policy and argue that a concurrent war power 
between the political branches is a procedural power that can be triggered by the 
president to require a “fast track-like” congressional process to take an advance yes or 
no position on a military deployment issue.20 Moreover, the initiation of this fast track-
like procedure for military deployment decision should also have an active dimension 
in foreign policy making.21 That is, a military deployment authorization, once reached, 
                                                            
18 It is worthwhile to recall Secretary of State Daniel Webster’s statement of a valid self-defense under 
international law here: “a necessity of self-defense, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, 
no moment for deliberation.” See VI THE WORKS OF DANIEL WEBSTER 261 (1851). Although his 
statement was made under international law, it is inspiring for us to be more accurate in defining the 
meaning of imminent threat from the perspective of congressional deliberation.  
19 The above framework is a general scope of Commander in Chief power underscoring a revived 
liberal and deliberative model of emergency power. A deliberative emergency power framework does 
not deem time and space compression of international relations to indicate the alienation of Commander 
in Chief power from congressional war power. To the contrary, such compression demands a tighter 
congressional-executive relationship, given that a small hostile action could swiftly and easily trigger a 
bigger crisis in contemporary international relation. Power is not an instrument used to direct others to 
act without persuasion but a capacity to deliberate with others in concert. To deliberate in concert 
suggests that we situate in the same space simultaneously. One of the most important functions of the 
Constitution is to mandate that people continuously deliberate on a common issue; otherwise, there will 
be a lacking of common ground in the public sphere. This is an indispensable pillar of the 
congressional-executive relationship, no matter whether it is a time of emergency or not. 
20 The downside of this suggestion will be similar to that of War Powers Resolution’s “sixty-day clock,” 
that is, the president could choose not to trigger the “fast track-like” authorization process. I will 
address this issue in a later section when discussing the role of judicial review. My main argument there 
is that the courts, as one of the concurrent branches of the government, should be more accessible for 
war power litigation by relaxing the interpretation of standing and political question doctrines.  
21 With regard to the importance of congressional foreign policy making and its relation with 
emergency power in the post-Cold War era, Jules Lobel has a comprehensive illustration. See Jules 
Lobel, Emergency Powers and the Decline of Liberalism, 98 YALE L.J. 1385 (1989).  
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it will trigger another legislative process requiring Congress to mold a more 
comprehensive foreign policy within a six-month period.22 
C. Humanitarian Operation and Congressional Control 
One of the controversial legal issues relating to use of force abroad in the post-Cold 
War period is the rising amounts of humanitarian operations authorized under UN 
Security Council resolutions. In terms of the constitutional interpretation concerning 
allocation of war power between the president and Congress, those controversies 
generally can be considered to have two dimensions. The first and foremost is whether 
a military deployment for a humanitarian operation could be justified solely under an 
authorization of the United Nations or another regional international organization 
without a congressional authorization? The second concerns whether the low-intensity 
nature of a humanitarian operation can be justified for an independent military 
deployment under the Commander in Chief power? Based on the empirical evidence 
demonstrated in chapter 4, I argue that the unstable nature of a humanitarian operation 
cannot justify an independent military deployment under the Commander in Chief 
power. 
In addressing the constitutional authority of the president’s independent use of 
force for humanitarian purposes in Somalia, Assistant Attorney General Flanigan 
argues that to maintain and support the credibility of a UN Security Council 
                                                            
22 As such, I would argue that a deliberative model of emergency power is not outside the Constitution 
but still should be controlled in accordance with basic constitutional principles. Several scholars 
regarded this non-normalcy period as a political moment that could only be checked by election and 
impeachment. See e.g. Id., at 1385; also Mark Tushnet, Defending Korematsu?: Reflections on Civil 
Liberties in Wartime, 2003 WISCON, LAW REV. 273 (2003). However, in terms that impeachment hardly 
had its effect in history, I doubt if impeachment could be an efficient tool for Congress to check on the 
president. Moreover, when calculating war and foreign affair policy, as empirical evidence shows, 
neither Congress nor the president is really affected by the election cycle, even though the constituents 
may retrospectively reflect their opinions. In addition, as I argued above, an adoption of open-rule 
procedure for a floor debate can also functionally play a role in national debate over a military 
deployment case. Therefore, I suggest that even during a political moment, an emergency also can be 
relatively accommodated in a liberal and deliberative model of constitutionalism.  
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Resolution, the president can justify an independent military deployment to enforce 
the Resolution under his Commander in Chief Power and Supremacy Clause.23 
However, the original purpose of the Supremacy Clause was to preempt international 
law with federal common law; it was not considered to be a source of state law.24 In 
other words, the Supremacy Clause does not intend to substitute congressional 
lawmaking authority with a direct application of international law to municipal law.25 
Therefore, from an empirical stand point, if the president attempts to cite 
Supremacy Clause as a legitimate source of independent military deployment for 
humanitarian operation, he should at least prove that Congress has shown a 
systematically lower level of control over such humanitarian operation authorized 
under an international organization. However, as the empirical model in chapter 4 
demonstrated, the level of congressional check on the president is positively correlated 
with humanitarian assistance, which suggests that Congress does not deem 
international institutions to be a sufficient measure of check on the president. Nor does 
Congress regard international institutions as legal authorities that can authorize the 
president to independently deploy troops abroad. I think this empirical pattern is 
reasonable because the decision making process of UN Security Council is not similar 
to that of congressional deliberation process, which makes municipal constituents 
difficult to oversee. As such, in order to prevent the president from bypassing 
Congress and detouring to international organizations, Congress in fact has to manifest 
a stronger will to control over the president in humanitarian operation area. 
                                                            
23 Authority of the President to Use United States Military Forces for the Protection of Relief Efforts in 
Somalia, 13 Op. off. Legal Counsel 8 (Dec. 4, 1992).  
24 See Louis Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the United States Constitution 156-65 (1996).  
25 Another source of authority often cited by the president is that the president should abide by 
international law under the Take Care Clause. But the Take Care Clause is deemed to be authoritative 
only if there is already a law enacted by Congress. In other words, Take Care Clause cannot be cited as 
a direct source of presidential power. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
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Another legal justification for the independent use of force abroad for 
humanitarian operations is humanitarian operation’s low-intensity.26 However, as the 
military operation in Somalia suggests, the line between low- and high-intensity 
operations was ambiguous when American troops crossed the Mogadishu line.27 More 
importantly, most of the military deployments for humanitarian assistance, as the 
empirical evidence demonstrates, accompany not a lower level of hostility but a higher 
one. Table 5.2 shows that of forty-three humanitarian assistance bills, thirty-three 
arose during a period of major hostility. This relationship between humanitarian 
assistance and force hostility is statistically significant, X2 (1, N=229) = 14.42, p < 
.001. This result informs us that though the development of an event triggering 
humanitarian assistance usually may be relatively static and emerging, Congress is 
highly concerned with the very unstable and unpredictable nature of such an assistance 
operation itself. Therefore, to ensure the function of Declare War Clause could also be 
fully realized in humanitarian operations, I argue that military deployment for a 
humanitarian operation also requires congressional authorization.28 
                                                            
26 Authority of the President to Use United States Military Forces for the Protection of Relief Efforts in 
Somalia, 13 Op. off. Legal Counsel 8 (Dec. 4, 1992).  
27 In March 1993, the UN Security Council authorized a mission, UNOSOM II, endowed with 
enforcement powers under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to establish a secure environment throughout 
Somalia. However, operations turned sour following the Battle of Mogadishu on October 3, 1993, when 
US forces attempted to launch an attack on the Olympic Hotel in search of Mohamed Farrah Aidid 
which caused 18 soldiers’ deaths.  
28 The above empirical pattern, a positively congressional regulation on humanitarian assistance, also 
reflects an immature status of humanitarian intervention in international law. For those proponents of 
humanitarian intervention, humanitarian already constitutes a source of customary international law.28 
However, such a strong universal and highly moral argument for humanitarian intervention 
unsurprisingly induces more moral disagreements, both nationally and internationally. An argument for 
a universal rule should always be plural. Therefore, as long as the president relies on such strong 
arguments as universal human rights for a humanitarian operation involving the military, he does not 
have independent military power to deploy troops even during peacetime as Commander in Chief.  
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Table 5.2. Relationship between Humanitarian Assistance and Hostility Level  
  Humanitarian Assistance?   
  Yes  No  Total 
Major Forces  33   83   113  
Minor Forces  10   103   116  
Total  43   186   229  
 
Based upon the empirical pattern delineated in chapter 4, this section attempts 
a substantial redefinition of imminent threat or sudden attack as an attack that will 
occur within less than one month. After an action is taken, a renewal process should be 
put on the congressional calendar within six months in order that a more 
comprehensive foreign policy for a military event may be shaped. Regarding 
humanitarian operations, I argue that advance authorization of Congress also should 
be acquired by the president even if a humanitarian incident is often a relatively static 
crisis. So far I have discussed only the procedural and substantive functions of Declare 
War Clause and its relevant possible reform of congressional rule. However, what type 
of Act of Congress can be counted as a valid authorization of and regulation on 
presidential power has not yet been discussed above. I will further explore this issue in 
the next section. 
II. Forms of Congressional War Authorization and Customary Presidential War 
Power 
There are various tools that Congress may use to present its judgment to the public and 
impose a check on the president. The traditional view of war power scholars of war 
and foreign affair powers is that Congress assumes control over the president 
 183 
principally through its budget power.29 A notable example is that Congress ended the 
Vietnam War by terminating the funding requested by the president. However, it is 
uncertain whether control over appropriations is an efficient instrument for Congress 
to exercise control over the president. In practice, presidents have often cited 
appropriations as an implied congressional authorization for a military deployment 
initiated by the executive branch without a congressional authorization.30 Moreover, 
Congress often tries to impose a check on the president by passing non-binding 
resolution such as a concurrent resolution or a single-chamber resolution. However, 
under INS v. Chadha,31 such non-bicameral resolution cannot be regarded as 
constitutional measures through which to bind the president to adhere to what 
Congress says. As such, it is worthwhile to make an empirical investigation into which 
of the types of legislative action other than “regular law” can be constitutionally valid 
and politically efficient checks on presidential power. 
In addition to viewing congressional appropriations as implied authorization 
for military deployment, modern presidents often cite congressional acquiescence as 
another such implicit acknowledgment of his Commander in Chief power by 
Congress. Throughout the history of U.S. foreign relations, presidents have 
unilaterally taken military action over 300 times32 without congressional authorization. 
A standing president thus often argues that he may make an independent use of force 
                                                            
29 See LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER 10-12 (2004).  
30 For example, in Somalia humanitarian intervention and Bosnia peacekeeping operation, Congress 
never authorize the president to use military intervening in Somali human rights crisis but still 
appropriate sufficient amounts of money for those operations, both of which became an important 
rationale of the president to justify his military actions as authorized by impliedly congressional consent 
in the appropriation bills.  
31 See Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).  
32 See Richard F. Grimmett, Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2004, Cong. 
Res. Serv. RL 30172, Oct. 5 (2004).  
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when he deems such action necessary to maintain the security and defense of the 
United States. 
In short, a general question regarding such disputes mentioned above concerns 
the forms of congressional action and inaction that may be seen as constitutionally 
valid forms and politically efficient tools of either congressional authorization for or 
congressional regulation over presidential war power. In the following two sections, I 
will (1) explore what the valid forms of congressional war authorization and 
regulation are, and (2) examine the appropriateness of the argument of congressional 
acquiescence as a source of customary presidential war power. 
A. Forms of Congressional War Authorization and Regulation 
In addition to declaration of and authorization for a war, Congress often regulates a 
military deployment event through a budget bill, single-chamber resolution, or 
concurrent resolution. I argue that a budget bill can be a time-limited authorization for 
a military deployment but that Congress should have an appropriate second time 
deliberation over the same military action issue. In addition, a concurrent resolution is 
a valid form of the regulation of president war power, whereas a single-chamber 
resolution can be a valid form if both chambers adopt an identical resolution. The 
overall reason for these arguments is that as long as a congressional procedure is 
functionally capable of generating a higher level of deliberation, the decision that 
emerges from such a procedure is constitutionally valid. In the following passages, I 
will discuss the validity of an annual budget bill and a non-binding resolution 
respectively. 
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1. Annual Budget Bill 
From the perspective of democratic deliberation theory, the enactment process of an 
annual budget bill is an opportunity for both Congress and the president to reconsider 
an issue each year. However, the empirical model presented in chapter 4 demonstrated 
that while the annual budget process tends to generate a lower level of congressional 
deliberation, the decision made after an annual budget process systematically 
generates a higher level of congressional check on the presidential power. I think that 
there is such a lower level of congressional deliberation in the annual budget process 
is because only those emerging and new security issues are often the reasons for 
congressional members to bring a constitutional issue into a budget bill debate.33 But 
once congressional members have deliberated over an issue, they tend to maintain a 
status quo policy for the upcoming year before they turn their eyes on other new 
foreign issues. 
For example, in 1995 and 1996, when a military crisis broke out between 
South Korea and North Korea, President Clinton ordered a joint military exercise with 
South Korea in the Yellow Sea to escalate the level of hostility, in an attempt to deter 
North Korea from a possible invasion of the South. Congress responded to the joint 
military exercise simply by stating a sense of Congress within the defense 
authorization bills passed over the next two years but without discussing the 
appropriateness of the escalation of hostility that the president could allow the military 
exercises to be performed. However, during the enactment process of the same 
defense authorization bill, Congress spent a great amount of time deliberating on the 
constitutionality of the peacekeeping operation in Bosnia. Therefore, it is fair to 
conclude that debate in the annual budget process is apt to focus on a new and 
                                                            
33 A similar conclusion is also made by Mitchell Pickerill. See MITCHELL PICKERILL, CONSTITUTIONAL 
DELIBERATION IN CONGRESS: THE IMPACT OF JUDICIAL REVIEW IN A SEPARATED SYSTEM 64-8(2004).  
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prevalent issue and maintain a status quo for an already existing policy or security 
threat. 34 
In terms of such a limited capacity for re-deliberation over the same issue in a 
summary35 annual budget process, I argue that annual budget law can only be a time-
limited congressional authorization for or regulation of a war. In particular, if 
Congress does not authorize the president to initiate a military action in a separate 
authorization bill, then an appropriation bill cannot be validly seen as an authorization 
of military deployment unless it has been “duly deliberated” by members of Congress. 
Otherwise, I argue that only the first-year appropriation bill can be seen as a valid 
authorization for a military deployment. 
But what is the meaning of “due deliberation” of a military deployment in an 
annual budget process? I propose two elements: separation of annual authorization and 
appropriation process, and adoption of open-rule for military deployment debate in the 
annual budget process. First, traditionally, even if an authorization clause is not 
enacted,36 an appropriation bill itself still provides a sufficient legal basis for the 
executive branch to spend the money.37 However, this may inevitably undermine the 
power of the oversight committee and the authority of the appropriation committee. 
The members of an oversight committee are those who particularly commit time and 
                                                            
34 In addition to the distraction provided by other foreign affair events, William Howell and Jon 
Pevehouse also suggest that domestic political struggles would distract congressional members because 
of its highly exploitable nature. See WILLIAM HOWELL & JON PEVEHOUSE, WHILE THE DANGERS 
GATHER 114-51.For example, the impeachment of President Clinton is by definition more politically 
exploitable than a constitutional issue concerning a joint military exercise with South Korea in order 
possibly to deter North Korea.  
35 In Greene v. McElroy, the Supreme Court refused to recognize that Congress has ratified the 
Department of Defense to establish a security clearance program through appropriation on the grounds 
that annual budget process is just a summary process. See Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959).  
36 This situation occurred twice during the passage of foreign affair authorization bills between 1989 
and 2008.  
37 See WALTER J. OLESZEK, CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURES AND THE POLICY PROCESS 48-9 (2004).  
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resources toward tracking every possible emerging issue. If the authorization process 
can be randomly substituted with a mere appropriation process, a congressional policy 
may lack sufficient publicity for the chair of the appropriations committee to have a 
substantially larger role. Second, as the empirical model demonstrated in chapter 4 
shows, an adoption of open-rule would generate a higher level of congressional 
deliberation. Therefore, I suggest that a military deployment issue should be debated 
under an open-rule during the annual budget process. 
2. Non-binding Resolution 
Other than regulating presidential war power through appropriations, Congress has 
often tried to impose a check on a presidential use of force through a non-binding 
resolution, such as a concurrent resolution or a single-chamber resolution. After INS v. 
Chadha, the failure of Congress to present a bill to the president is regarded as having 
no legal significance and thus cannot be seen as a constitutionally permissible 
instrument through which to control presidential war power. From an empirical 
standpoint, I think that to apply Chadha to a war power case, one should at least prove 
that a formal bicameral and presentment procedure—either annual budget process or 
ordinary lawmaking process— s the only channel in which the publicity of a law can 
emerge. Otherwise, an alternative procedure such as legislative veto can be a valid tool 
through which Congress can control the president. 
Table 5.3 shows that the level of constitutional deliberation in Congress is not 
systematically higher in a debating process over a binding regulation regarding a 
military deployment than in a debating process over a non-binding one. In other 
words, Congress does not think that a non-binding resolution fails to have an effect on 
the president. For example, in debating over whether to authorize President Clinton to 
enforce NATO’s bombing directive in Serbia, the level of constitutional deliberation 
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was greater than the average level of constitutional deliberation over other military 
events, even though Congress was only trying to vote on a concurrent resolution. 
Table 5.3. Relationship between Unilateral Presidential Action and Congressional 
Discourse 
  President Takes Unilateral Action?   
  No   Yes   Total  
High Deliberation  15  7  22 
Low Deliberation   8  8  16 
Totatl   23  15  38 
Pearson chi2(1) = 1.2817; Pr = 0.258 
Moreover, the empirical model presented in chapter 4 also demonstrated that 
the president systematically responds to a congressional regulation, either a binding or 
non-binding resolution, of his military deployment power by strategically issuing an 
executive order, a national security order, or a proclamation. This systematically 
unilateral presidential response to a congressional “partial” legislation also suggests 
that the president understands the political and legal effects of a formally non-binding 
resolution. War power negotiation and constitutional deliberation between the 
president and Congress in fact proceeds not only in a formal legislative process, but 
also in other alternative forms. In consequence, a non-binding resolution is 
functionally equivalent to that of a formally binding law in the eyes of both the 
president and of congressional members, and can be an alternative constitutional tool 
for Congress to assert control over the president.38 Lastly, I think a single-chamber 
                                                            
38 I think this argument is also similar to that of Charles Tiefer. He argues that since both binding and 
non-binding resolutions could raise attention and debate in the broader public sphere, a non-binding 
resolution can be a sufficient legal basis for regulation of presidential war power. His s argument is also 
consistent with my empirical finding that Congress systematically takes the attitude of the broader 
public sphere into account when legislators debate over both binding and non-binding military 
deployment regulations. See Charles Tiefer, War Decisions in the Late 1990s by Partial Congressional 
Declaration, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1, 105 (1999).  
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resolution cannot be seen as valid tool to control over the president because it does not 
stand for a full congressional deliberation over a substantial issue unless two chambers 
adopt an identical single chamber resolution. . 
B. Does Congress Always Acquiesce to a Presidential Use of Force? 
In the previous part I demonstrated that in negotiating the use of force, Congress do 
not necessarily adopt a formal and regular legislation. Congress can response to the 
president via alternative measures to express its intention. Analogous to this argument, 
many scholars also argue that historical practices of presidential independent use of 
force also provide legitimacy for the justification of inherent presidential war power, 
as long as Congress does not take action to express its objection to a use of force. 
However, based on the empirical evidence in chapter 4, I found that (1) 
presidential independent use of force systematically resisted congressional explicit 
regulation on a war, and more importantly, (2) legislative inaction were in fact 
systematically out of congressional unawareness of presidential encroachment on 
congressional war power, which suggests that congressional acquiescence cannot be 
used as a source for justifying customary presidential war power. I will illustrate these 
two empirical findings and my reflection on acquiescence doctrine and customary war 
power in greater detail in the following passages. 
1. No Systematic Practice of Congressional Acquiescence to Unilateral War 
Proponents of the presidential war-making usually argue that the historical practices of 
the president’s deployment of the military independent of Congress were often 
initiated without explicit congressional authorization since the Founders’ time. Hence, 
these proponents argue that these frequent, systematic, and unbroken practices already 
assign the president the role of primary and central decision maker of war and foreign 
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affair policy, while Congress only controls presidential war power out of an ad hoc 
political concern.39 Nevertheless, such an argument does not reflect a counterpart in 
the historical pattern, namely, congressional regulation over the presidential use of 
force. In other words, only until the historical practice of unilateral presidential 
military deployment compared with historical practice of congressionally authorized 
military deployment can one argue whether Congress intentionally acquiesced in a 
specific military deployment event. To explore this comparison, I examine two 
elements proposed by presidential war-making scholars: (1) whether statistics show an 
unbroken and systematic practice of non-congressional control over the president’s 
deployment of the military, and (2) whether such deployment is not out of an ad hoc 
political concern as is Congress’s attempt to check presidential war power. 
To assess the first element, I suggest recalling the result of the presidential 
unilateral model (Table 4.11) that I demonstrated in chapter 4. In fact, the president 
either tends to initiate a use of force partially beyond a congressional authorization or 
totally violates a congressional prohibition on a military deployment. Thus, the 
scholarly proponents of presidential war-making authority do not provide a fair 
account of presidential violation of congressional war-regulation. As the empirical 
model shows, whatever procedural/substantive or ex ante/ ex post controls Congress 
attempts to impose on the president, as long as there is a minimum control pertaining 
to a military deployment, the president systematically resists it. There is no systematic 
and unbroken non-congressional control over military deployment. Hence, I would 
understand that the historical pattern of unilateral use of force is not a constitutional 
justification for inherent presidential war-making power but, as history reminds us, an 
ongoing power counteraction between the president and Congress. 
                                                            
39 See Henry P. Monaghan, Presidential War-Making, 50 B.U. L. REV. 19, 25-7 (SPECIAL ISSUE 1970).  
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As to the second element, more importantly, the empirical models in chapter 4 
demonstrated that a lower presidential approval rating systematically generates 
unilateral military deployment, which may suggest that the president tends to justify 
his unilateral action solely based on power politics by going public, creating rally-
around-the-flag effect, and skipping a mutual deliberation with Congress. This 
suggests that even a unilateral military deployment is not necessarily initiated out of 
non-political concern. Therefore, I would argue that even if one can hardly prove 
congressional war regulation does not emerge out of an ad hoc political concern, 
proponents of customary presidential war power also cannot show that unilateral war 
is not a random political concern. 
I believe that the empirical evidence presented here could help us assess what I 
would call the “frequency” argument in United States v. Midwest Oil Co,40 which is 
often cited as a legitimate source of customary presidential war power by the 
proponents of presidential war-making authority. In the Midwest Oil case, the 
Supreme Court ruled that if a repeated executive usage is not objected to by Congress, 
then that unilateral usage is presumed to be authorized by Congress, especially when 
that usage has lasted systematically over years. To put this argument into quantitative 
terms for proponents of presidential war-making, it can be restated thus: an implied, 
constitutionally valid presidential war power is positively correlated with two or more 
identical kinds of unilateral executive action. However, this statement neglects the fact 
that under some circumstances, unilateral usage is often a political response to other 
political campaigns without intention to deliberate with Congress. I believe that such a 
deliberative intention in a unilateral action is important to the extent that a 
foundational premise of deliberative politics is that all of the political actors have 
desires mutual understanding and reciprocal justification. If a unilateral act does not 
                                                            
40 See United States v. Midwest Oil Co. 236 U.S. 459 (1915).  
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participate with such nature, it simply undermines the function of Declare War Clause, 
as I mentioned in the last section. Therefore, though a judge can take such a “repeated 
usage” argument into account, the burden of proof in a war power case should be 
beyond the “frequency” standard held in the Midwest Oil case and cannot be applied 
as a controlling justification for the existence of a customary presidential war power.41 
2. No Fully Congressional Awareness of Unilateral Presidential Action 
Another important element for the justification of congressional acquiescence is 
whether Congress is fully aware of a unilateral presidential action. As Michael 
Glennon points out, a legislative inaction cannot be necessarily deemed as an 
acquiescence to the president if Congress does not have both the opportunity to notice 
the existence of a unilateral action and the institutional capability to make an 
objection. Moreover, in Greene v. McElroy,42 the Supreme Court also held that an 
assumption of congressional acquiescence should at least be should at least be 
grounded upon congressional awareness. Thus, from an empirical standpoint, 
legislative silence can be proven to be legislative acquiescence under a full awareness 
situation if (1) the level of congressional deliberation is systematically higher after the 
president takes a unilateral action, and (2) the probability of congressional regulation 
of the president can be easily made after a fait accompli unilateral presidential action. 
However, as the empirical evidence shown in the following passages, neither of these 
elements can be confirmed. 
                                                            
41 For a more demanding definition of customary law making between the political branches, Michael 
Glennon has enumerated a set of comprehensive elements, including legal consistency, normalcy, 
duration, density, and continuity. See Michael Glennon, The Use of Custom in Resolving Separation of 
Powers Disputes, 64 B.U. L. REV. 109, 127-134 (1984).  
42 See Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959).  
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With regard to the first element above, Table 5.3 reveals that a presidential 
unilateral action does not significantly raise a higher level of constitutional 
deliberation. In fifteen initiations of unilateral war, eight of them generated higher-
level deliberation, while seven generated a lower-level deliberation. Such a non-
statistically significant distribution may suggest that a unilateral presidential action 
does not necessarily give rise to congressional awareness of a possible presidential 
encroachment on its power. Ironically, this finding is even consistent with the 
arguments of proponents of presidential war-making power, who argue that 
congressional regulation of a war is just only out of random concern. If they hold this 
argument to be true, then it is hardly understandable why legislative silence 
throughout history can be seen as intentional congressional inaction. 
As for the second element, the empirical evidence shows that there is no 
statistical difference between the proportion of legislative action and inaction in 
unilateral and non-unilateral military deployment cases. Table 5.4 shows that the 
probability of generating a congressional regulation on the president after a unilateral 
presidential military action is not significantly greater than a congressional authorized 
one. One of the possible reasons that the probability of congressional regulation is not 
higher is that a military deployment may have simply ended, which gave Congress no 
opportunity to deliberate. 
Based on the two empirical findings presented above, I would have a difficult 
time concluding that scholars of war power regard congressional inaction as an 
implied, systematic congressional consent to a unilateral military deployment by the 
president. Hence, as a matter of the interpretation of law, congressional inaction over a 
presidential unilateral military deployment event should be presumed to be the result 
of presidential encroachment on congressional war power but not a precedent for 
justifying inherent presidential war power. 
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Table 5.4. Relationship between Unilateral Presidential Action and Congressional 
Post-regulation  
President Takes Unilateral Action?   Congress Regulate 
on the Presidential 
Power   No  Yes   Total  
No  0  1  1 
Yes   23  14  37 
Total   23  15   38 
Pearson chi2(1) =   1.5748   Pr = 0.210 
III. Courts as a Forum for Facilitating War Power Deliberation 
On top of control over presidential war power through law, congressional members, 
and also various citizens often try to challenge the constitutionality and legality of a 
war in court. Such long history challenging the presidential power in the courts 
suggests that citizenry as a whole expect to ask judicial branch to facilitate their voices 
in order to support them participate into the political and decision-making process43 of 
war policy making. Moreover, in terms of the systematic pattern of unilateral 
presidential use of force regardless of what Congress explicitly says, as Justice 
Jackson’s pointed out in his famous opinion in Youngstown,44 it is court’s 
responsibility to perform a heightened review on presidential action in order to keep 
equilibrium of our constitutional system. However, in this long history challenging the 
presidential war power in the courts by congressional members and citizens, judicially 
prudential rules often play a dominant role in war power adjudication in order not to 
involve into both branches’ power controversy that often frustrates those people who 
try to rebalance the war power between the president and Congress. Therefore, it is 
                                                            
43 See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 3-11 (1980).  
44 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).  
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important to reinterpret those judicially prudential doctrines in war power litigation 
cases to facilitate the citizenry’s deliberation in the war-making process. Nevertheless, 
what I want to repeatedly emphasize here is that because these reinterpretations below 
based on the limiting nature of empirical evidences, those reinterpretation are just 
supplements to the entire debates of judicially prudential doctrines in war power 
litigation. 
Generally, judicially prudential rationales given by courts are divided into two 
types: (1) prudence based on procedural reason (i.e. standing, and ripeness/ mootness) 
and (2) prudence based on subject matter reason (i.e. political question doctrine). In 
this section, I will explore these issues based on the empirical evidence I found in 
chapter 4 to assess whether these judicially prudential doctrines are capable 
offacilitating not only congressional and public deliberation but, most importantly, a 
check on presidential war power. My principal argument is that in order to realize 
democratic constitutional deliberation in the public sphere, we should interpret the 
function and scope of these judicially prudential doctrines in accordance with a more 
dynamic procedural and substantive function of Declare War Clause. 
A. Procedural Prudence Based on Standing 
Procedurally prudential doctrines concern such matters as who has standing to 
challenge against the constitutionality and legality of a war in a court, whether a case 
is ripe for judicial adjudication, and whether a case is already moot not for judicial 
judgment. In this part, I will only explore the issue of the standings of citizens and 
congressional members as plaintiffs in the litigation of war power cases. My main 
argument here is that to create a more accessible judicial forum concerning national 
security cases for both citizens and congressional members, not only (1) should the 
courts reassess congressional attitudes toward various military deployment debates 
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situated in the broad public sphere, but (2) Congress also should have the will to 
incorporate a more deliberative-orientated rules for war power debates. 
The function of standing is to ensure that the allegedly violated right of a 
plaintiff can be redressed by a judicial action. The primary elements of the 
standingdoctrine are clearly stated in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,45 in which the 
Supreme Court remarked that (a) there is an actual or imminent injury on a legally 
protected interest, (b) such injury can be fairly attributed to the challenged action of 
the defendant, and (c) there exists a likelihood that a judicial favorable decision to the 
plaintiff can redress that injury. These elements of standing doctrine have been often 
applied to war and foreign affair cases by judges. I will discuss the application of this 
doctrine based on the empirical evidence in relevant litigations by congressional 
members and citizens respectively. 
1. Congressional Member Plaintiff 
In Raines v. Bird,46 six congressional members sued against the constitutionality of the 
line-item veto act on the grounds that the effect of congressional members’ votes 
would be diluted by the presidential cancellation of a particular item of spending in an 
appropriation bill. However, the Court ruled that such a “dilution effect” on the votes 
does not satisfy the meaning of “injury” defined by Lujan. An injury would be 
“completely nullified” by the president. Nevertheless, the Raines Court opined that 
congressional members could still adjust that dilution effect by simply amending or 
repealing the Line-Item Veto Act and need not challenge the statute’s constitutionality 
in the court. 
                                                            
45 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992); also see Northeastern Florida Chapter, 
General Contractors of America v. City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656 (1993).  
46 See Raines v. Bird, 521 U.S. 811, 829 (1997).  
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An impact of Raines on war power cases was seen in Campbell v. Clinton,47 in 
which thirty-one congressional members sued against President Clinton for his 
violation of failure to acquire congressional authorization for the air-strike against the 
former Yugoslavia, which completely nullified the results of congressional votes in 
that authorization decision process. Both trial and appellate courts48 ruled against the 
plaintiffs on the lack of standing grounds by reasoning that Congress could have 
passed a bill prohibiting the president from taking the air-strike. Moreover, the 
appellate court also noted that Congress could have achieved the same purpose by not 
appropriating funds for the military campaign or making an impeachment on the 
president. 
Based on these Supreme Court cases, one can understand that, in principle, the 
Court adopts a formal approach to interpreting the definition of the injury to 
congressional power. That is, as long as a congressional member can propose a bill 
and is not deprived of opportunity to vote a bill on the floor by the president, there is 
no standing for congressional members to sue against the presidential unilateral action 
of a military deployment. Such rationale can be called a “vote-oriented” doctrine of 
congressional standing. Nevertheless, this “vote-oriented” standard thoroughly 
neglects the fact that one of the main functions of legislative action, which is at the 
nature of such action, is not voting, but reciprocal understanding and consensus 
building. From an empirical standpoint, this “vote-oriented” view should at least prove 
that the degree of voting per se is the most important mechanism to check a 
presidential military deployment.49 In other words, a “vote-oriented” view should meet 
                                                            
47 See Campbell v. Clinton, 52 F. Supp. 2d 34 (D.D.C. 1999), aff’d 203 F. 3d 19 (D.C. Cir 2000). 
48 Id.; also Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F. 2d 611 (D.C. Cir. 1973).  
49 See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 462 (2000) (legislator standing is proper 
if she or he can reasonably demonstrate that a past or future vote is fairly traceable to the challenged 
action.)  
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the hypothesis that if more congressional members’ votes converge on the same 
opinion, then the level of congressional check on the president is also accordingly 
higher. 
Table 5.5 displays this relationship between the degree of congressional votes 
and the level of congressional check on the presidential war and foreign affair powers. 
The result primarily confirms that the degree of consensus does not have any 
statistically significant relationship with the level of congressional control over 
presidential power. In particular, if one only looks into those military deployment 
cases, in thirty super-majority (two-thirds of the members of both chambers voting for 
a bill) cases, the level of congressional control over the president in fact randomly 
concentrates on level 2 and 4, which suggests that the number of votes is not a 
mechanism that generates an effective and balanced relationship between the political 
branches. Moreover, an identical situation can also be observed in those simple-
majority (at least more than half of the members of both chambers vote for a bill) 
cases and non-military foreign affair cases. 
In consequence, based on the empirical observation presented above of the 
relationship between congressional votes and control over the president, I argue that to 
find a standing for congressional members in a court to challenge a presidential action, 
the court should first discern whether the president has impaired the opportunity of 
congressional deliberation over a military deployment case. Consistent with my 
primary argument mentioned in the first section of this chapter, any unilateral 
presidential military action without advance congressional deliberation unless the 
president can rationally prove that a military deployment should be dispatched within 
one month to repel a sudden attack, is an actual injury to the institutional power of 
Congress. 
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Table 5.5. Congressional Votes and the Level of Congressional Control on the 
President 
Panel A. Level of Congressional Control on the Presidential Military Deployment Power  
Level of Congressional Control on the Presidential Military Deployment 
Power 
  
0  1  2  3  4  5  Total 
Simple‐
majority 
0  0  2  0  3  1  6 
Super‐
majority  
4  1  13  1  9  2  30 
Fails of 
passage  
2  0  0  0  0  0  2 
Total   6  2  15  1  12  3  38  
Pearson chi2(10) = 13.6378; Pr = 0.190 
Panel B. Level of Congressional Control on the Presidential Non-military Deployment Power  
Level of Congressional Control on the Presidential Non‐military 
Deployment Power 
  
0  1  2  3  4  5  Total 
Simple‐
majority 
3  3  14  3  11  2  36 
Super‐
majority  
12  9  51  28  32  7  139 
Fails of 
passage  
2  2  6  3  1  2  16 
Total   17  14  71  34  44  11  191 
Pearson chi2(10) = 7.5477; Pr = 0.673 
2. Citizen Plaintiff 
Another kind of litigation challenging the constitutionality and legality of a war is 
often initiated by citizens. However, the Supreme Court has also often denied such 
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litigation on the ground of precluding “extra-judicially” questions from the Court and 
keeping and balancing “lines of separation [among the three branches] drawn by the 
Constitution.”50 In other words, standing doctrine assures that a legal but not advisory 
question is presented at the bar and should be resolved “not in the rarified atmosphere 
of a debating society, but in a concrete factual context conducive to a realistic 
appreciation of the consequences of judicial action.”51 
To apply the above “non-advisory opinion” standard to a war power case, I 
argue from an empirical standpoint that one should at least prove that in a military 
deployment decision making process, both the president and Congress are isolated 
from public attitudes toward a military action. It is empirically true that the president 
and Congress should and do indeed independently decide on a military deployment 
case as I demonstrated in chapter 4. However, my empirical findings do not suggest 
that legislators do not take public attitudes, or what I called “political factors” 
(presidential approval rating, election year, divided government, and percentage of 
president’s party in Congress), into the decision-making process account. 
As Table 4.15 demonstrates, the quality of congressional deliberation in 
military deployment cases is also statistically correlated with presidential approval 
rating and the advent of an election year. This result suggests that in military 
deployment cases, the citizens in the broader public sphere in fact desire to mutually 
engage in a war power deliberation with Congress. Military deployment litigation is 
not an atomic action taken by random citizens in the public sphere. Rather, such 
litigation is situated and concurrent with other political actions in the public sphere to 
deliberate over and re-legislate the legitimacy and justification of a military campaign. 
This concurrent action taken in the political public sphere is one of the core tenets of 
                                                            
50 See Valley Forge Christian College v. American United for Separation, 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982).  
51 Id.  
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democratic deliberation. As such, I argue that a finding in a case that a citizen has 
standing to sue against military deployment legality should be “loosely defined” by 
the court on the grounds that this action is not situated in a rarified debating 
atmosphere. 
But what is the limit of the above “loose definition” of citizen standing? I think 
there are at least two directions that can satisfy the “injury formula” specified by 
Lujan. First of all, in the event of an injury to a citizen’s rights in a military 
deployment case, that citizen has the right to deliberate both with Congress and other 
citizens reciprocally. Each constituent across the nation, as the empirical evidence 
demonstrates, systematically affects the deliberation of congressional members in each 
debate over a military authorization bill. This suggests that every American citizen, 
under the unification of the Constitution, deliberates on a war power issue via the 
“nexus of public sphere,” namely, Congress. 
Accordingly, I argue that either (1) a presidential action that impairs a 
congressional opportunity to deliberate on a military deployment authorization in 
advance, or (2) the adoption by Congress of closed-rule for the floor debate over 
military deployment,52 is arguably detrimental to the citizens’ right to mutually 
deliberate in the political public sphere. In consequence, under the former 
circumstance, the court should find a standing for citizen plaintiffs to sue the 
president, while in the later situation, a standing to sue Congress, both of which could 
ensure that both the legislative and the executive branches take charge over their 
political responsibilities. 
                                                            
52 As I have argued in the first section of this chapter, a closed-rule floor debate for military deployment 
authorization in fact dilutes the voice of constituents whose representatives are not defense and foreign 
affair committee members.  
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B. Judicial Prudence Based on Political Question Doctrine 
In addition to their absence from adjudicating a legality or allocation of war power 
case by declining to find a standing for congressional and citizen plaintiffs, the courts 
also employ another approach to avoid vindicating the merits of war power case by 
claiming that such a case is “political” in nature and therefore features inappropriate 
subject-matter under the judicial cognizance. In this part, I will (1) illustrate the 
meaning of “political question doctrine” and its application to several important war 
power cases, and (2) assess the appropriateness of political question doctrine in those 
cases based on various empirical evidences in chapter 4. To propose a more dynamic 
and flexible scope of political question doctrine in war and foreign affair power cases, 
I argue that the function and scope of political question doctrine should be carefully 
applied in accordance with the procedural and substantive function of Declare War 
Clause in military deployment litigation, whereas in foreign affair case political 
question doctrine could be broadly applied for the political branches to mutually form 
a more unified foreign affair policy within the constitutional limits. 
1. A Brief History of Political Question Doctrine 
The first and foremost illustration of political question doctrine in the Supreme Court 
was laid down by Justice Marshall in one of the most notable cases, Marbury v. 
Madison.53 Justice Marshall both argued that the Supreme Court has the power to say 
what the law is, and at the same time emphasized the importance of judicial restraint 
from a case in which the Constitution invests the president “with certain important 
political powers, in the exercise of his own discretion, and is accountable only to his 
country in his political character, and to his own conscience. . . . The subjects are 
                                                            
53 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).  
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political. They respect the nation, not individual rights. . . . the decision of the 
executive is conclusive.”54 
Although Justice Marshall pointed out that some presidential action such as 
ministerial appointment is a purely political matter, he did not elucidate the nature of 
judicial restraint considered by political question doctrine. A formalist explication 
emphasizes the textual allocation of some governmental power to the non-judicial 
branch governing the constitutional interpretation of a separation of powers case.55 
Whereas another functional explanation of a political question’s character accentuates 
a prudential approach, as the judicial branch lacks of institutional competence to 
adjudicate a case that warrants an extraordinary, democratically accountable 
judgment.56 
Such different textual and prudential approaches to the interpretation of 
political question doctrine in judicial restraint cases are best accommodated in Baker 
v. Carr,57 in which the Supreme Court also mentioned the relationship between 
political question doctrine and both war and foreign affair powers. The Baker Court 
enumerated several situations under which political question doctrine should be 
applied when a case58 
is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a 
coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and 
manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without 
an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; or 
                                                            
54 Id., at 165-6.  
55 See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 7-9 
(1959).  
56 See Alexander Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term—Forward: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. 
REV. 40, 75 (1961).  
57 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).  
58 Id., at 186.  
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the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution without 
expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an 
unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; 
or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncement by 
various department on one question. 
Hence, the Baker Court opined that the application of political question doctrine is 
flexible and not necessarily based on either the text of the Constitution text or on the 
ground of judicial prudence. 
Most importantly, the Baker Court argued that although in the areas of war and 
foreign affairs the political branches should have power to make political 
determinations, it does not follow that the judicial branch does not have the power to 
decide the legal effect of that political determination in accordance with various legal 
contexts.59 Therefore, though a court has no power to determine when and how a war 
should be initiated, for example, it still has power to review a military action with 
regard to the interpretation of belligerency under the laws of war. However, it is still 
uncertain under what context is the limit of political question doctrine drawn in war 
and foreign affair cases. In the next part, I further introduce several important judicial 
cases that specifically regard the application of political question doctrine in war and 
foreign affair cases. 
2. Application of Political Question Doctrine in War and Foreign Affair Cases 
Whether political question doctrine is applicable to military deployment or foreign 
affair cases is a very controversial issue. Some theorists (1) argue for the application 
of political question doctrine in war power cases on the grounds that formal 
constitutional texts not only exclusively mandate the political branches to resolve war 
power disputes, but also because judicial branch functionally lacks the expertise to 
                                                            
59 Id. 
 205 
find the legal facts pertaining to a war; (2) argue against the application of political 
question doctrine by claiming that at least under the circumstances of offensive or 
major military campaign, a military action can be defined as a “war” and should be 
reviewed under the legal principle mandates by Declare War Clause; or (3) argue that 
the application of political question doctrine is a functional tool for the Court to 
maintain different political interactions of war power negotiations between the 
political branches within the limit of constitutionalism. In this part, I will introduce 
these complex disputes over the application of political question doctrine in war and 
foreign affair cases. 
In the following parts, I will first (a) introduce the aforementioned three kinds 
of applications of political question doctrine in accordance with military deployment 
and foreign affair power cases respectively, and then (b) evaluate those three kinds of 
arguments based on the empirical evidences revealed in the previous chapter 
respectively. 
a. Arguments for Application of Political Question Doctrine in War and Foreign Affair 
Cases 
In Ange v. Bush,60 the plaintiff, an Army Sergeant, sued against President Bush 
because he deployed troops in Operation Desert Shield before an imminent and 
offensive military action against Iraq without advance congressional authorization. 
Judge Royce Lamberth ruled that a dispute about military initiation is “political” 
because a decision of war and peace policy is not only “textually demonstrable” for 
the political branches to form via various constitutional tools but is also fashioned in 
the political process as well, and thus leaves no room for the judicial branch to 
                                                            
60 See Ange v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 509 (D.D.C. 1990).  
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adjudicate such a dispute.61 Moreover, an alternative to the above political question 
doctrine application and resting on the strict reading of the constitutional text was 
presented in Campbell v. Clinton,62 in which case Judge Silberman ruled that no one 
could challenge the legality of a war (in this case against Yugoslavia) due to the lack 
of a “judicially manageable standard.”63 
As for the foreign affairs area, Goldwater v. Carter64 is one of the most 
representative cases regarding the debate over political question doctrine. In 
Goldwater, Senator Barry Goldwater (joint by other congressional members) sued 
against President Carter’s decision to terminate the mutual defense treaty with Taiwan 
in formally recognizing the People’s Republic of China. Justice Rehnquist reasoned 
that a termination of United State’s treaty with a foreign country is purely political in 
nature not only because it only has an external effect upon the United States, but also 
the Constitution, contrary to the adoption of a treaty, is silent about the termination 
procedure of a treaty.65 Thus, Justice Rehnquist opined that the Court should view 
treaty termination as a “policy determination” and left such determination for the 
political branches. 
                                                            
61 Id., at 512-4.  
62 See Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F. 3d 19, 24-5 (D.C. Cir. 2000).  
63 Id., at 24.  
64 See Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979).  
65 Id. 
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b. Arguments against Political Question Doctrine in War and Foreign Affair Cases66 
Concerning military deployment cases and a court’s refusal to apply political question 
doctrine in the most recent major cases is presented in Dellums v. Bush.67 In Dellums, 
Judge Harold Greene held that as Commander in Chief, the president does not have a 
sweeping discretion to initiate any magnitude of offensive military attack; otherwise, 
the original intention of “an effectual check to the Dog of war” by Congress expected 
by the framers would become an illusion. In this vein, Judge Greene maintained the 
argument that a court undoubtedly has no difficulty in finding whether a military 
action qualifies as a war, especially when large amounts of Americans have been or 
would be killed. Accordingly, Judge Greene concluded that if the function of Declare 
War Clause has its normal meaning and is materialized, political question doctrine 
must not be applied for the protection of Americans. 
As for the non-application of political question doctrine in foreign affair cases, 
it was best illustrated in the Goldwater case by Justice Powell.68 Justice Powell, 
contrary to Justice Rehnquist in the same case, argued that, first, precisely because 
presidential termination of a treaty is not textually demonstrated in the Constitution, it 
is the Court’s responsibility to determine whether the president has power to 
unilaterally terminate a treaty.69 Second, in accordance with Baker, Justice Powell 
opined that even if the Constitution does not provide a judicially manageable standard 
for treaty termination, political question doctrine does not necessarily bar a court from 
                                                            
66 One should note that non-application of political question doctrine in war and foreign affair cases 
may suggest that a court may either be restrained from deciding a merit on a standing ground, or to the 
contrary, may be vindicating a merit of a case. In this part, I only discuss those cases involving non-
application of political question doctrine but do not touch on the relationship between the non-
application of political question doctrine and other prudential doctrines.  
67 See Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141 (D.D.C. 1990).  
68 See Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979).  
69 Id. 
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reviewing the validity and legal effect of a presidential termination of a treaty.70 
Finally, Justice Powell argued that if an application of political question doctrine 
would create irreconcilable voices pronounced by different branches, it would be the 
Court’s constitutionally mandated responsibility to avoid such embarrassment, as the 
Baker case pointed out.71 
3. Political Question Doctrine as a Tool to Police the Border of Constitutional Politics 
Louis Henkin argues that if a court applies political question doctrine in a case, it in 
fact adjudicates that a political action as a whole still operates within the limit of 
constitutionalism (such as rule of law).72 I think this view is largely concurrent with 
Justice Jackson’s famous opinion in Youngstown,73 in which he argues that 
constitutional silence on an issue is left for the political branch to fill in the 
constitutional content through concurrently political interaction in each event. As 
such, the function of political question doctrine is a judicial tool to police the norm of 
a political game and sometimes even to empower either branch in a particular political 
event. 
In accordance with the above canon of political question doctrine in war and 
foreign affair cases, Louis Henkin thus argues that courts in fact suggest that a 
particular political branch (and usually the president) has a dispositive effect in a case 
of constitutional silence.74 Henkin explains that political question doctrine, in reality, 
is not a judicial abstention from review; rather, it is a doctrine that recognizes the legal 
                                                            
70 Id. 
71 Id. 
72 See Louis Henkin, Is There a “Political Question” Doctrine?, 85 YALE L. J. 597 (1976).  
73 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
74 See Louis Henkin, supra note 72, 597.  
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effect given by the interaction between the political branches based on their 
constitutional power.75 
So in such a military deployment case as that of the Vietnam War, various 
lower courts refused to review those cases involving the constitutionality of military 
deployment because any judicial step-in would in fact impair the constitutional tools 
owned by Congress to resolve such deep political conflict with the president, which 
would substantially keep Congress out of an ongoing political game. As for those 
cases only involving foreign affair power, since the primary constitutional principles 
are less at stake than they are in cases involving military deployment power, political 
question doctrine would also often be applied to modestly keep the judicial branch 
from intervening in foreign affair matters.76 
C. A Reinterpretation of Political Question Doctrine 
In this part, I will assess the three kinds of political question doctrine arguments 
presented above, according to the empirical evidence demonstrated in chapter 4. In 
short, I argue that whatever theory of political question doctrine one holds, in the 
determination of whether an issue is “political,” one should in the first place define 
what issue is a “legal” question in a military deployment under both the procedural 
and substantive functions of Declare War Clause. Moreover, I argue that application 
of political question doctrine should be relatively constrained in military deployment 
cases if the issue being litigated relates to whether the president acquires an ex ante 
congressional authorization, whereas the doctrine could be loosely applied in foreign 
affair cases. 
                                                            
75 See LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 143-7 (1996).  
76 Id., at 147-8.  
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As the empirical evidence has demonstrated in chapter 4, congressional 
deliberation on a constitutionality of a military deployment systematically 
concentrates on the timing of congressional control. That fairly suggests that 
congressional “law-deliberation” and “law-making” in a military deployment decision 
mainly focuses on whether Congress can and wants to make an ex ante authorization. 
Based on this empirical evidence, I think that a military deployment dispute in a court 
is a “legal” question regarding two parts. The first part is the procedural function of 
Declare War Clause. In particular, it is a legal question whether a congressional 
authorization of war--if it is made under an adoption of open rule and referral of a bill 
to committee, or is an appropriation act--is made under a separation of annual 
authorization and appropriation process. The second part is in accordance with the 
substantive function of Declare War Clause--that is, whether Congress authorizes a 
deployment before a military initiation, or whether an arguably sudden attack cannot 
secure an advance congressional authorization within one month. As such, to decide 
whether to authorize a military deployment is a matter that is textually provided for 
the political branches, but to adjudicate whether a military campaign is effectively 
“activated” by law in advance is an easily manageable standard that can be found by 
the judicial branches.77 
Second, in the Dellums case, Judge Greene claims that whether a military 
deployment question is “legal” depends on the possible scale of hostility and casualty. 
As empirical evidence demonstrates in chapter 4, while a “legal” check on a major 
hostility is systematically higher than a minor one, the result at the same time also 
reveals that legal control over a minor hostility does not emerge in vacuum. The 
empirical result also informs us that the legal factors affecting the difference types of 
                                                            
77 I think this interpretation of this political question is consistent with the canon proposed by the Baker 
Court. That is, if a legal effect should be governed by a previous political decision, a court at least must 
shoulder its responsibility to decide whether such a legal effect exists.  
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“legal” control over the president suitable for a major war or for a minor war mainly 
lie in whether a substantive control over a foreign crisis policy is provided in a law. 
Thus, based on this empirical analysis, I think a magnitude of hostility per se does not 
constitute a constitutional line between a political and legal question in nature. A 
question can be regarded as “political” if one asks a court to declare 
unconstitutionality of a congressional silence on a substantive foreign policy (but not 
on a military deployment authorization) regarding a foreign affair crisis, which may 
create “multifarious pronouncements” by a judicial decision.78 But the legality of a 
war, whether it is major or minor is a “legal” question, given that an issue is relevant 
to the timing of congressional war regulation. 
A more complicated assessment of political question doctrine pertains to 
whether it can be an effective tool both to balance the negotiating power over 
declaring war and shaping foreign affairs, between the political branches and to create 
a more unified voice for the country. I analyze this question in terms of the empirical 
evidence based on the model of unilateral presidential action. In terms of that model 
demonstrated in chapter 4, I am pessimistic that an application of political question 
doctrine could leave much room for the political branches to act concurrently and 
create an institutional precedent for a more balanced war negotiating power, as several 
courts expect. As empirical evidence demonstrated in chapter 4, in military 
deployment cases, neither a congressional war regulation nor a greater number of 
congressional members objecting to the presidential position could prevent the 
president from taking a unilateral military action. The empirical pattern already 
informs us that the president alone dominates the military deployment negotiations. If 
judges think that an application of political question doctrine could empower Congress 
                                                            
78 I think this conclusion is also consistent with my bottom-line argument and empirical finding: a 
“legal” question of military deployment is about the timing (i.e. ex ante authorization) of congressional 
control.  
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to “do something” to restore this unbalanced relationship of war power negotiation via 
various constitutional tools, they therefore ignore the reality of power politics and 
impair the tradition of the rule of law in America. 
Nevertheless, the critique presented above of the empowerment of 
congressional power to negotiate military deployment power with the president 
through political question doctrine does not undermine the “empowerment function” 
of this doctrine. In particular, a unilateral military action by the president can be 
categorized into two types as mentioned in the last section: action without any 
congressional authorization and action beyond a congressional authorization. In the 
former type, as my argument suggests above, it is a “legal” question, for Congress 
does not explicitly permit a military deployment in advance--the legal effect of this 
can be easily found by a court. In the latter type, however, I would regard it as a 
political question on the grounds that even Congress could not necessarily foresee a 
clear scope of its authorization in a military deployment event. 
As empirical model demonstrated in chapter 4, contrary to a congressional war 
regulation, the president does not tend to systematically resist a congressional 
regulation of a foreign affair matter. This fairly suggests that an application of political 
question doctrine arguably can be expected by a court to empower and even encourage 
the president to cooperate with Congress in order to begin a new round of the foreign 
affair policy formation process. Hence, if a court attempts to apply political question 
doctrine in order to strengthen congressional negotiation power with the president in a 
foreign affair area, I think a “political” question is actually tantamount to an 
“uncertain legal effect” question and thus should “remand” the case back to the 
political branches. That is, if a court finds that a presidential unilateral action cannot 
necessarily be placed into the ambit of a congressional foreign affair regulation, unless 
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that there are constitutional rights involved, a court should be prudent and provide the 
political branches with an additional opportunity for mutual deliberation. 
D. A Defense of a Broader Scope for Constitutional Review of War Power 
My reinterpretation of a narrower scope of standing and political question doctrines in 
war and foreign affair cases would be strongly challenged by a conventional 
prudential argument. In addition to defending my reinterpretation based on the 
empirical evidence mentioned above, I also want briefly to provide another reason in 
terms of the function of judicial review from the perspective of deliberative 
democracy theory. Although different deliberative democratic theorists have different 
attitudes toward the role of constitutional review, I argue that their various 
perspectives still can find common ground for war and foreign affair power litigation 
if the main objective of judicial review is to motivate a higher quality of constitutional 
deliberation in the legislative process, as this can promote a more unified political 
accountability he government. I briefly present three reasons in the following 
passages. 
As the empirical evidence from chapter 4 shows, congressional rule is a key 
institutional factor that affects the level of ideal speech situation and congressional 
control over the presidential power. These key procedural factors, as I have indicated 
above primarily include adoption of an open-rule, separation of the annual 
authorization and appropriation processes, and referral of a House bill to committee. I 
think that a constitutional review limiting these procedural factors by definition is not 
beyond judicial competence, for these may all be found in public record. 
Furthermore, at least in the case of military deployment deliberation (but not 
necessarily that of foreign affair deliberation), since the empirical model strongly 
demonstrates that both Congress and the broader civil society as a whole are desired to 
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have a mutual deliberation, it is fair to conclude that congressional rule is not a mere 
congressional “internal” subject matter. It becomes a previous question of public 
reasons of war and peace policies in the public sphere. 
Lastly, as empirical evidence shows in Table 5.3, a unilateral military action by 
the president and legislative action or inaction are often ad hoc political decisions, 
which suggests that in fact there is no systematic and institutionally “invisible” norm 
for interaction between the political branches in an incident of military deployment as 
political question doctrine expects. Therefore, if a judicial review mainly focuses on 
those “due law-deliberation/ making process,” it can “remand” a political conflict back 
to the political branches and encourage them to shoulder their political accountability 
to create a more coordinated norm of war power negotiation for in order to unify the 
American public. However, one should note that this “procedural” due law-making 
argument for judicial review does not exclude a minimum “substantive” due law-
making argument. Namely, as I have repeatedly emphasized in this chapter, an 
advance congressional authorization for a military campaign is the bottom line of a 
substantive due standard for a military deployment action, except that an emergency 
military campaign should be taken in one month. 
In sum, I believe that if the function of war power judicial review is a broad 
procedural due law-deliberation/ due law-making process combined with a minimum 
substantive due law-deliberation/ due law-making process, it will not be in violation 
with the prudential concern of judicial branch. 
IV. Summarizing the Deliberative-oriented Argument for National Security 
Constitution 
Here at the conclusion of this chapter, I want to make a brief summary of my main 
arguments or suggestions for a more deliberative-oriented reform for war power 
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constitution. I mainly argue that a due legal constitutional function and standard of 
Declare War Clause are predicated on whether Congress is capable to the greatest 
extent possible of making a reasoned authorization of military deployment within an 
ideal speech situation of the lawmaking process. Therefore, I suggest that there are 
procedural due law-deliberation/ due law-making processes and substantive due law-
deliberation/ making processes that should be explored based on various points of 
empirical evidence. Moreover, the scope of judicial review should also be considered 
in terms of these standards. 
Only one argument has been made with regard to substantive due law-
deliberation/ making standard here. I suggest that Congress can appropriately take a 
yes or no position on a military deployment in one month. In this vein, therefore, I 
argue that an emergency situation constitutes the need to repel a sudden attack within 
one month. Otherwise, the president should acquire an advance congressional 
authorization. 
As for the procedural due law-deliberation/ due law-making process, first of 
all, since the empirical models demonstrated that both Congress and the broader civil 
society desire to have a mutual deliberation upon a military deployment incident, an 
adoption of open-rule in the House floor debate is indispensible. It will ensure that the 
voices of citizens could be heard in a reciprocal deliberate between the citizenry and 
Congress and take possible political action via a more open forum in the House. 
Second, as the empirical evidence also demonstrates that the quality of constitutional 
deliberation is lower in the annual appropriation process, perhaps for the reason that 
the function of an appropriations committee is not as specialized as that of the defense 
and foreign relations committees, I argue that separation of the annual authorization 
and appropriation budget processes from deliberation over both the defense and the 
foreign affair budgets should be strictly enforced. Third, empirical evidence also 
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reveals that if a bill is referred to a House committee, the level of congressional check 
on the presidential power is higher. In consequence, I also suggest that deliberation 
over both military deployment and foreign affairs bills should not bypass the 
jurisdiction of defense and foreign relations committees. 
The enforcement of due process cannot be realized through judicial action. 
Therefore, I suggest that before applying a prudential judicial doctrine including 
standing and political question doctrine, a court should first consider the historical 
pattern of whether an instance of congressional inaction is a primary phenomenon, 
compared with a situation when a congressional war regulation is systematically 
resisted by the president. Based on my empirical analysis, I find that no matter what 
the level of congressional war regulation is, the president systematically encroaches 
upon such congressional regulation. Therefore, I argue that so far there is no room for 
a justification of inherent presidential war power through congressional acquiescence 
discourse. 
More importantly, in terms of such a historical pattern of presidential 
resistance, I argue that neither a prudential standing doctrine nor political question 
doctrine will restore and empower Congress to restore the balance of war power 
negotiation. As such, I argue that a court should adopt a loose standing doctrine for 
both citizen and congressional plaintiffs. The most important here is to interpret that 
an “injury” to the right to have a due law-deliberation/ due law-making exists if those 
procedural and substantive due standards are arguably violated. Lastly, I reason that if 
we treat the function of judicial review as a mechanism through which to motivate a 
higher quality of congressional deliberation, a court can adopt a broad procedural due 
law-deliberation/ making process review and a minimum substantive due law-
deliberation/ making process review, which would not only fall within judicial 
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expertise but also promote greater political accountability and coordination among the 
political branches. 
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CHAPTER 6: 
CONCLUSION 
What kind of democratic theory and U.S. law-making institution can promote a more 
politically accountable government in the area of war policy making? We should 
establish a more democratic, deliberation-oriented congressional rule to create both a 
more ideal speech situation for congressional deliberation and broader public sphere as 
a whole on the constitutionality of a war. The establishment of such a rule would thus 
generate a more reasoned, balanced, and concurrent war power. In providing 
justification for this answer, I demonstrated three main empirical models in this 
dissertation: (1) the relationship between the quality of congressional deliberation and 
the level of congressional attempt of control over presidential power, (2)the 
relationship between congressional attempt of control over presidential power and 
presidential unilateral action, and (3) the relationship between congressional rules and 
the quality of congressional deliberation  
From the very beginning of the American republic, the Founders proposed 
control over presidential war and foreign affair power through congressional 
deliberation. For example, James Madison, in his address to Congress on Jay Treaty, 
emphasized that both the Declare War and the Commander in Chief Clauses need to 
be exercised with congressional deliberation and discretion. James Wilson, in the 
Philadelphia Convention, argued that the calculation of a constitutional system is to 
make in Congress a concurrent and certain decision based on national interest about an 
initiation of a war. Moreover, in the Federalist Papers, John Jay wrote that 
congressional procedure can consider and decide a more temperate and cooler decision 
for a just cause of war. Additionally, Pierce Butler also in the Convention argues that 
the purpose of the Declare War Clause is to ensure a unified national support for a 
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military action. I think all of these various historical interpretations of the Founders of 
war and foreign affair powers converge on one important point: control over 
presidential war power through congressional deliberation.  
Although the importance of congressional deliberation concerning war and 
foreign affairs is part of the American constitutional tradition, the Founders did not 
provide a clear answer to the following questions regarding the conditions of 
democratic deliberation, the contents of a “deliberative” war power relationship 
between the political branches, and the canon of “deliberative” constitutional 
interpretation of war and foreign affair war. First, from a theoretical standpoint, what 
are the conditions for a “good” democratic deliberation and the contents of a 
“deliberative” and balanced war and foreign affair powers relationship? Second, from 
an empirical standpoint, does “good” congressional deliberation necessarily generate a 
more controllable and balanced war power between the political branches? Third, 
from constitutional interpretation and policy suggestion points, what implication does 
the thesis of “control through congressional deliberation” have on the interpretation of 
Declare War Clause, congressional rules, and their relevant constitutional and legal 
issues? These three questions left unanswered by the Founders are the principal 
research questions I have endeavored to explore in this dissertation. In the balance of 
this chapter, I will provide a brief answer for each question I demonstrated in the 
previous chapters respectively.  
I. What Are the Conditions and Contents of Good Deliberation and 
“Deliberative” War Power?  
In modern democratic deliberative theory, I identified three theoretical conditions and 
contents for a good congressional deliberation and a balanced war power relationship 
in order to generate my principal empirical hypotheses and analytical variables. These 
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theoretical conditions and contents are:  (1) constitutional public reason, (2) 
reciprocally political action, and (3) universal discourse principle.   
A. Constitutional Public Reason 
The first principle I identified in my dissertation is the suggestion that a constitution is 
the starting point of democratic deliberation. Following the central tenets of political 
liberalism, I argue that constitution is a minimum reason of which American public 
and political lives constitute. But since a constitution is only a minimum public reason 
for our public life, I also elucidate that the nature of a constitution is a public 
resolution of an entrenchment of public reason that recognizes our history as value-
plural, and thus the content of a constitution needs to be continuously interpreted and 
constructed by the public. Therefore, in the United States, constitutional deliberation is 
not a monopoly of the Supreme Court but should be a public virtue of Congress, and a 
component of the broad public sphere as a whole.  
In war and foreign affair power areas, I think constitutional deliberation in 
Congress is especially important on the grounds that the judicial branch regularly 
denies  reviewing of relevant issues. Although I argued that constitutional deliberation 
should be an indispensible part of congressional deliberation, this theoretical argument 
should be empirically provable to the extent that a higher level of constitutional 
deliberation in Congress can generate a more balanced congressional-executive 
relationship. Such an empirical demand becomes the most fundamental research 
hypothesis of this dissertation. In other words, if there is a higher level of 
constitutional justification in Congress, then a higher level of congressional attempt of 
control over the president in a law will be generated.  
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B. Reciprocally Political Action  
Yet another empirical question must be asked: what is an operational measurement of 
the above “higher level of congressional control” in a law? I think it depends upon the 
degree of reciprocity of a political action. As I argued in chapter 2, if constitution 
deliberation is an indispensable part of political life, then a reciprocally political action 
is another necessary element of democratic deliberation because disagreement over the 
contents of constitution always persists. More specifically, constitutional interpretation 
always involves different moral arguments held by different moral agencies, and thus 
disagreement is expected to be a constant of constitutional deliberation. However, 
such disagreement should not obstruct political action. In consequence, to prevent 
democratic deliberation and cooperation from falling apart, I argued that reciprocal 
and concurrent political action is a crucial element that can encourages future 
constitutional deliberation. 
In war and foreign affair power areas, I think this reciprocal political action 
principle is vital because the Constitution does not provide for many guidelines 
regarding the allocation of war or foreign affair power between Congress and the 
president. Much of the content of relevant war power allocation should be left for a 
mutual deliberation. Therefore, I argued that the bottom-line standard for a concurrent 
war power action is that even if there is no consensus on a substantive war or foreign 
policy between the political branches, Congress should at least procedurally be 
informed of a presidential action and give Congress a sufficient opportunity to 
deliberate and take a yes or no position. This standard thus generates my major 
measurement regarding congressional control over the president. That is, substantive 
control stands for a higher level of congressional attempt of control over the president, 
while procedural control stands for a lower level of congressional attempt of control 
over the president.  
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C. Universal Discourse Principle  
The third principle I proposed is a combination of Habermas U-principle and D-
principle. Disagreement over constitutional interpretation always exists. It is therefore 
essential, in order for democratic deliberation to thrive, that there be a universally 
agreed upon procedure of participation to ensure that every moral agency’s has 
opportunity (U-principle) to discourse and criticize on an action norms (D-principle). 
In spite of various kinds of discursive procedures in the public sphere, the most 
fundamental procedure is still the deliberative process in Congress, which Habermas 
called “the nexus of public sphere.” Therefore, the participating structure and speech 
condition in Congress are at the center of democratic deliberation and must be 
carefully explored. Moreover, even though Congress is the nexus of the  public sphere, 
deliberative theorists agree that congressional members have the obligation to 
deliberate independently in the political public sphere and not merely reflect the 
chaotic opinions of civil society. In other words, congressional members are 
accountable to their constituents, but in the meantime they should be independent of 
their constituents during the deliberation.  
Accordingly, the relationship between the congressional participation structure 
and congressional deliberation can be divided into two kinds: the effect of 
congressional rule-setting on congressional deliberation and the effect of non-
congressional rule-setting (or “political factors”) on congressional deliberation. Two 
hypotheses are related to these two kinds of participation structure. The first 
hypothesis is that if Congress adopts a more inclusive and information-facilitative 
congressional rule, then a higher level of congressional deliberation can be expected. 
The second hypothesis is that even if congressional deliberation is affected to certain 
extent by congressional members’ respective constituents, congressional rule still 
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plays a primary and independent role in determining the quality of congressional 
deliberation.  
An examination of how these two hypotheses relate to the war and foreign 
affair powers areas, is important for two reasons. First of all, the Founders expected 
that a relatively insulated Congress elected from a wide territory would be beneficial 
to congressional deliberation, which is especially important in discussing a just cause 
of a war. Second, precisely for this reason, the elements of procedural due process of 
lawmaking and deliberation that are crucial to condition prudently congressional war 
and foreign affair decisions, are thus worthy of being identified through an empirical 
analysis.  
II. Is a Good Congressional Deliberation more likely to Impose a Check on the 
Presidential War Power? 
This question in fact consists of two main empirical questions. First, is Congress more 
likely to impose a check on the presidential use of force after a good deliberation over 
the constitutionality of a current or proposed presidential decision on use of force? The 
main empirical model demonstrates that , if Congress has a higher level of 
deliberation, then Congress is more likely to impose a higher level of check on the 
president through the passage or rejection of legislation.  Second, is a higher level of 
congressional check on the president more likely to prevent the president from taking 
a unilateral use of force? The empirical model demonstrates that once Congress 
regulates a military deployment, the president systematically resists such regulation 
and takes unilateral action alone. Although neither deliberation nor legal regulation on 
war can necessarily prevent the president from unilaterally deploying the troops, I 
argue that congressional deliberation and war regulation can invite the president to be 
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charged with greater political accountability. In the following passages, I briefly 
describe these results in more detail.  
A. The Quality of Congressional Deliberation and Check on the Presidential War 
Power 
To explore whether the war power relationship between the president and Congress is 
balanced and reasoned, I observed it from two aspects in chapter 4: (1) the level of 
legal control over the president, and (2) the probability of presidential unilateral 
action. One should be reminded that I do not suggest that deliberation itself is a check 
on presidential power; rather, deliberation is a process used to decide the degree of 
legal control over the president and persuade the president to accept what Congress 
says. Law is still the primary mechanism to impose a check on presidential power.  
1. Legal Control over the President and Congressional Deliberation  
As for the relationship between congressional deliberation and the level of attempt of 
control over the president, in a military deployment case, the empirical model 
manifestly demonstrates that a higher level of congressional deliberation consistently 
generates a higher level of congressional attempt of control. Upon a further 
investigation into the content of congressional control over presidential military 
deployment provided in a law, the data shows that a higher level of congressional 
deliberation generates statistically more ex ante control over military deployment than 
substantive policy control does. In other words, regarding a military deployment 
event, Congress is concerned with whether it has opportunity to take a yes or no 
position in advance.  
In addition to the level of congressional deliberation, there are also three 
important factors that determine the level of congressional attempt of control over the 
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president’s military deployment power. First, the empirical model demonstrates that a 
higher hostility level generates a statistically greater level of congressional attempt of 
control. But that does not suggest that congressional attempt of control over a minor 
use of force does not exist; it is just statistically lower. Second, the model also 
demonstrates that the type of military action affects congressional attempt of control. 
In particular, if a military deployment is for international assistance, such military 
action triggers a statistically lower level of congressional attempt of control. Third, 
two “political factor” variables, — lower presidential approval rating and lower 
percentage of congressional members of the president’s party in Congress — will 
generate a statistically higher level of congressional attempt of control.  
With regard to a non-military deployment case, the empirical model also 
strongly demonstrates that a higher level of congressional deliberation results in a 
higher level of congressional attempt of control over the president. A further look at 
the content of congressional control over the president provided in a law in a non-
military deployment case, a higher level of congressional deliberation tends to 
generate more ex post and substantive policy control over the president. That suggests 
that in foreign affairs, Congress is willing to authorize the president loosely to take an 
action first by delineating some substantive foreign policy for the president.  
Besides the level of congressional deliberation, there are also several factors 
significantly determining the level of congressional attempt of control over the 
president. First, the model demonstrates that a higher level of hostility also generates a 
statistically higher level of congressional attempt of control. Second, the type of 
military action that is being proposed also significantly affects the level of 
congressional attempt of control. Contrary to that of military deployment control, a 
military action for international assistance yields a higher level of congressional non-
military deployment control. Third, only one “political factor” variable, lower 
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presidential approval rating, generates a higher level of congressional attempt of 
control over the president.  
2. Congressional Control and Unilateral Presidential Action  
To explore congressional control ability over the presidential war power through the 
passage or rejection of legislation, I constructed a unilateral presidential action model 
in chapter 4. The model demonstrates that in a military deployment case, whatever 
level of attempt of control Congress imposes, the president systematically resists it. In 
a non-military deployment case, the president’s calculation of whether to take a 
unilateral action is a kind of ‘public appealing” based more out of political concerns.  
In a military deployment case, the empirical model demonstrates that the 
level of congressional deliberation is not a significant factor in making the president 
cooperate with Congress in making war policy. In particular, as long as Congress tries 
to regulate military deployment, re-deployment, or withdrawal, the president will 
systematically impair such regulation. The president resists a congressional military 
deployment regulation through various unilateral tools at his disposal, including a 
unilateral dispatch of the troops, an executive order, a signing statement, or a 
proclamation.  
In a non-military deployment case, the empirical model demonstrates that a 
higher level of congressional deliberation generates a greater probability of unilateral 
presidential action. This kind of presidential unilateral action in foreign policy making 
is also a synthesis of political calculation to counter congressional constraint through a 
highly public act. In particular, the empirical model demonstrates that a lower 
presidential approval rating and a divided government both statistically signal a 
probability of unilateral presidential action. Hence, it is fair to conclude that unilateral 
presidential action in foreign policy area is a kind of deliberative action to the extent 
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that the president tries to pressure Congress by generating pressure from the 
constituency and Congress is fully aware of a constitutional issue.  
B. Transition: Deliberation and Collaborative Political Accountability  
Deliberative theorists may be disappointed by the above empirical findings: a higher 
level of congressional deliberation and a higher level of congressional check on the 
president cannot prevent the president from taking a unilateral military action. 
However, I think this finding does not undermine the value of democratic deliberation. 
To the contrary, and for the reasons I elaborate below, it suggests that a good 
congressional deliberation can place the president under a greater political 
accountability if he is in violation of a congressional regulation. 
The central tenet of democratic deliberation is simple: deliberate before you 
act. Any action should be predicated on a norm generated out of a deliberative 
process. This central tenet not only suggests that deliberation is a premise of law, but 
also reminds us that while an action is controlled by law,  deliberation itself is not. 
Thus, two kinds of accountability are derived from the aforementioned central tenet of 
democratic deliberation: reason-giving and acceptance of a better argument and 
decision thereof. The president can provide his opinion on a bill during the 
consideration of a bill through various channels. If his rationale is not accepted by 
Congress, he is both legally and politically accountable for compliance with a law that 
Congress has predicated on a weightier argument; otherwise he can veto the bill.  
Therefore, even if the empirical model demonstrates that a higher level of 
congressional deliberation cannot prevent the president from taking unilateral action, I 
argue that it is still legitimate to promote “good” deliberative condition in Congress on 
the grounds that a better justification not only can be presented to the public sphere but 
also creates a unequivocal legal and political accountability for the president to abide 
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by. In consequence, I further present the third model to explore what kind of 
congressional law-making rule and “political factors” influence the quality of 
congressional deliberation.  
III. What Kind of Congressional Participation Structure Influences the Quality 
of Deliberation?  
The congressional participation structure can be observed by regarding two 
dimensions: (1) congressional rule-setting on deliberation and (2) non-congressional 
rule-setting (“political factors”) as mentioned above. With regard to the relationship 
between congressional rule-setting and quality of deliberation, in a military 
deployment case, the empirical model systematically demonstrates that an adoption of 
closed-rule will contribute to a lower level of congressional deliberation. In addition, 
referral of a bill to committee also generates a higher level of congressional 
deliberation. In a non-military deployment case, three factors will yield a lower level 
of deliberation: deliberation in an annual budget process, an adoption of closed-rule, 
and filibuster. It seems worthy of note that an invocation of cloture can generate a 
higher level of congressional deliberation.  
As for non-congressional rule-setting (“political factors”), in a military 
deployment case, the empirical model demonstrates that although military 
deployment deliberation is systematically affected by the political factors, 
congressional rule still plays a statistically significant role in determining the level of 
congressional deliberation. More specifically, both presidential approval rating and the 
advent of an election year will generate a lower level of congressional deliberation; 
while in the meantime, an adoption of closed-rule still contributes to a lower level of 
deliberation. Therefore, one can conclude that deliberation over the constitutionality of 
military deployment in Congress is independent of but closely connected with civil 
229 
society. A slightly different situation is observed in a non-military deployment 
deliberation. The empirical model demonstrates that an adoption of closed-rule and 
filibuster will decrease the level of non-military deployment deliberation. Also, an 
invocation of cloture can contribute to the level of non-military deployment 
deliberation. But “political factors”  does not have any significant effect on the level of 
congressional deliberation. Therefore, it is fair to conclude that non-military 
deployment deliberation in Congress is strongly independent of public opinion in civil 
society.  
The aforementioned empirical findings have two important implications  on 
the democratic deliberation in Congress. First, the institution of congressional 
participation  indeed elaborates an independent deliberative function as the Founders 
expected. But at the same time, the empirical evidence also demonstrates that 
Congress does not neglect public opinion or civil society during military deployment 
deliberation. Second, among various congressional rules, it is fair to say that an 
adoption of open rule, invocation of cloture, and a referral of a bill to committee are 
three important factors that contribute to a better speech situation.  
IV. What Implications does Empirical Analyses of Congressional War Power 
Deliberation Have on Constitutional Interpretation of War Power? 
The empirical analyses above provide a plethora of information about whether and 
how Congress can exert attempt of control over the president through deliberation as 
the Founders expected, the limits of congressional ability to regulate a war, and 
historical patterns of presidential unilateral action. As a matter of constitutional 
interpretation, these analyses provide much insight for reflection on various disputes 
over war power interpretation. In chapter 5, I examined three legal issues often raised 
in the war power area: (1) the procedural and substantive function of Declare War 
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Clause, (2) the form of congressional war authorization and customary presidential 
war power, and (3) justiciability and political question doctrine in  war power 
litigation. My overall argument is that interpretation of the allocation of war power 
should be in accordance with procedural and substantive due law-deliberation and 
law-making processes. But to realize a veritably deliberative war power Constitution 
and a more accountable government, certain congressional rule reforms are needed.  
A. The Procedural and Substantive Function of Declare War Clause  
Two legal issues are explored in chapter 5 under the Declare War Clause: (1) the 
function of Declare War Clause, and (2) the relationship between Declare War Clause 
and Commander in Chief power. As for the first issue, I argue based on the empirical 
evidence that the function of Declare War Clause is a mandate for greater publicity 
because both Congress and civil society have a strong desire in the military 
deployment decision-making process to mutually deliberate with each other. With 
regard to the second issue, I argue that Commander in Chief Clause is an independent 
presidential war power to repel a sudden attack that will occur within one month. My 
ground for this, based on the empirical evidence, is that Congress is able to have a 
higher level of deliberation within one month to take a yes or no position on a military 
action decision.  
1. The Procedural Function of Declare War Clause 
As the empirical model demonstrates in chapter 4, Congress systematically and 
seriously takes civil society’s attitude into account during a military deployment 
decision making process, which suggests that Congress and civil society both desire a 
reciprocal deliberate with each other in the broader public sphere. I think this 
phenomenon is consistent with the Supreme Court’s opinion in Bas v. Tingy that both 
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declared and undeclared wars are public wars, because Congress and civil society are 
both involved in a war-making decision. From the perspective of deliberative 
democracy, this mutual deliberation over a military deployment decision in the public 
sphere is a collaboration of a two-track public sphere that is searching for a greater 
publicity of a war. Thus, I argue in chapter 5 that the function of Declare War Clause 
is a mandate requiring both the president and Congress to deliberate devotedly with 
civil society in a military deployment decision making process, regardless of whether 
it is going to make a declaration of war or authorization for a war.  
To realize the aforementioned “greater publicity” of a war, I proposed in 
chapter 5 that a military deployment debate on the floor should be taken under an 
adoption of open-rule. Moreover, I suggest that a military deployment bill should be 
referred to committee for informed judgments. Lastly, since filibuster is a significant 
factor contributes to a lower level of congressional deliberation, I suggest that in a 
military deployment decision-making process, the Senate should seriously consider to 
adopt a simple-majority vote for invocation of cloture.   
2. The Substantive Function of Declare War Clause and Commander in Chief Power  
The Founders at the Philadelphia Convention and modern presidential war power 
scholars agree that the president has the independent power to repel an attack on 
America without advance congressional authorization under his Commander in Chief 
power. But to what extent the president can repel an attack is still a matter of legal 
controversy.  
On the grounds of Congress’ deliberative ability, I argue that if an attack 
would occur within one month, then the president has the independent power to repel 
that attack. The reason for suggesting that an attack occurs within a one-month period 
as a sudden attack on the grounds that the empirical model in chapter 4 demonstrates 
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that Congress needs one month to have a higher level of deliberation and take a yes or 
no position on a military deployment. Moreover, in a military deployment bill, the 
empirical model demonstrates that Congress systematically generates ex ante control 
over a military deployment rather than substantive foreign policy, which suggests that 
Congress is concerned about whether it can deliberate over a military deployment 
issue before an event. In consequence, I suggest that the substantive function of 
Declare War Clause is that any military deployment should be considered in advance 
by Congress unless a sudden attack on America would occur within one month; only 
then can the president independently dispatch the troops under his Commander in 
Chief power.   
However, since a congressional authorization for a war is only a yes or no 
position on a military deployment event, the scope of such authorization should not be 
loosely interpreted. As the empirical statistical findings in chapter 4 demonstrate, after 
a military deployment, Congress is able to form a substantive foreign policy control 
over a foreign crisis within six months. This suggests that in a congressional war 
authorization, Congress does not necessarily expect to invest the president with great 
discretion in order to manage a foreign crisis. But because of the institutional limit, 
Congress needs to take a longer time to form a substantive control over the 
management of a crisis. Hence, when one interprets the scope of a military 
deployment authorization, one should note that its scope and substance is more 
dynamic.  
B. Form of Congressional Authorization and Customary Presidential War Power 
Two issues relating to types of congressional war regulation are explored in chapter 5 
regarding (1) the types of valid forms of congressional authorization and regulation of 
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a military deployment, and (2) the appropriateness of the argument for customary 
presidential war power.  
1. What are Valid Forms of Congressional War Authorization and Regulation?  
In addition to declaration of and authorization for a war, Congress often regulates a 
military deployment event through a budget bill, single-chamber resolution, or 
concurrent resolution. I argue that a budget bill can be a time-limited authorization for 
a military deployment. In addition, I argue that concurrent resolution is a valid form of 
the regulation of president war power, whereas a single-chamber resolution can be a 
valid form if both chambers adopt an identical resolution. The reasons are provided as 
follows.  
As to the budget bill, the empirical model in chapter 4 demonstrates that 
congressional deliberation of a budget bill is systematically lower than that of a non-
budget bill, but the level of attempt of control over presidential power is consistently 
higher in a budget bill. As I explained in chapter 5, this is because Congress often 
employs the annual budget process in order to deliberate and regulate an emerging 
military crisis, but at the same time congressional members are unable to deliberate a 
second time over an already ongoing military action but choose status quo. Therefore, 
I argue that if Congress does not duly ( at least schedules a consideration on legislative 
calendar) deliberate a second time an ongoing military event, a continuing 
appropriation for such a “non-first year” military event should not be deemed as a 
valid and tacit congressional authorization unless Congress had authorized a war by 
enacting an independent bill.  
As for concurrent resolution, the empirical model in chapter 4 demonstrates 
that the level of congressional deliberation is identical to that of a binding bill. In 
addition, when a bill tries to impose a higher level of attempt of control over the 
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president in a non-binding concurrent resolution, the president systematically tries to 
avoid it by taking a unilateral action. As such, it is fair to say that both the president 
and congressional members expect that a non-binding concurrent resolution has the  
legal effect of imposing a check on the president. With regard to a single-chamber 
resolution, since it does not represent a full deliberation of Congress, I think it is not 
appropriate to regard such resolution as a legally valid tool for regulating a war. 
However, if both chambers adopt an identical single-chamber resolution, it can stand 
for a full congressional deliberation and thus be seen as a constitutionally valid 
measure to express its attempt of control over the president.  
2. Congressional Acquiescence is Not a Source of Customary Presidential War Power 
The argument for customary presidential war power often claims that the content of 
presidential war power is also supplemented by congressional acquiescence to events 
of presidential military deployment independent of Congress. The acquiescence 
doctrine consists of two elements in war power area: (a) no historical pattern of 
presidential encroachment on congressional war regulation, and (b) significant 
congressional awareness of a unilateral presidential military action. The empirical 
model in chapter 4 demonstrates that neither of these two elements is satisfied. Hence, 
the proponents of customary presidential war power should rely on other standards to 
justify claiming the implied congressional consent of presidential war power.  
The proponents of presidential war power often argue that Congress often took 
no action in response to an independent presidential use of force. Thus, based on those 
independent military events, they argue that Congress tacitly agreed that the president 
has independent power to dispatch troops as he deems necessary. However, as I 
mentioned in chapter 5, this argument fails to indicate whether  the president  
historically and systematically encroaches on congressional war regulation.  If the 
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president does not systematically resist congressional regulation, then those incidents 
of congressional acquiescence can be regarded as the “systematic and unbroken 
practice” of Congress. In terms that the empirical model in chapter 4demonstrates that 
as long as there is a war regulation, the president statistically defies it. Therefore, I 
think those events of independent presidential military deployment  did not constitute 
systematic and unbroken precedents of congressional acquiescence.  
With respect to whether Congress is aware of a unilateral presidential  action, I 
state from an empirical standpoint that the proponents of customary presidential power 
should at least prove that after a presidential unilateral action: (1) the probability of a 
higher level of congressional deliberation is significantly greater than a lower level of 
deliberation before a presidential unilateral action, and (2) the probability of 
generating a congressional regulation on the president is significantly greater than 
generating a congressional regulation before a unilateral presidential  action. The 
empirical data demonstrated in chapter 5 shows that neither the probability of higher 
level of congressional deliberation nor the probability of congressional regulation of 
the president is significantly greater after a unilateral presidential  action than it is 
before a unilateral action. Thus, I conclude that congressional acquiescence cannot be 
a source for justifying customary presidential war power.  
C. Justiciability, Political Question, and War Power Litigation 
In chapter 5, I repeatedly emphasized that the function of Declare War Clause is to 
promote a reasoned military deployment decision-making process within an ideal 
speech situation to the greatest extent. To realize this function, judicial review is 
indispensable because one of the most important functions of judicial review is to that 
ensure citizenry’s deliberation in the decision making process can be fully facilitated. 
However, courts almost always refuse to review war power cases on prudential 
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reasons. In chapter 5, I assess two kinds of prudential reasons based on the empirical 
evidence demonstrated in chapter 4: (1) standing doctrine and (2) political question 
doctrine. I argue that the court should loosely interpret the legal meaning of “injury” in 
Lujan case to create more opportunity for both congressional members and citizens to 
litigate war power cases. Moreover, I argue that political question doctrine should be 
carefully applied in a manner consistent with a dynamic due law-deliberation and law-
making process concept of the function of Declare War Clause. Last, I want to 
emphasize that though I try to reconceptualize standing and political question doctrine 
based on the above empirical evidences, such reconceptualization is just a supplement 
to the whole debates of constitutional war power debates.  
1. A Reinterpretation of Standing Doctrine in War Power Litigation 
Generally, two types of plaintiffs often litigate a war power issue in court: (1) 
congressional members and (2) citizen plaintiffs. With regard to congressional 
member plaintiffs, the court usually refuses to review a case by reasoning that a 
congressional member’s right to vote is not injured by a unilateral presidential  
military deployment because that congressional member still can introduce and enact a 
bill that would be able to express its attempt of control over the president. From an 
empirical standpoint, I argue that this “vote-oriented” view should prove that the 
degree of voting itself is the most important factor for Congress to provide a check on 
the president. The empirical dataset in chapter 5 demonstrates that the level of 
congressional attempt of control over the president is not significantly higher when 
more congressional members vote for a bill. In consequence, I argue that the 
significant factor is not whether a voting opportunity is injured by a presidential 
unilateral action, but whether deliberation opportunity is injured.  
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As for citizen plaintiffs, the court usually refuses to review a case by reasoning 
that a citizen’s right is not injured by a unilateral presidential action. If the court 
accepts a citizen as a plaintiff in such case, it would allow an advisory question 
presented before a court “in a rarified debating atmosphere in a society.” As the 
empirical model demonstrates in chapter 4, both the level of congressional 
deliberation and the level of congressional attempt of control over the president are 
significantly affected by the public attitude, which suggests that a debate over a 
military deployment action is not in a rarified debating atmosphere. Hence, war power 
litigation is one of those democratic deliberative actions that are vigorously debated in 
the public sphere. As such, if the president takes a unilateral military action, I argue 
that the citizens’ right to mutually deliberate with each other in the nexus of public 
sphere, namely, Congress, is injured.  
2. A Reinterpretation of Political Question Doctrine in War Power Litigation  
The court often refused to review a war power issue by arguing that it is a matter that 
is (1) a textually demonstrable power of the political branches, or (2) left to the 
political branches to fill in the contents through individual event. My principal 
argument is that to decide whether a question is “political,”  one should first look into 
whether a question is “legal” in terms of the empirical evidence of congressional 
regulation pattern of military deployment. I briefly explain my argument based on the 
empirical evidence demonstrated in chapter 4.  
Some judges argue that whether Congress purports to authorize a war is a 
power textually demonstrated for it and the court does not have power to review it. I 
think this argument ignores the fact that for Congress, a legal question in a military 
deployment case is whether Congress has the opportunity to deliberate and decide to 
authorize or decline a military deployment before a presidential action is taken. I 
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emphasized above that the empirical model in chapter 4 demonstrates that Congress 
systematically concentrates on the timing of control over a military deployment 
provided in a law. Therefore, based on this empirical pattern, I argue that a “legal” 
question in a military deployment case is whether Congress has decided to authorize 
or decline a military action before a military event.  
Some argue that a war power issue is political on the grounds that any judicial 
involvement in a war power case will impair the incentives of political branches 
cooperatively to resolve a political conflict and further re-balance the power 
relationship between the president and Congress. I think that this argument ignores the 
reality of constitutional politics concerning war power. As I repeatedly emphasized 
above, the empirical model presented in chapter 4 demonstrates that the president 
systematically declines to accept any level of congressional attempt of control over his 
military deployment power unless he deems it is consistent with his military objective. 
Otherwise, the president will simply resist it. Therefore, if one thinks that an 
application of political question doctrine can facilitate a more cooperative relationship 
between the president and Congress, it would be an illusion. 
V. The Limit of the Thesis and an Agenda for Future Research 
The main limitation on my research concerns the subjective judgment on the quality of 
congressional member’s speech. Although I tried to limit the impact of subjective 
judgment by applying only two sub-categories of Discourse Quality Index and testing 
each, it may be better in the future to make a inter-coder reliability test. Second, since 
most of the primary deliberations in Congress are taken in committee, an ideal and 
more complete future study should include committee deliberation into the scope of 
research. Third, this thesish focuses on deliberations over military and foreign affair 
bills, which inevitably  skip an investigation on how the quality of congressional 
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deliberation affects congressional decisions on individual rights bills. Lastly, this 
dissertation did not have opportunity to examine how the patterns of congressional 
deliberation and presidential war power under the context of Cold War and Vietnam 
War are different from that of post-Cold War era. I hope that the empirical research 
that I have presented here could be a helpful starting point for understanding the 
relationship between and implications of congressional deliberation and presidential 
war power.  
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APPENDIX A: 
DRUG TRAFFICKING TIMELINE (EVENT NUMBER: 1) 
Drug Trafficking Timeline (Event Number: 1)  
11/29/1989  National Defense Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Years 1990 and 
1991  (101‐189)    HR 2461 
 
Possible relating E.O. 12696 
(11/13/1989):  
President’s Drug Advisory 
Council: President established 
the Presidents Drug Advisor 
Council which can recommend 
relevant policy to Director of 
National drug control policy.    
1. Inter‐branch procedural control: 
Report by the Secretary of Defense on 
the drug interdiction activities (Sec. 
1213)  
2. Inter‐agency procedural control: 
Secretary of defense shall carry out an 
integration of network and consults 
Director of National Drug Control Policy 
(Sec. 1204)  
3. Substantive control: authorizes to 
intercept a vessel and hot pursue (1 
section: Sec. 1202)  
4. $ Not more than $450, 000, 000 for 
drug interdiction and counter‐drug 
activities (Sec. 1201)  
11/21/1989  Department of Transportation 
and Related Agencies 
Appropriation Act, 1990 (101‐
164)  HR 3015  
1. Not less than $567,000,000 shall be 
available for drug enforcement 
activities for Coastal Guard   
2. Inter‐branch procedural control: 
Possibly legal use of deadly force by 
Coastal Guard in the future according 
to any law, regulations, treaty, or 
executive agreements  (Sec. 325)  
12/13/1989  International Narcotics Control 
act of 1989 (101‐231) HR 3611 
1. $115,000,000 is appropriated for 
international narcotics control 
assistance 
2. Substantive control: foreign 
stationed forces can participate into 
that country’s police arrest action  (Sec. 
15)  
3. Assistance: military and econ 
assistances (Sec. 3, 10, 12, 15, 17)  
11/5/1990  Department of Defense 
Appropriations Act of 1991 (101‐
511) HR 5803  
1. $1,084,100,000 for drug interdiction 
and counter‐drug activities   
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Drug Trafficking Timeline (Event Number: 1)  
11/5/1990  National Defense Authorization 
Act for Fiscal year 1991 (101‐510) 
HR 4739 
1. $ 1,084,100,000 ( Sec. 301)  
2. Inter‐branch procedural control: 
Report on defense spending for 
counter‐drug activities (Sec. 1007)  
3. Logistic military assistance asked by 
other federal agencies for other foreign 
countries (Sec. 1004)  
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APPENDIX B: 
FIRST IRAQI WAR (EVENT NUMBER: 2) 
First Iraqi War (Event Number: 2)    
8/2/1990   A resolution to condemn Iraq's 
invasion of Kuwait  ( S Res 318)  
1. Retrospective recognition of the 
embargo against Iraq 
2. Express the possible need for further 
air, sea, and land forces for resolving 
the crisis  
8/7/1990  Operation Desert Shield begun   
8/20/1990  NSD 45: Directed Secretary of 
Defense to organize  multi‐
national force requested by 
Kuwait   
 
11/5/1990  Iraq Sanctions Act of 1990 (101‐
514)  HR 5114   
E.O. 12722: Blocking Iraqi 
Government Property and 
prohibiting Transactions with Iraq 
E.O. 12724: Blocking Iraqi 
Government Property and 
prohibiting Transactions with Iraq 
1. Inter‐branch procedural control: 
Consultation with Congress regarding 
Iraqi crisis (Sec. 586B); Report to 
Congress with respect to Iraq’s nuclear, 
WMD, Ballistic Missile, and offensive 
military capability (586J) ; notice to 
Congress pertaining to Iraqi trade 
embargo (586C) ; certification to 
Congress regarding the sanctions 
against Iraq (586H)  
2. Retrospective recognition of trade 
embargo (586C)  
3. Assistance: humanitarian assistance 
(586C)  
11/5/1990  Treasury, Postal Service and 
General Government 
Appropriations Act 1991 (101‐
509) HR 5241  
1. Sense of the Senate (Sec 630)  
2. Inter‐agency procedural control: the 
President should take actions in 
concert with Secretary of State, 
Defense, Treasury, and OMB (Sec 630)  
3. Inter‐branch procedural control: the 
President should consult with the 
Congress; inform Congress legislative 
initiatives relating to the goals 
enumerated in the sense of the Senate 
(Sec 630)  
10/1/1990  Supplemental appropriations for 
“Operation Desert Shield” for the 
fiscal year 1990 (HJ Res 655)  
1. Authorization of supplemental 
appropriations for military personnel, 
operation and maintenance   
11/5/1990  National Defense Authorization 
Act for Fiscal year 1991 (101‐510) 
HR 4739 
1. Authorizes the President to decide if 
econ sanction against Iraq is in the 
national interest of US (Sec. 1458)  
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First Iraqi War (Event Number: 2)    
11/17/1990  Iraq International Law 
Compliance Act of 1990 (Vetoed 
by the president) HR 4653 
 
1. Inter‐branch procedural control: 
consultation with Congress with 
respect to Iraq‐Kuwait crisis; notice to 
Congress regarding regulations issued 
under E.O. 12722 and 12724; notice of 
termination of sanctions; certify to 
Congress with regard to the change of 
Iraqi policy if Iraq has great 
improvement on human rights policy 
(Sec. 522; 523; 543) 
2. Retrospective recognition of trade 
embargo against Iraq (Sec. 523)   
3. Assistance: Humanitarian assistance 
1/14/1991  Authorization for Use of Military 
Force Against Iraq Resolution 
(102‐1) HJ Res 77 
NSD 54: Authorizes military 
action against Iraq to bring about 
Iraq’s withdrawal from Kuwait  
1. The President is authorized to 
implement UN Resolutions relevant to 
Iraq (Sec. 2)  
2. Inter‐branch procedural control: the 
president shall make available to the 
Speaker and President pro tempore of 
the House and Senate about his 
determination on the use of force; 
report to Congress every 60 days with 
respect to Iraq’s compliance with UN 
Resolutions (Sec. 2; 3)  
4/10/1991  Operation Desert Shield/ Desert 
Storm Supplemental 
Appropriations Act, 1991 (102‐
28) HR 1282  
1. Authorization of the incremental 
cost of Operation Desert Shield and 
Storm $15,000,000,000 
2. Inter‐branch procedural control: the 
president shall report to Congress 
about troop redeployment relevant to 
Operation Desert Shield and Storm 
4/6/1991  Persian Gulf Conflict 
Supplemental Authorization and 
Personnel Benefits Act of 1991 
(102‐25) S 725  
1. Authorization of supplemental 
appropriations for Operation Desert 
Storm (Sec. 101; 102;103) 
2. Inter‐branch procedural control: a 
transfer of Operation Desert Storm 
fund should be noticed‐and‐waited; 
Secretary of Defense shall monthly 
report to Congress on cumulative 
amount (Sec. 105; 106)  
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Somalia Timeline (Event Number: 3)  
11/21/1989  Foreign Operations, Export 
Financing, and related Program 
Appropriations Act, 1990  (101‐
167) HR 3743 
HR 2939 was previously vetoed 
by the president and then 
became HR 3743 (but the bill 
vetoed is not related to Somalia 
issue)  
1. None of the funds should be 
appropriated for Somalia, except 
through the regular notification 
procedures of the Committees on 
Appropriations (Sec. 542)  
2. Econ support fund for Somalia is 
rescinded (Sec. 589)  
10/30/1991  International Cooperation Act of 
1991 (Failed to pass on 
Conference Report in the House)  
HR 2508 
 
The relevant provisions in this Act 
is independently enacted in Horn 
of Africa Recovery and Food 
Security Act (102‐274)  
S 985  
1. Sense of Congress: the president 
should develop a plan to meet the 
emergency need of Somalia and 
deliver those humanitarian resources 
to those needed but not military (Sec. 
1062)  
2. Sense of Congress: direct the 
president to pledge diplomatic and 
military resources for UN 
peacekeeping and peacemaking  
3. Humanitarian assistance; but 
prohibitions on econ and military 
assistance to Somali government (Sec. 
1063; 1064; 1065; 1066)  
4. Inter‐branch procedural control: the 
president shall submit certification  to 
appropriate committee regarding the 
distribution of humanitarian 
assistance; the president shall also 
report on the progress with regard to 
Somali situation ( Sec. 1067; 1068)  
6/28/1991  Expressing the sense of the 
Senate regarding the emergency 
humanitarian and political 
situation in Somalia (S Res 115)  
1. Sense of the Senate expresses that 
the president should lead the world to 
resolve Somali factions conflict 
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4/21/1992  Horn of Africa Recovery and Food 
Security Act (102‐274)  
S 985 
1. Sense of the Congress: direct the 
president should use whatever 
diplomatic resources to resolve Somali 
conflict; offer equitable distribution of 
human relief resources and 
emergency food assistance; direct the 
president to pledge diplomatic and 
military resources for UN 
peacekeeping and peacemaking 
Humanitarian assistance; but 
prohibitions on econ and military 
assistance to Somali government (Sec. 
3; 4)  
2. Prohibitions on military and econ 
assistance (Sec. 7)  
3. Inter‐branch procedural control: the 
president shall submit certification  to 
appropriate committee regarding the 
distribution of humanitarian 
assistance; the president shall also 
report on the progress with regard to 
Somali situation (Sec. 8;9)  
5/19/1992   Expressing the sense of the 
Senate regarding needed action 
to address the continuing state of 
war and chaos and the 
emergency humanitarian 
situation in Somalia (S Res 258)  
1. Urges UN to remain committed to 
peacekeeping in Somalia  
8/10/1992  Expressing the sense of the 
Congress regarding the desperate 
humanitarian crisis in Somalia 
and urging the deployment of 
United Nations security guards (S 
Con Res 132)  
1.  Retrospective recognizes the 
appropriation of the presidential 
security guards deployment to 
Somalia on 7/27/1992 
2. Urges the president through UN to 
deploy security guards for 
humanitarian relief  
10/6/1992  (102‐391) HR 5368  1. Not less than $25,000,000 shall be 
made available for Somalia for 
disaster relief 
2. Funds obligated in this Act shall not 
be obligated or expended for Somalia 
unless through the regular notification 
procedures of Committee on 
Appropriations (Sec. 540)  
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10/8/1992  Concerning the humanitarian 
crisis in Somalia (H Con Res 370)  
1. Express the willingness of the US to 
participate into UN Somali security 
guards deployment in consistent with 
US legal requirements  
11/30/1993  National Defense Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 1994 ( 103‐
160) HR 2401  
1. Sense of Congress: the president 
should consult and report with the 
Congress regarding the US forces 
deployment in Somalia (Sec. 1512)  
2. Sense of Congress: the president 
should seek congressional approval 
regarding the continuance of Somali 
commission by 11/15/1993 (Sec. 
1512)  
11/11/1993  Appropriations for the 
Department of Defense for the 
fiscal year ending Sep. 30, 1994 
(103‐139) HR 3116 
Signing statement: the president 
construed section 8151(b)(2)(ii) 
as not restricting his 
constitutional responsibility and 
authority as Commander In Chief, 
including his ability to place U.S. 
combat forces under the 
temporary tactical control of a 
foreign commander where to do 
otherwise would jeopardize the 
safety of U.S. combat forces in 
support of UNOSOM II.  
1. The Congress approves the 
combating action in Somalia only for 
expenses incurred through 3/31/1994; 
the said date could be extended by 
congressional authorization (Sec. 
8151)  
2. Future peacekeeping action should 
consult with the Congress fifteen days 
prior to the deployment or no later 
than forty‐eight hours after the 
deployment; the said consultation can 
be waived if the president report to 
the Congress that the estimated cost 
will not exceed $50,000,000. (Sec. 
8153)  
3. The president should seek 
supplemental appropriations for the 
defray of Somali cost (Sec. 8153)  
9/30/1994  Appropriations for the 
Department of Defense for the 
fiscal year ending Sep. 30, 1995 
(103‐335) HR 4650  
Signing Statement:  
1. None of the funds should be used 
for the continuous presence of US 
military personnel in Somalia ( Sec. 
8135)  
2/12/1994  Emergency supplemental 
appropriations and rescissions, 
1994 (103‐211) HR 3759 
1. Authorization of funds for the 
incremental and associated costs 
incurred in relation with the ongoing 
operations in Somalia (Sec. 302)  
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10/5/1994  National Defense Authorization 
Act for Fiscal year 1995 (103‐337) 
S 2182 
1. Authorizes appropriations for 
incremental and associated costs 
regarding ongoing operations in 
Somalia (Sec. 1002)  
2. Report on intelligence lessons 
learned from Somali action ( Sec. 
1403)  
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Panama Timeline (Event Number: 4)     
2/14/1989  1. Urgent Assistance for Democracy 
in Panama Act of 1990 (101‐243) 
HR 3952 
2. President Bush issued an E.O. 
12710 and Proclamation 6103 
pursuant to the above law to 
terminate the emergency situation 
regarding Panama declared by E.O. 
12635 and Proclamation 5779 by 
President Reagan  
1. Authorization of econ and military 
assistance (Sec. 101)  
2. Inter‐branch procedural control: 
the president shall notify the 
Congress 15 days before each 
obligations of funds applicable to 
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (Sec. 
102)  
2/22/1989  NSD 4: US Policy Toward May 7, 
1989 Elections in Panama 
(classified)  
 
5/4/1989 
5/16/1989 
A resolution relating to free and 
fair elections in Panama  (S Res 
120)  
Concerning the May 7, 1989, 
Presidential election in Panama (H 
Con Res 122)  
1. Condemns Noriega 
2. Ask the president to report and 
consult with Congress relating to 
further Panama’s foreign policy  
 
7/22/1989  US Actions in Panama (classified)    
11/21/1989  Departments of Commerce, Justice, 
and State, the Judiciary, and 
Related Agencies Appropriations 
Act, 1990 (101‐162) HR 2991 
1. Sense of Congress: Noriega has 
contributed to international illegal 
drug trafficking and should be 
removed from the position of power 
in Panama  
5/25/1990  Dire Emergency Supplemental 
Appropriations for Disaster 
Assistance, Food Stamps, 
Unemployment Compensation 
Administration, and other Urgent 
Needs, and Transfers, and Reducing 
Funds Budgeted for Military 
Spending Act of 1990 (101‐302) HR 
4404  
Signing statement:  
1. Econ assistance (Chapter III)  
2. Inter‐branch procedural control: 
the Secretary of Defense shall notify 
the Congress of all the additional and 
associated costs of Operation Just 
Cause (Sec. 211)  
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6/30/1989  Dire emergency Supplemental 
Appropriations and Transfers, 
Urgent Supplemental, and 
Correcting Enrollment Errors Act of 
1989 (101‐45) HR 2402  
1. Sense of the Senate: the President 
should not appoint a new 
administrator of the Panama Canal 
commission unless he certifies that 
Panama have become a 
democratically elected government 
(Sec. 405)  
9/1/1989  NSD 21: US would not recognize 
Noriega government and support 
the clearly‐won Endara 
government; current econ 
sanctions against Panama would be 
strictly enforced  
 
11/30/1989  National Security Directive (NSD) 
32: Prohibit vessels of Panamanian 
registry from entering US ports  
 
1/24/1990  NSD 33: US should re‐activate econ 
and other logistical assistance to 
Panama 
 
1/24/1990  NSD 34: US should initiate a 
$40,000,000 for humanitarian 
assistance to Panama and other 
econ recovery plan  
 
5/22/1990  Supplemental Assistance for 
Emerging Democracies Act of 1990 
(HR 4636)   
1. Reject to provide supplemental 
econ assistance to Panama (Failed to 
pass in the House)  
2. Authorizes $470,000,000 as 
supplemental appropriation for 
Panama econ assistance (Sec. 101)  
3. Inter‐branch procedural control: 
the president shall notify the 
Congress 15 days before each 
obligations of funds applicable to 
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (Sec. 
101)  
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LEBANON HOSTAGE (WILLIAM HIGGINS) CRISIS (EVENT NUMBER: 5)  
Lebanon Hostage (William Higgins) Crisis (Event Number: 5)  
8/3/1989  A resolution regarding American 
hostages in Lebanon (S Res 164)  
1. The Senate will support any 
retaliation against terrorists   
11/29/1989  National Defense Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 1990 and 1991 
(101‐189) HR 2461 
1. Sense of Congress: the president 
should use all available resources to 
identify those persons responsible for 
the kidnapping and retail against 
those terrorist in accordance with 
national and international legal 
requirements, including the use of 
military force (Sec. 1638)  
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Bosnia Timeline (Event Number: 6)     
10/30/1991  International Cooperation Act of 
1991 (HR 2508)  (Failed to pass on 
conference report in the House)  
1. Sense of Congress: all peoples of 
Yugoslavia should resolve their future 
through democratic, peace, and 
negotiated ways  
4/18/1991  To express Senate support for 
democracy and human rights in 
Yugoslavia and Senate opposition 
to the use of force against 
democratic republic governments 
in Yugoslavia (S Res 106)  
1. Senate noticed that democratic 
election requirement in 101‐513 has 
not been met 
2. Once there is military crackdown 
on Bosnia, the president should 
suspend econ assistance to 
Yugoslavia  
7/11/1991  A resolution to express the Senate's 
support for democratization in 
Yugoslavia (S Res 153) 
The Senate urges the president to 
contact with the leader of 
Yugoslavia’s democratic republics 
and provide foreign assistances to 
those republics  
4/29/1992  Regarding the aggression against 
Bosnia‐Herzegovina and 
conditioning United States 
recognition of Serbia (S Res 290) 
1. US should hold accountable Serbia 
government for the occupation of 
Bosnia  
2. US should hold its recognition of 
Republic of Yugoslavia  
5/30/1992  E.O. 12808: Blocking “Yugoslav 
Government” Property and 
Property of the Government of 
Serbia and Montenegro  
1. Congress retrospectively codified 
in Pub. L. 103‐160 (11/30/1993)  
6/4/1992  Relating to the enforcement of 
United Nations Security Council 
resolutions calling for the cessation 
of hostilities in the former territory 
of Yugoslavia (S Res 306)  
Calls on the president to urge UN 
Secretary General to enforce the 
Security Council resolutions seeking 
cessation of hostilities in the former 
republics of Yugoslavia  
6/5/1992  E.O. 12810: Blocking Property of 
and Prohibiting Transactions with 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia  
1. Congress retrospectively codified 
in Pub. L. 103‐160 (11/30/1993)  
10/6/1992  Foreign Operations, Export 
Financing, and related Programs 
appropriations Act, 1993 (102‐391) 
HR 5368 
1. Development assistance fund of 
humanitarian relief for Bosnia 
2. Inter‐branch procedural control: 
The president should timely certify 
to the Congress regarding transfer of 
defense articles to Bosnia and report 
to the Congress every 60 days once 
the said transfer begins (Sec. 599D)  
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6/22/1992  Dire Emergency Supplemental 
Appropriations Act, 1992 (102‐302) 
HR 5132 
1. Inter‐branch procedural control: 
humanitarian assistance funds spent 
for Bosnia shall be made available 
only through the regular notification 
procedures of the Committee on 
Appropriations ( Sec. 106)   
8/11/1992  Relating to authorization of 
multinational action in Bosnia‐
Herzegovina under Article 42 of the 
United Nations Charter  (S Res 330/ 
H Res 554) 
1. The president should call for UN 
Security Council meeting for the 
authorization of all the necessary 
means, including use of force and 
demonstration of force to ensure 
humanitarian relief in Bosnia 
2. The said meeting should also 
review the arms embargo on Bosnia, 
discussion of convene of war crime 
tribunal 
3. No US military force should be 
introduced for combat except a 
clearly defined objective  
1/15/1993  E.O. 12831: Additional Measures 
with Respect to the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia  
1. Congress retrospectively codified 
in Pub. L. 103‐160 (11/30/1993)  
4/25/1993  E.O. 12846: Additional Measures 
with Respect to the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia  
1. Congress retrospectively codified 
in Pub. L. 103‐160 (11/30/1993) 
11/30/1993  National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 1994 (103‐160) HR 
2401 
1. Retrospective codified of the 
presidential sanctions against Serbia 
in E.O. 12808, 12810, 12831, 12846, 
Proclamation 6389 (Sec. 1511)  
2. Prohibits assistance to Serbia; but 
the said prohibition can be waived 
after the president certifies to the 
Congress that emergency basic 
humanitarian needs are met. (Sec. 
1511)  
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4/30/1994  Foreign Relations Authorization 
Act. Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995 
(103‐236) HR 2333 
1. Sense of Congress: the president 
should terminate the US embargo on 
Bosnia to assist Bosnia’s right to self‐
defense under Art. 51 of the UN 
Charter and provide military 
assistance to Bosnia (Sec. 520)  
2. Sense of Congress: explicitly asked 
the president to retract executive 
policy adopted on July 19, 1991 in the 
Federal Register (Suspension of 
Munitions Export Licenses to 
Yugoslavia) (Sec. 520)  
3. The president is authorized to 
exempt sanctions against Yugoslavia 
if such assistances are to support its 
democratic program supported by 
the US (Sec. 532)  
9/30/1993  Foreign Operations, Export 
Financing, and Related Programs 
appropriations Act, 1994 (103‐87) 
HR 2295 
1. Inter‐branch procedural control: 
The president should timely certify 
to the Congress regarding transfer of 
defense articles to Bosnia and report 
to the Congress every 60 days once 
the said transfer begins (Sec. 548)  
2. The president is authorized to 
provide up to $25,000,000 for UN 
War Crimes Tribunal without regard 
to the ceiling limitation in Foreign 
assistance Act of 1961 if he 
determines that doing so will 
contribute to a just resolution of  
charges regarding genocide (Sec. 
548)  
11/11/1993  Department of Defense 
Appropriations Act, 1994 (103‐139) 
HR 3116  
1. Sense of Congress: None of the 
funds should be made available for 
the purposes of deploying Armed 
forces to implement peace‐
settlement in Bosnia, unless 
previously authorized by Congress  
8/12/1993  Emergency Supplemental 
appropriations for Relief from the 
Major, Widespread Flooding in the 
Midwest Act of 1993(103‐75) HR 
2667  
1. Sense of the Senate: UN should 
expedite the process of the 
prosecution of war crimes in the 
former Yugoslavia  
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8/23/1994  Foreign Operations, Export, 
Financing, and Related Programs 
Supplemental appropriations Act, 
1994 (103‐306) HR 4426  
1. Inter‐branch procedural control: 
The president should timely certify 
to the Congress regarding transfer of 
defense articles to Bosnia and report 
to the Congress every 60 days once 
the said transfer begins (Sec. 546)  
2. The president is authorized to 
provide up to $25,000,000 for UN 
War Crimes Tribunal without regard 
to the ceiling limitation in Foreign 
assistance Act of 1961 if he 
determines that doing so will 
contribute to a just resolution of  
charges regarding genocide (Sec. 
575) 
3. Inter‐branch procedural control: 
the Secretary of State shall report to 
the Congress with respect to the 
collection of the evidence regarding 
genocide information and further 
furnish such evidence to War Crimes 
Tribunal (Sec. 575)  
9/30/1994  Department of Defense 
Appropriations Act for the fiscal 
year ending September 30, 1995 
(103‐335) HR 4650  
1. Sense of Congress: None of the 
funds should be made available for 
the purposes of deploying Armed 
forces to implement peace‐
settlement in Bosnia, unless 
previously authorized by Congress  
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10/5/1994  National Defense Authorization Act 
for fiscal Year 1995 (103‐337) S 
2182/ HR 4301  
 
Signing Statement: Construes Sec. 
1404 in the right column as not 
applicable   
1. Inter‐branch procedural control: 
report on reforming UN peace 
operations (Sec. 1401); the Secretary 
of Defense shall submit a military 
readiness assessment of US armed 
forces in peacekeeping operations 
within Bosnia 30 days following the 
deployment of US ground forces, 
including total number of forces, 
estimated cost, expected duration 
( Sec. 1402)  
2. Sense of Congress: UN should lift 
arms embargo on Bosnia and provide 
logistical assistance ; 
3. Substantive control: if the Bosnian 
Serbs do not accept contact Group 
proposal by 10/15/1994, then the 
president should formally introduce a 
resolution in UN Security Council to 
terminate the Bosnia arms embargo; 
if the said resolution is not accepted 
by Security Council, then the 
president shall submit a plan and 
consult with the congress regarding 
military training assistance to Bosnia 
government and further provide no 
funding for the enforcement of the 
Bosnia arms embargo (Sec. 1404)  
2/12/1994  Emergency Supplemental 
Appropriations Act of 1994 (103‐
211) HR 3759 
1. Funds shall only be obligated and 
expended to fund the incremental 
and associated costs of the 
humanitarian operations and no‐fly 
zone enforcement relating to Bosnia  
10/25/1994  E.O. 12934: Blocking Property and 
Additional Measures with Respect 
to the Bosnian Serb‐Controlled 
Areas of the Republic of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina   
 
256 
Bosnia Timeline (Event Number: 6)     
8/11/1995  Bosnia and Herzegovina Self‐
Defense Act of 1995  (S 21)  Vetoed 
1. The president should terminate 
arms embargo on Bosnian 
government once US government 
receives request made by Bosnia; the 
said termination should only be 
implemented after the withdrawal of 
UNPROFOR (Sec. 4)  
2. Inter‐branch procedural control: 
the president shall report to the 
Congress on the status and 
completion of the withdrawal of 
UNPROFOR (Sec. 4)  
3. Direct the president to introduce a 
resolution into Security Council to 
terminate the arms embargo once 
Bosnia request UNPROFOR to 
withdraw from Bosnia (Sec. 4)  
4. None of the provision in this act 
should be construed as an 
authorization of troop deployment in 
the territory in Bosnia (Sec. 4)  
12/1/1995  Department of Defense 
Appropriations Act, 1996 (104‐61) 
HR 2126 
1. Sense of Congress: none of the 
funds available under this Act shall be 
obligated for any peacekeeping 
operation in Bosnia unless authorized 
by the Congress after the enactment 
of this Act (Sec. 8124)  
2. Sense of Congress: the president 
shall consult with the Congress 
before any deployment of the US 
forces in any international 
peacekeeping, peace enforcement, 
and humanitarian assistance 
operation; the said consultation shall 
be performed at least 15 days before 
the deployment, but if the president 
determines that the national security 
so requires, he may delay the 
consultations after the initiation of 
such deployment (Sec. 8115)  
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12/13/1995  To prohibit Federal funds from 
being used for the deployment on 
the ground of United States Armed 
Forces in the Republic of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina as part of any 
peacekeeping operation, or as part 
of any implementation force (HR 
2770  Failed to pass)  
1. No Federal funds shall be 
appropriated or otherwise available 
for the deployment on the ground of 
United States Armed Forces in the 
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
as part of any peacekeeping 
operation, or as part of any 
implementation force  
12/13/1995  To prohibit the use of funds 
appropriated to the Department of 
Defense from being used for the 
deployment on the ground of 
United States Armed Forces in the 
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
as part of any peacekeeping 
operation, or as part of any 
implementation force, unless funds 
for such deployment are 
specifically appropriated by law (HR 
2606 Failed to pass)  
1. None of the funds appropriated or 
otherwise available to the 
Department of Defense may be 
obligated or expended for the 
deployment on the ground of United 
States Armed Forces in the Republic 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina as part of 
any peacekeeping operation, or as 
part of any implementation force, 
unless funds for such deployment 
have been specifically appropriated 
by a law enacted after the date of the 
enactment of this Act  
12/13/1995  Expressing the opposition of the 
Congress to President Clinton's 
planned deployment of United 
States ground forces to Bosnia (S 
Con Res 35 Failed to pass) 
1. Expressing the opposition to the 
presidential decision to deploy troop 
to Bosnia  
12/13/1995  Expressing the sense of the House 
of Representatives regarding the 
deployment of United States 
Armed Forces to Bosnia (H Res 306) 
1. Expressing the questions of and 
concerns over the presidential troop 
deployment to Bosnia  
5/23/1995  Foreign Relations Authorization 
Act, Fiscal Years 1996 and 1997 (HR 
1561) (Failed to override the 
presidential veto)  
1. The president is authorized to 
enter into an international 
agreement to assist the self‐defense 
of Bosnia and relating substantive 
requirement of such agreement (Sec. 
1610)  
2. Inter‐branch procedural control: 
the president shall submit a report on 
the progress of the said authorization 
(Sec. 1610); the president shall also 
submit a report on the military and 
non‐military aspects of the 
implementation of general 
framework agreement (Sec. 1611)  
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2/12/1996  Foreign operations, Export 
Financing, and Related Programs 
Appropriations Act, 1996 (104‐107) 
HR 1868 
1. The president is authorized to 
transfer defense articles to Bosnia 
pursuant to a lifting of the UN arms 
embargo (Sec. 540)  
2. Inter‐branch procedural control: 
The president should timely certify 
to the Congress regarding transfer of 
defense articles to Bosnia and report 
to the Congress every 60 days once 
the said transfer begins (Sec. 540)  
3. The president should certify to the 
Congress the urgent humanitarian 
needs in Yugoslavia or need for the 
negotiated settlement of the conflict 
in Bosnia, then the president could 
terminate sanctions against Serbia 
(Sec. 540A)  
4. The president is authorized to 
provide non‐military assistance to 
Serbia in post‐conflict period. (Sec. 
540A)  
5. Funds appropriated under this Act 
in the territory of Bosnia may only b e 
funded in the territory of the Bosnian 
Federation (Sec. 584)  
9/23/1996  National Defense Authorization Act 
for fiscal Year 1997 (104‐201) HR 
3230  
1. The price of the equipment 
transferred to Bosnian government 
should not exceed the lowest level 
transferred to any other country (Sec. 
1083)  
10/8/1997  Department of Defense 
Appropriations Act, 1998 (105‐56) 
HR 2266 
1. None of the funds in this Act may 
be made available for the 
deployment of forces in Bosnia after 
June 30, 1998, unless the president 
consult and transmit a certification to 
the congress not later than May 15, 
1998 that the extension of the 
deployment meets with the national 
security interest; the president shall 
also submit a supplemental 
appropriations request accompany 
with that certification (Sec. 8132)  
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11/26/1997  Foreign Operations, Export 
Financing, and Related Programs 
Appropriations Act, 1998 (105‐118) 
HR 2159  
1. Econ assistance to Bosnia; the 
president is authorized to withhold 
funds appropriated under SEED as 
long as he determines and certifies 
that Bosnia has not complied with 
General Framework Agreement for 
Peace in Bosnia  
11/18/1997  Nation Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 1998 (105‐85) HR 
1119 
1. Sense of Congress: US ground 
combat forces should not participate 
in a follow‐on force in Bosnia after 
June 1998, but the president also 
should consult with Congress 
regarding a NATO‐led force in Bosnia 
after June 30, 1998. (Sec. 1201, 1202) 
2. Substantive and inter‐branch 
procedural control: No funds of DoD 
for fiscal year 1998 and beyond may 
be used for the deployment of 
ground combat forces after June 30, 
1998, unless the president consults 
and certifies with and to the 
Congress that that extension is met 
with national security interest and 
submit a supplemental appropriation 
request in the same time (Sec. 1203)  
3. Inter‐branch procedural control: 
Secretary of defense should report 
on each activity carried out in Bosnia 
(Sec. 1204) 
4. Inter‐branch procedural control: 
the president should report on the 
political and military conditions in 
Bosnia (Sec. 1205)  
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10/17/1998  Strom Thurmond national Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
1999(105‐261) HR 3616  (HR 4103’s 
debate regarding Bosnia should be 
included in this act)  
1. $1,858,600,000 is authorized for 
Bosnia peacekeeping operations 
2. Inter‐branch procedural control: 
the president may certify to the 
Congress that peacekeeping 
operation is in accordance with US 
national security interest and 
requests a supplemental 
appropriations for the amount 
exceeding the said authorized 
amount (Sec. 1004)  
3. Sense of Congress: US ground 
combat forces should not remain in 
Bosnia indefinitely, and the Congress 
urges the president also should 
consult with Congress regarding a 
NATO‐led force in Bosnia after June 
30, 1998. (Sec. 1201, 1202)  
4. Inter‐branch procedural control: 
the president shall report to the 
Congress on the continuing operation 
information in Bosnia semiannually; 
Secretary of Defense should also 
reports on the effect of operations in 
Bosnia on US military capability to  
conduct two simultaneous major 
theater wars (Sec. 1203, 1204)  
5. Inter‐branch procedural control: 
the Secretary of Defense shall report 
to Congress on the major 
contingency operations and ongoing 
operations; the request of a 
contingency appropriations should 
also be accompanied with a report on 
the objectives of the operation made 
by the Secretary of Defense (Sec. 
1211, 1212) 
6. Inter‐branch procedural control: 
the Secretary of Defense shall submit 
a report on the lesson learned from 
NATO‐led stabilization force in Bosnia  
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10/5/1999  National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2000 (106‐65) S 
1059/ HR 1401 
1. The president may not obligate 
more than 1,824,400,000 
incremental costs for Bosnia 
peacekeeping operations (Sec. 1006)  
2. The said limitation can be waived 
by the president if he certifies to the 
Congress that it is in accordance with 
national security interest and will not 
adversely affect the readiness of 
military forces and also submit a 
supplemental appropriation request 
accompanied the said certification  
(Sec. 1006) 
3. Sense of Congress: the president 
shall review the national security 
strategy regarding those noncritical 
overseas missions involving US forces 
(Sec. 1235)  
4. Inter‐branch procedural control: 
the president shall submit a report of 
the above review by March 1, 2000. 
(Sec. 1235)  
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10/30/2000  Floyd D. Spence National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2001 (106‐398) HR 4205  
1. The president may not obligate 
more than 1,387,800,000 
incremental costs for Bosnia 
peacekeeping operations; the said 
limitation can be waived by the 
president if he certifies to the 
Congress that it is in accordance with 
national security interest and will not 
adversely affect the readiness of 
military forces and also submit a 
supplemental appropriation request 
accompanied the said certification  
(Sec. 1005)  
2. Inter‐branch procedural control: 
the president should report to the 
Congress on the effect of continued 
operations in the Balkans region on 
readiness but such obligation is not 
required after US terminates its 
military operations in the region (Sec. 
1005)  
3. The president shall develop a 
comprehensive political‐military 
strategy relating to the benchmarks 
of Bosnia peacekeeping operation 
(Sec. 1212)  
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12/28/2001  National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2002 (107‐107) S 
1438 
1. The president may not obligate 
more than 1,315,600,000 
incremental costs for Bosnia 
peacekeeping operations; the said 
limitation can be waived by the 
president if he certifies to the 
Congress that it is in accordance with 
national security interest and will not 
adversely affect the readiness of 
military forces and also submit a 
supplemental appropriation request 
accompanied the said certification  
(Sec. 1005)  
 2. Inter‐branch procedural control: 
the president should report to the 
Congress on the effect of continued 
operations in the Balkans region on 
readiness but such obligation is not 
required after US terminates its 
military operations in the region (Sec. 
1005)   
1/10/2002  Foreign Operations, Export 
Financing, and Related Programs 
Appropriations Act, 2002 (107‐115) 
HR 2506  
1. Econ assistance to Bosnia  
2. The president is authorized to 
withhold the funding for the said 
econ assistance if he determines that 
Bosnia does not comply with General 
Framework Agreement for Peace in 
Bosnia  
5/28/2003  E.O. 13304: Termination of 
Emergencies with Respect to 
Yugoslavia and Modification of E.O. 
13219 of June 26, 2001  
 
12/8/2004   Consolidated Appropriations Act, 
2005 (108‐447) HR 4818 
1. Econ assistance to Bosnia  
2. The president is authorized to 
withhold the funding for the said 
econ assistance if he determines that 
Bosnia does not comply with General 
Framework Agreement for Peace in 
Bosnia  
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Haiti Timeline (Event Number: 7)    
11/19/1989  Foreign Operations, Export 
Financing, and Related Programs 
Appropriations Act, 1990 (101‐
167) HR 3743 (It previously was 
HR 2939 but was vetoed not 
relevant to the Haitian provisions 
in the right column.)  
1. Military assistance material for 
Haiti shall be limited to non‐lethal 
items; None of the funds shall be 
obligated for Haiti unless as provided 
through the regular notification 
procedures of the Committee on 
Appropriation 
2. Assistance to Haiti should be 
suspended unless Haiti embarks on 
the transition to democratic power 
(Sec. 560)  
3. The said limitation does not 
include humanitarian and democratic 
assistance (sec. 560)  
5/25/1990  Dire Emergency Supplemental 
Appropriations for Disaster 
Assistance, Food Stamps, 
Unemployment Compensation 
Administration, and other Urgent 
Needs, and Transfers, and 
Reducing Funds Budgeted for 
Military Spending Act of 1990 
(1041‐302) HR 4404  
1. Not less than $10,000,000  made 
available for econ and electoral 
assistance for Haiti (two sections)  
11/5/1990  Foreign Operations, Export 
Financing, and Related programs 
Appropriations Act, 1991 (101‐
513) HR 5114 
1. Military assistance material for 
Haiti shall be limited to non‐lethal 
items;  None of the funds shall be 
obligated for Haiti unless as provided 
through the regular notification 
procedures of the Committee on 
Appropriation (Sec. 541)  (two 
sections)  
10/2/1991  A resolution relative to Haiti  (S 
Res 186/ H Res 235)  
1. All US assistance to Haiti shall 
remain suspended until restore of a 
democratic government  
10/4/1991  E.O. 12775: Prohibiting Certain 
Transactions with Respect to Haiti  
No congressional retrospective 
recognition (authorized by IEEPA and 
NEA)  
10/28/1991  E.O. 12779: Prohibiting Certain 
Transactions with Respect to Haiti  
No congressional retrospective 
recognition (authorized by IEEPA and 
NEA)  
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10/6/1992  Foreign Operations, Export 
Financing, and Related Programs 
Appropriations Act, 1993 (102‐
391) HR 5368 
1. None of the funds shall be 
obligated for Haiti unless as provided 
through the regular notification 
procedures of the Committee on 
Appropriation (Sec. 540) (two 
sections)  
6/3/1993  Proclamation 6569: Suspension of 
Entry as Immigrants and non‐
immigrants of persons who 
formulate or implement policies 
that are impeding the negotiations 
seeking the return to 
constitutional rule in Haiti  
 
6/30/1993  E.O. 12853: Blocking Government 
of Haiti Property and Prohibiting 
Transactions with Haiti  
IEEPA, NEA, UN Participations Act of 
1945 
9/30/1993  Foreign Operations, Export 
Financing, and Related Programs 
Appropriations Act, 1994 (103‐87) 
HR 2295 
1. None of the funds shall be 
obligated for Haiti unless as provided 
through the regular notification 
procedures of the Committee on 
Appropriation (Sec. 520)  
2. None of the funds may be 
obligated or expended for military‐
related assistance to Haiti unless such 
assistance program is an integral part 
of UN program or for strengthening 
the civilian control over military (Sec. 
563)  
10/18/1993  E.O. 12872: Blocking Property of 
Persons Obstructing 
Democratization in Haiti  
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11/11/1993  Department of Defense 
Appropriations Act, 1994 (103‐
139) HR 3116 
1. Sense of Congress: US has interest 
in preventing uncontrolled 
emigration from Haiti and thus 
should remain engaged in Haiti (Sec. 
8147)  
2. Sense of Congress: but funds 
appropriated by this Act should not 
be obligated for US military 
operations in Haiti unless authorized 
in advance by the Congress; for 
protection of US citizen, property, or 
any other national security interest, 
but in no later than 48 hours shall the 
president report to the Congress 
(Sec. 8147)  
3. Sense of Congress: if the said 
military deployment is reported to 
the Congress in advance, then the 
above limitation need not be applied 
(Sec. 8147)  
5/7/1994  E.O. 12914: Prohibiting certain 
transactions with respect to Haiti  
 
5/7/1994  Proclamation 6685: Suspension of 
entry of aliens whose entry is 
barred under UN Security Council 
Resolution 917 or who formulate, 
implement, or benefit from 
policies that are impeding the 
negotiations seeking the return to 
constitutional rule in Haiti 
 
5/21/1994  E.O. 12917: Prohibiting certain 
transactions with respect to Haiti 
 
6/10/1994  E.O. 12920: Prohibiting certain 
transactions with respect to Haiti  
 
6/21/1994  E.O. 12922: Blocking property of 
certain Haitian nationals  
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8/23/1994  Foreign Operations, Export 
Financing, and Related Programs 
Supplemental Appropriations Act , 
1994 (103‐306) HR 4426 
1. None of the funds shall be 
obligated for Haiti unless as provided 
through the regular notification 
procedures of the Committee on 
Appropriation (Sec. 520)  
2. Sense of Congress: US has interest 
in preventing uncontrolled 
emigration from Haiti and thus 
should remain engaged in Haiti  
3. Sense of Congress: but funds 
appropriated by this Act should not 
be obligated for US military 
operations in Haiti unless authorized 
in advance by the Congress; for 
protection of US citizen, property, or 
any other national security interest, 
but in no later than 48 hours shall the 
president report to the Congress  
4. Sense of Congress: if the said 
military deployment is reported to 
the Congress in advance, then the 
above limitation need not be applied 
(The above 2‐4 was dropped at the 
conference stage)  
10/5/1994   National Defense Authorization 
Act for Fiscal year 1995 (103‐337) 
S 2182/ HR 4301 
1. Authorization of incremental and 
associated costs related to US 
operations in Haiti (Sec. 1002)  
2. In light of several humanitarian 
relief assistances of US forces, the 
Secretary of Defense should submit a 
review and Congress a report of the 
effect of those humanitarian 
operations on the force structure 
required to fight and win two major 
regional contingencies; after the 
submission of such report, the 
president should also submit a report 
detailing the steps the presidents 
intends to meet the Secretary’s 
report ( Sec. 1069)  
2/12/1994   Emergency Supplemental 
Appropriations Act of 1994 (103‐
211) HR 3759 
1. Funds appropriated in this Act shall 
only be obligated and expended for 
incremental and associated costs 
relating to the maritime interception 
operations relating to Haiti (Sec. 301) 
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10/14/1994  E.O. 12932: Termination of 
Emergency with respect to Haiti  
 
10/25/1994  United States Policy toward Haiti 
(103‐423) SJ Res 229/ HJ Res 416 
 
Signing Statement: interprets Sec. 
2’s language as seeking only 
information about the rules of 
engagement that I may supply 
consistent with my constitutional 
responsibilities, and not 
information of a sensitive 
operational nature.  
1. Sense of Congress: the president 
should have sought congressional 
approval before deploying US forces 
to Haiti (Sec. 1)  
2. The president shall submit a 
statement of US’s policy objectives in 
Haiti (Sec. 2) 
3. The president shall monthly report 
to the Congress on the situations in 
Haiti (Sec. 3)  
4. the Secretary of State shall report 
to the Congress on human rights 
situation in Haiti (Sec. 4)  
5. The Secretary of State shall report 
on all agreements US enters into with 
Haiti (Sec. 5)  
6. Nothing in this resolution should 
be construed as approval and 
disapproval of the US participation in 
UN mission in Haiti (Sec. 6)  
9/28/1994  Department of Veterans Affairs 
and Housing and Urban 
Development, and Independent 
Agencies Appropriations Act, 1995 
( 103‐327) HR 4624  
1. Legal effects o UN Security Council 
Resolution does not constitute 
authorization of US troop 
deployment to Haiti (Dropped this 
section in the Conference stage)  
4/10/1995  Emergency Supplemental 
Appropriations and Rescissions for 
the Department of Defense to 
Preserve an d Enhance Military 
Readiness Act of 1995 (104‐6) HR 
889  
1. Within 60 days after the 
enactment of this Act, the president 
shall report to the Congress the 
estimated incremental costs of US 
deployment in Haiti and its 
associated military activities (Sec. 
106)  
5/23/1995  Foreign Relations Authorization 
Act, Fiscal Years 1996 and 1997 
(HR 1561)   
Veto override failed  
 
1. Sense of Congress: the president 
should cease obligating funds in 
peacekeeping operations including 
Haiti (Sec. 218: this section was 
dropped in the Conference stage)  
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1/3/1996  National Defense Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 1996 (HR 1530) 
 Vetoed  
1. The president should closely 
consult with the Congress regarding 
UN peacekeeping operations and 
before any vote regarding Security 
Council Resolution with respect to 
that peacekeeping operation (Sec. 
1301)  
2/12/1996  Foreign Operation, Export 
Financing, and Related Programs 
Appropriations Act, 1996 (104‐
107) HR 1868  
1. None of the funds shall be 
obligated for Haiti unless as provided 
through the regular notification 
procedures of the Committee on 
Appropriation (Sec. 520)  
2. None of the funds shall be made 
available for Haitian if it is not 
controlled by a democratic regime 
(Sec. 564);  
3. None of the funds shall be 
appropriated for Haiti unless the 
president report to Congress and 
certifies that Haitian government is 
investigating extrajudicial killing (sec. 
583); the said report can be waived if 
it is for the timely withdrawal of US 
forces from Haiti (Sec. 583)  
4. The above two limitations shall not 
be construed as a limitation on 
humanitarian relief (Sec. 583)  
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11/26/1997   Foreign Operations, Export 
Financing, and Related Programs 
Appropriations ct, 1998 (105‐118) 
HR 2159  
1. None of the funds shall be 
obligated for Haiti unless as provided 
through the regular notification 
procedures of the Committee on 
Appropriation (Sec. 520)  
2. Several limitations on assistance 
for Haiti can be waived if the 
president report to the Congress that 
Haitian government cooperates with 
US in the investigation of political and 
extrajudicial killings (Sec. 562) 
3. The said limitation can also be 
waive if it for humanitarian, electoral, 
counter‐narcotics, or law‐
enforcement assistance (Sec. 562)  
4. The said limitation can also be 
waived if the president certifies to 
the Congress that the waiver is in the 
national interest of US (sec. 562)  
10/5/1999  (106‐65) S 1059/ HR 1401  
 
Signing Statement: section 1232, 
which contains a funding 
limitation with respect to 
continuous deployment of United 
States Armed Forces in Haiti 
pursuant to Operation Uphold 
Democracy. I have decided to 
terminate the continuous 
deployment of forces in Haiti, and 
I intend to keep the Congress 
informed with respect to any 
future deployments to Haiti; 
however, I will interpret this 
provision consistent with my 
constitutional responsibilities as 
President and Commander in 
Chief 
1. No funds available to the DoD may 
be expended after May 31, 2000 for 
the continuous deployment in Haiti 
for Operation Uphold Democracy 
(Sec. 1232)  
2. If there is still any troop 
deployment in Haiti after the said 
date, the president shall submit a 
report to the Congress (Sec. 1232)   
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11/29/1989  National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991 (101‐
189) HR 2461 
1. Sense of Congress: US and Korea 
should consult on the reductions of 
US military forces in Korea and 
report to the appropriate 
congressional committee on the said 
issue (Sec. 915)  
2. The president shall also report to 
the Congress on US security plan in 
East Asia (Sec. 915)  
11/21/1989  Foreign Operations, Export 
Financing, and Related Programs 
Appropriations Act, 1990 (101‐167) 
HR 3743 (This Act previously was HR 
2939 but vetoed by the president)  
1. No stockpile shall be located 
outside US military base except 
Korea, NATO, or other non‐NATO 
major ally. (Sec. 587)  
11/21/1989  Department of Defense 
Appropriations Act, 1990 (101‐165) 
HR 3072 
1. Sense of Congress: as long as 
North Korea does not abandon its 
intention to reunite, the threat to 
Korea will remain clear and present 
(Sec. 9110)  
2. Sense of Congress: however, the 
president shall reassess the US 
military structure in Korea and 
submit a report on such assessment 
(Sec. 9110)  
11/5/1990  Military Construction Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 1991 (101‐510) 
HR 4739  
1. Authorization of appropriation for 
US military base in Korea (one 
section) 
10/31/1991  International Cooperation Act of 
1991 (HR 2508)  
Vetoed  
1. No stockpile shall be located 
outside US military base except 
Korea, NATO, or other non‐NATO 
major ally. (Sec. 207)  
2. Designates Korea as non‐NATO 
major ally (Sec. 223)  
272 
Korea Timeline (Event Number: 8)     
12/5/1991  National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 (102‐
190) HR 2100  
1. Sense of Congress: the president 
shall report to the Congress on the 
basing and military structure of US 
forces in Asia (Sec. 1043)  
2. The president shall also submit a 
report to the Congress on the econ 
and political situations in Korea after 
the gradual reduction of US military 
troops in Korea (Sec. 1044)  
3. The commander of the special 
operations commander of any other 
unified or specified combatant 
command may authorize payment 
for training in conjunction with a 
friendly developing country; the 
Secretary of Defense shall submit to 
congress a report regarding the said 
military training (Sec. 1052)  
10/23/1992  National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 1993 (102‐484) HR 
5006 
1. No appropriation may be used for 
permanent duty ashore in nations 
outside the US except Korea, NATO, 
and non‐NATO major ally if there is 
armed attack on those alliance 
countries. (Sec. 1302)  
11/30/1993  National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 1994 (103‐160) HR 
2401 
1. Sense of Congress: In light of the 
ballistic missiles threat of North 
Korea’s, the Secretary of Defense 
shall submit a report to Congress on 
the possible modification of ABM 
Treaty to install anti‐ballistic missile 
devices (Sec. 234)  
2. Urges the president not to 
provide econ assistance to North 
Korea unless it fully comply with the 
inspection of IAEA and does not 
have or seek a nuclear weapons 
capability (Sec. 1613)  
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4/30/1994  Foreign relations Authorizations Act, 
Fiscal Year 1994 and 1995 (103‐236) 
HR 2333 
1. The president is authorized to 
transfer certain obsolete or surplus 
defense articles to Korea (Sec. 509)  
2. Sense of Congress: US has 
national security interest in curtain 
the WMD and nuclear weapons in 
North Korea; as such, the president 
should consult with allies regarding 
the military posture of the US to 
deter a North Korean attack or to 
defeat such an attack should it 
occur. To toward these ends, the US 
and South Korea should take all 
steps necessary to defend 
themselves, including joint military 
exercises. (Sec. 529)  
10/5/1994  National Defense Authorization Act 
for fiscal Year 1995 (103‐337) S 2182 
1. The president shall submit a 
report to Congress on the readiness 
of the military forces of Korea to 
defeat an attack by North Korea 
(Sec. 1322)  
2. Sense of Congress: the Secretary 
of Defense shall submit a report on 
the force structure based on the 
hypothesis of winning a war with 
North Korea (sec. 1323)  
3. Sense of Congress: in light of the 
nuclear and WMD threat of North 
Korea, the US Forces should 
continue the Team Spirit (jointly 
military exercise) with Korea and 
seeking of international sanctions 
against North Korea (Sec. 1324)  
11/26/1997  Foreign Operations, Export 
Financing, and Related Programs 
Appropriations Act, 1998 (105‐118) 
HR 2159 
1. None of the funds appropriated 
pursuant to this Act shall be 
obligated or expended to directly 
and indirectly finance any assistance 
to North Korea (sec. 507; 523) 
2. Not more than $40,000,000 
defense articles may be made 
available in the Korea (Sec. 575)  
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10/5/1999  National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2000 (106‐65) S 1059 
1. Secretary of Defense shall submit 
a report on the security situation on 
the Korean peninsula. (Sec. 1233)  
2. Sense of Congress: Recognizing 
Korea as a region of potential cross‐
border, large‐scale theater in the 
future, the president shall submit a 
report on possible disengagement of 
US forces from several missions to 
execute US national security 
strategy in terms of the said 
scenario. (Sec, 1235)  
9/29/1994  Riegle‐Neal Interstates Banking and 
Branching Efficiency Act of 
1994(103‐328) HR 3841  
1. Sense of Congress: the president 
should work to achieve an 
enforceable agreement with allies 
regarding multilateral controls to 
thwart efforts of North Korea to 
acquire arms and WMD (Sec. 202)  
1/3/1996  Ballistic Missile Defense Act of 1995 
(104‐106)  S 1124  
It previously was HR 1530, but HR 
1530 was vetoed…. 
1. In light of North Korea’s 
continuous missile test, it is the 
policy of US to deploy TMD and 
NMD systems and the Secretary of 
Defense shall report on the progress 
the said architectures. (Sec. 234; 
235) 
2. To install the above systems, the 
Congress urges the president to 
negotiate with Russia to amend 
ABM Treaty. (Sec. 236)  
3. Funds under this Act shall not be 
obligated to implement an 
international agreement to ban test 
on the said missile defense system. 
(Sec. 237)  
4/10/1995  Emergency Supplemental 
Appropriations and Rescissions for 
the DoD to Preserve and enhance 
Military Readiness Act of 1995 (104‐
6) HR 889 
1. None of the funds may be 
obligated or expended for assistance 
to North Korea (Sec. 109)  
12/1/1995  Department of Defense 
Appropriations Act, 1996 (104‐61) 
HR 2126 
1. None of the funds may be 
obligated or expended for assistance 
to North Korea (Sec. 8088)  
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7/21/1996  Defense and Security Assistance 
improvement Act (An act to amend 
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961) 
(104‐164) HR 3121  
1. Korea shall be deemed as US 
major non‐NATO ally (Sec. 147)  
9/30/1996  Omnibus Consolidated 
Appropriations Act, 1997 (104‐208) 
HR 3610 
1. None of the funds may be 
obligated or expended for assistance 
to North Korea (Sec. 8065)  
11/29/1999  Consolidated Appropriations Act 
(106‐113) HR 3194 (It previously was 
HR 2415)  
1. No cooperation with North Korea 
with respect to nuclear 
infrastructure. (Sec. 706)  
2. Not more than $320,000,000  may 
be made available for stockpiles in 
Korea (Sec. 1301) 
3. The president is authorized to 
transfer obsolete and surplus 
defense articles to Korea (Sec. 1302) 
10/6/2000  Security Assistance Act (an Act to 
amend Foreign Assistance Act of 
1961) (106‐280) HR 4919  
1. No more than $50,000,000‐ may 
be made available for stockpiles in 
Korea. (Sec. 111)  
10/18/1999  Foreign Operations, Export 
Financing, and Related Programs 
Appropriations Act, 2000 (HR 2606)     
Vetoed 
1. None of the funds appropriated 
pursuant to this Act shall be 
obligated or expended to directly 
and indirectly finance any assistance 
to North Korea (Sec. 507; 523)  
2. The president should certify and 
report to the Congress before 
obligating and expending funds for 
KEDO (Sec. 576)  
3. Not more than $40,000,000 may 
be made available for the stockpiles 
in Korea (Sec. 584)  
10/6/1992   Foreign Operations, Export 
Financing, and Related Programs 
Appropriations Act, 1993 (102‐391) 
HR 5368 
1. None of the funds appropriated 
pursuant to this Act shall be 
obligated or expended to indirectly 
finance any assistance to North 
Korea (Sec. 543) 
2. Up to $189,000,000 may be 
available for stockpiles in the 
Republic of Korea. (Sec. 569)  
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8/23/1994  Foreign Operations, Export 
Financing, and Related Programs 
Supplemental Appropriations Act, 
1994 (103‐306) HR 4426 
1. None of the funds appropriated 
pursuant to this Act shall be 
obligated or expended to directly 
and indirectly finance any assistance 
to North Korea (Sec. 507; 523) 
2. Up to $40,000,000 may be made 
available for stockpiles in the 
Republic of Korea (Sec. 535)  
9/30/1993  Foreign Operations, Export 
Financing, and Related Programs 
Appropriations Act, 1994 (103‐87) 
HR 2295  
1. None of the funds appropriated 
pursuant to this Act shall be 
obligated or expended to indirectly 
finance any assistance to North 
Korea (Sec. 523) 
2. Up to $72,000,000 may be made 
available for stockpiles in the 
Republic of Korea. (Sec. 535)  
4/30/1996  Foreign Relations Authorization Act, 
Fiscal Years 1996 and 1997 (HR 
1561) Failed to override the veto 
1. Sense of Congress: no assistance 
North Korea unless such assistance 
is in accordance with the purpose of 
KEDO and the president also notify 
and report to the Congress that such 
assistance is in the vital to the 
national security interest of the US 
(Sec. 1607)  
2/12/1996  (104‐107) HR 1868  1. No funds may be made available 
under this Act to KEDO unless the 
president determines and certifies 
to the Congress (one section)  
2. None of the funds appropriated 
pursuant to this Act shall be 
obligated or expended to directly 
and indirectly finance any assistance 
to North Korea (Sec. 507; 523) 
3. Not more than $40,000,000 may 
be made available for stockpiles in 
the Republic of Korea (Sec. 531B)  
9/23/1996  National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 1997 (104‐201) HR 
3230 
1. Any NMD deployed by the US 
should be able to defeat Taepo 
Dong II missile (Sec. 246)  
10/8/1997  Department of Defense 
Appropriations Act, 1998 (105‐56) 
HR 2266  
1. None of the funs made available 
under this Act may be obligated or 
expended for assistance to North 
Korea (Sec. 8066) 
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10/17/1998  Department of Defense 
Appropriations Act, 1999 (105‐262) 
HR 4103 
1. None of the funs made available 
under this Act may be obligated or 
expended for assistance to North 
Korea (Sec. 8060)  
10/25/1999  Department of Defense 
Appropriations Act, 2000 (106‐79) 
HR 2561  
1. None of the funs made available 
under this Act may be obligated or 
expended for assistance to North 
Korea (Sec. 8060)  
8/9/2000  Department of Defense 
Appropriations Act, 2001 (106‐259) 
HR 4576 
1. None of the funs made available 
under this Act may be obligated or 
expended for assistance to North 
Korea (Sec. 8057) 
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10/6/1992   Foreign Operations, Export Financing, 
and Related Programs Appropriations 
Act, 1993 (102‐391) HR 5368 
1. Not less than $5,000,000 shall be 
available only for Kosovo’s 
development assistance fund (Title 
II’s one section)  
11/5/1990  Foreign Operations, Export Financing, 
and Related Programs Appropriations 
Act, 1991 (101‐513) HR 5114 
1. None of the funds appropriated 
under this Act shall be obligated or 
expended for the assistance to 
Yugoslavia unless the Secretary of 
State certifies that Yugoslavia 
complies with Helsinki Accords. 
(Sec. 599A)  
9/30/1993  Supplemental Appropriations for the 
New Independent States of the 
Former Soviet Union Act, 1993  (103‐
87) HR 2295 
1. Humanitarian assistance (Sec. 
549)  
8/23/1994  Foreign Operations, Export Financing, 
and Related Programs Supplemental 
Appropriations Act, 1994 (103‐306) 
HR 4426  
1. Humanitarian assistance (Sec. 
547)  
2/12/1996  Foreign Operations, Export Financing, 
and Related Programs Appropriations 
Act, 1996 (104‐107) HR 1868 
1. The president should not cease 
sanction against Serbia unless he 
certifies to the Congress that there 
is substantial improvement of 
human rights situation in Kosovo 
(Sec. 540A) 
2. Humanitarian assistance (Sec. 
541)  
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12/1/1995  Department of Defense 
Appropriations Act, 1996 (104‐61) HR 
2126  
1. Sense of Congress: a deployment 
or participation of US forces in any 
peacekeeping, enforcement, or 
humanitarian assistance, the 
president must engage in 
consultations with the Congress at 
least 15 days before such 
deployment. However, in the case 
of emergency, the president may 
delay such consultations no later 
than 48 hours after such 
deployment. (Sec. 8115)  
2. The president should seek 
supplemental appropriations to 
meet the incremental costs no later 
than 90 after the initiation of the 
deployment. (sec. 8115)  
4/30/1996  HR 1561 Failed to override the veto   1. The president shall report to the 
Congress on the diplomatic efforts 
to terminate human rights violation 
in Kosovo (Sec. 1611)  
11/26/1997  Foreign Operations, Export Financing, 
and Related Programs Appropriations 
Act, 1998 (105‐118) HR 2159  
1. Humanitarian assistance to 
Kosovo (Sec. 539)  
6/9/1998  E.O. 13088: Blocking property of the 
Government of the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia, Serbia, and 
Montenegro, and prohibiting new 
investment in the Republic of Serbia 
in response to the situation in Kosovo 
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10/17/1998  Department of Defense 
Appropriation Act, 1999 (105‐262) HR 
4103 
Signing Statement: Consistent with 
the plain language of section 8115 
and the intent of the Congress, I shall 
interpret it to apply only to the 
deployment of additional ground 
forces to one or more of the three 
countries. Further, I shall interpret 
and implement section 8115 
consistent with my constitutional 
authority to conduct the foreign 
relations of the United States and as 
Commander in Chief and Chief 
Executive, and not in a manner that 
would encumber my constitutional 
authority.  
1. None of the funds appropriated 
under this Act may be obligated or 
expended for any additional 
deployment of forces to Yugoslavia 
unless the president consult and 
report to the Congress; but nothing 
in this section shall be deemed as 
restriction on the presidential 
authority to protect US citizens. 
(Sec. 8115)  
4/27/1999  E.O. 13120: Ordering the selected 
reserve and certain individual ready 
reserve members of the armed forces 
to active duty 
 
4/30/1999  Blocking property of the Government 
of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 
Serbia, and Montenegro, and 
prohibiting trade transactions 
involving the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia in response to the 
situation in Kosovo 
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10/5/1999  National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2000 (106‐65) S 1059 
(It previously was HR 1401)  
1. The president shall submit a 
supplemental appropriations 
request for peacekeeping or 
combats operation in Yugoslavia if 
he determines such action is in the 
interest of US national security 
(Sec. 1004)  
2. The Secretary of Defense shall 
submit a report to the Congress on 
the conduct of  military operation 
regarding “Operation Allied Force” 
(bombing operation to resolve 
Kosovo conflict) ; the said report 
shall also consult with the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff and the Commander in Chief, 
US European Command (Sec. 1211) 
3. Sense of Congress: US should 
provide sufficient resources for an 
expeditious and thorough 
investigation of the alleged war 
crimes committed in Kosovo (Sec. 
1212)  
12/28/2001  National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2002 (107‐107) S 1438 
1. No more than $1,525,600,000 
may be obligated for incremental 
costs for Kosovo peacekeeping 
operations (Sec. 1005)  
2. The president my waive the said 
limitation if he certifies that the 
waiver is necessary in the national 
security interest and report to the 
Congress on the reason of 
additional funding; a supplemental 
appropriations request shall also 
accompany with the said report 
(Sec. 1005)  
1/17/2001  E.O. 13192: Lifting and modifying 
measure with respect to the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia   
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7/10/2001  Foreign Operations, Export Financing, 
and Related Programs Appropriations 
Act, 2002 (107‐115) HR 2506  
1. Funds may be made available for 
assistance for Serbia if the 
president determines and certifies 
that Yugoslavia is cooperating with 
the ICTY and taking steps 
consistent with the Dayton Accords 
(Sec. 584)  
2. Funds made available under 
SEEDs should not exceed 15 
percent of the total resources for 
calendar year 2002 for assistance 
for Kosovo; none of the said funds 
shall be made available for large 
scale physical infrastructure 
reconstruction (one section)  
7/13/2000  Military Construction Appropriations 
Act, 2001 (106‐246)  HR 4425  
1. Assistance to Kosovo for law 
enforcement (Sec. 502)  
2.  This section was stricken after 
an amendment debate: None of 
the funds shall be available for 
ground combats troops after July 1, 
2001 if the Congress does not enact 
a joint resolution to authorize to do 
so. (Sec. 2410)  
10/18/1999  (HR 2606) Vetoed   1. The sanctions against Yugoslavia 
shall remain unless the president 
certifies to the Congress Serbia is 
fully cooperating with ICTY 
regarding the investigation of 
human right violation in Kosovo 
(Sec. 599)  
2. Funds available under SEEDs 
shall be made for the assistance to 
Kosovo (one section)  
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Afghanistan Timeline (Event Number: 10)       
9/14/2001  E.O. 13223  1. Ordering the ready reserve of the 
armed forces to active duty and 
delegating certain authority to the 
Secretary of Defense  
9/14/2001  Proclamation 7463  1. Declaration of national emergency 
by reason of certain terrorist attacks  
9/18/2001  Authorization for Use of Military 
Force Against Terrorists (107‐40)  
 
9/23/2001  E.O. 13224  1. Blocking property and prohibiting 
transactions with persons who 
commit threaten to commit, or 
support terrorism  
10/25/2001   NSPD 9  Defeating the Terrorist Threat to the 
United States  
12/12/2001  E.O. 13239  1. Designation of Afghanistan and the 
airspace above as a combat zone 
1/10/2002  Department of Defense and 
Emergency Supplemental 
Appropriations for Recovery from 
and Response to Terrorist Attacks 
on the US Act, 2002 (107‐117) HR 
3338 
1. Humanitarian and reconstruction 
assistance for Afghanistan (one 
section under Chapter 6)  
7/2/2002  E.O. 13268  1. Termination of Emergency with 
respect to the Taliban  
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12/4/2002  Afghanistan Freedom Support Act 
of 2002 (107‐327) S 2712 
1. Econ, humanitarian, and military 
assistance for Afghanistan (Sec. 
103;108; 202; 204;206) 
2. The president may provide 
assistance under this Act to any 
eligible foreign country or IGO if he 
determines that such assistance is in 
the national security interest and 
notifies to the Congress at least 15 
days prior to the assistance (Sec. 
205); the president shall also submit 
a report to the Congress every 6 
months on immediate and long‐term 
security needs of Afghanistan (Sec. 
206)  
3. Sunset: military assistance to 
Afghanistan shall expire after 
9/30/2006 (Sec. 208)  
12/2/2002  Bob Stump National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2003 (107‐314)  S 2514 
Signing Statement:  Section 1043 
establishes new requirements for 
the executive branch to furnish 
sensitive information to the 
Congress on various subjects. The 
executive branch shall construe 
such provisions in a manner 
consistent with the President's 
constitutional authority to 
withhold information the 
disclosure of which could impair 
foreign relations, the national 
security, the deliberative 
processes of the Executive, or the 
performance of the Executive's 
constitutional duties.  
1. Secretary of Defense shall submit 
to the Congress an annual report on 
the conduct of Operation Enduring 
Freedom; each report shall be 
prepared in consultation with the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staffs, 
commander in Chief of Us Central 
command (Sec. 1043)  
8/2/2002  2002 Supplemental 
Appropriations Act for further 
Recovery from and Response to 
terrorist Attacks on the US (107‐
206) HR 4775 
1. Military logistical assistance for 
Afghanistan (two sections) 
2. Authorization of additional amount 
for peacekeeping relating to 
combating international terrorism in 
Afghanistan (one section)  
3. Report on Afghanistan security and 
humanitarian assistance (Sec. 603)  
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2/20/2003   Consolidated Appropriations 
Resolutions, 2003 (108‐007) HJ 
Res 2  
1. Humanitarian assistance for 
Afghanistan (three sections) 
2. None of the funds appropriated 
under this Act shall be used for 
Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 
2002 unless the DoD notifies to the 
Congress (Sec. 112)  
11/6/2003  Emergency Supplemental 
Appropriations Act for Defense 
and for the Reconstruction of Iraq 
and Afghanistan (108‐106) HR 
3289  
1. Authorization for additional 
amount for operation and military 
assistance for Afghanistan (one 
section & Sec. 1107) 
2. Secretary of Defense shall notify 
the Congress not less than 15 days 
before providing military assistance 
to Afghanistan (Sec. 1107) 
3. Humanitarian assistance to 
Afghanistan; Secretary of Defense 
shall provide quarterly reports to the 
Congress regarding the source of 
funds of the said assistance (Sec. 
1110)  
4. Secretary of Defense shall submit 
to Congress a report on the military 
operations of the forces and 
reconstruction activities of the DoD 
in Afghanistan (Sec. 1120)  
5. Military construction project’s 
funds may be obligated for the needs 
of Global War on Terrorism; the 
Secretary of Defense shall submit a 
notice the Congress regarding the 
obligation of funds within fifteen 
days after the first said obligation; 
the Secretary of Defense shall also 
submit a quarterly report and 
certification of the said obligation 
and its relating construction (Sec. 
1301)  
6. Econ assistance for Iraq 
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4/16/2003   Emergency Wartime 
Supplemental Appropriations Act, 
2003 (108‐11) HR 1559  
1. Authorization of additional 
expense for ongoing military 
operations in support of the global 
war on terrorism; the Secretary of 
Defense is authorized to transfer the 
appropriation in the proviso of his 
Section for the military personnel 
funds if the Secretary of Defense 
notify to the Congress not fewer than 
5 days prior to such transfer and 
submit a quarterly report on the 
summary of the said transfer (one 
section)   
2. Authorization of the 
reimbursement for drawdown 
support under the Afghanistan 
Freedom Support Act of 2002 after 
the Secretary of Defense notify the 
Congress (Sec. 1307)   
1/23/2004  Consolidated Appropriations Act, 
2004 (108‐199) HR 2673  
1. Econ and humanitarian assistance 
to Afghanistan (Sec. 523)  
11/24/2003  National Defense Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 2004 (108‐136) 
HR 1588  
1. Authorization of supplemental 
appropriations for fiscal year 2004 for 
the Reconstruction of Afghanistan 
(Sec. 1004)  
9/30/2003  Department of Defense 
Appropriations Act, 2004 (108‐87) 
HR 2658  
1. Sense of the Senate: any request 
for funds for an ongoing overseas 
military operation, including 
Afghanistan, should be included in 
the annual budget of the president 
(Sec. 8139)  
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12/17/2004  9/11 Commission Implementation 
Act of 2004 (108‐458) S 2845 
 
Signing Statement:  
1) The executive branch shall 
construe provisions in the Act, 
[including Sec. 7104,] that 
mandate submission of 
information to the Congress, 
entities within or outside the 
executive branch, or the public, in 
a manner consistent with the 
President's constitutional 
authority to supervise the unitary 
executive branch and to withhold 
information that could impair 
foreign relations, national 
security, the deliberative 
processes of the Executive, or the 
performance of the Executive's 
constitutional duties.  2) The 
executive branch shall construe as 
advisory provisions of the Act that 
purport to require the conduct of 
negotiations with a foreign 
government or otherwise direct or 
burden the President's conduct of 
foreign relations, [including] the 
Afghanistan Freedom Support Act 
as amended by section 7104. 
Further, the executive branch shall 
construe section 6(j)(5) of the 
Export Administration Act of 1979 
as amended by section 7102(c) of 
the Act, to identify a non‐exclusive 
factor for the Secretary of State to 
consider in his discretion in 
making determinations under 
subsection 6(j), as is consistent 
with the use of the non‐exclusive 
term "include" in the provision 
and the congressional decision 
reflected in the text of the statute 
to afford the President substantial 
latitude in implementation of the 
provision.  
1. The president shall identify foreign 
countries that are being used 
terrorist sanctuaries and implement 
necessary tools under IEEPA to 
eliminate such sanctuaries and report 
to the Congress on the said progress 
(Sec. 7102)  
2. Assistance for Afghanistan and its 
relating report requirements: 
assistance plan regarding the 
promotion of econ, political, and 
social development; 5‐year strategy 
(shall in consultation with US Agency 
for International Development); 
expansion of international 
peacekeeping in Afghanistan (Sec. 
7104)  
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8/5/2004  Department of Defense 
Appropriation Act, 2005 (108‐287) 
HR 4613 
1. Sense of the Senate: any request 
for funds for an ongoing overseas 
military operation, including 
Afghanistan, should be included in 
the annual budget of the president 
(Sec. 8138) 
2. The Secretary of defense shall 
submit to the Congress 15 days prior 
to provide military training 
assistances for Afghanistan  (Sec. 
9006) 
3. Authorization of funds for urgent 
humanitarian relief for Afghan people 
and require report on such assistance 
9Sec. 9007)  
4. Authorization of funds for 
Afghanistan Freedom support Act 
(Sec. 9008) 
5. Providing funds available to DoD 
for operation and maintenance for 
logistical support for Afghanistan 
supporting military stability and 
report on military operations in 
Afghanistan (Sec. 9009; 9010)  
6. Report to the Congress on the 
estimated costs cover the 2006‐2011 
of Operation Enduring Freedom (Sec. 
9012)  
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10/28/2004  Ronald W. Reagan National 
Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2005 (108‐375) HR 
4200 
1. The Secretary of Defense is 
authorized to increase army active 
duty personnel for fiscal years 2005‐
2009 to support operations in 
Afghanistan (Sec. 403)  
2. Provide funds for response to 
Afghan urgent humanitarian relief; 
the Secretary of Defense shall also 
submit quarterly reports on the said 
program (Sec. 1201)  
3. Military assistance to Afghanistan 
military and security forces; the 
Secretary of Defense shall submit a 
notification not less than 15 days 
before the provision of such 
assistance (Sec. 1202)   
4. Other report requirements: 
quarterly accounting for Operation 
Enduring Freedom (Sec. 1041)  
5. Authorization for increased costs 
due to Operation Enduring Freedom 
and transfer amounts for such action 
is necessary in the national interest; 
the said transfer may be made only 
after the Secretary of Defense 
consults with the chairmen and 
ranking members of the 
congressional defense committees 
(Sec. 1505; 1511)  
12/8/2004   Consolidated Appropriations Act, 
2005 (108‐447) HR 4818 
1. Humanitarian and reconstruction 
assistance for Afghanistan (Sec. 523; 
534)  
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1/26/2006  National Defense Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 2006 (109‐163) 
HR 1815 
1. Provide funds for response to 
Afghan urgent humanitarian relief; 
the Secretary of Defense shall also 
submit quarterly reports on the said 
program (Sec. 1202) 
2. The president is authorized to 
transfer defense articles to the 
military and security forces of 
Afghanistan; the president may not 
transfer the said articles or defense 
services until 15 days after the date 
on which the president has provided 
the said notice (Sec. 1209)  
3. The Secretary of Defense shall 
submit a report on records of civilian 
causalities in Afghanistan (Sec. 1223)  
4. Other war‐related reporting 
requirements: the Secretary of 
Defense shall submit to the Congress 
a report on the logistical costs 
relating to Operation Enduring 
Freedom (Sec. 1221)  
5. Retrospective recognizes that riot 
control agents are not chemical 
weapons as provided in E.O. 11850 
for defensive military modes to save 
lives; but the president shall submit a 
report on the use of riot control 
agents (Sec. 1232)  
6. Authorization for increased costs 
due to Operation Enduring Freedom, 
including procurement, military 
personnel funds, and authority to 
transfer authorization; the said 
transfer may be made only after the 
Secretary of Defense make 
consultation with and notice to the 
Congress (Sec. 1513) 
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12/30/2005  Department of Defense, 
Emergency Supplemental 
Appropriations to Address 
Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, 
and Pandemic influenza Act, 2006 
(109‐148) HR 2863 
1. Sense of the Senate: any request 
for funds for an ongoing overseas 
military operation, including 
Afghanistan, should be included in 
the annual budget of the president 
(Sec. 8117) 
2. Iraq Freedom Fund may be 
transferred  to support Afghanistan 
activities; the Secretary of Defense 
shall submit a report 5 days prior to 
making such transfers (one section)  
3. Authorization of the funds for 
military logistical support to 
Afghanistan (Sec. 9006)  
4. Authorization of the funds for 
logistical support in Afghanistan; 
Secretary of Defense shall also 
provide quarterly reports (Sec. 9009)  
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5/11/2005  Emergency Supplemental 
Appropriations Act for Defense , 
the Global War on Terror, and 
Tsunami Relief, 2005 (109‐13) HR 
1268 
1. Authorization of transfer authority 
to Secretary of Defense for security 
forces fund, including military 
logistical funds and humanitarian 
relief; the Secretary of Defense shall 
notify the Congress not fewer than 5 
days prior to making such transfers 
and provide quarterly report no later 
than 30 days after the end of each 
fiscal quarter to the Congress (one 
section)  
2. Sense of the Senate: any request 
for funds for an ongoing overseas 
military operation, including 
Afghanistan, should be included in 
the annual budget of the president 
(Sec. 1024) 
3. Authorization of econ assistance to 
Afghanistan (one section)  
4. Authorization of additional amount 
for Afghanistan peacekeeping 
operation (one section)  
5. Authorization of additional amount 
for operation and maintenance for 
Afghanistan; the said funds may be 
available after consultation with the 
congressional committees (one 
section) 
11/14/2005   Foreign Operations, Export 
Financing, and Related Programs 
Appropriations Act, 2006 (109‐
102) HR 3057  
1. Econ assistance for Afghanistan; 
the Secretary of State shall also 
certifies to the Congress that 
Afghanistan is fully cooperating with 
US regarding poppy eradication (one 
section)  
2. Humanitarian assistance (Sec. 523) 
3. Transfer of excess defense articles 
for Afghanistan (Sec. 571)  
3/6/2006  NSPD 46  U.S. Strategy and Policy in the War on 
Terror  
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6/15/2006  Emergency Supplemental 
Appropriations Act for Defense, 
the Global War on Terror, and 
Hurricane Recovery (109‐234) HR 
4939  
1. Authorization of transfer authority 
to Secretary of Defense for security 
forces fund, including military 
logistical funds and humanitarian 
relief; the Secretary of Defense shall 
notify the Congress not fewer than 5 
days prior to making such transfers 
and provide quarterly report no later 
than 30 days after the end of each 
fiscal quarter to the Congress (one 
section)  
2. The program similar  to 
Commander’s Emergency Response 
Program in Afghanistan shall remain 
available until Dec. 31, 2007 (Sec. 
1207) 
3. Sense of the Senate: any request 
for funds for an ongoing overseas 
military operation, including 
Afghanistan, should be included in 
the annual budget of the president 
(Sec. 1213)  
4. Econ support fund for Afghanistan 
shall remain available until Sep. 30, 
2007 (one section)  
5. Authorization of additional amount 
for operation and maintenance for 
Afghanistan; the said funds may be 
available after consultation with the 
congressional committees (one 
section)   
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10/17/2006  John Warner national Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2007(109‐364) HR 5122 
 
Signing Statement: Several 
provisions of the Act call for 
executive branch officials to 
submit to the Congress 
recommendations for legislation, 
or purport to regulate the manner 
in which the President formulates 
recommendations to the Congress 
for legislation. This provision 
includes section 1008. The 
executive branch shall construe 
these provisions in a manner 
consistent with the President's 
constitutional authority to 
supervise the unitary executive 
branch and to recommend for the 
consideration of the Congress 
such measures as the President 
deems necessary and expedient.  
 
2) A number of provisions in the 
Act call for the executive branch 
to furnish information to the 
Congress or other entities on 
various subjects. These provisions 
include sections 1402. The 
executive branch shall construe 
such provisions in a manner 
consistent with the President's 
constitutional authority to 
withhold information the 
disclosure of which could impair 
foreign relations, the national 
security, the deliberative 
processes of the Executive, or the 
performance of the Executive's 
constitutional duties.  
1. Authorization for additional 
emergency supplemental 
appropriations for fiscal year 2006 for 
Afghanistan and Global War on 
Terror (Sec. 1002; 1008)  
2. Authorization for increased costs 
due to Operation Enduring Freedom 
and transfer amounts for such action 
is necessary in the national interest; 
the said transfer may be made only 
after the Secretary of Defense 
consults with the chairmen and 
ranking members of the 
congressional defense committees; 
quarterly reports on the details of 
any obligation or transfer of funds 
from the Afghanistan Security Forces; 
report on the supplemental and cost 
of war execution reports (Sec. 1512; 
1517; 1518)  
3. Quarterly reports on DoD 
response’s to threat posed by IED 
(Sec. 1402)  
4. The establishment of a special 
working group on Afghanistan 
transition group; the said group shall 
report not later than one year after 
the date of the enactment of this Act 
on the said subject (Sec. 676)  
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9/29/2006  Continuing Appropriations 
Resolution, 2007 (109‐289) HR 
5631 
1. Authorization of transferring Iraqi 
Freedom Fund for the support of 
operations in Afghanistan; the 
Secretary of Defense shall notify the 
congressional committee 5 days prior 
to the said transfer (one section) 
2. Authorization of transfer authority 
to Secretary of Defense for security 
forces fund, including military 
logistical funds and humanitarian 
relief; the Secretary of Defense shall 
notify the Congress not fewer than 5 
days prior to making such transfers 
and provide quarterly report no later 
than 30 days after the end of each 
fiscal quarter to the Congress (one 
section)  
3. Authorization of the funds for the 
program similar  to Commander’s 
Emergency Response Program in 
Afghanistan; the Secretary of Defense 
shall submit to the congressional 
defense committee quarterly report 
regarding the source and allocation 
of the said program (Sec. 9006) 
4. Authorization of the funds for 
other military logistical funds (Sec. 
9007; 9008)  
5. Each amount appropriated in this 
title is designated as making 
appropriations for contingency 
operations directly related to the 
global war on terrorism (Sec. 9013)  
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1/28/2008  National Defense Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (110‐181) 
HR 4986; This bill previously was 
HR 1585 but was vetoed on 
12/28/2007.  
1. Report on incremental cost of the 
early enhanced deployment (Sec. 
353) 
2. Report on progress toward security 
in Afghanistan (Sec. 1230)  
3. The Secretary of Defense shall 
submit a report on a plan regarding 
sustaining the security in Afghanistan 
and border security with Pakistan 
through 2010 (Sec. 1231; 1232)  
4.  Authorization for increased costs 
due to Operation Enduring Freedom 
and transfer amounts for such action 
is necessary in the national interest; 
the said transfer may be made only 
after the Secretary of Defense 
consults with the chairmen and 
ranking members of the 
congressional defense committees; 
quarterly reports on the details of 
any obligation or transfer of funds 
from the Afghanistan Security Forces; 
report on the supplemental and cost 
of war execution reports (Sec. 1512; 
1517; 1518)  
11/13/2007  Department of Defense 
Appropriations Act, 2008 (110‐
116) HR 3222 
 
Signing Statement: The Act 
contains certain provisions 
identical to those found in prior 
bills passed by the Congress that 
might be construed to be 
inconsistent with my 
Constitutional responsibilities 
(8116, and the provision 
concerning consolidation under 
the heading "Operation and 
Maintenance, Defense Wide"). To 
avoid such potential infirmities, I 
will interpret and construe such 
provisions in the same manner as I 
have previously stated in regard to 
those provisions.  
1. Any request for funds for an 
ongoing military operations overseas, 
including operations in Afghanistan 
shall be included in the annual 
budget as submitted to 
Congress( Sec. 8116)  
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5/25/2007  U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans' 
Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq 
Accountability Appropriations Act, 
2007  (110‐28) HR2206 (It 
previously was HR 1591, but failed 
to override the presidential veto) 
1. Authorization of additional amount 
for Afghanistan security forces fund 
(one section) 
2. Authorization of funds for 
Afghanistan’s urgent humanitarian 
relief; and requires the Secretary of 
Defense to report to the Congress 
regarding the allocation and sources 
of the funding (Sec. 1307)  
3. Econ support fund (one section)  
4. The Secretary of Defense and OMB 
shall submit a report on transition 
readiness assessment by unit of 
Afghan security forces and its 
anticipated funds (Sec. 3303) 
5.  Authorization of additional 
amount for Operation Enduring 
Freedom (one section)  
6/30/2008   Supplemental Appropriations Act, 
2008  (110‐252) HR 2642 
1. Econ support fund (one section)  
2. Authorization of additional amount 
for Operation Enduring Freedom (one 
section)  
3. Authorization of funds for 
Afghanistan’s urgent humanitarian 
relief; and requires the Secretary of 
Defense to report to the Congress 
regarding the allocation and sources 
of the funding (Sec. 9104)  
4. Authorization of additional amount 
for the logistical military of Operation 
Enduring Freedom (one section)  
5. Authorization of additional amount 
for Afghanistan security forces fund 
(one section) 
6. The Secretary of Defense and OMB 
shall submit a report on transition 
readiness assessment by unit of 
Afghan security forces and its 
anticipated funds (Sec. 9205)  
7. The president shall submit 
quarterly reports on the funds 
provided for logistical support to 
coalition forces supporting military 
and stability operations in 
Afghanistan (Sec. 9206)  
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12/26/2007  Consolidated Appropriations Act 
(110‐161) HR 2764 
1. Econ support (one section)  
2. Transfer of excess defense articles 
for Afghanistan (Sec. 669) 
3. The Secretary of Defense may 
transfer the funds of Iraqi Freedom 
fund for humanitarian assistance for 
Afghanistan (one section) 
4. Authorization of the funds for 
Afghan security forces; the Secretary 
of Defense shall notify to the 
Congress t days prior to the said 
transfer (one section)  
5.  Authorization of funds for 
Afghanistan’s urgent humanitarian 
relief; and requires the Secretary of 
Defense to report to the Congress 
regarding the allocation and sources 
of the funding (Sec. 606) 
6. Authorization of the funds for 
logistical military support (Sec. 607)  
10/14/2008  Duncan Hunter National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2009 (110‐417) S 3001 
1. Authorization for increased costs 
due to Operation Enduring Freedom 
and transfer amounts for such action 
is necessary in the national interest; 
the said transfer may be made only 
after the Secretary of Defense 
consults with the chairmen and 
ranking members of the 
congressional defense committees; 
quarterly reports on the details of 
any obligation or transfer of funds 
from the Afghanistan Security Forces; 
report on the supplemental and cost 
of war execution reports (Sec. 1512; 
1517; 1518)  
2. The Secretary of Defense shall 
submit to the Congress a report on 
the command and control structure 
for military forces in Afghanistan; 
border security with Pakistan; (Sec. 
1216; 1217)  
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12/28/2001  National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2002 (107‐107) S 
1438 
1. Authorization on amount of 
assistance to UN inspections of Iraq’s 
WMD activities (Sec. 1203)   
10/3/2002  NSPD??  Authorizing Training for Iraqi 
Opposition Forces  
10/16/2002  Authorization for Use of Military 
Force Against Iraq Resolution of 
2002 (107‐243) HJ Res 114 
 
11/2002  NSPD 21  Support for Inspections in Iraq  
12/11/2002  NSPD 17  National Strategy to Combat 
Weapons of Mass Destruction 
1/20/2003  NSPD 24  Post‐War Iraq Reconstruction 
2/20/2003  Consolidated Appropriations 
Resolution, 2003(108‐7) HJ Res 2 
1. None of the funds appropriated 
under this Act shall be obligated or 
expended for assistance for Iraq (Sec. 
502) 
2. Econ support fund may be funded 
for benefitting Iraqi people if the 
president certifies and notify to the 
Congress that such assistance is in 
the interest of US national security 
interest (Sec. 567)  
3/20/2003  E.O. 13290  1. Confiscating and vesting certain 
Iraqi Property  
5/22/2003  E.O. 13303  1. Protecting the development fund 
for Iraq and certain other property in 
which Iraq has an interest 
8/28/2003  E.O. 13315  1. Blocking property of the former 
Iraqi regime  
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11/6/2003  Emergency Supplemental 
Appropriations Act for Defense and 
for the Reconstruction of Iraq and 
Afghanistan (108‐106) HR 3289  
1. Authorization of Iraqi freedom 
fund; the said fund can be 
transferred for military personnel 
funds if the Secretary of Defense 
notify to the Congress 5 days prior to 
such transfer and submit an annual 
report also on such transfer 
2. Authorization of funds for 
providing military logistical support 
to coalition forces in Iraq (Sec. 1106) 
3. Secretary of Defense shall notify 
the Congress not less than 15 days 
before providing military assistance 
to Iraq (Sec. 1107) 
4. Humanitarian assistance to Iraq; 
Secretary of Defense shall provide 
quarterly reports to the Congress 
regarding the source of funds of the 
said assistance (Sec. 1110)  
5. Secretary of Defense shall submit 
to Congress a report on the military 
operations of the forces and 
reconstruction activities of the DoD 
in Afghanistan (Sec. 1120)  
6. Military construction project’s 
funds may be obligated for the needs 
of Operation Iraqi Freedom; the 
Secretary of Defense shall submit a 
notice the Congress regarding the 
obligation of funds within fifteen 
days after the first said obligation; 
the Secretary of Defense shall also 
submit a quarterly report and 
certification of the said obligation 
and its relating construction (Sec. 
1301)  
7. Econ assistance for Iraq  
4/16/2003  Emergency Wartime Supplemental 
Appropriations Act, 2003 (108‐11) 
HR 1559 
1. Authorization of additional 
expense for ongoing military 
operations in Iraq; the Secretary of 
Defense is authorized to transfer the 
appropriation in the proviso of his 
Section for the military personnel 
funds if the Secretary of Defense 
notify to the Congress not fewer than 
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5 days prior to such transfer and 
submit a quarterly report on the 
summary of the said transfer (one 
section)  
2. Authorization of reimbursement 
for the value of support under the 
Iraq liberation Act of 1998 after the 
Secretary of Defense notifies the 
Congress (Sec. 1309)  
2. Authorization of funds for military 
operations in connection with 
logistical support of other nations 
regarding Iraqi War; such payments 
should be made in concurrence with 
the Secretary of State and in 
consultation with the Director of 
OMB and 15 days following 
notification to the Congress; 
Secretary of Defense shall also 
submit a report to the Congress 
including a financial plan for the said 
funding (Sec. 1310)  
3. Funds available to econ assistance 
to Iraq shall be subjected to 
notification of the Committee on 
Appropriations, except that 
notification shall be transmitted at 
least 5 days in advance of the 
obligation of funds (one section)  
4. The president may suspend the 
application of the Iraq Sanctions Act 
of 1990 if he notifies the Congress 5 
days prior to exercising the said 
authority (Sec. 1503)  
5. The president shall submit a report 
on the US post‐conflict strategy for 
relief and reconstruction in Iraq not 
later than 45 days after the 
enactment of this Act and every 90 
days thereafter the initial report until 
9/30/2004 (Sec. 1506)  
1/23/2004   Consolidated Appropriations Act, 
2004 (108‐199) HR 2673 
1. Econ assistance for Iraq (one 
section)  
302 
Second Iraqi War Timeline (Event Number: 11)         
11/24/2003  National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2004 (108‐136) HR 
1588  
 
Signing Statement: Sections 1202, 
1204, require the executive branch 
to furnish information to the 
Congress or other entities on 
various subjects. The executive 
branch shall construe such 
provisions in a manner consistent 
with the President's constitutional 
authority to withhold information 
the disclosure of which could 
impair foreign relations, national 
security, the deliberative processes 
of the Executive, or the 
performance of the Executive's 
constitutional duties.  
1. Authorization of supplemental 
appropriations for fiscal year 2004 for 
the Reconstruction of Iraq (Sec. 1004) 
2. DoD shall submit a report on the 
transfer account including the Iraqi 
Freedom Fund to the Congress not 
later than 30 days after the end of 
each fiscal quarter (Sec. 1003)  
3. The Secretary of Defense shall 
submit to the Congress a report on 
the conduct of Operation Iraqi 
Freedom not later than March 31, 
2004; the said report shall be 
prepared in consultation with the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
the commander of the Us central 
Command (Sec. 1202)  
4. Other report requirements: the 
Secretary of Defense shall report on 
the security activities, acquisition by 
Iraq of advance weapons (Sec, 1203; 
1204)  
9/30/2003  Department of Defense 
Appropriations Act, 2004 (108‐87) 
HR 2658 
1. Funds made available under the 
heading of Iraq Freedom Fund of 
Pub. L. 108‐11 are hereby rescinded 
(Sec. 8128)  
2. Sense of the Senate: any request 
for funds for an ongoing overseas 
military operation, including Iraq, 
should be included in the annual 
budget of the president (Sec. 8139) 
5/21/2003  Expressing the sense of Congress 
that the United Nations should 
remove the economic sanctions 
against Iraq completely and 
without condition (H Con Res 160)  
1. UN should immediately lift the 
econ sanctions against Iraq pursuant 
to Security Council Resolution 661 
and 687 
5/11/2004  NSPD 36  United States Government 
Operations in Iraq  
??/??/2004  NSPD 37  Relating to Support of Iraqi 
Government in prosecution of war 
crimes  
7/29/2004  E.O. 13350  1. Termination of emergency 
declared in E.O. 12722 with respect 
to Iraq and the above E.O. 13290, 
13303, and 13315  
303 
Second Iraqi War Timeline (Event Number: 11)         
8/5/2004   Department of Defense 
Appropriation Act, 2005 (108‐287) 
HR 4613  
1. Sense of the Senate: any request 
for funds for an ongoing overseas 
military operation, including Iraq, 
should be included in the annual 
budget of the president (Sec. 8138) 
2. The Secretary of defense shall 
submit to the Congress 15 days prior 
to provide military training 
assistances for Iraqi New Army (Sec. 
9006) 
3. Authorization of funds for urgent 
humanitarian relief for Iraqi people 
and require report on such assistance 
9Sec. 9007)  
4. Authorization of funds for 
Afghanistan Freedom support Act 
(Sec. 9008) 
5. Providing funds available to DoD 
for operation and maintenance for 
logistical support for Iraq supporting 
military stability and report on 
military operations in Iraq (Sec. 9009; 
9010)  
6. Report to the Congress on the 
estimated costs cover the 2006‐2011 
of Operation Iraqi Freedom (Sec. 
9012)  
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10/28/2004   Ronald W. Reagan National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2005 (108‐375) HR 4200  
 
Signing Statement: A number of 
provisions of the Act, including 
sections 1042,1202, 1204, call for 
the executive branch to furnish 
information to the Congress, a 
legislative agent, or other entities 
on various subjects. The executive 
branch shall construe such 
provisions in a manner consistent 
with the President's constitutional 
authority to withhold information 
the disclosure of which could 
impair foreign relations, national 
security, the deliberative processes 
of the Executive, or the 
performance of the Executive's 
constitutional duties.  
1. The Secretary of Defense is 
authorized to increase army active 
duty personnel for fiscal years 2005‐
2009 to support operations in Iraq 
(Sec. 403)  
2. Provide funds for response to Iraqi 
urgent humanitarian relief; the 
Secretary of Defense shall also 
submit quarterly reports on the said 
program (Sec. 1201)  
3. Military assistance to Iraqi military 
and security forces; the Secretary of 
Defense shall submit a notification 
not less than 15 days before the 
provision of such assistance (Sec. 
1202)   
4. The president shall submit a report 
on strategy for stabilization of Iraq 
(Sec. 1204)  
5. Other report requirements: 
quarterly accounting for Operation 
Iraqi Freedom (Sec. 1041); report on 
post‐major combat operation phase 
of Operation Iraqi Freedom (Sec. 
1042) 
6. Authorization for increased costs 
due to Operation Iraqi Freedom and 
transfer amounts for such action is 
necessary in the national interest; the 
said transfer may be made only after 
the Secretary of Defense consults 
with the chairmen and ranking 
members of the congressional 
defense committees (Sec. 1505; 
1507; 1511)  
9/30/2004  Joint Resolution making continuing 
appropriations for the fiscal year 
2005, and for other purposes (108‐
309) HJ Res 107  
1. Authorization for additional fund 
for Iraq Relief and Reconstruction 
Fund (Sec. 133 and 134)  
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1/6/2006  National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2006 (109‐163) HR 
1815 
 
An amendment was proposed to 
withdraw the troops from Iraq but 
failed to be adopted by the House 
on 5/25/2005   
 
Signing Statement: 
1)  A number of provisions of the 
Act, including section 1227, call for 
the executive branch to furnish 
information to the Congress on 
various subjects. The executive 
branch shall construe such 
provisions in a manner consistent 
with the President's constitutional 
authority to withhold information 
the disclosure of which could 
impair foreign relations, national 
security, the deliberative processes 
of the Executive, or the 
performance of the Executive's 
constitutional duties. 
2) Section 1222 of the Act refers to 
a joint explanatory statement of a 
committee of conference on a bill 
as if the statement had the force of 
law. The executive branch shall 
construe the provision in a manner 
consistent with the bicameral 
passage and presentment 
requirements of the Constitution 
for the making of a law.  
1. The Secretary of Defense shall 
submit a report on the actions taken 
to ensure that the Transition 
Assistance Programs for members of 
the forces separating from the Armed 
Forces; the said report shall be 
prepared in consultation with the 
Secretary of Labor and VA (Sec. 595)  
2. Provide funds for response to 
Afghan urgent humanitarian relief; 
the Secretary of Defense shall also 
submit quarterly reports on the said 
program (Sec. 1202) 
3. Other war‐related reporting 
requirements: the Secretary of 
Defense shall submit to the Congress 
a report on the logistical costs 
relating to Operation Iraqi Freedom; 
at the same time the Secretary of 
Defense shall submit quarterly  
regarding war strategy in Iraq and 
civilian casualties in Iraq ; and the 
president shall submit a report on US 
policy and military operations in Iraq 
(Sec. 1221, 1222, 1223, 1227)  
4. Retrospective recognizes that riot 
control agents are not chemical 
weapons as provided in E.O. 11850 
for defensive military modes to save 
lives; but the president shall submit a 
report on the use of riot control 
agents (Sec. 1232) 
5. Authorization for increased costs 
due to Operation Enduring Freedom, 
including procurement, military 
personnel funds, and authority to 
transfer authorization; the said 
transfer may be made only after the 
Secretary of Defense make 
consultation with and notice to the 
Congress (Sec. 1511;1513)  
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12/30/2005   Department of Defense, Emergency 
Supplemental Appropriations to 
Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of 
Mexico, and Pandemic influenza 
Act, 2006 (109‐148) HR 2863  
1. Sense of the Senate: any request 
for funds for an ongoing overseas 
military operation, including 
Afghanistan, should be included in 
the annual budget of the president 
(Sec. 8117) 
2. Authorization of the funds for 
military logistical support to Iraq (Sec. 
9006)  
3. Authorization of funds for 
humanitarian relief in Iraq (Sec. 9007) 
4. The Secretary of Defense shall 
submit a report to Congress a set of 
performance indicators and measure 
for progress toward military and 
political stability in Iraq (Sec. 9010) 
5/11/2005  Emergency Supplemental 
Appropriations Act for Defense , 
the Global War on Terror, and 
Tsunami Relief, 2005 (109‐13) HR 
1268  
1. Authorization of additional amount 
for operation and maintenance for 
Iraq; the said funds may be available 
after consultation with the 
congressional committees (one 
section)  
2. Authorization of Iraqi security 
forces fund; including military 
logistical funds and humanitarian 
relief; the Secretary of Defense shall 
notify the Congress not fewer than 5 
days prior to making such transfers 
and provide quarterly report no later 
than 30 days after the end of each 
fiscal quarter to the Congress (one 
section)  
3. Authorization of additional amount 
for Iraqi peacekeeping operation 
(one section)  
11/14/2005   Foreign Operations, Export 
Financing, and Related Programs 
Appropriations Act, 2006 (109‐102) 
HR 3057  
1. Econ assistance to Iraq (one 
section)  
2. Transfer of excess defense articles 
for Afghanistan (Sec. 571) 
2/2/2005  Relating to the free election in Iraq 
held on January 30, 2005 (H Res 60) 
1. Reaffirms that US will possess all 
necessary authority to fulfill their 
mission in Iraq 
307 
Second Iraqi War Timeline (Event Number: 11)         
11/18/2005  Expressing the sense of the House 
of Representatives that the 
deployment of United States forces 
in Iraq be terminated immediately 
(H Res. 571)  
1. It is the sense of the House of 
Representatives that the deployment 
of United States forces in Iraq be 
terminated immediately 
12/16/2005   Expressing the commitment of the 
House of Representatives to 
achieving victory in Iraq  (H Res. 
612)  
1. Setting an artificial timetable for 
the withdrawal of United States 
Armed Forces from Iraq, or 
immediately terminating their 
deployment in Iraq and redeploying 
them elsewhere in the region, is 
fundamentally inconsistent with 
achieving victory in Iraq 
6/15/2006  Emergency Supplemental 
Appropriations Act for Defense, the 
Global War on Terror, and 
Hurricane Recovery (109‐234) HR 
4939  
1. Authorization of additional amount 
for operation and maintenance for 
Iraq; the said funds may be available 
after consultation with the 
congressional committees (one 
section)  
2. Authorization of Iraqi security 
forces fund; including military 
logistical funds and humanitarian 
relief; the Secretary of Defense shall 
notify the Congress not fewer than 5 
days prior to making such transfers 
and provide quarterly report no later 
than 30 days after the end of each 
fiscal quarter to the Congress (one 
section)  
3. Econ support for Iraq (one section) 
4. Iraq Reconstruction fund shall 
remain available for one additional 
year (Sec. 1302)  
10/17/2006  John Warner national Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2007(109‐364) HR 5122 
 
Signing Statement: Signing 
Statement: Several provisions of 
the Act call for executive branch 
officials to submit to the Congress 
recommendations for legislation, or 
purport to regulate the manner in 
which the President formulates 
recommendations to the Congress 
1. The establishment of a special 
working group on Afghanistan 
transition group; the said group shall 
report not later than one year after 
the date of the enactment of this Act 
on the said subject (Sec. 676) 
2. Authorization for additional 
emergency supplemental 
appropriations for fiscal year 2006 for 
Iraq and Global War on Terror (Sec. 
1002; 1008) 
3. Sense of Congress: calling for 
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for legislation. This provision 
includes section 1008. The 
executive branch shall construe 
these provisions in a manner 
consistent with the President's 
constitutional authority to 
supervise the unitary executive 
branch and to recommend for the 
consideration of the Congress such 
measures as the President deems 
necessary and expedient.  
 
2) The executive branch shall 
construe section 1512 of the Act, 
which purport to make 
consultation with specified 
Members of Congress a 
precondition to the execution of 
the law, as calling for but not 
mandating such consultation, as is 
consistent with the Constitution's 
provisions concerning the separate 
powers of the Congress to legislate 
and the President to execute the 
laws.  
 
3) A number of provisions in the 
Act call for the executive branch to 
furnish information to the Congress 
or other entities on various 
subjects. These provisions include 
sections 1402. The executive 
branch shall construe such 
provisions in a manner consistent 
with the President's constitutional 
authority to withhold information 
the disclosure of which could 
impair foreign relations, the 
national security, the deliberative 
processes of the Executive, or the 
performance of the Executive's 
constitutional duties.  
convening of a summit for a 
comprehensive political agreement 
for Iraq (Sec. 1229)  
4. Authorization for increased costs 
due to Operation Iraqi Freedom and 
transfer amounts for such action is 
necessary in the national interest; the 
said transfer may be made only after 
the Secretary of Defense consults 
with the chairmen and ranking 
members of the congressional 
defense committees; quarterly 
reports on the details of any 
obligation or transfer of funds from 
the Iraqi Security Forces; report on 
the supplemental and cost of war 
execution reports (Sec. 1512; 1515; 
1516; 1518)  
5. Quarterly reports on DoD 
response’s to threat posed by IED 
(Sec. 1402)  
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9/29/2006   Continuing Appropriations 
Resolution, 2007 (109‐289) HR 
5631  
 
 
1. Authorization of transferring Iraqi 
Freedom Fund for the support of 
operations in Afghanistan; the 
Secretary of Defense shall notify the 
congressional committee 5 days prior 
to the said transfer (one section) 
2. Authorization of Iraqi security 
forces fund; including military 
logistical funds and humanitarian 
relief; the Secretary of Defense shall 
notify the Congress not fewer than 5 
days prior to making such transfers 
and provide quarterly report no later 
than 30 days after the end of each 
fiscal quarter to the Congress (one 
section)  
3. Authorization of the funds for 
other military logistical funds (Sec. 
9008)  
4. Not later than 60 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act and 
every 90 days thereafter, the 
Secretary of Defense shall submit a 
report to Congress a comprehensive 
report n performance indicators for 
progress toward military and political 
stability in Iraq (Sec. 9010)  
5. None of the funds shall be 
obligated or expended for the 
establishment of the permanent 
stationing of US forces in Iraq (Sec. 
9012) 
6. Each amount appropriated in this 
title is designated as making 
appropriations for contingency 
operations directly related to the 
global war on terrorism (Sec. 9013) 
6/16/2006  Declaring that the United States 
will prevail in the Global War on 
Terror, the struggle to protect 
freedom from the terrorist 
adversary (H Res 861) 
1. It is not in the US national security 
interest to set up an arbitrary date to 
withdraw from Iraq  
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1/28/2008  National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2008 (110‐181) HR 
4986; This bill previously was HR 
1585 but was vetoed on 
12/28/2007.  
 
Signing Statement: Provision of the 
Act, including section 1222, purport 
to impose requirements that could 
inhibit the President's ability to 
carry out his constitutional 
obligations to take care that the 
laws be faithfully executed, to 
protect national security, to 
supervise the executive branch, 
and to execute his authority as 
Commander in Chief. The executive 
branch shall construe such 
provisions in a manner consistent 
with the constitutional authority of 
the President.  
1. Report on incremental cost of the 
early enhanced deployment (Sec. 
353)  
2. Authorization of additional 
emergency supplemental 
appropriations pursuant to Pub. L. 
110‐28 (Sec. 1003)  
3. No funds appropriated under this 
Act may be obligated or expended for 
the 5. None of the funds shall be 
obligated or expended for the 
establishment of the permanent 
stationing of US forces in Iraq (Sec. 
1222) 
4. Report on US’s policy and military 
operations in Iraq; comprehensive set 
of performance indicators and 
measure for progress toward military 
and political stability in Iraq (Sec. 
1223)  
5. Sense of Congress: US should 
pursues a strategy to prevent a failed 
state in Iraq and urge the Gov of Iraq 
to agree on a comprehensive political 
settlement in Iraq based on 
federalism (Sec. 1226; 12270 
6. The president shall implement a 
policy to control the export and 
transfer articles into Iraq (Sec. 1228)  
7. Authorization for increased costs 
due to Operation Iraqi Freedom and 
transfer amounts for such action is 
necessary in the national interest; the 
said transfer may be made only after 
the Secretary of Defense consults 
with the chairmen and ranking 
members of the congressional 
defense committees; quarterly 
reports on the details of any 
obligation or transfer of funds from 
the Iraqi Security Forces; report on 
the supplemental and cost of war 
execution reports (Sec. 1512; 1515; 
1516; 1518)  
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11/13/2007  Department of Defense 
Appropriations Act, 2008 (110‐116) 
HR 3222  
 
Signing Statement: The Act 
contains certain provisions 
identical to those found in prior 
bills passed by the Congress that 
might be construed to be 
inconsistent with my Constitutional 
responsibilities (8116, and the 
provision concerning consolidation 
under the heading "Operation and 
Maintenance, Defense Wide"). To 
avoid such potential infirmities, I 
will interpret and construe such 
provisions in the same manner as I 
have previously stated in regard to 
those provisions.  
1. None of the funds shall be 
obligated or expended for the 
establishment of the permanent 
stationing of US forces in Iraq (Sec. 
8113) 
2. Any request for funds for an 
ongoing military operations overseas, 
including operations in Afghanistan 
shall be included in the annual 
budget as submitted to 
Congress( Sec. 8116)  
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5/25/2007  U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans' 
Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq 
Accountability Appropriations Act, 
2007  (110‐28) HR2206 (It 
previously was HR 1591, but failed 
to override the presidential veto)  
1. Authorization of additional amount 
for Operation Iraqi Freedom (one 
section)  
2.  Authorization of funds for Iraq’s 
urgent humanitarian relief; and 
requires the Secretary of Defense to 
report to the Congress regarding the 
allocation and sources of the funding 
(Sec. 1307)  
3. Conditioning of future US strategy 
in Iraq on the Iraqi government’s 
record of performance on its 
benchmarks ; the president shall 
submit a report on the progress of 
Iraqi government’s progress toward 
meeting the requirement of 
benchmarks; not until the president 
certifies to the Congress that Iraq’s 
progress on each of the benchmarks 
does the funds can be appropriated 
for the econ support fund for Iraq; 
the president shall direct the orderly 
redeployment of US forces from Iraq 
if the Iraqi government acting in strict 
accordance with their respective 
powers given by the Constitution 
(Sec. 1314)  
7/17/2007  E.O. 13438  1. Blocking property of certain 
persons who threaten stabilization 
efforts in Iraq  
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6/30/2008   Supplemental Appropriations Act, 
2008  (110‐252) HR 2642  
1. Authorization of additional amount 
for humanitarian assistance for Iraq  
and Operation Iraqi Freedom (two 
sections) 
2. Authorization of funds for Iraq’s 
urgent humanitarian relief; and 
requires the Secretary of Defense to 
report to the Congress regarding the 
allocation and sources of the funding 
(Sec. 9104)  
3. None of the funds shall be used for 
establishing a permanent base in Iraq 
(one section)  
4. Econ and democracy support (two 
sections)  
5. The Secretary of Defense shall 
submit a report to Congress a set of 
performance indicators and measure 
for progress toward military and 
political stability in Iraq (Sec. 9204) 
6. The Secretary of Defense and OMB 
shall submit a report on transition 
readiness assessment by unit of Iraqi 
security forces and its anticipated 
funds (Sec. 9207)  
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12/26/2007  Consolidated Appropriations Act, 
2008 (110‐161) HR 2764 
1. None of the funds may be made 
for the establishment for basing 
agreement in Iraq (Sec, 680)  
2. Authorization of funds for Iraq’s 
urgent humanitarian relief; and 
requires the Secretary of Defense to 
report to the Congress regarding the 
allocation and sources of the funding 
(Sec. 606) 
3. The Secretary of Defense shall 
submit a report to Congress a set of 
performance indicators and measure 
for progress toward military and 
political stability in Iraq (Sec. 9204) 
4. Transfer of excess defense articles 
for Iraq (Sec. 669) 
5. Iraq Freedom Fund may be 
transferred only for the support of 
operation in Iraq (one section) 
6. Authorization of funds for Iraqi 
security forces; the Secretary of 
Defense shall notify to the Congress 
on the said transfer 5 days in advance 
(one section)  
3/9/2007  1. United States Policy in Iraq 
Resolution of 2007 (SJ Res 9)   
Failed to agree on by achieving 60 
affirmative votes pursuant to the 
order made on March 7, 2007 
2. S Res. 107 
3. S Con Res 20 
1. The president shall promptly 
redeploy the troops in Iraq not later 
than 120 days after the enactment of 
this Act  
2. Sense of the Senate: the President 
and Congress should continue to 
exercise their constitutional 
responsibilities to ensure that the 
Armed Forces have everything they 
need to perform their assigned or 
future missions  
3. That it is the sense of Congress 
that Congress should not take any 
action that will endanger United 
States military forces in the field, 
including the elimination or reduction 
of funds for troops in the field  
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10/14/2008   Duncan Hunter National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2009 (110‐417) S 3001  
 
Signing Statement: Provision of the 
Act, including section 1211(2), 
purport to impose requirements 
that could inhibit the President's 
ability to carry out his 
constitutional obligations to take 
care that the laws be faithfully 
executed, to protect national 
security, to conduct diplomatic 
negotiations, to supervise the 
executive branch, to appoint 
officers of the United States, and to 
execute his authority as 
Commander in Chief. The executive 
branch shall continue to construe 
such provisions in a manner 
consistent with the constitutional 
authority and obligations of the 
President.  
1. None of the funds shall be used for 
the establishment of any military 
base in Iraq (Sec. 1211)  
2. The president shall submit a report 
on status of forces agreements b/w 
the US and Iraq (Sec. 1212)  
3. Authorization of the additional 
amount for urgent humanitarian 
relief in Iraq (Sec. 1214)  
4. Authorization for increased costs 
due to Operation Iraqi Freedom and 
transfer amounts for such action is 
necessary in the national interest; the 
said transfer may be made only after 
the Secretary of Defense consults 
with the chairmen and ranking 
members of the congressional 
defense committees; quarterly 
reports on the details of any 
obligation or transfer of funds from 
the Iraqi Security Forces; report on 
the supplemental and cost of war 
execution reports (Sec. 1512; 1515; 
1516; 1518)  
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Taiwan‐China Timeline (Event Number: 12)   
3/21/1996  A concurrent resolution expressing 
the sense of Congress regarding 
missile tests and military exercises 
by the People's Republic of China 
(H Con Res 148)   
1. The president should consult with 
the Congress regarding China’s 
missiles threat on Taiwan and 
appropriate response of US  
2. The president should reexamine 
the nature and quantity of defense 
articles enabling Taiwan to maintain 
sufficient self‐defense capability  
7/19/1992  To authorize the transfer of certain 
naval vessels to Taiwan (102‐322) 
HR 5412 
1. The Secretary of the Navy is 
authorized to lease the `KNOX' class 
frigates BREWTON (FF‐1086), ROBERT 
E. PEARY (FF‐1073), and KIRK (FF‐
1087) to the Coordination Council for 
North American Affairs 
2. The said authority will be expired 
two years after the enactment of this 
authorization  
10/30/1991  International Cooperation Act of 
1991 (HR 2508) Failed to agree on 
the conference report in House 
1. Sense of Congress: the future of 
Taiwan should be determined by 
peaceful means 
10/6/1992  Foreign Operations, Export 
Financing, and Related Programs 
Appropriations Act, 1993 (102‐391) 
HR 5368 
1. Anti‐tank shell may be sold to 
Taiwan if the president determines 
that to do is in the security interest of 
US (Sec. 551)  
7/28/1993  To authorize the transfer of naval 
vessels to certain foreign countries  
(103‐54) HR 2561 
1. The Secretary of the Navy is 
authorized to transfer to the 
Coordination Council for North 
American Affairs (which is the Taiwan 
instrumentality designated pursuant 
to section 10(a) of the Taiwan 
Relations Act) the auxiliary repair dry 
dock WINDSOR (ARD 22).  
2. The said authority will be expired 
two years after the enactment of this 
authorization  
9/30/1993  Foreign Operations, Export 
Financing, and Related Programs 
Appropriations Act, 1994 (103‐87) 
HR 2295 
1. Anti‐tank shell may be sold to 
Taiwan if the president determines 
that to do is in the security interest of 
US (Sec. 527)  
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12/2/1993  To authorize the leasing of naval 
vessels to certain foreign countries  
(103‐174) HR 3471  
1. To the Coordination Council for 
North American Affairs (which is the 
Taiwan instrumentality designated 
pursuant to section 10(a) of the 
Taiwan Relations Act), the `KNOX' 
class frigates JOSEPH HEWES (FFT 
1078), COOK (FF 1083), and BARBEY 
(FF 1088) 
2. The said authority will be expired 
two years after the enactment of this 
authorization  
4/30/1994  Foreign Relations Authorization 
Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995 
(103‐236) HR 2333 
1. Declaration of the Congress: The 
United States should take into 
account both the capabilities and 
intentions of the People's Republic of 
China with respect to the issue of 
Taiwan; The President should on a 
regular basis assess changes in the 
capabilities and intentions of the 
People's Republic of China and 
consider whether it is appropriate to 
adjust arms sales to Taiwan 
accordingly (Sec. 531)  
8/23/1994  Foreign Operations, Export 
Financing, and Related Programs 
Supplemental Appropriations Act, 
1994 (103‐306) HR 4426 
1. Anti‐tank shell may be sold to 
Taiwan if the president determines 
that to do is in the security interest of 
US (Sec. 527)  
10/5/1994  To express the sense of the Senate 
concerning United States relations 
with Taiwan (S Res 270) 
1. Sense of the Senate: urges the 
president to approve defensive arms 
sales to Taiwan based solely on 
Taiwan's self‐defense needs, without 
qualitative or quantitative 
restrictions 
2. Sense of the Senate: raise U.S. 
concerns about the People's Republic 
of China threat to forcefully reunify 
Taiwan and the People's Republic of 
China 
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10/19/1994  To authorize the leasing of naval 
vessels to certain foreign countries 
(103‐378) HR 5155 
1. The Secretary of the Navy is 
authorized to transfer to the Taipei 
Economic and Cultural 
Representative Office in the United 
States (which is the Taiwan 
instrumentality designated pursuant 
to section 10(a) of the Taiwan 
Relations Act) the `NEWPORT' class 
tank landing ships MANITOWOC (LST 
1180) and SUMTER (LST 1181) 
2. The said authority will be expired 
two years after the enactment of this 
authorization; the Secretary of 
Defense shall certify to the Congress 
before such transfer 
4/30/1996  Foreign Relations Authorization 
Act, Fiscal Years 1996 and 1997 (HR 
1561) Failed to override the 
presidential veto 
1. Section 3(a) and (b) of the Taiwan 
Relations Act (22 U.S.C. 3302) 
supersede to any provision of the 
Joint Communique of the United 
States and China of August 17, 1982 
8/15/1996  E.O. 13014  Maintaining unofficial relations with 
the people on Taiwan  
11/18/1997  National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 1998 (105‐85) HR 
1119  
1. To the Taipei Economic and 
Cultural Representative Office in the 
United States (the Taiwan 
instrumentality that is designated 
pursuant to section 10(a) of the 
Taiwan Relations Act), the following 
frigates of the KNOX class: 
(A) The WHIPPLE (FF 1062). 
(B) The DOWNES (FF 1070). (Sec. 
1025)  
7/10/1998 
7/20/1998 
Affirming the United States 
commitment to Taiwan  (S Con Res 
107 & H Con Res 301) 
1. Urges the President of the United 
States to seek a public renunciation 
by the People's Republic of China of 
any use of force, or threat to use 
force, against democratic Taiwan  
2. The president should reexamine 
the nature and quantity of defense 
articles enabling Taiwan to maintain 
sufficient self‐defense capability 
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10/17/1998  Department of Defense 
Appropriations Act, 1999 (105‐262) 
HR 4103   
1. Transfer to the Taipei Economic 
and Cultural Representative Office in 
the United States (the Taiwan 
instrumentality that is designated 
pursuant to section 10(a) of the 
Taiwan Relations Act)‐‐(A) the KNOX 
class frigates PEARY (FF 1073), 
JOSEPH HEWES (FF 1078), COOK (FF 
1083), BREWTON (FF 1086), KIRK (FF 
1987), and BARBEY (FF 1088); 
(B) the NEWPORT class tank landing 
ships MANITOWOC (LST 1180) and 
SUMTER (LST 1181); 
(C) the floating dry dock COMPETENT 
(AFDM 6); and (D) the ANCHORAGE 
class dock landing ship PENSACOLA 
(LSD 38).  (Sec. 8110)  
10/18/1999  Foreign Operations, Export 
Financing, and Related Programs 
Appropriations Act, 2000 (HR 2606) 
Vetoed 
1. The Secretary of State shall consult 
with the appropriate committees and 
leadership of Congress to devise a 
mechanism to provide for 
congressional input prior to making 
any determination on the nature or 
quantity of defense articles and 
services to be made available to 
Taiwan (Sec. 593)  
10/5/1999  National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2000 (106‐65) S 1059
 
Signing Statement: I am concerned 
with the tone and language of a 
number of provisions of S. 1059 
relating to China, which could be 
detrimental to our interests. China 
is undergoing a profoundly 
important but uncertain process of 
change, and I believe we must work 
for the best possible outcome, 
even as we prepare for any 
outcome. The Act's provision 
requiring annual reports on 
Chinese military power, similar to 
those previously produced on 
Soviet military power, assumes an 
outcome that is far from 
1. The Secretary of the Navy is 
authorized to transfer certain vessels 
to Taiwan (Sec. 1018)  
2. Annual report to the Congress on 
PRC’s military power regarding its 
strategy toward Taiwan (Sec. 1202)  
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foreordained—that China is bent 
on becoming a military threat to 
the United States. I believe we 
should not make it more likely that 
China will choose this path by 
acting as if the decision has already 
been made.  
Our long‐term strategy must be to 
encourage China to grow into a 
more prosperous and open society; 
to integrate China into the 
institutions that promote global 
norms on proliferation, trade, the 
environment, and human rights; to 
cooperate where we agree, even as 
we defend our interests and values 
with realism and candor where we 
do not. We cannot do that simply 
by confronting China or seeking to 
contain it. We can only do that if 
we maintain a policy of principled, 
purposeful engagement with 
China's government and China's 
people. 
I intend to implement the China 
provisions of the bill in a manner 
consistent with this policy, 
including, where appropriate, 
combining several of the reporting 
requirements. 
1/10/2001  Foreign Operations, Export 
Financing, and Related Programs 
Appropriations Act, 2002 (107‐115) 
HR 2506 
1. The president shall provide briefing 
and consult with the Congress 
regarding US’s security assistance to 
Taiwan (Sec. 573)  
12/28/2001  National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2002 (107‐107) S 
1438  
1. Authority to transfer naval vessels 
to Taiwan (Sec. 1002)  
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9/30/2002  Foreign Relations Authorization 
Act, Fiscal Year 2003 (107‐228) HR 
1646 
 
Signing Statement: Section 1206 
could be misconstrued to imply a 
change in the "one China" policy of 
the United States when, in fact, 
that U.S. policy remains 
unchanged. To the extent that this 
section could be read to purport to 
change United States policy, it 
impermissibly interferes with the 
President's constitutional authority 
to conduct the Nation's foreign 
affairs.  
1. Sense of Congress: resolution to 
Taiwan’s strait’s issues should be 
peaceful (Sec. 692)  
2. Taiwan shall be treated as though 
it were designated as non‐NATO 
major ally (Sec. 1206) 
3. The president shall provide briefing 
and consult with the Congress 
regarding US’s security assistance to 
Taiwan (Sec. 1263)  
4. Transfer certain naval vessels to 
Taiwan (Sec. 1701)  
12/2/2002  Bob Stump National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2003 (107‐314) HR 4546 
1. The president shall submit a report 
on the feasibility and advisability of 
conducting combined operational 
training with, and exchanges of 
general and flag officers between, 
the Armed Forces of the United 
States and the military forces of 
Taiwan (Sec. 1210)  
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Post‐first Iraqi War, Iraq’s Violation of UN Weapon Inspection and Operation Desert Fox 
Timeline (Event Number: 13) 
11/13/1997  Expressing the sense of the House 
that the United States should act to 
resolve the crisis with Iraq in a 
manner that assures full Iraqi 
compliance with United Nations 
Security Council resolutions 
regarding the destruction of Iraq's 
capability to produce and deliver 
weapons of mass destruction, and 
that peaceful and diplomatic efforts 
should be pursued, but that if such 
efforts fail, multilateral military 
action or unilateral United States 
military action should be taken (H 
Res 322) 
1. The House finds that Iraq has 
deliberately obstructed UNSCOM to 
inspect the production of WMD; the 
House urges the president to resolve 
the said crisis peacefully and multi‐
nationally. But US should unilaterally 
take military action if it is necessary 
to compel Iraq being complied with 
UN Security Council Resolutions 
8/14/1998  Finding the Government of Iraq in 
unacceptable and material breach of 
its international obligations (105‐
235) SJ Res 54 
1. The Congress finds that Iraq has 
materially breached its obligation 
with respect to chemical weapons 
inspections, nuclear devices, no‐fly 
zone 
2. The president is urged to take 
appropriate action to bring Iraq into 
compliance with its international 
obligations 
10/25/1999  Department of Defense 
Appropriations Act, 2000 (106‐79) 
HR 2561 
1. The Secretary of Defense shall 
submit a report to the Congress on 
the conduct of Operation Desert Fox 
(Sec. 8125)  
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11/16/1990  E.O. 12735  1. Proliferation of chemical and 
biological weapons constitutes an 
unusual and extraordinary threat to 
the national security and foreign 
policy of the United States and 
hereby declare a national 
emergency to deal with that threat 
2. Sanctions against foreign 
countries and authorizes the 
Secretary of State to determine 
which countries has used chemical 
weapons and violate the 
international law 
5/24/1991  A resolution commending the 
humanitarian relief efforts for Iraqi 
refugees (S Res 132) 
1. Sense of the Senate: supports the 
continuation of the benefits enacted 
by Congress for `Operation Desert 
Storm' to the participants of 
`Operation Provide Comfort' for the 
duration of that operation; the 
United States should respond 
immediately to the United Nation's 
appeal for increased assistance to 
the refugees  
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10/28/1991  Chemical and biological. Weapons 
Control and Warfare Elimination Act 
of 1991 (102‐138) HR 1415  
 
Signing Statement: Title V, Chemical 
and Biological Weapons (CBW), 
raises concerns with respect to both 
the President's control over 
negotiations with foreign 
governments and the possible 
disclosure of sensitive information; 
Other provisions that might be 
construed to require disclosure of 
the content of sensitive diplomatic 
communications, state secrets, or 
intelligence information will also be 
interpreted consistent with the 
President's responsibility to protect 
such information. See, e.g., sections 
506(b), and 508.  
 
 
11/16/1990 E.O.:  
1. Multilateral efforts to controls on 
chemical and biological weapons 
control as US policy (Sec. 503) 
2. Once the president receive 
persuasive information regarding a 
foreign country has made 
substantial preparation to use or has 
used chemical or biological 
weapons, the president shall 
determine whether that 
government has used such 
weapons; the chairman of the 
Committee on Foreign Relations of 
the Senate and House may at any 
time request the president to 
consider the said information (Sec. 
506)  
3. If the president determines that a 
foreign government has used such 
weapons, the presidential shall 
terminate assistance to that country 
except urgent humanitarian 
assistance and impose additional 
sanctions if certain conditions not 
met (Sec. 507)  
4. The president shall report to the 
Congress on the actions taken under 
this Act not later than 90 days after 
the enactment of this Act an d every 
12 months thereafter (Sec. 508)  
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12/5/1991  National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 (102‐
190) HR 2100 
1. Sense of Congress: Iraq's 
noncompliance with United Nations 
Security Council Resolution 687 
(unconditionally report on the 
locations of WMD) constitutes a 
continuing threat to the peace, 
security, and stability (Sec. 1095) 
2. Sense of Congress: the 
Government of Iraq, through its 
ongoing suppression of the political 
opposition, including Kurds and 
Shias, continues to violate the 
Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights and United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 688 (Sec. 1096)  
7/10/1992  NSD 70  US Nonproliferation Policy  
10/21/1992  E.O. 12817  Transfer certain Iraqi government 
assets held by domestic banks  
10/23/1992  Iran‐Iraq Arms Non‐Proliferation Act 
of 1992 (102‐484) HR 5006 
1. The president may provide 
assistance for UN Special 
Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) 
regarding non‐proliferation 
initiatives (Sec. 1505)  
2. The president shall apply 
sanctions against Iraq to control Iraq 
from acquiring WMD (Sec. 1602)  
3. The president shall submit an 
annual report on the action taken by 
the president regarding the said 
implementation (Sec. 1607)  
12/??/1993  PDD 18  Counter‐proliferation Initiative 
2/10/1996  National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 1996 (104‐106) S 
1124  (This act previously was HR 
1530 but vetoed by the president)  
1. The president shall apply 
sanctions against Iraq to control Iraq 
from acquiring WMD (Sec. 1408)  
3/27/1996  Expressing the sense of the House of 
Representatives concerning the 
eighth anniversary of the massacre 
of over 5,000 Kurds as a result of a 
gas bomb attack by the Iraqi 
government (H Res 379)  
1. Reaffirm the United States' 
commitment to protect and help the 
Kurdish people in Iraq 
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Post‐first Iraqi War, Iraq’s Violation of UN Weapon Inspection and Operation Desert Fox 
Timeline (Event Number: 13) 
9/23/1996  Defense Against Weapons of Mass 
Destruction Act of 1996 (104‐201) 
HR 3230 
1. In terms of the Iraq’s possession 
of WMD, the president shall 
cooperate with Russia a program to 
eliminate the production of 
weapons grade plutonium and 
report to the Congress on such plan 
no later than 180 days after the 
enactment of this Act (Sec. 1432)  
5/1/1998  1998 Supplemental Appropriations 
and Rescissions Act (105‐174) HR 
3579 
1. Sense of Congress: none of the 
funds may be made available for the 
conduct of offensive operations by 
United States Armed Forces against 
Iraq for the purpose of obtaining 
compliance by Iraq with United 
Nations Security Council Resolutions 
relating to inspection and 
destruction of weapons of mass 
destruction in Iraq unless such 
operations are specifically 
authorized by a law enacted after 
the date of the enactment of this 
Act (Sec. 17)  
10/17/1998  Strom Thurmond National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
1999 (105‐261) HR 3616 
1. Authorization of one year 
extension for support of UNSCOM 
(Sec. 1531)  
11/18/1997  National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 1998 (105‐85) HR 
1119  
1. Authorization of one year 
extension for support of UNSCOM 
(Sec. 1308) 
10/5/1999  National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2000 (106‐65) S 1059  
1. Authorization of one year 
extension for support of UNSCOM 
(Sec. 1505)  
10/30/2000  National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2001 (106‐398) HR 
4205  
1. Authorization of one year 
extension for support of UNSCOM 
(Sec. 1202) 
2. Sense of Congress: it is the policy 
of US to continuously commit to the 
protection Kurdish (Sec. 507)  
12/2/2002  Bob Stump National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2003 (107‐314) HR 4546  
1. Authorization of one year 
extension for support of UNSCOM 
(Sec. 1204) 
12/28/2001  National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2002 (107‐107) S 
1438 
1. Authorization of one year 
extension for support of UNSCOM 
(Sec. 1205) 
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APPENDIX N: 
SUDAN-AL QAIDA (TANZANIA AND KENYA EMBASSY BOMBING) 
TIMELINE (EVENT NUMBER: 14) 
Sudan‐al Qaida (Tanzania and Kenya Embassy bombing) Timeline (Event number 14)  
1/23/1995  E.O. 12947  1. Definition of terrorist 
2. Delegate authorization of 
designate foreign person as 
terrorist and blocked his 
property to the Secretary of 
Treasury  
6/21/1995  PDD 39: U.S. Policy on 
Counterterrorism 
1. US shall have the ability to 
respond rapidly and 
decisively to terrorism 
directed against us wherever 
it occurs, to protect 
Americans, arrest or defeat 
the perpetrators, respond 
with all appropriate 
instruments against the 
sponsoring organizations and 
governments and provide 
recovery relief to victims, as 
permitted by law.  
4/24/1996  Antiterrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act of 1996 
(104‐132)  S 735 
1. Congress’s finding: the 
president should use all 
necessary means, including 
covert action and military 
force, to disrupt, dismantle, 
and destroy international 
infrastructure used by 
international terrorists, 
including overseas terrorist 
training facilities and safe 
havens.  
8/20/1998  E.O. 13099  1. Osama bin Laden and al 
Qaida are added into the 
annex to E.O. 12947 as 
terrorists   
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APPENDIX O: 
ADDITIONAL TABLES FOR CHAPTER 4 
 
 
 
 
Appendix Table O.1. Number of Congressional Authorization or Regulation of 
Military Deployment Bills 
Event  No  Yes  Total 
Drug Trafficking  4  1  5 
First Iraqi War  6  3  9 
Somalia  10  2  12 
Panama  6  0  6 
Lebanon  1  1  2 
Bosnia  24  10  34 
Haiti  14  4  18 
Korea  29  2  31 
Kosovo  12  3  15 
Afghanistan  26  2  28 
Second Iraqi War  23  7  30 
Taiwan‐China Conflict  21  0  21 
Post‐first Iraqi War  15   2  17 
Sudan‐al Qaida  0  1  1 
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Appendix Table O.2. Number of Congressional Ex Ante Regulation in all 
Military Deployment Bills 
Event  No  Yes  Total 
Drug Trafficking  0  1  1 
First Iraqi War  0  3  3 
Somalia  1  1  2 
Lebanon  1  0  1 
Bosnia  6  4  10 
Haiti  4  0  4 
Korea  2  0  2 
Kosovo  0  3  3 
Afghanistan  1  1  2 
Second Iraqi War  6  1  7 
Taiwan‐China Conflict  0  0  0 
Post‐first Iraqi War  2  0  2 
Sudan‐al Qaida  0  1  1 
Total  23  15  38 
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Appendix Table O.3. Number of Congressional Ex Ante Regulation on Minor 
and Major Hostility Military Deployment Bills 
  Number of 
Congressional Ex Ante 
Regulation on Minor 
Hostility Military 
Deployment Bills 
  Number of 
Congressional Ex Ante 
Regulation on Major 
Hostility Military 
Deployment Bills 
 
Event  No  Yes  Total  No  Yes  Total 
Drug 
Trafficking 
0  1  1  0  0  0 
Somalia  0  1  1  1  0  1 
Lebanon  1  0  1  0  0  0 
Bosnia  2  0  2  4  4  8 
Haiti  2  0  2  2  0  2 
Korea  2  0  2  0  0  0 
Kosovo  0  1  1  0  2  2 
Second 
Iraqi War 
0  1  1  6  0  0 
Sudan‐al 
Qaida 
0  1  1  0  0  0 
Post‐first 
Iraqi War 
0  0  0  2  0  2 
Total  7  5  12  16  10  26 
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Appendix Table O.4. Interaction Terms Included for Discourse Quality of 
Constitutional Content and Congressional Participation Structures 
(ClosedRule/ Cloture x Political) 
Dependent Variable= MajorContent  
Non‐military Cases  Overall Cases 
LawCharacter  ‐0.804  
(‐1.49) 
‐0.711 
(‐1.52) 
HComHearing  ‐0.213 
(‐0.39) 
‐0.427 
(‐0.83) 
SComHearing  ‐0.049 
(‐0.08) 
‐0.113 
(‐0.19) 
ClosedRule  ‐0.429 
(‐1.15) 
‐0.581 
(‐1.74) 
Cloture  0.858** 
(2.34) 
0.87** 
(2.85) 
HCom  0.243* 
(1.88) 
0.289* 
(2.2) 
SCom   0.033 
(0.16) 
0.003 
(0.02) 
Time  ‐0.012 
(‐0.17) 
‐0.033 
(‐0.5) 
DividedGov  ‐1.193 
(‐1.61) 
‐0.935 
(‐1.08) 
Election  0.546* 
(1.69) 
0.406 
(1.59) 
Approval  0.146 
(0.11) 
0.281 
(0.2) 
PercentParty  ‐6.993 
(‐1.01) 
‐4.881 
(‐0.75) 
ClosedRule X Political  2.04 
(0.53) 
0.95 
(0.28) 
Cloture X Political   ‐5.818** 
(‐2.02) 
‐7.181** 
(‐2.53) 
Constant   3.976 
(1.15) 
2.554 
(0.8) 
N  191  229 
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